

*Project on Managing Political Disputes*

*Practicing Conflict  
Resolution in  
Divided Societies*

Selected and edited proceedings of a workshop  
held on December 14, 1992 at the Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem

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The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Leonard Davis Institute.

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# Introduction

In December 1993 the Project on Managing Political Disputes brought together a group of theorists and practitioners from Israel and abroad who are active in the field of ethnic conflict and conflict resolution. They were given the opportunity both to describe the activities in which they are involved and to share their insights about them.

It was a rich and rewarding conference for the forty or so who were invited to take part and we are pleased that due to the continued generous support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation we have been able to publish this booklet and so to make the content of our discussions available to a wider audience.

Our goal in the conference was to generate synergy and through creative interaction to help pool the growing body of intellectual and practical resources available for peacemaking. Many people in many parts of the world are laboring to contribute positively to the resolution of the devastating ethnic conflicts that currently plague our globe. Unfortunately, however, there are few opportunities for these peace-workers to share their methods, stories and experiences with each other (although happily several international networks are currently being established — among them the Ethnic Studies Network in Northern Ireland, the trainers network organised by International Alert in London, and the Interactive Conflict Resolution Network in North America — which will hopefully help to fill this gap).

By coming together from many parts of the world where intense ethnic conflict rages, and sharing our conflict resolution work with each other this conference provided one such forum for pooling the growing body of intellectual and practical resources for peacemaking. From Northern Ireland came Dr. Mari Fitzduff, founder and director of the Community Relations Council. Her paper describes the wide-ranging work of this organisation, conceptually, organisationally and practically. Dr. Juan Gutierrez of the Guernica Peace

Centre joined us to provide a hands-on presentation of his training (for which no formal paper is presented and which is therefore not included in this booklet). Dr. Paula Gutlove, Director of the Balkan Peace Project, came from Boston to summarize and illustrate the work which she and her colleagues are currently conducting in the former Yugoslavia, while Ms. Karen Medzinski of the Independent Mediation service of South Africa talked about the training program which she directs.

Closer at hand Dr. Ali Qliebo, a Palestinian anthropologist living in Jerusalem, spoke about indigenous methods of conflict resolution which are in use in his society, while Mr. Avi Melamed, Assistant Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Jerusalem Municipality, described his involvement in efforts to resolve conflict within Jerusalem. I myself described the theoretical and practical aspects of the work the Project on Managing Political Disputes is doing with Arabs and Jews.

Following the presentation of papers and discussion about them participants in the conference attempted to draw from the variety of experience described and presented ideas and concepts which are relevant to conflict resolution in Israel. The idea of creating in Israel a formal structure for encouraging research and training in conflict resolution and for providing mediation services was discussed in a very positive fashion.

As witnessed by this edited version of the conference proceedings, this gathering was a rich and fruitful one. It added to the practical and theoretical experience of the participants and will, we hope, make a modest contribution to the growth and development of conflict resolution theory and practice in a war-torn world.

Dr. Jay Rothman  
July 1993

# **Bringing Conflict Resolution to Israel Model-Building, Training and Institutionalization**

**JAY ROTHMAN**

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Over the past couple decades the field of conflict resolution, built largely upon prior work in peace studies and peace science combined with applications derived largely from industrial relations, has flourished in the United States and Western Europe. Bringing the concepts and skills known under the heading of conflict resolution to bear on ethnic conflicts in other parts of the world is not a simple matter of transfer. Just as development professionals have increasingly learned that third world development must be "appropriate" or it can do more harm than good, so figuring out what concepts and skills to apply and how to adapt them to specific places and contexts beyond the West is a delicate and labor intensive process.

This paper describes a six-year process designed to transfer and adapt conflict resolution for practical use in Israel. While the bulk of this process has been through training and model-building, the goal is to see it applied. However, efforts to see it used to tackle conflicts in the country have been restricted by the lack of an adequate institutional framework able to support a sustained intervention and follow-up effort. Thus it has become apparent that to apply conflict resolution in Israel, there is a clear need to institutionalize and professionalize it.

The first step in this six year journey was to adapt state of the art conflict resolution theories e.g. of Azar, Burton, Fisher and Ury, and Kelman, for presentation to, and training of, Arab and Jewish student leaders at Hebrew

University. This resulted in the development of a training and intervention methodology that was further refined over a three year project for training diplomats in pre-negotiation (Rothman, 1992). The methodology, which will be described in detail in this paper, was developed through an iterative process of model-building, engaging in training, getting feedback from participants in our training workshops, refining the model and engaging in further training. With a systematic conflict resolution methodology in hand, the last couple years has led to a search for ways in which to move beyond training and education into implementation of conflict resolution "in the field." This in its turn has led to concern with establishing institutional frameworks for promoting conflict resolution in Israel.

## METHODOLOGY

My principal academic and practical concern has been with finding peaceful ways to resolve protracted ethnic conflicts. Thus, building on the work of many other scholars and practitioners, I have tried to develop a systematic process whereby parties locked in deep and protracted conflict can begin to frame their problems in common, generate confidence that cooperative problem solving is possible, and structure plans and agendas for peace-building.

A fundamental precondition for resolving any conflict lies in getting disputants to see the value of engaging in constructive dialogue with each other and exploring cooperative solutions. However, when conflict is deeply entrenched — as is regularly the case in ethnic conflict — conditions that would lead parties to explore these avenues are often absent, or appear to be so. Conflicting parties are commonly hampered by the belief that the sole basis for resolving intense conflict is through conquest, or through mutual concession where parties give up a little in order to gain a little. The dispute is "settled" when one side gains the resources it seeks at another's expense, or the conflicting sides find a way to compromise and divide the resources at stake.

The compromise approach may be satisfactory when conflicts are over easily divisible resources which have little symbolic significance. However, parties who have been engaged in protracted conflict, as is the case in many



ethnic or national disputes, often perceive their fundamental sense of self and collective identity to be at stake (Azar, 1990). When control over resources is linked to these concerns, the "giving up" aspect of compromise often looms larger than the "gaining" component.

In ethnic and other protracted conflicts the very act of recognizing the legitimacy of one's opponents is often viewed as invalidating one's own concerns and claims (Kelman, 1987). Thus, before parties can imagine that mutual solutions are possible it is first necessary to shift their perception of conflict management from that of zero-sum ("the more the other side gains, the more I lose") to one which is potentially positive-sum ("the more the other side gains, the more I may gain as well").

#### A PRE-NEGOTIATION METHODOLOGY — FRAMING, INVENTING, STRUCTURING

A great deal of preparatory work is necessary to facilitate recognition by the parties that they potentially have more to gain than to lose by working with their adversaries to resolve their conflicts. The model of systematic preparation presented here is based on the premise that frustrated or threatened social needs are a central aspect of protracted conflict. Unlike tangible resources, these needs (i.e., identity, control, communal continuity, security, and survival) cannot be reduced or divided (Burton, 1990). Moreover, these needs are shaped by a host of underlying factors such as the values, history, and culture of parties in conflict.

Using this model, the emphasis is shifted away from exclusive focus on power and control of tangible resources to the underlying threats, fears, traumas, values, and aspirations of the parties engaged in conflict. Adversaries are helped to prepare for subsequent problem-solving and negotiation by engaging in a process involving three sequential phases:

i. *Framing* — the process by which parties derive shared definitions about the parameters of their conflict, thus building a *will-to-cooperate*.

ii. *Inventing* — the creation of cooperative options for addressing central aspects of the conflict, thus fostering a *confidence-to-cooperate*.

iii. *Structuring*—based on insights from framing and inventing, parties jointly decide on the content and procedure of subsequent formal problem-solving and negotiations, thus encouraging a *momentum-to-cooperate*.

## FRAMING

How parties define their conflict, what they choose to emphasize, greatly influences how they go about trying to solve it. Pre-negotiation is concerned with how parties regularly frame their conflicts. It is designed to help parties make their frames explicit. Then it seeks to help parties reframe their conflicts so that adversaries may frame a common definition of the conflict and thus begin to set a common agenda for problem solving or negotiation. In this section I will describe what framing is about and why it is important.

Parties locked in conflict regularly frame it in adversarial terms (Rothman, 1992, 1989). Participants tend to blame the conflict on the other side and therefore are more focused on winning than on resolving the conflict. In a typical conflict frame, participants attribute their own behavior to situational factors (i.e., “we have to build weapons because we are being threatened by our neighbors”) whereas the behavior of the enemy or outgroup is attributed to dispositional factors (i.e., “they build weapons because they are an aggressive, evil nation bent on destroying us”).

The prevalence of negative frames about conflict is derived in large measure from past experiences and common assumptions that parties hold about conflict and each other. Those who framed US-Soviet relations during the Cold War as a battle between the forces of good and evil were bound to develop different ideas about appropriate ways to manage the conflict than those who framed the conflict as motivated by such factors as insecurity and domestic considerations.

As parties analytically explore their frames, they may discover more positive ways of viewing their conflict. A carefully guided framing process in which disputants engage in analytical discussion, with the support of a panel of professional third parties, contributes to this phenomenon. Such discussions are designed to help conflicting parties find ways to stop viewing every

interaction with their adversaries as a competitive bargaining session. Instead, creative analysis and discussion are facilitated by the creation of a confidential, noncommittal, and informal environment for mutual exploration of various conflict frames.

In this model, systematic conflict framing encourages parties to articulate their own needs and values. By making their deep concerns known to each other, in a private and "off-the-record" context, parties learn about the more profound motivations of their opponents, which may overlap with their own. In the end of a successful framing process, parties will move from an adversarial to integrative conceptualization and articulation of their conflicts.

### *Summary: Framing*

**Description:** Designed to help parties articulate their normal, positional and regularly adversarial conflict frames and gain alternative and cooperative frames regarding overlapping interests and needs between adversaries.

**Why important:** because shared conflict frames are necessary to promote cooperative problem-solving and negotiation.

**Advantage:** enables parties to work in concert instead of in opposition to address their problem.

**Goal:** to foster common definitions of conflict among adversaries, and promote greater will-to-peace between them.

## INVENTING

Inventing is the process of creating cooperative strategies for solving central aspects of the conflict once it has been framed in common by both parties. The two parties must now go forward to build up confidence-in-negotiation and the belief that problem solving together will be positive. Having engendered a will to solve shared problems such as economic development, political participation, violence and so forth, cooperatively, this will must be made concrete through confidence that cooperative problem solving will lead to more benefits than

sacrifices. Conflict management and diplomacy are regularly, and often wrong-headedly, viewed as unilateral efforts for maximizing gains at the other side's expense, leading to zero-sum outcomes. Thus, for parties to venture into negotiation they must believe they have a good chance of "winning." One way for parties to build confidence that negotiation will not lead to unacceptable losses is to reconceptualize the nature of winning in a way that does not necessarily leave "losers" in its wake. Such positive-sum results are also popularly called "win-win" solutions.

The way such "win-win" outcomes are commonly, albeit mistakenly, sought is initially through a compromise approach, where parties give up a little in order to gain a little more. This may be satisfactory when conflicts are over easily divisible interests (e.g., money, rent, real estate), and it is often imperative when parties' positions are unbridgeable. However, when deeply held values and needs are at stake that are not readily divisible, if at all (e.g., identity, meaning, safety), a deeper level of reconciliation must first be fostered. In other words, compromise is the last step on the way to peacemaking, not, as is usually perceived, the first step.

If negotiation in situations of protracted conflict is seen as primarily about compromise then it is often viewed quite unfavorably by disputants locked in existential conflicts. This helps to explain, at least in part, why it is so difficult to arrange negotiations in situations where they are sorely needed. Moreover, if negotiation does occur and a solution is reached through sacrifices that one side ultimately deems unacceptable, there will be new outbursts of conflict. One way that theorists have attempted to overcome this problem is to distinguish between apparent and underlying concerns (Fisher and Ury, 1978).

If positive-sum solutions are not attained through compromise, what methods are available? One approach that is relatively unknown in the international arena, but quite well developed theoretically and practically in industrial relations, is the integrative approach. This approach was first formulated by Mary Parker Follett (1940), referring to strategies and options by which parties can cooperatively solve their conflicts with each other. "There are three main ways of dealing with conflict," wrote Follett, "domination, compromise, and integration. Domination, obviously, is a victory of one side

over the other . . . . Compromise [occurs when] each side gives up a little in order to have peace . . . . [Integration occurs when] a solution has been found in which both desires have found a place, [such] that neither side has to sacrifice anything.” We would add that integration is necessary where neither side will sacrifice anything that it really needs; integration thus enables parties to work together to fulfill their own needs without undermining those of the other. Follett (pp. 11) gives a simple illustration of the integrative approach:

In the Harvard Library one day, in one of the smaller rooms, someone wanted the window open, I wanted it shut. We opened the window in the next room, where no one was sitting. This was not a compromise, because there was no curtailing of desire; we both got what we really wanted. For I did not want a closed room, I simply did not want that particular window open, he merely wanted more air in the room.

To the extent that parties continue to frame their conflicts in terms of opposing positions — open the window or close it — domination strategies resulting in winners and losers are inevitable. Once parties delve into the underlying interests at stake in their conflicts, not only do they regularly refuse compromise at the outset, they also often discover overlapping concerns for which integrative approaches are more useful than distributive ones, at least to begin with. As will be illustrated below, when workshop participants are instructed to use “integrative techniques” they regularly generate approaches where both sides “win,” thus building up confidence that negotiations, which could lead to such outcomes, are useful.

Having generated integrative solutions in a conflict at the level of interests, participants in an “inventing” process then engage in “reality testing” of the extent to which such solutions will indeed meet the needs that have earlier been determined as underlying the parties’ interests. Thus, this approach to integrative problem solving focuses primarily on interests, with needs serving as a litmus test of feasibility. To use the window analogy, the Israelis needs to feel safe from the Palestinians, not to rule them. The

Palestinians need self-government; they do not need to threaten the Israelis. The needs are not in conflict and a “win-win” solution is possible.

Integrative strategies require cooperation between parties. Sometimes cooperation will demand that parties give up something in order to gain something else. For this to lead to integrative outcomes, the giving up must be based on mutual agreement, and not unilateral action. That parties are “in this together” is perhaps the main characteristic of integrative solutions. Cooperation does not necessarily mean that everyone gets everything they want; rather, that mutual adjustments and concessions are made with a view toward maximizing the fulfillment of underlying interests and needs of all parties. Instead of asking “How can I maximize my gains and minimize my losses?” as in classical preparations for negotiation, or in actual negotiation, parties ask “How can all sides maximize our gains and agree on mutual accommodations, such that our gains can be assured?”

To summarize, inventing is the process whereby integrative approaches are employed for designing possible solutions to a conflict. In this way confidence is fostered that negotiations are worth undertaking. Moreover, this approach also seeks to foster agreements that last. It seeks to help overcome the dilemma that often arises when parties are forced, through distributive techniques, into concessions which they do not genuinely wish to make. In such cases the “winners” may not retain their “spoils” for very long because the “losers” are not content with what they have achieved through the negotiation.

### *Summary: Inventing*

Description: design of mutually beneficial solutions to shared problems through integrative techniques.

Why important: because it shows disputants that their self-interest can be fulfilled through cooperation with their opponents.

Advantage: helps parties gain confidence that their respective needs and interests can be fulfilled through cooperation with the other side, instead of through domination or compromise.

Goal: to determine overlapping interests which meet essential needs and can be utilized in cooperatively designing concrete solutions.

## STRUCTURING THE CONTENT AND PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION

Structuring will be based on insights from framing and inventing, such that parties will make joint decisions about the variables that must be addressed in setting the table for formal negotiation and building a momentum-of-negotiation.

One of the problems of modern diplomacy is that it often puts process before content. If parties can only be brought to the table, by promises and threats if need be, the momentum of the "peace process" is expected to work wonders. In an apt description, a former director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry decried the approach being used to the peace process in 1990:

Instead of investing expensive political capital in unproductive diplomatic wrangling to convene preliminary talks on procedural steps for the discussion of modalities of elections designed to lead to negotiations on provisional arrangements, the parties and powers — and, in particular, peace — would be much better served by a major effort on their part to tackle directly the core issues of the conflict (Rafael, 1990, pp. 4).

The third phase of pre-negotiation, structuring, is designed to set the order right and place content before process. Based on substantive discoveries about parties' needs and interests derived during conflict-framing efforts, and generation of integrative solution options during inventing efforts, parties can then attempt to specify what will be on and off the agenda of upcoming negotiations. In traditional preparations for negotiation, detailed agenda-setting discussions are regularly left until the actual start of formal negotiations. This often leads to negotiations coming to an end before they really begin. If agreements about what will be discussed can be reached during pre-negotiation, the likelihood of successful negotiations should improve significantly. Instead

of jockeying for advantage over each other at the starting line, parties could devote their energies to coordinating substantive discussions. Thus, for instance, parties could spend precious negotiating time figuring out what agreements reached in principle and integrative options generated during prior stages are indeed politically feasible and how they could be implemented; what solutions should be packaged together to add to such feasibility; and what painful compromises must be made to ensure that these other "integrative" gains are sustained.

Following decisions about substantive issues, parties then try to reach agreements about various procedural issues. These include time and venue for negotiations; selection of participants who must be present to address the substantive issues on the agenda and who could later implement agreements; and the need for third parties and, if so, what type (adjudicator, mediator, facilitator, etc.).

### *Summary: Structuring*

Description: designing a structure (including process, agenda, venue, participants and so forth), to further develop, package and implement the various problem solving options developed in the inventing phase.

Why important: because a momentum for problem-solving and negotiation is built by forging mutual prior agreement on procedural variables between parties.

Advantage: based on consensus and agreement instead of unilateral decisions, or external imposition.

Goal: to mutually structure short-term, intermediate, and long-term processes and steps in the cooperative process.



## PRACTICAL ACTIVITY

In 1987 I came to Israel to undertake a dissertation drawing on the problem solving workshop approach to conflict resolution (Burton, 1969, Azar, 1990, Kelman, 1987), to design and conduct a training program for young Arab and Jewish student leaders at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. During this project 24 young leaders were trained in conflict resolution. In the ensuing years a systematic training and intervention methodology has been developed and employed for introducing conflict resolution theories and practices to hundred of Israelis (Jews and Arabs), Palestinians, academics, students and diplomats from around the world. Developmental research and testing have occurred within the framework of the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at Hebrew University, with the support of various foundations, and currently by the Konrad Adenauer foundation. The unifying thread across the three projects (student training, Project on Pre-Negotiation and the current Project on 'Managing Political Disputes') has been how conflict resolution may be effectively developed and applied in the Israeli context. In these projects, we have conducted basic research, developed theories, and carried out a series of courses and training programs for university students, young Arab and Jewish Israelis, community leaders, politicians and diplomats. This research has been primarily developmental. We have now arrived at the point in which we are confident that we have a well organized and structured approach that could be used to launch a broad and deep Israeli political dispute management program.

Our current project entitled 'Managing Political Disputes,' combines a training and intervention program with a research component. To further refine our method (Rothman, 1992a) and begin to apply it into every day life and problems between Arabs and Jews in and around Israel, we have initiated a series of workshops with leaders and policy makers drawn from four target areas:

### *Year One (1990/91): Grass Roots Leadership:*

Israel is constituted of a dizzying array of groups and sub-groups. Building political peace between them through the policy making process is a daunting

effort. However, many citizens groups exist both to promote their own interests and to promote better understanding and cooperation amongst them. Using our methodology (described previously), we have run a series of training seminars for leaders in a wide variety of citizen action groups in Israel.

#### *Year Two (1991/92): Arab-Jewish Problem Solving*

Having developed a systematic model for training Arabs and Jews in problem solving and conflict resolution concepts and practices, the next stage in our project was moving from training into intervention. Thus, we have run workshops designed to have a practical impact upon conflicts between Jewish and Arab communities in Israel, by training a wide variety of professionals and community leaders. Our main training activity consisted of a ten week training course for professionals with an emphasis on intervention. We also held a "re-union" workshop in which 35 "graduates" (out of several hundred) from our previous courses, conducted over the past 5 years, returned to take stock of the value of their training and how they were using it and explore the question of how to further institutionalize conflict resolution in Israel.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Year Three (1993): Jerusalem*

Regardless of future political arrangements over Jerusalem, Jews and Arabs are destined to live in the city side by side in one political form or another. In this project foundations will be laid for future joint policy making and cooperation between the communities. Joint teams of Israeli and Palestinian experts and analysts will work together to envision ways of cooperatively addressing five specific functional, bilateral problems in Jerusalem: public safety, city infrastructure, economic development, education and culture. The methodology described previously will be employed in guiding the teams to work cooperatively and effectively together. One envisioned result will be a policy-relevant book tentatively entitled: *Pieces of Peace in the City of Peace: Israelis and Palestinians Jointly Address Practical Problems of Jerusalem.*

*Year Four (1994) Regional Cooperation: Israel — Egypt*

Over the decade plus since peace was signed between Israel and Egypt millions of dollars have been spent on cooperative development projects between the two countries. Some have born fruit and some have been unsuccessful. We will examine conditions of success and possible reasons for failure; we will then convene policy makers from both countries to explore the launching of new cooperative projects (i.e., tourism promoticon; academic exchanges; scientific research; economic joint ventures).

**CONFLICT RESOLUTION INSTITUTION BUILDING**

We have labored for over six years to bring the theories and practices of conflict resolution, as they have evolved primarily in the West, to Israel and adapt them through use (mainly in the form of education and training) "in the field." It has become apparent during this time that a larger effort in the form of full institutional presence, must be established for conflict resolution to fully take root here and begin to fulfill its practical potential within Israel and between Israel and her neighbors. This has become obvious for several reasons. While six years ago such an idea seemed far fetched and support for such an idea very limited, today significant local and international support for institutionalizing conflict resolution in Israel is easily discerned.

For conflict resolution to become an available and viable presence in Israel and between Israel and her neighbors, it must prove its worth via practical and visible results. However, our modest efforts to move beyond training and education have basically been stymied by the lack of sustained institutional support for such applied work. Organizing workshops with "real actors" is extraordinarily labor intensive. Moreover, to move from workshops with such actors to implementation in the field and/or policy making requires a great deal of follow up which to date has been impossible given lack of an institutional framework for such a purpose.

Last spring, 1992, in support of promoting conflict resolution in Israel, 35 "trainees" came to a weekend "re-union" conference (as briefly described previously) and with a great deal of enthusiasm discussed ways to help

promote the idea and practice of conflict resolution in Israel. Six areas were explored: program development, education and training for trainers, fund raising, public relations, research and writing, and a broad category of setting up a conflict resolution institute or center.

The participants in this gathering afterwards drafted a formal statement on the potential value of a formal institutional framework for such an institute.

## CONCLUSION

In addition to planning a conflict resolution institute, the ad-hoc sub-committee unofficially "representing" those attending the re-union conference gave input into the design of this conference at which this paper is being delivered. Confident in the conflict resolution model (described in the first part of this paper) which re-union participants had all learned to greater or lesser degrees in their respective training workshops, as a useful point of departure and common frame of reference in thinking about conflict resolution and its practice, we agreed that if we were to launch a serious initiative for conflict resolution in Israel, a wider comparative framework would be invaluable.

Thus, the ad-hoc committee suggested holding a conference in which practitioner-scholars from other divided societies would be invited to share their conceptual frameworks and practical approaches. A very real result of the re-union meeting and the sub-committee resulting from it, then, is this present gathering with participants focusing on their own conflict resolution experiences in Northern Ireland, South Africa, Yugoslavia, Israel and the West Bank. Included as an important element in our discussion is a talk on the indigenous Arab model of mediation, the "sulha." This both symbolically and practically indicates our concern with ensuring that conflict resolution "transfer" from the West to the Middle East goes through the prism of local context, culture and experience.

We believe that the time is right, the concepts and practices are available, and what is most needed now is local initiative and international support for moving conflict resolution along in this society as it searches for

new means of peace-building domestically and in the region. We hope this conference will add momentum and wisdom to this effort.

## NOTE

1. This "re-union" conference gathered together some of the participants who had been trained in Rothman's dissertation research who at the time (1987) were students at Hebrew University, diplomats (returnees included an Egyptian, Mexican, British, and Togan) who participated in 1990 in a ten-week training program on "Pre-negotiation" for diplomats from around the world serving in Israel, members of a social work peace organization called Osim Shalom (or "peace-makers"), members of the Young Leadership Forum, participants in the ten-week conflict resolution training program sponsored by the Martin Buber Institute, and other professionals who had participated in training workshops between 1987 and 1992.

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# Northern Ireland — A Case Study

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## THE STARTING POINT

The main difficulty facing those of us involved in developing programmes to manage conflict in divided societies is that of knowing where to start in addressing it. Depending on the scale and the contours of the conflict, certain necessities will take precedence.

What is important to recognise is that while there is rarely just one right place to start addressing a conflict, there are usually several that are necessary, possible, and advisable. Mapping these must be a first start for conflict resolvers. Such cartography can both clarify and expedite the work, and allow relative successes to be assessed and evaluated. In achieving such delineations, it is important to allow for variation in contexts, and therefore subsequent remapping. Also to take account of the fact that parallel and integrated strands of work may necessitate the development of bodies to undertake it, and arranging for this, in a balanced and productive way, is essential.

I will illustrate this by showing the mapping which the Community Relations Council (CRC) in Northern Ireland<sup>1</sup> has undertaken, merely to illustrate, and not to prescribe.

## MAPPING THE WORK

In Northern Ireland, this mapping/remapping has varied over the years. Unfortunately, it has frequently suffered from an either/or approach in many

cases, with insufficient attention given to a consistent and parallel approach which would allow both for consistency of effort and flexibility of response.

### EDUCATION FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Conflicts are often exacerbated by the mutual ignorance which opposing sides in a conflict have about each other's fears, beliefs, and common humanity. Such ignorance and fear prevent the development of trust, respect for differing identities and agreement on issues of justice and rights. Most of our prejudices, fears and stereotyping come from our birth groups, and our immediate community. They are usually confirmed by our schooling, and our church allegiances. However in Northern Ireland we now believe that our schools in particular can become the place through which our children can learn about each other's historical perspective, and can develop worthwhile contacts with people from other communities which will sustain them through periods of communal crisis.

Developments in this area have included the setting up of integrated schools (previously almost all schools were segregated); the development of programmes on 'Mutual Understanding and Cultural Heritage' within all schools, whether segregated or integrated; and a substantial increase in inter-contact schemes for youth and children, both at the quantitative and qualitative level.

### EFFECTIVE AND SENSITIVE MILITARY CONTAINMENT

The use of security forces (police/military) to address and contain unrest and paramilitary violence is the most common, and sometimes first used, approach in many of our conflicts. And until we 'conflictologists' (as my Russian colleagues call us) help to develop more satisfactory ways to prevent, defuse and contain conflict in our divided societies this will continue to be the case. Such use however can quickly become counterproductive as security forces begin to be seen as aligned with one side or another, fall prey to their own

institutional pathology, or lapse into an interface that increases tension and hostility. The tensions can be difficult to manage, and what starts as a hoped for part of the solution can quickly turn into a substantial part of the problem.

Limiting such tensions can be helped through adequate clarification of the objectives and boundaries of the work of the security forces, continual assessment of the effectiveness of the means they use to contain paramilitarism (measured over and against the counterproductive nature of any negative security interface), and through much more substantial training for containment and peacekeeping as opposed to warmaking by the troops. The development of community liaison committees, designed to address community concern about methods of policing, has also, in some areas, contributed to a decrease in tension and a more effective formal/informal resolution of complaints against the security forces.

### COMMUNITY RENUNCIATION OF PARAMILITARISM

The use of violence by non-state forces to secure political gains continues unfortunately to be a much used option in divided societies. The methods of such groups, often conducted on a guerilla war basis, are often such that their consequences increase communal divisions and desire for revenge, and lay the foundations for grief and bitterness that can take generations to be forgotten. I know of no civil war where memories have faded in less than three quarters of a century — although interestingly, I know of some international ones that have been laid to rest in a considerably shorter time. But paramilitary violence can be almost impossible to totally contain. Even the best of security intelligence, the most comprehensive of security rituals e.g. searches, curfews, emergency legislation, will only limit and not defeat the few determined to make their views heard through violence, even at the expense of their own lives. So, while, sensitive military containment may be necessary, other options, both within and between communities must be developed.

Such challenge has come from the communities in Northern Ireland sometimes at a conceptual level (e.g. the questioning of the validity of any 'legitimate targets' in the context of our conflict), and the challenge to the IRA



by groups like the 'Peace Train'. The latter challenges the IRA about their continual bombing of the one rail link connecting Southern Ireland with Northern Ireland. Increasingly, communities have also united in cross community demonstrations against the continuing murders happening in our community, and groups and individuals appear to be more effectively developing the courage to challenge, through discussion, those still believing in the use of violence as a means to pursue political aspirations, rather than depending upon the use of the democratic process.

### PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The CRC sees its work as pre-political i.e. work that can enable the development of a solution to the Northern Ireland that is just and sustainable. It recognises that it is, eventually, on the wisdom and capacity of those who speak for our communities that our success in resolving our conflicts will depend. Occasionally, existing spokespersons prove adequate. Frequently, those who are there because of their representative nature, are limited by their very loyalty, their own weight of bigotry, and their own incapacity to seek for a solution for all, rather than a win for their own side. The tension between democracy and effectiveness in resolving the conflict can be evident. Northern Ireland is now run mainly by civil servants and public bodies in the absence of elected politicians. While the neutrality of some of these bodies may be questioned, there is no doubt that certainly the large 'minority' of Catholics (42%)<sup>6</sup> and many of the 'majority' of Protestants feel more adequately serviced by them rather than by the democratically elected politicians.

But while governance by committee may in some cases prove to be more satisfactory on a temporary basis, its decay into paternalism and possible autocracy must merit caution. The prior, if not parallel need, is for the quality of our political processes and of our representatives to be improved.

Work in this area has included qualitative international exchanges by politicians, sometimes on a cross party basis, and more extensive issue briefings e.g. on economics, agriculture, Europe, etc. also on a cross party basis.

## CONTEXTUAL WORK AND ITS RELATION TO THE WORK OF THE CRC

The Community Relations Council takes seriously its responsibility to cooperate with bodies pursuing the work described above, at a programme and practice level, and through the development of policy papers for government, military etc.

Such an analysis has freed the Community Relations Council, to develop its own particular focus of commitment. We believe it has been very important to make it clear that community relations work is not a substitute for such politically significant change. Without such clarification, we could be accused of naivete in presenting our work as the 'solution'. Instead, we clarify it as process work, which is not itself the solution, but enables those involved in conflict to address various possibilities for solutions together in a way that is more constructive than the 'shouting and shooting' approach, with which much of our history has unfortunately been characterised.

Such a framework has provided for credibility, and an avoidance of energy wasted in defending alleged naivete about the extent and nature of the problem.

## COMMUNITY RELATIONS WORK — AIMS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Secure in the knowledge that productive (if at times limited) parallel activities in the areas outlined above are happening, the Council has to be able to define more precisely its own work focus.

The mission statement of the Council for Community Relations is as follows:

**"To increase understanding and cooperation between the political, cultural and religious communities in Northern Ireland."**

In developing a strategy designed to realise its aim, the Council has assumed the following:

- It has a responsibility to work with all sections of society, and not just in those areas where the results of the conflict are more evident in sectarian violence or intimidation. It believes that prejudice and sectarianism in Northern Ireland is widespread, and exist irrespective of class or creed, although often exemplified differently by different groups and thus may need to be identified and addressed differently.
- In addressing possibilities for improving community relationships, it assumes that a variety of ways of addressing the need to combat prejudice will be adopted. It also assumes that such work will take place at many different levels e.g. personal, interpersonal, intra and inter community, within organisations and institutions, and at a structural level.
- It does not assume that such work should be carried out primarily by the Council. On the contrary, in order to fulfil its objectives, the Council seeks to multiply the effective development of community relations through co-operation with all other agencies who have the capacity to contribute to the work.

## COMMUNITY RELATIONS WORK — WHAT, WHO AND HOW

The development of community relations work must address the following questions:

What are we trying to achieve?

Who are we trying to involve in our work — and why?

How are we going to carry out the work?

### *What?*

The 'what' of community relations work is essentially about defining its specific objectives. It also should include, at many stages, and in many ways, the identification of specific and general performance indices for the work.

Such identification should always be considered in parallel with the progressive development of the work.

An increase in the following factors are the objectives the Council has set for itself:

- Adequate and accurate information by communities about each other's beliefs, customs, culture, and attitudes.
- A willingness to explore persisting prejudice and stereotyping, replacing it with knowledge based on reality.
- The development of empathy and respect between people and communities about each other's beliefs, fears and aspirations.
- Communities feeling confident in the non-triumphalist expressions of their heritage (e.g. commemorations, museums, marches, local traditions, etc.) and an acceptance that the existence of differing cultures should be accommodated within any relevant organisational, legal and constitutional structures.
- Open and honest communication between people about the differences that divide them, and the fears that they have about such differences, including competing territorial and constitutional claims.
- A capacity to reflect critically upon simplistic analyses of history and interest which prevent communities from moving from fixed positions.
- The capacity to make principled as opposed to loyalty based judgments about contentious issues of discrimination and rights, and collectively agreeing on principles of justice.
- Agreement about appropriate ways forward in the development of policing, security and legal systems in which all sections of the community can feel trust and confidence.
- Confidence in handling divisive issues constructively, at both the local and macro level, and a collective acceptance that the use of physical violence to solve conflicts is ultimately destructive to the development of relationships which are tolerant enough to bring about agreed solutions.

To be effective, we believe such factors must be conceptualised and popularised in such a way as to be:

- Understandable to people, and seen as relevant to their lives, and those of their children.
- Accepted as useful even to those people who have very strongly held political positions.
- capable of being addressed in a variety of ways and at many different levels which can take account of people's capacity, circumstances and energy.

### *Who?*

The Council's belief is that all groups at all levels of society are capable of contributing to the necessary improvement of community relations. Such a belief has informed the first two and a half years of the Council's work during which it has helped to develop, or set in motion, many hundreds of programmes to achieve the above objectives. Latterly, it has begun to target organisations which by their institutional nature, or their commitment to the use of violence are more difficult to challenge and reshape.

### *Year One: (Trial and Testing)*

In its first year, the Council concentrated on developing models with many of the voluntary, community and reconciliation groups that exist in Northern Ireland. Such groups are often flexible, willing to innovate, and exist throughout all levels and sections of society. They include tenants organisations, women's groups, community groups, cultural bodies, some church groups and trade unions. It also spent some development time working with existing reconciliation groups, more adequately resourcing them and encouraging them to develop more focused and effective programmes.

### *Year Two: (Structural Consolidation)*

In its second year, the Council moved on to ensure that organisations with more scope and power became engaged in its work. These included among

others the Housing Executive, Civil Service, Sports Council, Probation Board, and other public bodies, in addition to some sections of the business community. In addition, the Council also began a consultation with all sections of the security forces. The work undertaken with most of these organisations was about their engagement in the development of policies, programmes, and training modules to address issues of sectarianism and intimidation, within their workplace or within their communities.

### *Year Three: (Hard Corners)*

In its third year, the Council has begun to target more precisely those organisations/groups who are at the harder edges of our conflict. The particular engagement of conflicting politicians and of organisations which appear to exemplify sectarianism at its most explicit (the Orange Order) has been proving productive. Many of our churches are only now finding themselves able to move more wholeheartedly into the work, but are increasingly doing so. This should help the development of the work considerably, particularly in rural areas, as N. Ireland still has a church-going rate of approximately 70%, and therefore the capacity of the churches to assist positive change is enormous.

Work is now starting this autumn with training for certain sections of the security forces. Also work with both prison warders and prisoners, in particular 'political' prisoners, who have a particular capacity to positively influence the continuance or otherwise of the paramilitary campaign. And I believe community methods to challenge the use of paramilitarism will increasingly become more evident and effective, as many more groups have shown themselves willing to engage in dialogue and challenge with such persons.

### *How?*

How does community relations work happen? In a variety of ways, and under a variety of guises, carefully chosen to suit the context and the groups. Below are set out some of the ways in which the Council works:

*(i) Providing a Forum for Community Relations Issues*

a) The Council sees itself as having a key role in providing a forum through which community relations issues can be addressed. Such work is carried out primarily through information days, conferences and seminars. These concentrate on conceptualising and popularising new approaches in the field in such a way as to assist the development of a more positive approach to the management of differences at the political and cultural level. Thus the Council has organised a series of conferences on Identity, a series on Sectarianism and a series on the theme 'Freedom to Change?'

b) Increasing the capacity of the academic world to contribute to more effective practice within the field of community relations, including the developments of indices for objectives and evaluation. To this end we cooperate with academics on issues of research and evaluation. This spring, we are organising a 'Theory to Practice' conference to elucidate suggestions for practical conflict resolution from a variety of theorists.

c) As well as facilitating general debate about community relations issues, the Council provides more focused opportunities for groups working in particular areas to share their experience and enlighten their practice through hearing of each other's activities. This is done mainly through specialised meetings, seminars, and workshops. So far these have concentrated on issues of sport, district council work, churches and community relations development, and cultural traditions work.

*(ii) Development Work*

1) *Development work with groups.* Development work is the particular assistance which the Council gives to individuals, groups, or organisations wishing to initiate new work in the field of community relations or cultural traditions, or to further develop such work. Such development work takes up the majority of Council workers time, and mainly consists of the following:

- Encouraging groups to explore possibilities for their involvement in community relations/cultural diversity work;

- Assisting them in setting objectives for the work;
- Identifying appropriate methods of programme development and practice;
- Putting people in touch with facilitators if required and with other groups involved in the work;
- Identifying necessary resource/training materials;
- Helping groups to draw up appropriate grant applications to the Council or other funding bodies.

Approximately three hundred groups have been worked with in this way, during the existence of the Council. These have ranged from statutory bodies employing thousands, to small groups of no more than a dozen people.<sup>7</sup>

2) *Inter Community Contact Work.* An important part of all of the above development work is increasing the amount of qualitative inter-community contact work (i.e. contact which is characterised by a sharing of concerns and differences, and has the capacity to develop sustained relationships) which can take place at all levels throughout Northern Ireland. The Council is particularly concerned to help groups to look at ways to make such contact work more effective when it does occur. It recognizes that this often means involving groups in within-community work at the pre-contact stage as part of a programme which will eventually develop into a shared programme.

The Council also looks at all issues which contribute to the widespread segregation of communities such as housing patterns, educational structures, single-denominational youth clubs, segregated games, sport and social organisations. It looks at ways of addressing such segregation, and any apparent problems arising from it, in a manner that is appropriate to the context i.e. through individual consultations, group activities, meetings of common interest groups, etc.

3) *Cooperative work with other organisations.* To fulfil its objectives, the Council seeks to make not only efficient use of its own resources, but to multiply the effective development of community relations work through co-



operation with all other agencies who have the capacity to contribute to the work. It therefore develops such cooperation with the all relevant statutory, semi-statutory, voluntary/community, cultural, educational, work and professional, political, media, churches and security bodies.

*(iii) Grant Aiding*

The Council has available about one million dollars annually for distribution to groups and organisations working in the field. It believes that such grants, fairly minimal in overall terms, help it in encouraging new activities and in providing a useful service upon which much development work can be based. Most grants given are less than \$2,500. Approximately 600 plus such grants have been given since the inception of the Council.<sup>8</sup>

*(iv) Training*

Requests for 'training' to the Council have been consistent since its inception. The following training courses have been offered and in many cases, developed through the Council. It is important to emphasise that such training is not just about group work, although it invariably includes this, but about the whole gamut of techniques that may be needed to address constructively the development of community relations and conflict resolution work within a particular area. Such work can also include contextual and area analysis, structural interventions at organisational levels, and programme development for continuance of any conflict resolution programmes decided upon.

1) Contact work (How to facilitate qualitative contact between groups meeting from different traditions)

2) Anti-sectarian work (Work looking at how most of our groups and institutions exclude those from a different community, and how to develop programmes to address this)

3) Anti-intimidation work (How to deal with paramilitary, intimidation, racketeering etc. and how to deal with security force harassment)

4) Cultural traditions work (How to encourage cultural reflection and sharing i.e. of history and battles, of language, song and dance, in a way that can be a shared and not a divisive experience)

5) Prejudice reduction (Work carried out at an experiential, often cathartic level, addressing prejudice)

6) Facilitating political discussion (work for facilitators interested in stimulating productive political discussion — sometimes using actual political representatives)

7) Human Rights education (work done on a cross-community basis assisting groups to address issues of justice/rights on a principle, as opposed to loyalty, base)

8) Dealing with our history (Sharing conflicting frameworks of history in a positive, as opposed to a divisive way)

9) Mediation and conflict resolutions skills (Developing a 'Win/Win' as opposed to a 'Win/Lose' framework, and facilitator skills to assist this)

Work is also being developed for the coming spring on modules for the following areas:

10) Community relations and sport (developing more inclusiveness by sporting bodies)

11) Community relations at local church level (Possibilities for contact, biblical studies, post crisis work on a cooperative basis between churches, particularly at local level)

Most of these training courses have now been "franchised out" — i.e. existing groups have incorporated them into their programmes, or new sections of existing groups have undertaken to deliver on them to their constituencies. Only in this way can the Council respond to the demand for such courses. One adult education organisation alone over the past three months has run 40 such training workshops, with considerable success, according to the evaluations received.

The participants for such workshops are sometimes organisationally based and sometimes targeted to include a variety of people from differing

walks of life. Many will include public representatives, teachers, youth leaders, church pastors, and quite often a smattering of reformed paramilitaries. Often the most lively are those which include a variety of the latter!

The Council continues to maintain responsibility (in conjunction with a youth and community training group) for an action learning programme, for those involved in full time community relations work. This takes place over a period of six months, and includes three residential workshops, three seminar days, and a supervised action case study in the field.

The Council has also set up a trainers network, with approximately 60 people, who come together on a quarterly basis to share skills and concerns. It also organises 'apprentice' agreements between those who want to extend their skills, and those happy to have their support. The training work is often traumatic with conflict occasionally erupting into explicit hostility, and we therefore encourage people to work in pairs as far as possible. In addition, we produce a 'Trainers Index' which lists all available trainers, their particular skills, the methods they use, their track record, and their fees, where these apply.

We also have produced, for more general use, several modules for use in training in e.g. Anti-sectarian work, facilitating political discussion, and anti-intimidation work.

One interesting consequence of such training has been that many of our facilitators (and Council staff) are increasingly in demand in Russia and the CIS States, in former Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries, to assist with the development of policies and programmes to address conflict, including training development. While conscious still of the substantial work that still remains for us to do in our own land, we have been responding, in what we hope will be an increasingly coordinated and effective way to at least some of these requests. We not only feel that we may have much to give because of our experience, but we have also learnt that we have much to gain from such sharing in the development of our own theoretical and practice perspectives.

(v) *Research and Evaluation*

1) *Action research.* The Council, is not primarily concerned with research. However, on occasion, in order to more speedily facilitate effective practice, the Council engages in limited action-research projects which are directly related to its plans for practice.

These have included the production of action documents on Anti-sectarian work, neutral venue development, locally based church community relations work, and transport issues in community relations work. On going are documents on possibilities for the use of community drama in community relations work, and one addressing the issue of the display on flags and emblems, and national anthem singing in Northern Ireland which continues to provoke contention among our communities because of our divided political allegiances.

2) *Evaluation.* The Council also assists organisations working in the field to evaluate their work. It believes that such evaluation both increases the satisfaction of groups involved in the work, and supplies validation for funding bodies about the effectiveness of community relations work.

All training programmes, and most projects funded under our grant programmes, are evaluated in terms both of their particular effectiveness and their general overall impact.

## CURRENT TRENDS IN THE WORK

Two important trends in the development of the work have been identified over the past two years. The first is the increased willingness of groups to move more quickly and confidently into addressing issues of difference. This is a movement required by the Council in its assessment for grant-aiding groups soliciting financial resources, and it helps to move groups beyond the politenesses that can prevail when contact occurs.

The second trend is for groups increasingly to apply concepts of conflict resolution to practical problems of shared and contested areas, village

development, local council management, etc. Such local issue management appears to lead more immediately to an increased sense of confidence in a communities capacity to resolve conflicts than can be achieved through any similar investment of time in academical/theoretical considerations of such possible resolution.

### WHAT DIFFERENCE HAS IT MADE?

In assessing how effective such programmes are, one needs to distinguish between the particular result of e.g. a particular workshop organised, or a particular training day, or extended programme completed, and the overall effect of such programmes in contributing to community relations work at a macro-political level.

On the first issue, i.e. that of the particular, it is much easier to assess the effect or otherwise of a particular event. Before and after surveys, reflective surveys, impact assessment surveys examining particular programmes either in the immediate, or in the longer term, are all quite possible, and many have been done. Most show a satisfactory increase in terms of the objectives outlined under the 'what' section of this paper.

It is the more general effects that are somewhat more difficult to analyse, and I have only begun to develop a framework for these. For what it is worth, I share it with you. Precise aggregation of data has still to be secured on it.

### TREND BASED CRITERIA

I have used the concept of 'Trend Based Criteria' to describe such changes as are outlined below.<sup>9</sup> The emphasis in the trend based approach is on a comparison between objective realities over time, and analysis is based on empirically based evidence rather than relying on subjectively based evidence. The following have all shown an increase over the past three years:

- a) Cross community interactions increased. Easily assessed evidence related to particular projects aided by the Council and other bodies involved in Community Relations work.
- b) Anti-sectarian policies adopted/programmes developed. The number of organisations adopting these as part of their strategic/operational plans and implementing them as part of their programmes is a new, but increasing phenomenon. These include trade unions, sporting bodies, major voluntary and statutory bodies, and many community groups.
- c) Integrated schools. The number of explicitly integrated schools has risen in the past 10 years from 0 to 16. Although the first one was set up ten years ago, most of these have been developed in the last four years, and their numbers are likely to increase.
- d) Post-crisis work (i.e. in the wake of a murder/bombing). In the 70s, such incidents often resulted in communal tension and riots. The latter two years in particular have also seen the streets full in the wake of such incidences, but now the reason is a wish to cross territorial lines to mourn with one another, and demonstrate for an end to such tactics.
- e) Local government. Local councils were almost disbanded five years ago because of the discriminatory and hostile nature of many of their decisions, which were often based on sectarian dominance. These however have moved slowly but surely towards cooperation. Over half now exercise voluntary power sharing. Some are now tackling difficult issues of e.g. sectarian graffiti or obtrusive security check-points, in a relatively cooperative fashion. Many have also now found a way to mourn all dead in their constituency, who have lost their lives through the on-going conflict, as opposed to only their 'own' dead which would have been commonplace up to three years ago.
- f) Cultural marches, bands, fairs, etc. which used to take place on a separate and divided basis are now increasingly sharing their culture in an unhostile way. Some now march together on feast days, some have joint concerts and fairs featuring local cultural traditions

that can now for the first time include groups from both major traditions. Also, the Irish language, once seen as intrinsically connected to a particular republican/nationalist aspiration has now been freed of this association, and many classes teaching it now contain a substantially greater number of Protestants than would have been possible three years ago.

- g) Some churches traditionally hostile to this work, are now actually employing people to develop it e.g. the Presbyterian Church, and the Evangelical Conference of Northern Ireland. In addition, clergy are now in major numbers crossing territorial lines to attend funerals and wakes where political/sectarian murders have occurred.
- h) Workplaces are increasingly becoming more integrated places, as our legislation on monitoring/discrimination becomes effective.

As against the above positive trends, there is little evidence that our living (as opposed to work) territories are becoming any less substantially divided. Murders and bombings still continue, albeit at a much reduced level from the particularly terrible years of the 70s, which reached a total of almost 500 killed in 1972, to a point where the figure has been consistently below a hundred since 1980. And we still await an agreement on a political settlement, despite the substantial (and I believe productive) talking that there has been among some of our politicians.

However, if we can allow ourselves the luxury of considering at least some evidence at the attitudinal level, we see that there is at least some significant cause for hope. The British Social Attitude Survey undertaken in 1992 showed that three times as many people now, as opposed to five years ago, believe that community relations in Northern Ireland have improved. And looking to the future, only 7% now believe that such relations will get worse in the future.

Needless to say, the Council is determined to prove that negative figure of 7% will be even less over the coming years.

## NOTES

1. The Community Relations Council was set up in 1990 as an independent body to facilitate the development of Community Relations work. Its funding is a mixture of Government, European Community and Trust Funds. Its budget is approximately \$2.5 per annum and it has a staff of 16.

2. The best source book for research on Northern Ireland is a book by John Whyte, *Interpreting Northern Ireland*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990. It sets the context for the analysis supporting increased community relations work in Northern Ireland.

3. This integrated approach is developed in a paper 'A Typology of Community Relations Work,' (M. Fitzduff) written in 1989 for the Policy Planning and Research Unit of the Northern Ireland office. This paper set the context for the work of the CRC. John Darby has also written of such an approach in his professional lecture in 1990, called 'What's Wrong with Conflict?' published by the University of Ulster. Both documents are available from the Information Office of the CRC.

4. First Annual Report of the CRC, 1991.

5. One of the best treatments of these issues continues to be *Governing Without Consensus* by Richard Rose. Written in 1971, it is published by Faber and Faber, London. Also see Whyte above note 2.

6. Government Consensus figures, 1990. HMSO Publications.

7. Case studies of some of the work undertaken with groups are outlined in the CRC Annual Report 1992.

8. An outline description of all projects funded is included in the CRC Annual Report 1992.

9. Such an approach has recently been used to measure the effectiveness of the United Nations. See article by Kendall Stiles and Maryellen Macdonald "After Consensus, What? Performance Criteria for the UN in the Post-Cold War Era" in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 29, No 3, August 1992.



# **Promoting Sustainable Peace By Promoting Effective Dialogue**

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## **I. EVOLUTION OF A CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT IN THE BALKANS**

### *A. Introduction*

At the roots of the bitter conflicts in the former Yugoslavia lies a complex interplay of political, economic, and ideological factors. Any attempt at conflict resolution is complicated by the participating groups' historic experiences of loss and victimhood, by their differing perceptions of responsibility for the present war, by asymmetries of power, by continuing human rights abuses, and by the breakdown of normal lines of communication in wartime. Remarkably, some communication networks remain open. There is a desire among some people in the region to actively confront these issues in a constructive way, with the hope that trust and understanding can be rebuilt over the long term. An essential component in the development of a sustainable, long-term peace in this region depends in part on creating expertise in conflict resolution and developing an infrastructure that supports such work. Such an infrastructure would endure regardless of the political and military activity in the region.

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the ongoing violence in the region, interest in nonviolent methods of conflict resolution has been very high and has stimulated the evolution of The Balkans Peace Project. The goal of the project is to build indigenous skills in the region for conflict management,

peacemaking, and peacebuilding. In pursuit of this goal, the project organizes and facilitates meetings and dialogue workshops and develops conflict resolution training models and training materials. The project began in the summer of 1991 when individuals and groups in the former Yugoslavia sought conflict resolution training and interventions specifically focused on psychologically sensitive approaches. In response to these requests, the project organized a series of demonstration workshops in three former Yugoslav republics in the spring of 1992.

### *B. Conflict Resolution Demonstration Workshops*

In March 1992, the project team led a 2-3 day workshop in each of three former republics of Yugoslavia.<sup>1</sup> The sites for these meetings were Subotica (Vojvodina), Ljubljana (Slovenia), and Zagreb (Croatia). Attendance at these workshops consistently exceeded the planned numbers, with approximately 120 people attending the three workshops.

Each workshop had four goals:

- to present a framework to participants for thinking about conflict
- to demonstrate a variety of approaches to understanding and resolving conflict
- to assess the applicability of these approaches in the current environment
- to begin making plans to apply these techniques in specific cases

The workshop in Subotica was the first public event of a new academic center, The European Civic Center for Conflict Resolution.. In Ljubljana, the workshop was hosted by a government-supported research and education organization, the Ljubljana Peace Institute. The Zagreb workshop was hosted by the Project for Education for Non-Violent Conflict Resolution, a product of the newly organized Croatian Anti-war Campaign, and took place in the psychology department of Zagreb University. Participants in the workshops were predominantly healers (physicians, social workers, psychologists, and

refugee workers), political scientists, and educators, but also included journalists, government administrators, and others.

While each workshop program was tailored to the needs of the particular group, common discussion topics and participatory exercises were used for each. The workshops began with a discussion of the nature of conflict and frameworks for thinking about conflict. In understanding the nature of conflict it was pointed out that conflict does not have to result in violence but that it can serve as a catalyst for change. What is important is to manage the conflict in a constructive, rather than destructive, way. Conflict resolution work was described as a nonviolent process for relationship building, collaborative problem solving, and dialogue to lay the groundwork for productive negotiation. Themes in conflict situations were discussed, including:

- Emotions: the role played by anger, grief, fear, and guilt.
- Victimization: when one party feels wronged by the other, their political or personal rights violated.
- Scapegoating: when one person (or group) is made to feel responsible for everything bad or difficult in the conflict.
- Stereotyping: the attribution of a consistent set of characteristics to a group, without accounting for individual differences. While stereotypes in general can be either positive or negative, those associated with a conflict situation are usually quite negative and often so extreme as to completely dehumanize the other.
- Trust: most conflict situations are characterized by a lack of trust and/or a history of violations of trust; that trust, once broken, is very difficult to rebuild.
- Escalation: there is a cycle of action-reaction that can be difficult to break and that can rapidly advance the level of enmity.

The workshop participants also spent considerable time in discussion of conflict management options, such as holding a problem-solving workshop, and the healing function of grieving and apology in political conflict resolution. Furthermore, the workshops had a number of participatory elements including:

- a simulation that demonstrated negotiation dynamics, focusing on building and maintaining a working trust
- an exercise utilizing a family therapy technique called sculpting to help people define and articulate their perceptions of the conflict
- an exercise using another family therapy technique called circular questioning to identify stereotypes and the role these play in the escalation and perpetuation of conflict

The material presented was very well received. Typical of the responses was the statement of a participant in the Croatian workshop: “[We have] to accept the possibility of living together with Serbs as neighbours, and to reopen borders. This is difficult to accept for the moment, but I see it as the only way.”

All three sessions concluded with requests by participants for further assistance in a variety of conflict resolution projects and specific requests that the team arrange future conflict resolution training programs and problem-solving workshops. From six month follow-up reports we have learned that workshop participants have incorporated lessons from the workshops into a variety of contexts, including the classroom, work with refugee groups, and community conflict and dialogue sessions.

### *C. Project Methodology*

The Balkans Peace Project works through an integrated program of exploration and education. It explores adaptation and combinations of approaches utilized elsewhere (e.g., Northern Ireland, the Middle East, South Africa) in an effort to respond to the particular demands of this conflict. In this way we are able to bring together lessons and insights from many disciplines, including psychology, diplomacy, negotiation theory and practice, and family therapy. Learning occurs on multiple fronts. Workshop participants learn from the facilitators and from each other. The facilitators learn from each other, and from the workshop participants.

Our approach to conflict resolution is multi-disciplinary as it strives to be responsive to the needs and background of the groups with whom we are working. A distinctive feature of this approach is its emphasis on the social psychological dynamics inherent in inter-communal conflict.<sup>2</sup> Based on the pioneering work of John Burton, Herbert Kelman, and others, we believe it is crucial when dealing with deep-seated conflicts to employ conflict resolution processes that help the participants to acknowledge each other's needs for identity, recognition, security, and equity.<sup>3</sup> Only when such needs are acknowledged by the warring communities can collaborative problem-solving begin, generating sustainable solutions based on some degree of mutual understanding.

To promote such acknowledgement and mutual understanding, we build upon the "interactive problem-solving approach" to ethnic conflict developed by Herbert C. Kelman.<sup>4</sup> In this problem-solving approach, the setting, ground rules, agenda, and interventions are all designed to enable and encourage participants to speak freely and to listen to each other in ways usually inhibited by their conflict relationship. Participants are also encouraged to step back from their usual debate and rhetoric and to analyze possible shapes of solutions to their conflict based upon the real needs and fears of both communities. Participants in such interventions can come away with a clearer understanding and appreciation of the needs and fears of the "other side," with ideas about possible approaches to resolution of the conflict, and sometimes with plans for taking action to move toward that resolution.

We expand upon this problem-solving model in several ways. First, we believe that individuals need some basic introduction to the language and perspective of conflict resolution before they can participate in any meaningful dialogue about resolving their conflict. We utilize experiences from other parts of the world (e.g., Northern Ireland, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, South Africa) and from varied disciplinary backgrounds to provide a framework that draws upon psychology, diplomacy, negotiation theory, and family systems therapy.

Our second modification of Kelman's interactive problem-solving approach is to promote dialogue at the community level as well as at the national level. In the past, workshops have been conducted with national political

actors to affect national political decision-making. We strongly support this goal and hope to conduct such workshops in the Balkans when the political situation permits. However, we believe that interactive problem-solving can be extremely valuable at the local level as well. *The conditions for containment and eventual resolution of deep-seated conflicts must come up from the community level as well as down from the national leadership.* Each by itself will not be enough to sustain peace; each needs to reinforce the other. We will therefore work to establish dialogue at the local level, with community leaders, educators, and other professionals.

Finally, we extend the usefulness of interactive problem-solving by training local facilitators and mediators, who can then employ these approaches in all kinds of conflicts at both the local and national level. Historically, these approaches have been brought into conflict areas by professionals from the United States or Western European countries, who facilitate meetings or conduct training sessions on conflict resolution concepts but do not train people in the conflicting communities to conduct their own meetings and dialogues. We believe it is imperative that the people involved directly in the conflict learn how to facilitate communication between and among their peers, even in the most difficult circumstances.

## II. PROMOTING EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE

### *a. The Effect of Stereotypes*

Conflicts, especially national, ethnic, and religious ones, are frequently characterized by intense traumatic loss, victimhood, and dehumanization of the adversary. The experiences of war, the breakdown of communication, the personal losses, and feelings of victimhood heighten the tendency to form negative stereotypes of others. Stereotyping is defined here as the attribution of a consistent set of characteristics to a group, without accounting for individual differences. While stereotypes in general can be either positive or negative, those associated with a conflict situation are usually quite negative and often so extreme as to completely dehumanize the other. In order to establish constructive communication it is important to address the

misperceptions that exist on both sides, break down stereotypes, and try to move from a deadlocked debate into an authentic and constructive dialogue.

One process to address misperceptions between groups and stereotyping inherent in conflict situations has been developed by the Project on Promoting Effective Dialogue Across Ideologies, a project of the Center for Psychology and Social Change. Initiated in 1986, this project has led workshops on cultural and ideological stereotyping in a variety of international settings,<sup>5</sup> utilizing techniques from family systems therapy to help people express curiosity and compassion in their exchanges with one another, while gently challenging rigidly held belief systems. Dr. Richard Chasin, a psychiatrist and family therapist, began the project when he sought ways in which the systems thinking of family therapists might help open doors to the new thinking so clearly needed in the international arena. Family systems theory emphasizes relationships, interactive patterns, and context. Although they were designed for work with families, many of the techniques have suitable application to large group contexts.<sup>6</sup>

During the workshops the Balkans Peace Project ran in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia, workshop participants took part in an exercise, adapted from the Promoting Effective Dialogue Project, designed to help participants acknowledge and understand the effects of stereotypes that people of differing, often hostile, ideologies hold of each other. In this exercise, participants explored the stereotypes that they feel others hold of them (or their group) and began to address misperceptions that exist on various sides of a conflict and the impact of stereotyping. These exercises were an effort to establish more constructive communication between parties. The exercise is designed to create a safe structure in which people can communicate without risking hostile confrontation or engaging in false camaraderie. One of the techniques used is called "circular questioning." Participants are asked what stereotypes they think others have about themselves or the group that they are a part of. This type of questioning tends to create an atmosphere of high curiosity and low accusation and releases a flood of confusing information that stimulates meaningful dialogue about aspects of a relationship or a conflict.

Reflecting upon the role stereotypes play in conflict situations, one participant from the workshop in Subotica said, "Stereotypes are the products

of fear . . . . An open discussion can be the beginning of healing and conflict resolution. The process of healing can begin with exploration of stereotypes, characteristics, and fears of the other. The first step is in deciding if and when we want to talk to other groups.”<sup>7</sup>

### *Debate versus dialogue*

Another application of systemic thinking to conflict situations has been used by the Public Conversations Project in an effort to move ideologically separate groups from a confrontative debate mode of interaction to a more effective mutual exchange.<sup>8</sup> In an effort to guide their systemic interventions, Margaret Herzig and Richard Chasin, working with the project, have observed and enumerated behavior patterns exhibited in “conversations” between parties involved in a chronic conflict.<sup>9</sup> These patterns include:

1. Adversaries engage in limited, ritualized interactions, in which they don’t listen to each other and ask rhetorical questions.
2. Adversaries assume that the members of the other party are all alike — in particular, the most extreme leaders are assumed to represent the whole group. Within each alliance, differences are minimized, especially in the presence of the adversary, while those who join no side are suspected by both sides.
3. Most adversaries blame the other, hold assumptions about what the other thinks and believes, and are tied to fixed opinions about the other; rarely do parties take responsibility or exhibit genuine curiosity or open-mindedness.
4. Fixed and simple convictions are openly displayed while complexity, ambivalence, or confusion are concealed. If an adversary displays openness to conciliation, it is met with mistrust.
5. In a stalemate adversaries perceive the struggle as valuable, even though outside parties may tell them the struggle is more destructive than any alternative outcome.



Chasin, Herzig, and others in the Public Conversations Project have also put together a table distinguishing dialogue from debate, which is attached as appendix A.

With these observations in mind, the Public Conversations Project evolved guidelines for structured, facilitated communication between adversarial parties.

### *A workshop exercise in Jerusalem*

The principles evolved by the Balkans Peace Project and the Public Conversations Project guided a short exercise that I facilitated in Jerusalem with participants at the workshop on Practicing Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies. Participants were invited to engage in discussion about a “hot” political issue, the status of the old city of Jerusalem. This was an opportunity for people to engage in dialogue with someone who might have a very different perspective, in a format designed to enhance safety and mutual respect. It was an opportunity to explore one’s own certainties and uncertainties about an issue on which many people present held very strong, and polarized, positions. Participation in the exercise was as individuals, not as representatives from any political group, and was strictly voluntary.

Those who wanted to be participants in the dialogue were asked to pair up with someone they did not know. Others, who chose to be observers, were matched to dialogue pairs, so that the room was divided into small dialogue clusters of two or three people. Ground rules and agreements were explained for the exercise as follows:

1. Maintain confidentiality for the dialogue session
2. Listen to each person speaking; do not interrupt
3. Use respectful language, rather than pejorative terms, about the other
4. Accept the “pass rule” — anyone not ready or not willing to respond to a question can decline to do so without explanation.

The guidelines or recommendations include asking participants to speak from their own personal experience when possible and to avoid making attributions to people outside the room.

The participants were asked to discuss with their partner a series of questions, all with very specific time limits. First they were asked to speak for three minutes each in turn about their own life experience as it related to Jerusalem, their personal history, their interests, their personal involvement. Next they were asked to speak for two minutes in turn about what they felt to be at the heart of the issue regarding the status of Jerusalem, explaining their beliefs about their position. The third set was an opportunity to explore the complexity of the issue, as each speaker discussed (for three minutes) the grey areas that exist within their own approach, including the dilemmas they might have about their positions and beliefs, and the uncertainty they might feel. They were encouraged to think about how their position might be in conflict with their belief system or value system, or how they might have mixed feelings about their position. Finally, the small groups were given five minutes in which anyone, including the observer, was allowed to ask questions of curiosity or to share any last closing thoughts. They were encouraged to stay in the first person, trying not to say "they" or "them" and cautioned that this was not a time to persuade, but a time to learn.

All members of the workshop participated in the exercise. The discussion afterwards highlighted what they felt they had gotten out of this short structured exchange.

Many people felt that the exercise was a valuable way to move into a dialogue with someone they didn't know about a very sensitive political issue. Some felt that the ground rules and the careful structuring of the exercise were the key to its success, in particular the safety and the sharing that it made possible.

The rule about listening without interrupting was a matter for much discussion. Some felt that it really opened up space for the speaker, allowing a monologue in which one did not feel the need to justify or qualify one's remarks. It also caused people to listen in a way they don't normally listen, in a more absorbed way without "getting caught up in what your response should be." Some people thought it was going to be difficult to speak for three

minutes without interruption but then found they had much more to say than they thought they would. Others said they could not believe it had only been three minutes that they were speaking — that so much more ground was covered than they thought could be covered in such a short time. One participant explained, “You can say a lot in three minutes when you know that no one will interrupt you.” One participant reported that listening without responding to a speaker for three minutes was unnatural, and uncomfortable, and that culturally it was not appropriate, even insulting to listen without response. This stimulated a discussion about the value of learning how to listen, and how infrequently people listen with care to what others are saying. A presenter from South Africa told about a listening exercise used in conflict resolution work there. In this exercise, one person speaks, stating a position, then the other person must paraphrase what they heard before stating their position. Also, the ‘assignment’ to speak for three minutes demanded, according to one participant, that one get one’s thoughts in order, so the process of the dialogue begins even before the exchange of views.

Other comments reflected upon the differences between this structured dialogue and other types of interactions. One person said that “much more was revealed here . . . particularly through the third question, which was very important. It was a fantastic way to explore our own and other’s uncertainties, and helped us move to common ground.” In agreement with this statement, another participant offered his sentiments: “As we started out each round, we found we had more and more in common. This is in spite of the fact that when we started we felt we were really very far apart.” Other people commented that they particularly liked the beginning of the exercise, stating that the cooperative atmosphere it engendered and the personal interaction it created allowed a very different kind of interaction and conversation.

One participant who used the exercise to have a dialogue with someone who lived, as she did, within the walls of the old city, commented, “I appreciated the exercise very much . . . . It was a unique opportunity to explore issues at the foundation of how we have both chosen to live our lives.”

There was general agreement that tools like this one that help create authentic dialogue are crucial in the search for sustainable peace in any conflict situation.

## NOTES

1. For a more detailed report of the first year of the project's activity see P. Gutlove et al., *Towards Sustainable Peace in the Balkans* (Cambridge MA: Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, 1992).

2. Joseph Montville led a discussion in all three workshops about the healing function of grieving, apology, and forgiveness in political conflict resolution, exploring with the participants the depth of pain, fear, and hatred that a history of unatoned violence creates in a victimized people. He noted that many nations and groups in conflict have competing, if not entirely symmetrical, psychologies of victimhood. A detailed report on the discussions in the three workshops is presented in Appendix 3 of P. Gutlove et al., *Towards Sustainable Peace in the Balkans* (Cambridge MA: Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, 1992).

3. differences between communities of people, rather than between individuals or governments, regardless of whether those communities exist within or across international borders.

4. John Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

5. technique has been developed primarily by H. C. Kelman, who has used it to promote collaborative problem solving between Israelis and Palestinians. A recent presentation of this approach can be found in H. C. Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar Practitioner" in *Mediating International Relations*, ed. Berkovitch and Rubin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pages 64-96.

6. For a more detailed discussion of modes of analysis and intervention utilizing family systems therapy see Richard Chasin and Margaret Herzig, "Family Systems Therapy and Soviet-American Relations," in *The Project on Promoting Effective Dialogue Across Ideologies, Compendium of Project Reports, 1987-1991*, ed. R. Chasin, P. Gutlove, and M. Herzig (Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge, MA, 1988).

7. Richard Chasin and Margaret Herzig, "Creating Systemic Interventions for the Sociopolitical Arena," in *The Global Family Therapist: Integrating the Personal, Professional and Political*, ed. B. Berger-Gould, and D. H. Demith (Needham, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon Press, 1992).

8. A detailed report on the discussions in the three workshops is presented in Appendix 3 of P. Gutlove et al., *Towards Sustainable Peace in the Balkans*, (Cambridge MA: Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, 1992).

9. The Public Conversations Project was founded in 1989 by Laura Chasin, who is now the Project Director. Margaret Herzig, former associate director of the Promoting Effective Dialogue Project, is now the executive director of the Public Conversations Project, and Richard Chasin, founder of the Promoting Effective Dialogue Project, is an advisor to the Public Conversations Project. For more information, contact The Public Conversations Project of the Family Institute of Cambridge, 51 Kondazian Street, Watertown, MA 02172.

10. Richard Chasin and Margaret Herzig, "Creating Systemic Interventions for the Sociopolitical Arena," *op. cit.*

# **Training in the Context of Multi-Party Conflict in South Africa**

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The aim of this paper is to provide some insights into the nature of the training the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa offers in the context of political and community conflict. The content of the training as well as the process (i.e. the way in which the training is conducted) is placed in the context of multi-party conflict prevalent in South Africa.

By way of background, IMSSA is an independent, non-profit organisation committed to the effective resolution of industrial and community conflict. At the level of community conflict, IMSSA assists community based organisations in managing conflict, disputes and negotiations, by providing services such as mediation, adjudication, facilitation and training.

Before I talk about the nature of the training itself, the context in which the training occurs needs to be explored.

In the last two and a half years, South Africa has undergone major political changes. From a context of severe state repression and extensive use of power, the pressure is now on the political parties to attempt to find a negotiated settlement. At all levels in society, interest groups are attempting to negotiate for the benefit of their particular constituency.

The lifting of the ban on political movements and parties in 1990 has resulted in the emergence of previously suppressed conflicts. These conflicts have manifested themselves into four distinctive types of disputes. They are:

1. One interest group versus an authority structure (e.g. — the African National Congress versus the South African Police over the right to hold a march)
2. A number of interest groups versus an authority structure (e.g. the civic association, and the African National Congress/Congress of South African Trade Unions/South African Communist Party alliance versus the Black Local Authority over the withholding of rent payments and the provision of services)
3. An intra-community dispute which includes an authority structure as one of the parties (e.g., the way in which a hostel should be upgraded)
4. Intra-community-interest group versus interest group (e.g., a taxi war over routes — Pretorius and Storey 1992)

The nature of these disputes is specific to the particular context in which they arise. Conflict in South Africa cannot be described as “black on black” violence, nor “multi-ethnic conflict” because that would simply what is a highly complex and complicated situation.

Before 1990 the overriding conflict in South Africa was between the state and the democratic forces. Any hint of the emergence of a dispute was dealt with swiftly and sharply through highly repressive mechanisms.

With the emergence of a climate of negotiation, parties are identifying the urgent need to prepare themselves to negotiate effectively. They recognise that they simply do not have the skills, capacity, expertise or experience to deal with disputes in this new way.

This need is counterbalanced by both South Africa’s past and present realities: South African society can be characterised as having a culture of violence. People are used to dealing with each other through the use of force and power. The use of power tactics has proved itself more in people’s minds and in reality than has negotiation.

‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ is evolving out of a context of wars, rebellions, repression and insurrection. In more stable societies, dispute resolution is used as a resource to the negotiation process. In societies in transition or where there is an imbalance of power, parties are more likely

to rely on the use of power in dealing with disputes. It is militant action rather than negotiation that is seen by many to have opened doors to new rights and, in fact, negotiation forums themselves (Anstey 1992, 2).

The present reality is that the negotiation playing fields have not been levelled and material conditions have not changed. The removal of apartheid legislation has not brought about a political solution, nor has it removed poverty, provided housing, or improved health and welfare. If anything, the removal of such legislation has removed the agent of blame. These social tensions are now being expressed at grassroots level and it is at this level that they need to be addressed and resolved (Pretorius & Storey 1992, 4).

While parties recognise the need to equip themselves with process skills (such as negotiation skills), the issues need to be resolved simultaneously. Parties need the skills to deal with the violence, but the underlying causes of the violence need to be resolved before parties can constructively engage. However it is training, rather than third party mediation that is most often requested. A possible explanation for this is that bringing in outside mediators on an issue basis leads to an ongoing dependency. While the issue might be resolved today, the parties are not empowered to deal with the issue that emerges tomorrow and again they will need to call in a mediator. Parties have identified their need as how to empower themselves to deal with their own issues.

There is no fool-proof, tried-and-tested model that we can provide to participants as the answer to resolving disputes, as no such model exists. Each context within which disputes arise is different. The premise of our training programmes is that participants need to develop their own judgment skills so that they can deal with each new situation that arises given its own set of specific circumstances.

The major challenge in our training is how to confront existing, ingrained attitudes and behaviour patterns. It is always tempting to lecture people on what we, the "expert" dispute resolvers, believe is the most constructive way of doing things. As we know only too well from the prolonged conflict in the Middle East, Northern Ireland and South Africa, "telling" has no impact whatsoever.

The aim of our training is to empower participants by creating an awareness and understanding of the range of options that are available to them for managing conflict and dealing with dispute. It is not sufficient just to know that there are different ways of dealing with conflict. One needs to experience them and analyse them before deciding which to use and when. Responsibility for their own learning, and subsequently their own actions is placed with the participants — they have control over how far they want to go in accepting or trying out different options in managing conflict or negotiating. In order to achieve this, the training methodology ensures full participation in the sharing of knowledge and practising of new skills. Participants draw from their own experience as well as learning from others and sharing their experiences.

By maintaining control and being able to test out new skills, rather than receiving top-down input given by the trainer, people are able to challenge each other and push back the boundaries of their own limitations.

IMSSA conducts training at three different levels in the community and political context.

1. At the grassroots level, or interest groups such as civics, African National Congress, Inkatha Freedom Party and other community based organisations
2. Fieldworkers, NGO's and service organisations (e.g. the National Land Committee made up of associated members of organisations working in the area of rural development or Lawyers for Human Rights)
3. Third part facilitators or mediators drawn from the communities themselves or outsiders who have a knowledge of and have been involved in mediating conflicts in communities.

In order to illustrate the nature and logic of the training, I will now describe a section of the training we conduct in conflict assessment, conflict management and negotiation for participants in categories one and two. Although we do conduct training in category three, as explained above, there is less demand from the communities themselves for outside mediators at




this stage. Rather the demand is to train the parties themselves as well as those organisations directly representing interest-groups. Hence my focus on categories one and two.

To people well-versed in conflict resolution theory and practice, the learnings may appear to be stating the obvious. However, our experience is that the majority of people are not consciously aware that there are different options available to them in managing conflict let alone having the ability to make strategic choices as to when to use one approach over another and how.

The key learning to be drawn out of the training section that follows, is that underlying conflicts, especially when grounded in ideological differences, cannot always be resolved. However they may, and very often do manifest themselves as disputes. It is important to choose the most appropriate way, given the circumstances, of managing conflict as one can only resolve disputes effectively if one can manage conflict.

After introductory exercises dealing with "what is conflict" and when and how it may be constructive as well as destructive, we move onto the different styles commonly used in managing conflict. Using the well-known Thomas-Killman model (see below), we plot axes using low-assertiveness, high-assertiveness and low-cooperativeness, high-cooperativeness as variables. We then plot the different styles on the graph as follows:



(Adapted from Thomas-Killman)

To ensure that participants do not get caught up in labels without fully understanding the concepts, we use an exercise to develop understanding and integrate the learning.

In pairs, using specially developed packs of cards, participants sort the mini-scenarios on the cards into the five different styles. Some of the cards are ambiguous — making the point that the styles are often fluid and do not exist in isolation from one another. The aim is for participants to reach an understanding of what modes of behaviour characterise the different styles. Participants then sort the cards into when the particular style is used appropriately and when inappropriately. It is important to stress:

1. That all styles may be appropriate given the right circumstances.
2. It is never appropriate to rely only on one style.

Appropriateness or inappropriateness of an approach is determined through being aware of the potential outcome of the choice one makes. Not only is it important to be aware that there are different ways of doing things, but what are the likely consequences that will result from opting for one approach as opposed to another. We encourage parties to first analyse the circumstances (including the power relationships), decide on what they want their relationship to look like after the dispute has been dealt with, and then decide on the most appropriate way of dealing with the dispute in order to achieve that desired outcome. In order to consolidate the learning we might get participants to analyse or role play some of the card game scenarios, or specific conflicts that people are presently dealing with. The full range of options within each style is also explored. For example, if participants feel that the use of power is an appropriate and effective way of managing a particular conflict, we would explore different ways of using power (and its potential consequences) such as violence, use of the media, voting, and the threat of the use of power. The benefit is two-fold:

1. Participants get some practice in the conscious use of different styles;
2. They experience first-hand and in a safe environment, the inter-

personal consequences and longer-term results of using the different approaches.

In terms of the process, it is important to note that the learnings are generated by the participants themselves. The trainer does not lecture on what style to use, when and why. After experiencing the styles themselves, participants discuss the advantages and disadvantages and challenge each other's knowledge and perceptions in order to learn. The trainer's input comes at the end as a top-up where necessary to summarise or re-emphasise learning points.

Given the need for participants to equip themselves with negotiation skills, we would then move on to demonstrating that the way one most often manages conflict is closely linked with the way one negotiates.

Most people approach conflict using a competitive/forcing style and this generally translates into a positional style of negotiating. However, just as there are different ways of handling conflict, so too are there different ways of approaching negotiations.

We expose participants to these different approaches, namely interest-based and positional bargaining, and through a role play give participants practice in the different approaches. Participants experience what the effects of these approaches are on helping or hindering settlement.

As conflict handling styles are appropriate or inappropriate depending on the circumstances, so to, the different approaches to negotiation have both costs and benefits depending on the situation, power distance and the nature of the relationship. Again, the participants themselves explore the costs and benefits drawing from past experiences, each other, and the role plays.

The main learning is that the required outcome for the negotiation itself, the short and long term relationship, as well as the specific circumstances, should inform the approach negotiations take. The emphasis is on empowering participants to make informed and conscious decisions.

Because of the history of conflict and lack of accessibility of some of the options — e.g. negotiation and the courts, the issue of power (sources of, access to and use of) needs to be explored thoroughly. There are often

tremendous power imbalances between interest groups and the authorities with whom they need to negotiate with. There is no culture of good-faith negotiation between the parties and their past experience is one of being repressed and coerced by those very same authorities. Training needs to acknowledge this and work in the context of past experience to create the potential for a new reality.

It is important to stress that the trainer is not promoting one option to the exclusion of all the others. What is important, is for the participants to be aware of the potential consequences of the strategies and approaches. A useful analytical tool for participants is to consider what their next best alternative is, if they fail to reach a negotiated agreement. The term used is BATNA, or Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. Parties need to evaluate all the possible outcomes of the approaches open to them. They need to assess their BATNA, not only in terms of if it will get them what they want, but also in terms of the transaction costs: i.e. Time, money, likelihood of conflict recurring, mutual satisfaction with the outcome, effect on short and long-term relationship.

If it is necessary to use power or the threat of power to achieve an aim, the choice should be made in an informed and responsible way. Strategy should be thought through and all possibilities explored rather than responding reactively with a potentially damaging approach, for all parties.

The training follows the path whereby participants are made aware of and practice interpersonal, communication and negotiation skills such as listening skills; dealing with anger (your own and others); dealing with threats, dealing with deadlock and developing options, to equip participants to negotiate more effectively.

Through facilitated learning, participants draw out the criteria for what constitutes an effective and constructive negotiation from the planning and preparation stages to reaching settlement and implementation. We focus attention on understanding the dynamics of the conflict and the considerations and issues which need to be taken into account at all stages of the negotiation. The aim is that participants should understand and be able to reflect upon the complexity and breadth of issues involved in a political or community dispute.

Participants need the skills to identify the bargaining arena and analyse and assess the conflict. Through an extended, realistic role-play, parties grapple with the issue of power and how to get parties to the negotiating table.

Using the same role-play participants explore the processes for obtaining mandates and selecting their negotiating teams. They follow the negotiation process through making concessions, reaching settlement, evaluating agreements, ratifying with their constituencies, implementation and follow up.

It is important that parties are able to separate content issues from the process issues. To facilitate this understanding, we use the "What"/"How" model developed by Radford and Glaser.

The "WHAT" refers to the substance of "What you do", the "HOW" refers to the process, or "How you do it".

The distinction is important as the aim of the training is not to provide solutions to the problems and issues currently experienced by participants — the "What". This creates a dependence on the trainer/facilitator as different problems do and will continually arise and a third party will need to be called in again and again. The aim rather is to empower the participants with the skills and tools as to "how" they themselves can effectively deal with the issues they are currently dealing with and those that will arise in the future.

As mentioned above, there is no single process that can be applied to all disputes ensuring their effective resolution. Each context within which disputes arise is different. Participants need to develop their own judgment skills and levels of awareness and understanding so that they can effectively deal with each new situation that arises given its own set of specific circumstances.

The nature and complexity of the disputes facing the participants back in the community or political environment will determine to what extent participants can even begin to try out new skills learned. It would be unrealistic to expect a three day course in dispute resolution to completely erase ingrained behaviours and attitudes.

An essential component of our training is a continual process of self-evaluation and reflection. Participants need to constantly integrate new learnings, tying them in with previous experiences and adding onto the learning blocks. It is also essential to ensure that the training does not exist in a vacuum. So often training courses are a lot of fun and make a change from everyday reality, but as soon as one returns to the real-life situation, old styles of behavior re-emerge. Built into our programmes are mechanisms which get participants to draw links between what they are learning and how they can apply what they have learned. Through these processes, the participants and the trainer can assess whether or not learning has taken place.

An important question is, how can we evaluate if the training is having any longer-term benefits?

Unlike the confined and easily identifiable work environment where one can conduct a case-study evaluating the effectiveness of training, the political and community context does not allow for such case studies. In the industrial arena, effective learning can be assessed, eg. according to how well the parties perform and how constructive their negotiations turn out to be.

Here are some ideas for assessing the longer term benefits of community/political dispute resolution training. It is insufficient to merely assess how well participants have understood and can repeat the processes. Rather, effective learning can be assessed depending on how well participants are able to apply these process skills to their particular issues. To this end I would recommend interventions that combine facilitation and training. That is, dealing with the WHAT/HOW distinction simultaneously.

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# **Tribal Methods of Conflict Resolution — The Palestinian Model: *Atwah* or *Sulh Asha'iry***

DR. ALI H. QLEIBO

*Atwah* is a tribal method of resolving social conflicts and it is precisely this collective aspect that makes it socially binding by crystalizing intra-tribal alliances and promoting social solidarity. It is a preferable means by which social conflicts are resolved in the various Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent, and typifies the tribal element in Arab culture. A pre-Islamic tribal tradition it has been accepted and practiced by the prophet Mohammed thus gaining its legitimate authority in many Arab societies.

In large areas of the modern Arab world, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine *atawah* coexists alongside with both: a) the formal legal court systems as introduced by the Napoleonic code into the Arab world and b) the *shari'a* law, i.e., formal Muslim law. Against this background *atawah* may be viewed as a semitic tribal legal system a sort of local understanding of justice that has survived and evolved in the shadow of Arab society.

Modern nation states express ambivalent attitudes towards this intra-family, intra-tribal manner of resolving conflicts independent of the state-run jural penal systems as may be observed in the case of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon. In these countries the government may recognize resolutions reached by tribal law in regions far off from urban centers in desolate desert areas whose residents are bound in their life-style by highly coercive tribal kinships and corresponding set of social obligations and alliances. Noteworthy among such

nomadic or semi-nomadic tribal populations is the paramount importance of the kinship unit known locally as the *hamuleh*. In brief, the *hamuleh* is a phratry composed of five generations descendant of a single grandfather that has the operational function of a closely knit extended family. In Arab urban centers with heterogeneous populations namely peasants, bedouins and traditional city dwellers, the legal channels by which conflicts are resolved can be highly problematic. Traditional tribal values such as honour (*sharaf*) and an archaic understanding of justice can leave a significant cross-section of the urban populations extremely dissatisfied with official law courts and may instead of resolving the conflict help inadvertently to further muddle the situation. The Jordanian legal system for practical reasons has recently sought to encompass and accept the decisions worked out by family tribunals as formally binding. In the Occupied Territories, in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip because of the refusal of the Palestinians to recognize and normalize relations with the Israeli legal system and in effect in the absence of a Palestinian legal apparatus *atwah* or *sulh asha'iry* has become par excellence the major method by which intra-Arab conflicts are resolved.

The process of solving social conflicts through the mediation of family tribunals may alternatively be described as *atwah* or *sulh asha'iry*. In fact both terms describe the same social ritual. Whereas the word *sulh asha'iry* may be roughly translated as tribal reconciliation, the other term *atwah* refers more directly to the social aspect of the process conjuring a series of values indispensable to traditional tribal society such as honour (*sharaf*) saving face (*karamah*), gallantry (*nakhweh*), valiance (*murua'h*), wisdom (*hilm*) and generosity (*karam*).

*Atwah* is a polysemic concept that does not allow for cross-cultural literal translation. The word itself, as is common to all semitic words, has the triadic root *ata*. The verb in the infinitive may be understood as equivalent to the English verb to give. But the similarity stops here . . . *Ata* as an Arabic personal name of a male child is understood to mean "given by God," i.e., *Ata*, the first born male (*Hiba* is the equivalent name given to a female). The personal name in effect comes to mean: giveth as a gift, a prestation . . . since in Arab society it is "the Lord that giveth and the Lord that taketh." As nouns *Hiba* is an unconditional gift and *Ata* is a conditional gift.



*Atwah* the quality of *ata*, as in giving, is better understood circumstantially within the overall system of tribal reconciliation. A crisis may arise if a truck driver hits a van and the driver of the van is killed. Among the Arabs such an incident may quickly develop into a blood feud and a vendetta may quickly follow up to avenge the *wasting* of a kinsman blood. To avoid the chance of such a problem until absence of malicious intention is clearly established by proving beyond doubt that the death was totally accidental, a tribal reconciliation is considered of great importance.

The truck driver will seek the immediate protection of his own *hamuleh* who will immediately form an emissary that will be dispatched to visit a number of unrelated but closely allied headsmen of other *hamule*'s whose role will be to mediate with the *hamuleh* of the murdered van driver. These tribesmen who are recognized as local dignitaries immediately pay a visit to the family of the deceased whose own *hamuleh* is already gathered in his house or in the *hamuleh* guest house (*diwan*). The purpose of this visit is to take *atawah*. In this particular context the word *atawah* is understood as a generous gift in which a truce is given for an agreed-upon period of time and that guarantees safety for the culprit, the truck driver. In fact it means that he will not be subject during this period of time to a vendetta.

As such *atawah* is understood as the act of making a truce (*hudne*) and in fact giving peace. It is the first step in a series of endless visits and discussions during which the family of the deceased carries out its own investigations concerning the circumstances of the accident and all possible contact prior to the accident between the victim and the culprit. meanwhile the culprit is slowly integrated into the meetings until, at a certain point, he gradually assumes a voice and is allowed to state his version of the story in front of the family of the victim. If absence of malice is established the family of the murdered may generously pardon him. On the other hand, if the deceased has a widow and helpless children an *atawah muhamadie* is asked for, i.e., blood money. The Jordanian government, in order to curb arbitrary greed and to exercise official control on excessive demands, has interfered and has set the standard amount at 10,000 Jordanian dinars.

Two factors, social and psychological, play a crucial role in the socially binding resolutions reached by *atawa* a) the *hamula* and the corollary honour

— *sharaf* system b) the individual sense of satisfied appeasement that both parties carry with them when they resume regular social life. The series of social events that accompanies the conflict resolution take place in great pomp and becomes social occasion on which huge feasts are organized (paid for the culprit) and a great number of lambs are sacrificed. On the one hand the family of the victim is highly deferred to and overly pampered in order to appease the slighted to their honour that they sustained through the transgression, albeit accidental. On the other hand, the culprit has occasion to show off his wealth and, more important, to assert his social status through his close association and dependency on the dignified allies who represented his cause. In nomadic and peasant society where meat is rarely eaten these legal rituals become festive social occasions.

I asked my bedouin informant to give me one good reason underlying their preference for tribal law and his answer was succinctly eloquent; "because the culprit has to pay money as a punishment." He then explained that governmental punitive measures such as incarceration are meaningless. "He (the culprit) will sit in prison and do nothing . . . he has his food brought to him and a place to sleep and rest . . . but in tribal law he must pay money . . . for the coffee, the sugar, the flour, the rice, and the goats and he must work very hard to get the necessary money, this is true punishment." To save face the food must be plenty, generosity being a highly esteemed value; on the other hand to be pampered, to be difficult to be persuaded to forgive and finally do so is gallant. However if blood money was taken or its cash equivalent for other transgressions the plaintive, his honour redeemed stands up and says "This is my right, *haqq* it is not generosity *karam* from you . . ." In effect both parties, the family of the victim and the culprit assert their social status and can achieve further social standing through the *atweh* system that rallies around each parties local dignitaries as allies.

Social conflicts that would require *sulhas* can range from neighbours' squabbles over a fence, trespassing rights, rape, (*sa'ihet al dhoha*) and include individual sense of personal affront if an individual is insulted publicly, the insult would immediately escalate to collective dishonour which the whole *hamuleh* will rise to defend. A family squabble can ensue if a person decides to build a high fence that would seem to shut off the sunlight and the air from

the neighbours' adjacent house. The plaintive neighbour can complain politely; if his plea is ignored he will feel slighted and will seek the support of local notables and dignitaries. The process begins with his private visit to these notables to explain his case and the whole *atwah* process will be set in motion.

The social context allows for infinite conflicts to arise but the option for one method of resolving the conflict over another is not a matter of personal choice. The *atwah* system equally popular by choice among Christian and Muslim tribal and peasant Arabs is deeply rooted in the fact that Arab society on the whole is a shame oriented society. Social pressure in a small scale society where most transactions are carried on familial personal bases exerts a strong coercive power, the collective body has its own understanding of proper and improper behaviour and it is in this context that the concepts of honour and shame exist. The individual is either a respected member of the collective body or is ostracised with no special weight or rights. In such a cultural system one has to preserve his honour in public and *atwah* or *sulh ashary* is a major means of establishing individual status and family prestige.

# **Conflict in Jerusalem — Discussion Session**

**Led by AVI MELAMED**

**Deputy Advisor on Arab Affairs, Jerusalem Municipality**

*Jay Rothman:* Avi Melamed will be speaking about incidents of conflict in Jerusalem in which violence was very much involved from the outset. He will talk about the ways that the municipality sought to reduce the conflict. We will also ask our participants from overseas to tell us if they have any comments specifically on the incidents Avi talks about. What approaches can they suggest given their own context, experience and models.

*Avi Melamed:* My name is Avi. I am a fourth generation Jew from Jerusalem. I am going to speak about violent conflict between communities based on my everyday experience regarding Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.

About 400,000 Jews are living in Jerusalem alongside an Arab population estimated at about 150,000. We are talking here about two totally different communities, bitterly divided regarding the question as to what should be Jerusalem's political destiny. Should it be as it is today the one and only undivided capital of the state of Israel where the Jews and Arabs are under Israeli authority? Or should the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem come again under Arab rule, and perhaps be the future capital of the Palestinian state should it be established?

On the one hand, the Arabs are motivated by a constant feeling that the Arab-Christian and Moslem-identity of Jerusalem is under threat from

Israel and Zionism, especially since the 1967 War. Any controversial move which might, according to the Arabs, threaten that identity should be resisted firmly.

On the other hand, Jews consider what is known as the reunification of Jerusalem during the Six Day War as a historical and even mystical event which symbolizes the unity and historical role of the Jewish nation. Therefore, the Jews resist any act which they think challenges that reality.

During the last five years, during what is known as the Palestinian uprising, the intifada, the conflict in Jerusalem between the communities, Jews and Arabs, has intensified and become more violent. This conflict is based on initial hostility which led to situations with explosive potential. There follows an explosion which sets up reaction and leads to a circle of violence.

I shall now describe the violent conflict in Jerusalem by analyzing two serious incidents that happened in the last two years and in which I was unfortunately involved.

Two years ago, it was a very lovely day. Generally I notice that the most violent events happen on very fine days. The birds are singing while people are getting killed. Two years ago, on this fine day, the bodies of two young Jewish boys were found in the north side of Jerusalem. Within one hour, the city was "on fire" from the north to the south. Violent clashes occurred between Arab and Jews all through the city. I myself had the doubtful privilege to be stoned twice. Once by Arabs who thought I was a Jew and once by Jews who thought I was an Arab.

Believe me, it was a frightening thing. The police lost control. People were clashing everywhere. Cars were burned. One Arab was killed. Dozens were injured. Some of them severely injured. It was a terrifying thing and I was caught in the middle. I was blocked in a house in an Arab area. The house was attacked by rioters and things reached the point where I thought that maybe I should try to use my gun against Jews. At this point I would like to stop and ask our foreign guests what part does conflict resolution have in a case like this?

*Mari Fitzduff:* Our own experience is often very similar in situations where a small Catholic neighborhood's surrounded by many Protestant neighbor-

hoods or vice versa. Can I just start by pointing out that the figures that you give of Jerusalem as to the relative size of the two communities. There has been evidence in France to show that as soon as a minority reaches 25%, between 20% and 25, you have trouble. As soon as that minority grows to about 45%, cooperation starts. So difficulty is at its maximum when a minority is between 25% and 45%, as it is in Jerusalem. I would like to distinguish between immediate and long-term. The Community Relations Council in Belfast frequently gets phone calls from groups asking what can we do in a specific conflict situation.

Short-term work, given that the police have failed to keep order is often problematic. We would usually use what we call the “decent people” who are often even the priests, the pastors, sometimes the doctors or particularly the women to attempt to repair the damage. In Northern Ireland there is no group, paramilitary or police, who can face up to a group of determined women. Men are very reluctant to stone or to kill women. We would often phone round to get a group of women from both communities who would actually go and put these rioting men in their places. I have seen my own aunt face up to a group of five paramilitaries who had just blown up an army contingent. They tried to come to the garden of her house over a hedge. She stood in front of them and said: ‘You are not going to break down my hedge’. These were people who had just blown up a bus load of soldiers. We often use either women, the priests or the doctors in a situation like that.

*Gutierrez:* The only experience I know of response to a violent confrontation is in Guatemala. The Menonites in Guatemala have quick response training, and when an army group comes to a peasant village, they go and meet them first. By so doing they have often prevented peasants from being murdered.

The second thing may be to involve the media, the television camera. People try to destroy television cameras when they are involved in violence. So if you have people who are willing to use the camera to make the public aware of what is happening, you may be able to help.

*Karen Meidzinski:* We have the sort of situation Mr. Melamed described arising all the time with violent interactions. We try to handle it by training

people who can step in as mediators in crisis situations. How successful they are, we are not sure. They seek to identify leaders or “decent people” in each of the conflicts of groups. Such efforts must be directed entirely to your own community. Once you have quieted them down a bit the mediation becomes possible.

*Paula Gutlove:* The situation described is not the kind that is right for a dialogue. I think it is important to know when you need law, when you need force, and when you need other means. In this kind of a crisis, you need a system of law.

*Avi Melamed:* In the end I did not use my gun. In fact the official representatives of the municipality and the police did not deal with the matter. Instead, a very positive thing happened. In the very hour of terror and violence a local initiative taken both by Arabs from Beit Safafa (the Arab village where violence was most acute) and by Jews from Gilo, a nearby Jewish neighborhood. They generated a common activity, a local guard, unarmed, which in the very first hour of the riots started acting with only one aim—to prevent violent elements reaching the area where the violence was taking place. The guard had no arms. It was made up of groups of 3 or four walking together through the neighborhood. Half of them were Arabs, half of them were Jews. They prevented trouble makers from entering the area.

After that initiative an approach was made to the municipality to follow up. We, of course, gladly responded. We called a meeting. I think the first meeting was on the first night, the very same evening after the day of the riot. The municipality started trying to organize these meetings but the original initiative was taken by the people from the neighborhood.

I turn now to my second incident. October the 8th, 1990, was one of the most tragic days in history of conflict between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem. Eighteen Palestinians were killed on that day in violent conflict on “Haram Al-Sharif” or Temple Mount in which unfortunately I was involved as before. It was the Jewish Feast known as Succot, one of the important Jewish holidays. Normally, Jews go to the Western Wall as their forefathers went to the Temple in ancient times. A group of Jews, extremists known as

the "Temple Mount Faithful," announced a few days before Succot that its members intend to go to the Temple Mount and carry out some kind of religious ceremony. When this announcement was made, it generated enormous anxiety and fear among the Arabs. They responded immediately by saying that they would not allow Jews to enter this Temple Mount at this time.

Immediately my Department started the process of dialogue with the Arab leadership, with the Jews. Finally the issue reached the Supreme Court which issued an order preventing the entrance of the Temple Mount Faithful to the Mount. I myself announced the Court's decision to the Supreme Moslem Council and the Moslem leadership in Jerusalem. It looked as if the crisis was behind us. But on October 8th violence took place. I entered the Temple Mount while the shooting was going on. People were being arrested. The whole place was full of tear gas. Nobody knows for sure what happened. When I entered the Temple Mount, bodies were everywhere. The first thing I did was run over to the offices of the Moslem Council Leadership. I entered and I saw one of those who I had spoken with the night before and who had told me: 'don't worry, everything is under control'. Let me stop at this point. I am on the Temple Mount. Bodies are lying everywhere. What should we do to resolve the conflict?

*Ali Qleibo:* The word you used most often, the Temple Mount, is not really acceptable. The correct usage is the "Haram al-Sharif." It is a very sensitive use of the word.

*Jay Rothman:* Thanks for the correction. For other people who do not know what this is about, there are two words for the same area. There is the Hebrew word which in English is the "Temple Mount" and the Arab world "Haram al-Sharif."

*Mari Fitzduff:* I feel terribly at home. The dispute over language is a very significant one. For those of us working in conflict resolution, there is always the fear that at some level we will inadvertently use language that does not take account of sensibilities of other people. I do not wish to comment on the totality of the incident you described because quite honestly I have not



followed its real implications. Perhaps one long-term answer is to educate each community to respect the other's culture. A second, when we suspect a crisis is going to happen, it is the use of what we call observing. We would actually have a team, perhaps an international team, who are observers. They make it known to all parties that they are there to observe and this can encourage people to be on their best behavior so that in fact, if anything happens, it will not be their particular group who would be blamed.

*Karen Meidzinski:* I do not have anything to say about that incident itself or on the action which you took beforehand. What is worth setting up is a structure made up of members representing the different parties, at which anyone has heard or hears a rumor of violence, a meeting can immediately be called to assess whether there is anything in the rumor. If there was any likelihood that in fact it was the truth they would work upon preventing it.

*Ali Qleibo:* I just want to say something at this point. First of all, an event like this has so many different versions. Mr. Melamed knows one version. He codifies it in particular terms and on particular political/ideological lines. You have other people who will see the act in their own terms. As far as the Arabs are concerned, one of the most popular versions is that it was a pure accident. Two boys were playing with a tear gas cylinder. Tear gas came out. Something they did not know. The Arabs thought the Jews were attacking them. They threw stones. The Jews saw the stones and so on. Whatever the truth of the matter the incident derived from mutual mistrust.

Basically what you want to ask about is strategies for preventing the violent reactions which led to deaths, but I feel a need to dispute your account. We cannot look at 'conflict resolution' while we are still in conflict over facts.

*Avi Melamed:* I just said before nobody knows for sure, and I think nobody will ever know, what happened. Can we deal with such incidents? Perhaps in the long-term I think the answer for that question is on two different levels. I realize that inside the communities both Jews and Arabs, there are positive forces who are willing and capable to try and generate a process that will either prevent or stop the process of violence.

I would like to conclude with something more personal. Though my job is very frustrating, there is something very striking about Jerusalem. Despite the bitter conflict the bottom line is that in some mysterious way a normal framework of life is being kept intact. Every day, 40,000 people, Jews, are going from south to north and north to south, crossing the way, huge Arab sections and almost nothing bad is happening.

I have an explanation for this "normality" on two levels. The first one is 'common sense'. The majority of people, Arabs and Jews, want to live peacefully. The second thing is that we, at the Jerusalem municipality, as an authority which deals with the issue of co-existence of two different communities, have as Mayor Kollek said, a very simple principle. Co-existence does not mean necessarily integration. The two can live one next to the other. Each can live within its own cultural and educational heritage and have its own goals and aims. Living side by side in harmony is a practical possibility.

## **Conflict Resolution and Its Future Role in Israel — Discussion Session**

At the end of the seminar a discussion took place on the future role of conflict resolution in Israel. The discussion was centred on the text of a statement drawn up at an earlier meeting held in May, 1992, by some 40 of those who had taken part in earlier work done by the Project on Managing Political Disputes.

The text of this statement was as follows:

“To establish an institute devoted exclusively to conflict resolution to provide and promote creative mechanisms for resolving social conflicts. It will be modelled on conflict resolution programs around the world, in particular those in ethnically divided societies (e.g. the Community Relations Council in Northern Ireland, the Centre for Intergroup Studies and Independent Mediation Services in South Africa, Community Boards, San Francisco, etc.).

The Institute will provide on-going mechanisms for enhancing communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution processes within Israel and between Israel and her Arab neighbors. The immediate future of Israeli-Palestinian relations as the latter enter into a new period in their national history of self government will be of particular concern to the Institute. The Institute will also be committed to addressing intra-group disputes within each respective community (e.g. between religious and secular communities.

To begin with we envision three areas of concentration: education and training; conflict resolution intervention/mediation; basic and policy-oriented research and writing. We are convinced that conflict resolution is an idea whose time has seriously arrived for Israel, both within the society and between Israel and her neighbors, and thus we are committed to permanently establishing a sound and useful vehicle for promoting and conducting conflict resolution activity in Israel.”

*Mari Fitzduff:* When we set up the Community Relations Council in Northern Ireland, we went as high as possible to find support; as high as was necessary both in seeking to involve government and also appointing our governing body, 24 people all of whom are powerful in their own right within their own communities. This was in order to ensure the respect that is needed for the Council if our work is to succeed and if we needed, for instance, to challenge government. We had with us a group of very strong people who could not be dismissed out of hand. It actually took a few years to ensure that we were accepted at the highest possible levels and sponsored by people who commanded respect right across the community. This did not mean they did not have political perspectives and some of them would be quite open about the political options they preferred but they were absolutely committed to pursuing those options within a process designed to secure mutual understanding. That was all we asked of them.

*Robin Twite:* Did you go around talking to these individuals? Did you actually get them in a corner and tell them what you wanted and have a blueprint already?

*Mari Fitzduff:* We won the government first.

*Jay Rothman:* Who is we? You and a group of friends?

*Mari Fitzduff:* A colleague and I worked in association with the Commission of Human Rights which is a government organisation. You in Israel may not have the same type of institution. We worked with a body which was set up to advise the government. They actually took a lot of responsibility for getting us established. We did also a survey which gained a consensus about what was needed from about 30 significant institutions, so that we knew what they wanted and could persuade them to support us.

*Jay Rothman:* Were you sure from the beginning that you wanted the Council to be government connected and funded?

*Mari Fitzduff:* No. We took a lot of advice on that. We took advice about whether there should be an institution and secondly about whether it should be government funded. In the end, the decision was that if it was not government funded, the government would not listen to us. But the option of seeking independent resources also existed and I would not rule that out. There are pluses and minuses in being funded by government.

*Jay Rothman:* You claim that you have been able to maintain your freedom and independence in spite of receiving government funding.

*Mari Fitzduff:* We have but that was because we had very strong people in our Council from the beginning who were convinced that this was necessary, who only said that they would do the job if they were given freedom.

*Robin Twite:* Also there is a tradition in British society that allows for such freedom. The BBC is the best example I can think of organisations that are in effect government funded but are controlled by independent boards. I think that that is something unfamiliar to Israel.

I should like to ask you about your relationship to universities because here much work on conflict resolution and community relations has been taking place at the universities. They have sponsored research and provided space for it but are a little apprehensive about the non-academic aspects. While they are clear about their interest in conflict resolution in an international context such as the dispute between Syria and Israel, or within the peace process, I have a feeling that there is doubt about the social, intercommunal aspects.

*Mari Fitzduff:* The articulation of the recognition that a top level process is unlikely to succeed without a lot of work at a whole variety of other levels, is a first step that you have to take in the search for credibility.

On the question about universities, the universities in Northern Ireland would have been incapable of spawning an organization like ours because at the end of the day they do basic research and the idea of even making recommendations is somewhat anathema to them. We now ask them

to carry out some research for us but insist that it be combined with active involvement, with recommendations. The universities are still struggling with this concept. They have, however, begun to recognize that they need to serve the community in a much more practice-oriented way.

*Paula Gutlove:* I am thinking of the center of which I was the first director, the Balkans Peace Project, the experience of which is relevant. One of the things that we started with was a strong board and I am wondering whether or not you ought to put together both an advisory board and a working board. An advisory board of luminaries who give their names and a working board who are prepared to work. A couple of other things you need to decide. One is if you want it to be an independent institute or if you want it to be an institute with an academic connection, or a religious connection, or a government connection? You have a variety of options. Our center is a non-governmental organization that has an affiliation with Harvard so that it can use the Harvard name but it is completely separate from Harvard. It uses Harvard's space but we raise our own money and the money does not flow through Harvard which gives us a lot of independence. It gives us a lot of independence but the association with Harvard gives us a lot of credibility. I don't know whether that is a possibility here in Israel?

The way we were able to obtain affiliation was to put together a board of very influential people in terms of Harvard. I think that one of the things that's not clear so far is whether in Israel you want to have an academic or a community based group. You say that you are committed to working on inter-group disputes in different communities but you also are interested in doing work within the society and between Israel and her neighbors. You are interested in both the diplomatic level and the intra-communal level. I think there are some important decisions that need to be made before you are able to set up the institute because if your mandate is too broad, you are not going to be focused enough.

The only other thing I wanted to say is that for an institute like this, I think it is critical that your board be multi-partisan. You have clear representation from a variety of constituencies. And that it not be "your" institute or "your" effort but a group effort.

*Mari Fitzduff:* Can I just reemphasize that point. We found that there was no difficulty in persuading people who would have what we call different political preferences to come on board together. The only commitment that we asked of them was to this kind of process.

*Paula Gutlove:* One other thing I was thinking about and I don't know how possible it is would be to seek a grant for about a year to research what the best kind of institution would be. Rather than starting with the institute start with a research project. I do not know if you've already done this. If you get a grant to research the best kind of institute and have some money, you can involve people gradually.

*Naomi Sheffer:* I think a lot is going on in conflict resolution in Israel. Many people are doing field work with grassroots population using the same models as are used in Northern Ireland and in the Institute in Boston. Through such efforts many individuals understand more fully the context that we live in and are able actually to talk to other people within their communities and of course to Arab neighbors.

*Ali Qleibo:* The choice of a Board is important. It is not at all effective if you choose politicians. These people are already far disengaged from the people. You want to get in touch with the people. The big names can give credibility. They will put you in contact with the universities, with the high schools, with the different communities. But they should not be involved with the proposed institute directly. Many of them represent a particular political party and they will not have the time to work.

*Jay Rothman:* But that's true everywhere. That's true in England too. People give their names. You don't expect them to go to the work but you need them because without them, you do not have legitimacy.

*Mari Fitzduff:* I think Dr. Qleibo has an absolutely valid point. We not only had the heavy weights but we also had the community. In fact we have ex-paramilitaries, ex-extremists, who are now involved in community develop-

ment. We had a whole variety of people involved at the local level involvement as well as having the heavy weights. How did it work? With a lot of attention and a lot of care, it actually worked. When I said the advisory board needed powerful people, I did not necessarily mean powerful people only. We have people from every level, but not active politicians.

*Jay Rothman:* All I am sure is that conflict resolution as a concept in practice needs to be legitimized in a serious way in Israel and I am not sure how best to do it. That is what we are discussing now.

*Mari Fitzduff:* I think you have a real problem with energy. The strange thing is a community relations council seldom does not do community relations work. What it does is assist groups who do it to develop their strategies. It will network with them. It will fund them if necessary. You cannot do it all. We work through other organizations. In Northern Ireland if you responded every time the media rang you up about a particular incident, you would never be off the phone. You would soon lose credibility. But our Community Relations Council assists a lot of other groups to do media work and to talk about appropriate responses in communities. Work in one particular place could take up years of your time but if you could assist a group who are committed and loyal to that particular place, then that work can proliferate. It is the ripple effect. There are six hundred groups we have been working with in the last two years. You are talking about crisis work, medium term work and long term work and developing strategies for it and making sure you do not have to do all the work, or indeed even a thousandth of the work, yourself but you help others to get it done.

*Ilana Rosenman:* I have heard now several functions of the proposed centre. Crisis intervention is one function. I think you said long term services that go on regardless of whatever else is happening is another. Prevention, effecting policy or policymakers, and research are yet others. It seems to me that we should look at all of them as being important but not all of them have to be done by the same actual group of activists. It would be a shame to start weighing which one of these is more important. There may be two or three more which



we have not identified yet but we can divide the work up. They do not all have to be done by the same people as long as there is networking and cooperation going on between us.

*Paula Gutlove:* I just wanted to mention that in the city of Los Angeles, they set up an umbrella group for crisis resolution which met once a month for a couple of hours in the morning and all the people representing the various organizations (and there were many far flung organizations working in this area), made sure that they had a credible representative at that meeting.

*Jay Rothman:* It was after the crisis?

*Paula Gutlove:* It was ongoing. This was a continual thing to keep a way for people to network together about all the different things that were going on, to help each other in areas that they needed and to be a communication source for all the people working in crisis and conflict resolution because there are so many proliferating agencies.

*Robin Twite:* To change the subject somewhat I should like to ask if any of you know where in Israel would you go at present if you needed a mediator?

*Naomi Sheffer:* At the Ministry of Labor we have trained mediators, group leaders. We can take them to a very short intensive course and train them to go back to their own communities. We have done this in the university. You have to go back to the community to deal with the problem of the community. You have to take a mediator who is growing within the population and is able to talk to the population. The group who work in Talpilot when there were riots there took upon themselves to prevent any other outburst of violence in the community. They took upon themselves to build a program, a community program, to prevent other violence. Of course, we hope that the community we work with might feel a little bit better, more secure when they started to develop some notions of 'good' Arabs as well as 'bad' Arabs, of being able to talk to each other, of not blaming the whole community because of the bad deed of just one person. You have to go back to the community. We have four million

people in Israel who do not know much about how to behave in a crisis.

*Karen Meidzinski:* The communities themselves need to identify who they are going to trust as mediators. No matter how many organizations pop up all over the place of people who are interested in conflict resolution and people who think they have the skills and think that they will be great at it, it is the community that must find the solution. So we need to get into the communities and meet with people and find conflict resolution people who are in trustworthy and credible positions.

*Jay Rothman:* Karen, can you tell us more about how did your institution start, because it seems to be the opposite of Mari's. You're totally non-governmental. How did you go about doing it?

*Karen Meidzinski:* We started off a lot smaller. We started off in the industrial arena about eight years ago. It was an academic initiative but not connected with an academic institution. It was working in industrial conflict resolution first; then it was decided that we should start thinking about promoting ideas on mediating more widely in South Africa. We also got together a board of part time qualified highly respected individuals who decided that they would promote the concept. Such as people who were well respected in business and who had some say with the unions. A board was set up and then a small office in a business school. The process started very slowly by phoning companies, people who were in conflict and promoting the services to them of alternative conflict resolution. In the first year we did about 30 mediations and four arbitrations which was really terribly hard work. The service grew and grew through promotion and through word of mouth. We advertized. This year, we are doing 600 mediations and a similar number of arbitrations, both in industry and elsewhere.

*Ali Qleibo:* The situation you describe in South Africa is perhaps idealistic for Palestinians. We cannot imagine them. We do not have any organizations. The Israelis have a state. They have unions. It is a system that is clearly established. For the Palestinians, there are no unions. There are no

organizations. The Palestinian workers within Israel have individual contracts. There are no unions speaking for them.

You have to distinguish between the conflicts within the green line (the 1967 border of Israel) and those in the West Bank and Gaza.

*Robin Twite:* Even if there is a political settlement there will be many small disputes which will need some kind of resolution if they are not to grow into major disputes. So there are really two complete sets of problems here. The problem with what happens within Israel as it was before 1967 and the problem of what happens in the West Bank if there is a settlement. We should distinguish. There may be a need for two separate institutional frameworks.

*Naomi Sheffer:* When you are working on a community level, you have to bear in mind that you have to start to work with each community separately before you meet two communities. Even Arabs and Jews within the green line. You have to work first with the Jews and then with the Arabs separately and then to meet those groups together on a more common ground of understanding, of ability to converse, of ability to share some responsibility for mutual agreement. Because of the situation of the population, the Arabs and the Jews, even within the green line, you cannot work immediately on the grassroots with two groups together.

*Jay Rothman:* We are having two conversations. One is a strategy of how we go about doing our work and the other is the strategy about how we go about institutionalizing our work. And they are two sets of related discussions obviously but they are also different.

*Robin Twite:* I would like to try a little experiment to see whether there are certain things we are agreed with which we could all agree. Everybody has made a contribution but we have not focused it.

Firstly, I think we all agree that "conflict resolution" as a very broad heading is worthwhile. Secondly, I think we also agree that there is need for more impetus for this type of work. There are different views about where that impetus should come from but this society desperately needs an ability to

reconcile its conflicts and no one is in doubt about that. There is a gap.

Thirdly, this impetus can only be given if people from all sections of the community are involved, and especially those with influence. The board ought to represent no political party or interest group but be made up of individuals who command respect.

Fourthly, there has to be outside funding if the concept is to be realized. Whether it comes from the government or private sources is unclear. Most of us feel that the proposed institute or whatever it is called should be nonpolitical and "professional" at the level below the board. There should be professionals and they should be paid.

Fifthly, any such organization would need to be quite sophisticated in structure because it would need to take in the grassroots which Naomi put so much emphasis on and it would need support from higher levels as well. That is to say it would need to be the sort of body which could intervene to help people at the grassroots but also draw support from them. If we start setting up an institution without looking at what people really need, this will not work.

Lastly, we are agreed that there are two separate problems for conflict resolution within this area of the world. One within Israel within the green line where the Arab community enjoy legal equality. Admittedly they are discriminated against but there is equality before the law. The second, in the West Bank and Gaza where there is an immense imbalance in terms of power and the conflict resolution as between Jewish settlers and the Palestinian villages, (assuming there is a settlement) would be a separate and very difficult problem. One which ought to be thought of as part of the peace process.

It seems that in both cases, however, since things are so difficult, there has to be work on the conflicting groups separately to get them to change their attitudes rather than immediately bringing representatives of the two sides together. In other words, you have to explain what conflict resolution is before you can get interaction.

These are all points where there was some agreement. Recognizing them we can in the future consider how best to proceed.

## List of Participants

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Professor Yehuda Amir	Bar Ilan University
Merav Averbuch	Teacher/youth educator
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