An intrastate conflict between ethnic-national-religious identity communities – one whose focus is each one’s aspiration to make its mark on the nature of the state and its character – positions the state’s decision makers before a difficult deliberation in shaping immigration policy, if they wish to adhere to liberal principles. The policy dilemma is exacerbated when the government also faces a certain tension: on one hand, the country has a duty to protect the rights of its citizens to bring a foreign partner with whom they wish to start a family into its gates; on the other, the state may be concerned that giving a sweeping permit for the entry of marriage immigrants will accelerate the process of eroding the majority’s demographic advantage and have negative political ramifications.
Against the backdrop of this dilemma, the article discusses the question of justifying the integration of demographic considerations in immigration policy for divided countries, focusing on Israel as a test case.

The dramatic events named “Arab Spring” resulted from the popular uprising against authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East and led to the toppling of rulers in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Thus, astonishingly, the long-standing aspirations of Islamist factions wanting democracy, economic equality, and the elimination of corruption were realized in the blink of an eye. Though it is unclear what the character of these new regimes in the Arab world will be – authoritarian as in the past, democratic, or Islamist – it appears most likely that the latter will take the reins.
The response of the European Union and its member states to the dramatic events is puzzling; for decades, partnerships existed with the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and friendly relations prevailed – though this policy ostensibly conflicted with the central European values as it ignored the denial of democracy in the Middle East. Now, with the outbreak of the “Arab Spring,” Europe’s leaders have turned their backs on the “friendly” regimes and enthusiastically supported their opponents – in political declarations, in official policy, and in physical involvement – despite the real concerns that Islamist forces can reap the benefits of the revolution. This turning point in Europe’s policy raises many questions and concerns.
The article analyzes the considerations that shaped European policy toward the Muslim world in light of Europe’s vital interests, which include curbing a massive flow of Muslim immigration; averting violent responses on the part of Muslim minorities in Europe; reducing the influence of radical and fundamentalist Islam in the Middle East amongst Muslim immigrant minorities; and securing energy resources. These are permanent and continuing interests; preserving them is one of the cornerstones of European policy. These interests and their foundations can account for the profound reversal in attitude regarding recent events in the Middle East – it is an outgrowth of a calculated risk and a lack of alternatives.
Finally, questions about the State of Israel’s status arise: Does Israel face growing danger as a result of “Arab Spring”? There is a perilous possibility that Islamist forces will take control; how is it reconciled with the chance that the events will lead to progress in peace processes in the Arab world? Future European policy toward Israel is also called into question in light of the uncertainty about the region’s future.

Conducting research in conflict environments is generally an immense challenge, given the many sensitivities and the atmosphere of suspicion that usually characterizes the research population. Nonetheless, the methodological aspects of fieldwork in environments of conflict have not yet been systematically researched. Using a survey and examination of the primary methodological problems we suggest employing snowball sampling in order to deal with this challenge. The efficacy of this method has been recognized as significant in the literature in a variety of cases, primarily those focused on “marginal” populations, which tend to be hidden and hard to access for research purposes. However, we assert that in a conflict environment the entire population becomes, to an extent, a “marginal society,” going underground and therefore becoming difficult for the external researcher to access. The method’s efficiency under these conditions makes it possible to conduct research under the constraints of a conflict environment, minimizing the prospects of researchers admitting defeat before even embarking on a study. We share our experiences of fieldwork in varied conflict environments and provide a number of insights and recommendations for employing snowball sampling.

The two philosophers of social contract base all their deliberations on two fundamentals: scientific methodology on the one hand, and proof from the holy scriptures in accordance with political Hebraism on the other hand. Both philosophers begin with the fact that man was created in the image of God. Both recognize natural equality amongst human beings and both base themselves on ethical axioms – natural laws – which originate in God. However, there are significant differences between them: Hobbes perceives man as renouncing God and His eternal commandments, expressed both in original sin and in Cain’s murder of his brother. In contrast, Locke perceives man as good, complying with God’s commandments. Similarly, in their descriptions establishing the social contract and the creation of a political community, both theorists link scientific methodology – the theoretical model – to the words of the Bible, using it as a sort of historical-empirical foundation.
Hobbes perceives the establishment of a state as the product of man’s original sin, in which his nature was spoiled. Therefore, the rational fear of God’s latent power must be replaced with the instinctive fear of the exposed strength of the “Leviathan” (the mythological biblical creature), the absolute state, which is an alternative to God. Locke, in contrast, perceives man as good. Furthermore, Hobbes presents the state, the “Leviathan,” as a new God. He bases his perception regarding the authority of an absolute monarch on the rules given to kings in the Book of Samuel and on Israel’s leaders in the Bible. He compares the obedience that the Ten Commandments require of human beings to the obedience that a king demands from his subjects. Locke, in contrast, is a protagonist of limited governance, and likens the contract between the king and his nation to the covenant between God and Noah. He interprets a passage about the Hebrew slave whose work is limited in order to bolster his position on the holiness of freedom. Hobbes relates to the “Kingdom of God” as an ideal governmental model that expresses rule by agreement, the rule of reason and morality. Thus, original sin is connected with the sin of rebelling against God in Samuel’s days.
Locke also chooses to present the theocratic government of Israel, which is presented in the Bible as an ideal unique government because of (and despite) the fact that it is an antithesis to his liberal perception. Through his determination that only the people of Israel were chosen by God, and that therefore God functions as a political leader only in the land of Israel, he precludes any possibility of drawing conclusions from the characteristics of this regime for modern politics. In fact, my analysis of these philosophers’ writings suggests that there is a developmental process leading from religious political philosophy to modern political philosophy.

As is the case in most parliamentary democracies, the Knesset – the Israeli parliament – may be dissolved prior to the end of its constitutional legislative term. On one hand, this institutional tool brings a degree of uncertainty to the political system and can undermine the government’s stability and steering capacity; on the other, there are political circumstances under which dissolving a parliament and moving up elections can bring the political system out of a stalemate and help crystallize a different parliamentary majority, creating a new and more stable government. This article attempts to examine the case of Israel; more specifically, it assesses whether the shortcomings of early dissolution exceed its advantages, especially given the claims that the Knesset wields excessive authority to decide on an early dissolution. The first section of the article surveys the mechanisms through which the Knesset and other parliaments in parliamentary democracies can be dissolved. We subsequently analyze the end of the terms of the seventeen Knessets between 1949 and 2009. The findings indicate that in the past fifteen years, significant changes have taken place in the ways in which the Knesset has been dissolved. Contrary to the claims, these changes have actually balanced the relationship between authorities in a way that reinforced the standing of the government and prime minister vis-à-vis the Knesset. Moreover, in contrast with the general impression, in most cases the Knesset acted as the “responsible adult” and made measured and wise use of its self-dissolving authority.

Abstract

This paper considers the role of apologies in the promotion of order in the international arena. It will introduce the following claims: first, that ethical issues, particularly the subject of dealing with moral wrongs through apologies, are an important part of the greater discussion of world and international orders; and second, that the strategy of dealing with a past transgression through an apology contributes to the realization of stable order. The main argument of this paper is that apology and forgiveness undertaken by international actors, even though not legally obligating, facilitate the maintenance of order. Although the legal aspects of world order and international order are prominent, they do not alone indicate the internalization of order and its values by actors. Common social "unwritten rules” accompany these legal obligations. Extensive compliance to these rules by actors is a valid sign of order. Apology and forgiveness can be seen as such rules: as social ordering principals.

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Abstract

Since the 1940's Britain's transatlantic identity has been one of its most prominent features. This identity has been so profoundly internalized that one often forgets Britain's "zigzagging" between three alternative and even contradictory identities after World War II: 1. A Third World Force aimed at creating a bridge between East and West 2. A European civilization 3. A transatlantic identity 
I account for these variations in British identity by presenting the theoretical concept of identity balancing which postulates that states manipulate their identities in order to fulfill materialistic interests. Identity balancing is a four-phase process: 1. States identify a threat to their physical security and locate other states that are similarly threatened 2. The threatened states emphasize identity characteristics which unite them and downplay those that separate them 3. They frame the common characteristics as being crucial for their continued existence and as requiring cooperation among all states with similar identity characteristics 4.this utilitarian identity becomes so deeply integrated that it transcends its original purpose, becoming an inherent factor within the fabric of society. 
Applying the concept of identity balancing I explain the shift in Britain’s identity as deriving from a shift in its security interests. After World War II, Britain believed that its interests would be best served by forming an independent pole and therefore emphasized the difference between its identity and that of its wartime allies. As the British economy deteriorated and the Soviet geo-strategic menace escalated, Britain realized that it needed American support. Since the US conditioned its support on a consolidated Europe, Britain sought to "invent” a common European identity. Once it realized that a European identity circle enabled the US to evade its commitment to Europe, it reverted to the strategy of forming close relations with the US, emphasizing the transatlantic identity dimensions common to both countries.

Abstract

This study examines the triangular relations between the United States, the European Union and MERCOSUR as a case of soft balancing against the hegemon in the post Cold War international system. Most existing literature focuses on the relations between the hegemon and the other great powers (i.e. secondary powers) and on hard balancing and the use of power and force as a means to restrain the hegemonic power. The present research offers, therefore, a twofold contribution; a theoretical framework and an empirical analysis which examines the relationship between three levels of power: the hegemon, a secondary power, and a tertiary power.

The study traces both the US-MERCOUSR relations and the EU-MERCOSUR relations in four subsequent periods, between the years 1991- 2006. In this way I attempt to show that the greater the US involvement and attempts to influence economic and political structures in the region, the more the secondary and tertiary powers – the EU and MERCOSUR – cooperate in order to strengthen their global and regional position, respectively, and weaken the hegemonic endeavor.

Following a careful analysis of the developments during the period of study I have established that the EU-MERCOSUR relationship should be considered a form of soft-balancing the hegemon. The EU challenged the American initiative of the FTAA and succeeded in influencing the events of the Western Hemisphere by supporting MERCOSUR politically and economically, holding bilateral meetings in response to the FTAA meetings and offering MERCOSUR a better FTA agreement, and strengthening MERCOSUR’s bargaining position in the FTAA talks. The result is that the FTAA negotiations are stalled and MERCOSUR is the only integration or group of states in the American continent that did not sign a free trade agreement with the US.

This case study shows, I believe, that using political, economic and diplomatic means and strengthening ties with tertiary powers can be fairly successful in soft-balancing the hegemon. Furthermore, applying this to different cases of triadic relationships can provide a useful comparative understanding of the conditions under which soft power is more or less affective.

Abstract

The spread and intensification of the phenomenon of terror in the twenty-first century has changed the modern battlefield. One of the main phenomena contributing to this change is the manner in which terror blurs the distinction between combatants and civilians. The center of gravity has shifted from the clear distinction between civilians and combatants to more subtle distinctions, where civilians undertake various activities—from information gathering for and logistical support of the combat forces to morally supporting them—giving them a central role. This paper presents and analyzes the assertion that the change which terror has created on the battlefield justifies an alteration in the attitude toward the various participants on the battlefield. My argument is that this shift in attitude involves, inter alia, the influence of human rights law on humanitarian law, and I demonstrate the practical significance of this influence on how we react to the players on the battlefield: combatants, civilians, as well as civilians who participate (directly or indirectly) in combat.