Gordon Fellman

Peace in the World
or
The World in Pieces

Policy Studies ★ 34
In Memory of Brigadier General David Carmon
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PEACE IN THE WORLD OR THE WORLD IN PIECES

Micro-war, Paradigm Shift, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

SUMMARY

The persistence of the nuclear threat reveals a procedural framework governing encounters at individual, institutional, and national levels of analysis: the adversary paradigm. The assumption that the other side must be overcome or submitted to logically culminates in murder, war, and finally, the threat of nuclear annihilation.

After over forty years of living under the shadow of nuclear war, the nations of the world have begun to comprehend the gravity of the nuclear threat: there now appears to be a winding down of wars, for fear that even a conventional war could escalate into a nuclear face-off. Yet national conflicts persist in the form of “micro-war,” which retains, at small-scale levels, the essence of war. In micro-war, killing is individualized and personalized in such ways as to make it more fully comprehensible than in “macro-war.”

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a continuing micro-war that reveals for the world the basic nature of that human activity which now must be brought to an end, lest the nuclear threat be realized. A classic case of the adversary paradigm, the conflict offers the opportunity to move to the alternative, namely, the mutuality paradigm. The latter builds from empathy, humanization of the other, and interdependence, while the adversary paradigm is based on attempts to dominate, exploitation, and dehumanization of the other.

Israelis and Palestinians have the opportunity to represent and model a transition from the saliency of the adversary paradigm in human consciousness and behavior to the beginnings of saliency of the mutuality paradigm.

THE PROBLEM

Margaret Mead once claimed that the nuclear threat is the first genuine discontinuity in human history. Indeed, the capacity of homo sapiens to destroy itself by its own hand is yet another way in which humans are unique on the planet. No other species can do significant damage to the planet at all.

The nuclear threat and secondary threats of ecological catastrophe are the end point in a logical series of developments that follow from what I shall call the adversary paradigm.
THE ADVERSARY PARADIGM DEFINED

Analytically apart from and in addition to the specific content of human encounters—religious, family, political, economic, athletic, academic, legal, etc.—is a set of expectations about their consequences. Encounters take many forms, most of which imply or even demand a comparison of outcome along some lines, such as money earned, points gained, or honor achieved.

Men, perhaps more than women, are trained to compete for rewards of numerous kinds which usually reduce to money, power, honor, and self-respect. The rewards are assumed to be scarce, so that for some to win them, others must lose them. Athletes are encouraged to win contests, which, among other things, involve defeating their opponents. The raison d'être of business people is to make as much money as possible and eliminate the competition or at least outdo them. Lawyers learn that winning cases is more important than discovering truth or honoring justice. Students are encouraged to strive for grades higher than those awarded their colleagues. Politics is the art of gaining for a group of people whatever a society prizes, at the expense of competitors. Toward that end, lying, stealing, and betrayal of the public trust are all permitted, with a token wrongdoer sacrificed now and then to make it appear as if "there is nothing wrong with the system, there are just some bad apples in it."

The desire to win expresses a paradigmatic assumption about encounters: the other person/persons/group must be overcome or submitted to. I am identifying this as the adversary assumption. It means taking for granted that competing to "win" what is defined as desirable is natural, so natural that, like an orthodox religious person never truly questioning the reality of the divinity, one simply takes the assumption for granted.

The adversary assumption is rationalized in clichés that are meant to define cold, hard reality: It's a dog-eat-dog world, You have to look out for Number One, It's a jungle out there, To the victor go the spoils, Winning isn't everything—it's the only thing, All's fair in love and war, Winner take all, Don't be a sucker, It's me or him and I want it to be me. These are supposedly objective statements about the nature of relationship in the world. They undergird an epistemology that justifies competition. But the adversarial assumption is not only about competition.

Competition implies outcome: contestants want the wealth, medals, honor, spoils, esteem, territory, anything defined as the objective content of the contest. The adversary assumption, by contrast, implies something else: that all encounters involve ranking and that it is essential to make every effort to outrank the other. It is the ranking itself, at least as much as rewards that follow from it, that is the issue. Indeed, it can be argued that, in addition to whatever intrinsic meaning lies in material and social rewards, they are most significant as indicators of adversarial victory and defeat.
Like competition, the adversary assumption also implies that, if one has not succeeded in a contest, one accepts defeat. The outcome of encounter then is either triumph or submission. Although a draw is conceivable, as when two wrestlers or boxers are evenly matched, that is considered an undesirable anomaly.

However vivid the cognitive rationalizations of the adversary paradigm, its deepest level of reality is emotional. It is felt to be right, normal, necessary, natural, even moral, to seek advantage over the other, to “win” what one’s culture defines as worth winning. To the extent that the actor feels deeply, continuously, and even desperately attached to the adversary paradigm, I will call the adversary assumption the adversary compulsion.

By adversary compulsion, I mean that people deeply committed to the adversary mode of relationship experience themselves as having no equally powerful other choice; they reject, ridicule, or deny alternatives to seeking victory or accepting defeat as the result of an encounter. It is not as if they do not acknowledge and even enjoy pleasure in cooperation and friendship but rather that, in most situations, those options are downplayed in favor of adversary contact. Even to suggest that the adversary relation might better be subordinated to a more cooperative, mutual mode of relating, is, for people driven by the adversary compulsion, to set up yet another contest. The very advocacy of kindness, sharing of resources, empathy, love, is seen as a threat to the adversarial commitment and must be staved off by argument, attack, possibly even murder.

The adversary compulsion is based on feelings of enjoyment in mastery, feelings of wanting admiration and approval for one’s accomplishments, feelings of envy and competitiveness, and feelings of fear. Although overdetermined in its meaning, the adversary compulsion follows especially powerfully from the seldom acknowledged emotion of fear: the fear of losing something vital in the course of an encounter: the contest itself.

Overcoming is experienced in comparative terms: victors are acknowledged by themselves and others as superior in (1) athletics, money-making, warring, governing, singing, writing, etc.; or (2) an intrinsic quality: gender, skin color, physiognomy (height, weight, build, beauty, hirsuteness, hair color and texture, eye color), lineage, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, etc.

This is not to suggest that all people are driven only by adversary compulsion and that more genial motives never enter the picture. Nor is it to suggest that men and women are affected equally by the compulsion. Indeed, most adversary encounters take place in institutional contexts, and institutions are, so far, almost without exception, designed, developed, and controlled by men. Thus most encounters are shaped by the male framework in which they take place. Although it is possible also to identify a contrasting female framework noticeably more cooperative, so far in history that model is located either at the edges of institutions or, until the advent of modern feminism, in minor opposition to them.
Even so, not all people are equally committed to adversary behavior. However, while not an exclusive way of acting, it has been dominant in history until now. The alternative mutuality tradition is not a compulsion and so far has not framed the major goals in encounters.

Just like other compulsions (to smoke, drink, have sex, abstain from sex, make money, spend money, hoard money, gamble, wear leather, succeed at work, fail at work, and so forth) the adversary compulsion is felt to be part of a reality that is not under the actor’s control. Unlike the others just listed, the adversary compulsion is not viewed as a compulsion. Alcoholics usually know there are options but feel their compulsion is beyond their control. In this respect, most compulsive behavior is neurotic, that is, the actor understands there are people who do not share the compulsion but does not know how to abandon it. Habit, emotional familiarity, and compulsion make it extremely difficult to imagine serious alternatives to adversarial relations in most areas of endeavor.

None of this is to suggest that all people, or even all men, are subject to the adversary compulsion in anything like equal degrees. Some people escape its strictures altogether. And it may be that, as with other needs, this one is apparent because of its prevalence rather than its being genuinely universal. It may also be that those who feel the need most deeply define their experience as universal and that the majority, whose adversary needs may be milder, simply go along with this driven minority.

If the other is automatically an adversary, then one can compete on any issue at all, inherent or achieved. There is a gamelike quality to the contest, for, after the superiority-inferiority ranking is established, future encounters can reverse the previous ranking. Sport is especially interesting in this respect, since opportunities to re-rank are not only built into the framework of relationship but are exercised frequently.

There is one exception to this condition of renewing encounter and reopening possibilities for its outcome: murder, which establishes once and for all who is “superior” and who is not. Why murder? If there is meaning in encounter, and I take for granted that for men especially, much meaning lies there, then why end the possibility of future encounter, which is what murder means in this context?

In the fundamental text of the Western tradition, the Bible, it is interesting that murder appears very soon after creation. With only four people on earth, one of them kills another.

Why did Cain not try harder to make his offerings as acceptable to God as Abel’s, or, in adversary terms, more acceptable? I think the answer is in part that God did not allow those options. The Bible presents the adversary mode almost immediately. Adam’s “superiority” over Eve is established by his prior birth and her—most bizarre—birth from his body. The serpent defines an adversarial relationship between God and the first two humans; it is the agent of that relationship, the external representation of it. Dare to confront your maker/parent, who is, in some intrinsic way, an adversary, the story makes
clear, and you and all future progeny lose. Forever. It is this harshness of defeat that defines one significant aspect of authority relations from the beginning of the biblical tradition.

Before very long, Cain slays Abel. By preferring produce of the land over animals, God makes clear to Cain that the very nature of his work was less acceptable than Abel's. Although He could have accepted both offerings, God established an invidious comparison from the beginning. Why then did Cain not abandon animal husbandry and take up farming?

Deeply hurt, Cain was not disposed to reason the situation out very well. His fratricide expressed an impulse rather than reasoned analysis.

Cain is wrong for, after the murder, it is not clear what Cain has won. His goal is to eliminate Abel and feel triumphant. But God does not then welcome Cain's effort to please him as a shepherd. Nor does God congratulate Cain on overcoming his putative adversary. If his goal is to win God's blessing for his offering, not only does Cain not receive it, it is not evident why he would think that killing Abel would bend God's favor toward the murderer.

There is an aftermath to murder that differs qualitatively from the consequence of other forms of encounter: disapproval, shame, and guilt are visited upon the victors by their society and, usually, by themselves. Furthermore, murder ends forever the chance of the vanquished to recoup strength and renew the encounter. And, finally, although Cain acts upon the adversary assumption, he is also made to learn that in its ultimate form, the adversarial relation can draw very grave consequences upon him—indeed, unavoidably enduring ones. (Note the correspondence to the sin of Adam and Eve: no second chance.)

As Cain's act demonstrates, the impulses of anger and rage, following the experience of emotional hurt (narcissistic wounding, in Gregory Rochlin's phrase), govern behavior to a frightening extent.

And so throughout the Bible. The adversary paradigm informs the relationship, through God's command, of Abraham and his father and Abraham and his son. The paradigm laces encounters between Hagar and Sarah, Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, Joseph and his brothers, Rachel and Leah, Moses and Pharaoh, Moses and God, Moses and his people, the Hebrews and other tribes, and so on. The Bible is a sourcebook, a guide, a chisel that engraves the adversary principle in stone upon whomever it instructs. Even in the Law itself, given to or created by Moses in the Sinai, the first Commandment pits God against other possible divinities, and the other Commandments are in effect efforts to regulate adversary tendencies, lest they overwhelm warm family feelings and good-neighborliness.

Yet the Bible does not instruct readers only in the adversary paradigm. While clearly subordinate, a secondary paradigm of cooperation and good feeling is also apparent in the text. Ruth's relationship with Naomi, the uniting of the tribes of Israel, Saul's initial bond with David, David's friendship with Jonathan, the love poem "The Song of Songs," collectively are an appeal to a paradigm of cooperation, friendship, and love.
God’s relationship with the Jewish people is a powerful biblical picture of an alternative to the adversary paradigm. In return for God’s blessing in choosing them to promote law, justice, awareness of divinity, the Torah, Jews are to be fulfilled by observing commandments defining their devotion and their unique role in God’s plans for the planet. (There is thus reciprocity in the relationship, but little of mutuality. With momentary exceptions, such as Jonah’s and Abraham’s efforts to bargain, God sets the terms of the relationship and the Jews can do little but carry them out.)

The New Testament tries to mitigate the harsh effects of the Old Testament’s adversary assumption, but the effort is complicated by internal contradictions. The problem is not just with Jesus’ defining love, as he does, partly in adversarial terms (he who is not with me is against me), thus confusing two contrasting paradigms; the confusion lays the groundwork for subsuming the alternative, a paradigm of mutuality and love, under the adversary paradigm. Such action defeats mutuality, even if acknowledging it in some ways. Once institutionalized, Christianity, in the name of love, historically assaults the opposition, thus contradicting itself entirely in its otherwise noble effort to realize Jesus’ vision of love as more redeeming than the alternatives.

WAR AS THE ULTIMATE MANIFESTATION OF THE ADVERSARY PARADIGM

When it peaks in murder, the adversary compulsion expresses impulse more than careful analysis; specifically, the impulses of anger and rage. The anger and rage implicit in adversarial encounters are ordinarily moderated successfully enough to stop short of murder, their ultimate implication. This is true in all societies. Murder is forbidden by law, the law is obeyed most of the time, and those who flout it are subject to severe enough sanctions that any “glamour” in the rash act is neutralized by threats of opprobrium and punishment.

Those who do commit murder are sometimes “psychopaths,” people who appear to have either insufficiently developed consciences or none at all. For most people most of the time, though, morality is sufficient to restrain impulses that lead from anger and rage to murder.

But this is not the case among nations. One of the functions of the nation-state is to neutralize morality, and to sanction plunder, aggression, and killing in the name of “national interests” (usually those of economic, military, political, religious, or other elites, with such interests being rationalized in terms of the supposed interests of the entire population).

War is murder on a collective scale. Whatever is gained by killing a single adversary, more is gained, apparently, by killing numbers of adversaries.

Throughout most of history, warring was limited to armed adversaries, although civilians may be robbed, raped, and killed by victors in military
triumph. But in the modern era, wars are waged by large armies, often against whole populations. Through the nation-state, war is the adversary principle carried out on a massive scale, against entire other peoples.

War can be considered in collective terms as the effort of peoples or nations to gain land, resources, honor, and whatever else is valued, from other people or nations. It can also be considered a context in which individual adversary tendencies are conveniently acted out collectively, with social and political approval.

Just as with adversarial meetings between individuals, those among nations often focus more on the very fact of victory and defeat than on the material outcome. Although diplomacy always remains an option and clearly has the advantage of assuring fewer deaths and less destruction than war, it clearly does not arouse the passions or often the chances to manipulate populations that war does. This is to suggest, in the strongest possible way, that whatever the real, objective circumstances of war, there are also deep, underlying emotional realities that are at least as important in the prosecution of war, indeed, in the maintenance of the institution of war, as the issues that the battles are supposedly about.

By the time they end, wars have destroyed people and property, and, at least for the losers and increasingly for the victors, they also gravely damage romantic fantasies of glory, strength, and rightness. Largely due to the escalation in scope of havoc made possible by the application of sophisticated technology to war, and by the extension of killing to civilians, wars increasingly end with each side soberer than before.

The accounting at war’s end of losses of people and investments does not touch the emotional costs in terms of pride, hope, fear, and other feelings inflamed by war. Although rituals of victory abound, like parades and appointments of great warriors to high office, there is as yet no vocabulary, no ceremony, no ritual for coming to terms with the emotional meanings of losing or of overcoming others.

The desire for revenge probably reflects, among other things, the absence of a culturally normative way of dealing with failure. Given the adversary assumption, losing must generate a fantasy/desire/plan to recoup by matching oneself against the opponent again, or against another opponent, and trying yet another time to win.

If war were only a periodical acting out of the adversary compulsion, it could likely go on forever. Assuming that the desire to live is stronger than the many motives that lead to war, it can ordinarily be assumed that contending parties will at some point terminate their conflicts without destroying either population entirely. But with tools developed to the point of nuclear annihilation, the continuation of war is becoming impossible.

War is the most highly technologized sector of collective human existence, which adds yet another clue to its significance for the human species. War technologizes murder, and it does something strange to that technology. Killings within societies are usually performed by weapons that bring killer
and victim into close contact, through hands, rocks, knives, clubs, guns, ropes, poison. Murderers usually know their victims face-to-face, have reasons for killing them, encounter victims personally, and are responsible for the outcome of the encounter.

Historically, war offers a series of steps leading away from the immediacy of individual murder to the distant and abstract. In tribal wars, encounter draws on weapons like those above, plus spears, arrows, and other small-scale devices for one-on-one combat. The primary difference between tools for individual murder and those for war is that the latter introduce the possibility of distancing the killer from the killed. The arrow may be shot from afar, and with the advent of the catapult, distance firearms, and bombs, the killer is farther still from the killed.

War technology has developed in the direction of depersonalizing killing. There would appear to be two reasons for this. One may have to do with conscience: even though war permits killing, not everyone cares to take up the offer. And if a personal grudge is not at stake, it may be very difficult to motivate warriors to kill. Indeed there is evidence from the Second World War that many American soldiers would not shoot at the enemy even from the front lines in the thick of battle. By distancing the killer from the killed, though, it is apparently easier to perform the act of murder. The taped music in helicopters bombing Vietnam, in the film Apocalypse Now, makes the point vividly. Not only did the pilots and bombardiers not see their victims, they had stereo distractions from even thinking about them. This is a far cry from the trench warfare of the First and Second world wars.

Another reason for depersonalizing killing is efficiency. The logic of war seems to support a concept of efficiency that may be a logical extension of a principle fundamental to modern technology altogether. Efficiency is essential to large-scale production of usable and salable products, but it can also serve to blind people to its context. That is, dedication to efficiency becomes a defense against recognizing the human dimensions of the work process. The cruel treatment of workers in factories and mines is a model for the far deeper brutalization of efficiency in war. In both cases, the commitment to produce in the smoothest manner is a way of ignoring, even denying, the human costs of such production.

Nazi death camps were extensions of industrial dehumanization, productivity gone totally mad. The “product” was a caricature of the ultimate consequence of the “rational” economy, death. Perhaps in some metaphysical way, in terms of assault on the environment, deadening of workers’ consciousness, and diversion of real human concerns onto material metaphors, the death camps were the logical conclusion of the efficient economic system as it has evolved in the West.

It is as if the very concept of separation of humanity and productivity is being carried to its extreme implication; dehumanization of every person in every step of the productive process. Attention is on the product, not on the people involved in any aspect of its manufacture, sale, and use.
The efficiency principle bifurcates in its application to war in modern history. On the one hand, the Nazi death camps were the industrialization of killing on a personal scale. Guards and executioners saw their victims face-to-face, mocked them, reviled them, beat them, often shot them at close range or shoved them by hand into death chambers. Whatever the difficulty in comprehending the psychology of this encounter, whatever its grotesqueness and psychopathology, it had a deep personal element. Contempt, ridicule, demonization, degradation, hatred, racism in its most virulent form defined the relationship of Nazi and victim.

The Nazi killing of Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, Communists, the disabled, and others had exactly the compulsive quality of the adversary compulsion. The Nazis did not invent a mode of interaction so much as they carried one already existent to one of its two possible extremes.

Americans chose the other. The Nazis, inventive in a way that hideously caricatured both science and technology, conceived of both the death camps and their dialectical opposite: atomic weapons. If Zyklon B personalized the encounter between attacker and attacked, the nuclear device would depersonalize it even more than V-2's devastating London. Rocket victims were still identifiable, and the rhetoric of the London blitz allowed for endless human stories of heroism and steadfastness. The nuclear possibility, which the Nazis were, as it turned out, unable to bring about, would by contrast mean obliteration of entire cities which had no chance to prepare for attack or to resist it once launched. Dying, like the release of the bomb itself, would be altogether anonymous.

It appears now that it was not necessary for the U.S. to develop the nuclear bomb once it learned the Nazis did not have a chance of completing it. The United States nonetheless persisted and of course used the first and only two such devices ever employed in war.

Although the United States had actually killed more people in the firebombings of Dresden, Cologne, and Tokyo than in the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is the latter cases that excite the world's awe and dread, not the former. Like Zyklon B, nuclear bombings involve breaking a taboo. Poison gas, outlawed internationally after its ghastly successes in World War I, was supposedly not used in World War II. Yet if one considers Zyklon B as a poison gas and radioactivity as the most effective poison gas possible, then both the Nazis and the Americans violated the injunction against poison gas by moving its use from the realm of trench warfare, its locus in World War I, to warfare against civilians. Both sides, then, used a method outlawed among nations and developed it in directions far more monstrous, both in terms of effect and target populations, than those that led to the original ban.

Yet radioactivity and Zyklon B are not identical. Although the deathcamp killings were new in terms of scale and ideological justification, the techniques used—shooting and gassing—were replications and extensions of familiar technologies of killing.
The release of nuclear energy in war, by contrast, clearly signaled something new in history, as Margaret Mead's claim suggests. What is new is that nuclear technology is not just another clever weapon, but threatens to destroy both user and intended victim, and indeed, the planet altogether. Although scientists disagree on the finality of the outcome of a hypothetical full nuclear confrontation, no one denies that there is at least a serious possibility it could mean annihilation of the human species, possibly all life, maybe even the planet itself.

A vivid image for the qualitative newness of the meaning of nuclear technology is the double-barreled shotgun. Whereas in all previous wars, one could expect weapons to point in both directions, with some people on each side being killed and others not, the nuclear possibility offers the image of the user of the gun in which only one barrel points outward, virtually destroying the entire enemy society. This feat is possible but at a heavy price, since the second barrel is pointing inward toward the aggressor, also devastating the entire aggressor society. Only now is it true that, in order to kill the other, one must kill oneself. To put it more dramatically still, nuclear technology now makes it virtually certain that homicide is inextricable from suicide.

If nuclear omnicide is the ultimate expression of the adversary compulsion, the final implication of the adversary paradigm, and if it is understood that war is too costly to pursue at its maximum level, then something new in history has happened to war: war cancels itself. It is outmoded.

After forty-three years of the reality of the nuclear threat, humankind is beginning to integrate its awesome potential; fail-safe measures are becoming increasingly numerous and sophisticated in order to minimize the chances of accidental or unauthorized ("mad impulse") nuclear holocaust. And the superpowers in charge of the threat are taking full responsibility for it, and have begun moves toward serious reduction of nuclear stockpiles.

While such moves could be seen as nothing more than mollifying nervous publics, they could also be interpreted as realistic measures to start the winding down of the madness of the threat to destroy the planet for any reason whatsoever. But, the skeptic can reasonably continue, even if nuclear confrontation is avoided, conventional wars can continue ad infinitum. So it would seem, until one realizes that the most likely scenario for a nuclear catastrophe is escalation from conventional war. Absurd though it may sound, it is becoming increasingly clear that prevention of conventional wars is the best safeguard against that qualitative jump to the once unthinkable.3

To put the matter as dramatically as possible, it is at least an intriguing possibility that the nuclear threat implies the end of war. It has not yet been fully enough assimilated to result in that, and there are still wars all over the globe. But those wars seem to indicate some fundamental changes in the nature of the outcome of war. The Iran-Iraq conflict, for example, has been a conventional war, with the addition of chemical and/or biological toxins. The
war persisted for almost a decade, and it now appears that neither side has "won" in any sense in which we are familiar with that word.

This is not to suggest there are not also other reasons for the current termination of many wars: the remarkable developments of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union; what appear to be efforts by both superpowers to spare themselves potential war temptations and to solidify their control over smaller powers; world economic developments that make trade imbalances, deficits, and short-changed social services especially insane in the light of huge expenditures for nonconsumable military hardware; and so on.

The stalemate ending of the Iran-Iraq war may in part have resulted from other countries' desires that it end that way. It has been important to major actors that neither Iran's Islamic fundamentalism nor Iraq's aggressive nationalism triumph and that neither side emerge victorious. It appears that major external actors arranged arms supplies so as to allow a near-even match that would end in a draw. If that is the conclusion of the war, then not only will neither side have gained anything substantial for its efforts in the ordinary sense of the spoils of war, but the unusual duration, viciousness, and human cost of the war will surely imprint on human consciousness in the late twentieth century the message that a major war of that sort cannot, for whatever reasons, be won. Given its character as the longest war of the century and the appalling number of casualties, it could well be that this conflict will represent the futility of war more than it will demonstrate the brilliance of any given tactics or weapons.

The Soviet Union's pullout from Afghanistan follows the U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia in revealing the limits of the most powerful nations in attempting to impose their wills on dissident movements in client states. Although the United States can hardly be said to have absorbed the lessons of the Vietnam War fully, it has learned enough not to send troops to Central America where a number of tiny wars have drawn its participation. And even those wars, fought by U.S.-encouraged, paid, and trained proxies, are not going the way the sponsor wishes. Given the U.S. failure to destroy the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and the insurgent movements in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the Philippines, and elsewhere, and the Soviet Union's fiasco in Afghanistan, it could be that the superpowers are learning that they cannot have their way by military means, even in small countries, and that promoting armed struggle for whatever reason, even by mercenaries, seems no longer worth the effort. The superpower accomplishment in most of these cases is not to overcome the dissidents but rather, at most, to keep them at bay. Except for continuing arms sales, there seems no further profit in such military exercises.

The Lebanon situation is another example of a peculiar limit in the current nature of war. Internecine struggles continue daily, with shifting balances of power. No resolution is in sight, and one could argue that the
military activity engaged in by the many forces in Lebanon has taken on the character of a full-blown compulsion. Each side seems driven to engage in small-scale war as if it has no choice, as if it has to enact rituals that no longer have adequate meaning but which the actors seem unable to renounce. The continuing tragedy in Northern Ireland has a very similar character.

Within the Eastern bloc, objections to Soviet domination have traditionally been contained through police-state methods of control rather than, with rare exceptions, through armed conflict. Dissident movements in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere use the written word and the streets (and now in Poland, the ballot box) to carry on their protests. Intimidations and arrests are common, but torture and killing seem almost "archaic" in those situations. Recently, not only has the Iran-Iraq war wound down but Vietnam has been leaving Cambodia, Cuban troops and Angola have ended the war with South Africa, Namibia seems soon to be free of South African domination, and progress seems to be under way in the Western Sahara and Cyprus. And setbacks or no, it does seem as if the Sandinista-Contra war is nearly over. That of course leaves Sri Lanka, India, the Kurdish problem in several countries, El Salvador, the Basques in Spain, and other major conflicts. But the direction does seem to be toward ending wars, not escalating existing ones or starting new ones. Despite predictions of an Israeli war with Syria, it seems no more likely now than in the past seven or eight years during which so many have been predicting it with such certainty.

If war is indeed winding down, the two most recent examples of lightning-swift victories further demonstrate the point rather than, as might seem at first glance, contradicting it. In a burst of what some might consider old-fashioned jingoism, the British defeated Argentina, which was enjoying its own corresponding spasm of national pride, in the matter of who owns the Falkland Islands. It must be pointed out that the Falklands are of little objective value to anyone and that most likely few Britons had ever heard of them or knew their location until Mrs. Thatcher girded her loins, excluded the media, and roused her countrymen's and women's passions for faded empire by offering a tiny taste of what it was like to do battle and win. The point is not so much the victory, though, as the minuscule scale of the conflict, the paucity of stakes, and the uneven match between the two warring parties that made the confrontation more of a farce than a war in the usual sense.

Those terms were exceeded and melodramatized in the subsequent encounter between the United States and the island nation of Grenada. Whether or not the point of the exercise was to shore up a flagging anticommunism in the United States, to divert attention from the immediately prior massacre of several hundred marines in an ill-starred U.S. adventure in Lebanon, or other considerations, a face-off between a nation of 240 million and one of 120,000 was not war in the grand style.

The very brevity and triviality of those conflicts make them seem more like caricatures of war than the classic action itself. It is as if in the winding down of war, some comic last gasps are being written into history by a malevolent authority with a clear sense of the absurd.
MICRO-WAR AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Within nations, an internal, small version of war is becoming increasingly common. Perhaps because nations are becoming aware that they can no longer afford to divert their populations' discontents by channeling attention to charges against other nations, intranational conflicts are beginning to replace international ones. Regional and ethnic movements are suddenly abounding in the Soviet Union of all places. These are probably, in part, a response to Gorbachev's efforts to relax tensions between the superpowers. Internal rebellions, sometimes ethnic, sometimes social-class, sometimes ideological, abound in China, Sri Lanka, Algeria, the Sudan, Burundi, Central America, Iraq, Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other places.

These encounters can be called micro-wars. Like civil wars or internal revolutions drawing on modest weaponry and involving soldiers and civilians in relatively small numbers, intranational conflicts are wars on a very small scale. It may be that as war on the massive scale, macro-war, becomes increasingly recognized as impossible, it will be replaced, at least for a while, by micro-war.

The Israeli-Palestinian confrontation is not principally between or among nation-states, even though nations have taken part in various phases of the conflict. It is rather between a nation and a people captive to it, on territory which is not legally part of Israel but not part of any other national entity either.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers a variation on what might be the early stages of the winding down of war. In the first year of the intifada, about the same number of people were killed as often die in one day's action in the Lebanese quagmire or in recent Algerian unrest.

It is curious that the world seems far more concerned with one Palestinian death in the occupied territories than with hundreds of deaths in Lebanon, hundreds of thousands in the Iran-Iraq war, and the respective numbers in Contra actions in Nicaragua, U.S.-supported actions against popular uprisings all over the globe, Indian action against Sikhs, Tamil and Sinhalese attacks on each other in Sri Lanka, and so on. Using this contrast as a way of dismissing international protests against Israeli occupation policies, the Israeli right wing argues that it is antisemitic to focus on Israel for evils commonly committed by other nation-states. There is something to this logic, but other interpretations are also possible.

Suppose there is a dim but growing world awareness that war everywhere must end, lest any war accidentally or deliberately escalate into the final conflagration. Nations and individuals are then beginning to adopt a new attitude toward war. Rather than bringing war abruptly to an end, the trend seems to be to allow war only if its scale can be reduced, preferably drastically so. That way, an institution taken for granted for millenia can be examined carefully, its basic elements being viewed as if through a microscope in a context where very few people are hurt and where there is no apparent threat to the planet.
Micro-war, the miniaturization of conflict, could be a permanent replacement for macro-war, or it could be a way-station in the dialectical process of transcending war altogether. (It could also be a meaningless blip on the screen of war; speculations such as these are meant only to be heuristic.)

Terrorism, that focus of so much apprehension and fascination in the world today, is one of several forms of micro-war. It includes hijacking planes; ransoming hostages; bombing and shooting up restaurants, schools, stores, buses, and Olympic gatherings. On the state level, micro-war means bombing refugee camp populations, teargassing and shooting into protest crowds, exiling dissidents, blowing up houses, beating people, and in general using state power to intimidate and terrorize.

Both forms of micro-war, that sponsored by states and that sponsored by dissident individuals and movements, share the characteristic of drawing sudden, melodramatic attention to causes by randomizing victims and killing with seeming impunity. Such actions individualize the essence of war, which is killing, and the essence of twentieth-century war, which is killing the innocent.

Terrorism, the individualization of killing in warlike circumstances, is the essence of micro-war. In addition, micro-war involves armed struggle, of rebels against soldiers. (It is not clear, in war terms, what is the status of rock throwers in the Palestinian intifada. The mode of attack is not violent in the classical form; but neither is rock throwing nonviolent in any acceptable sense. Although much of the Palestinian resistance that constitutes the intifada is genuinely nonviolent—e.g., noncooperation with tax authorities, employers, and the merchants of the dominating society—the physically assertive part, mainly rock and firebomb throwing but also tire burning and roadblocks, could as an aggregate be considered a new tactic, semiviolent resistance.)

It is noteworthy that one Arab being beaten by Israeli soldiers arouses more disgust in world viewers than thousands dying in the Gulf War. This is not necessarily hypocrisy or selective inattention (although neither charge is irrelevant) so much as it is an exercise in facing the meaning of war by individualizing it into manageable human terms. The viewer can more easily empathize with one person being beaten by a rock or baton wielded by one soldier than with thousands killed by bullets and bombs or even poison gas, on the front or in cities in Iran and Iraq.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus offers a model, a case study, a very small form of war which can be followed and abhorred in specific, agonized, grotesque detail. It can remind the viewer of American soldiers torching Vietnamese huts with cigarette lighters, and of Sergeant Calley's killing spree in My Lai.

The tendency of nations to condemn Israel for the brutalities of its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza can be seen as a displacement of concern for all war onto one particular war. World focus could just as well be on Lebanon or Northern Ireland, which are also striking examples of micro-war. Why is it, instead, on the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel?
Peace in the World or the World in Pieces

Israel and several of its Arab neighbors have engaged in five macro-wars, but the relationship of Israel with the Palestinians themselves has remained from the start at the level of micro-war. On both sides, all the acts of terrorism and retaliation (counterterrorism) from the beginning of the Israeli state in 1948 are micro-war tactics. The conflict itself, especially as the threat of further wars between Israel and Arab countries subsides, could be seen as emblematic of what I believe is possibly the historic transition from macro-war to micro-war.

By attending to the Israeli case, nations perhaps inadvertently update a classic tradition of fascination with Jews and of locating a more general concern with collective issues, especially moral ones, on them. Widespread criticism of Israel is not just an attack on it (although that may be part of it), or just antisemitism (although that is also sometimes there). It is an implicit critique of war itself and, behind that, of the nation-state in all its corrupt, vulgar, duplicitous, particularistic, destructive, exploitative, cynical being. And it may also indicate an aspiration, even a survival tactic, toward the introduction of morality—conscience—into international affairs.

The nation-state has brought the world to the verge of total ruin. The institution of war in its modern forms is a function of the nation-state. The befouling of the planet by dangerous industrial practices is defended and promoted by the nation-state. The drastic maldistribution of goods and services in the world is guaranteed and enforced by the nation-state. The dehumanization of vast numbers of people within and beyond its boundaries is a specialty of the nation-state.

For the world to survive its present crises, it will have to begin to locate the paths that lead beyond the nation-state. Not immediately, but eventually.

For whatever reasons, the faults of the nation-state are currently identified with Israel more than with any other nation. There is thus a new dimension to the Jew as scapegoat. For centuries, Jews were reviled for allegedly representing aspects of human behavior that people are taught to repress as individuals (dirtiness, uncontrolled sexuality, violence, amorality, immorality).

Social science offers the insight that all these issues, complex and problematic for everyone, can be “projected” outward, usually onto weak minorities, and persecuted there. Scapegoating is part of a process whereby individuals and groups deny their own inner, complex realities. By accusing Jews (or any other group) of being sex-ridden, inherently violent, amoral, uncivilized, etc., accusers avoid facing their own (and everyone’s) tendencies in exactly those directions.

Now in a sovereign state, Jews have become the object of projection on another level. They are reviled for representing those repulsive aspects of the nation-state that other nation-states deny in themselves, such as exploitation and degradation of minorities, the political use of brute force, and unprincipled dealings with other nation-states.

Probably in an effort to “catch up” and become acceptable as just another nation, Israel is in fact guilty of those charges, but no more so than other
nations. It is not just Israel that puts its majority population’s interests above others. The Soviet Union does the same thing. Eastern Europe is its West Bank and Gaza, but with “autonomy”; some of its own “republics” are at this moment trying to gain “autonomy” if not more. Winding down a disastrous war, Afghanistan is in the last stages of renegotiating for autonomy in its relationship with the Soviet Union. The United States does to entire countries in most of Latin America and parts of Asia what Israel does to the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Allende’s Chile tried to buck autonomy and was destroyed in the process. Nicaragua tried too, and the returns on its effort are not yet in. Proconsul Marcos went too far in his corruption in the Philippines, and the U.S. allowed Corazon Aquino to replace him, but surely only on condition that she never opt for full independence.

Minorities are brutalized even today by governments in probably half the countries in the world, on scales usually more severe than what goes on in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli arms sales to reactionary regimes are not unique; something like thirty-five other nations sold weapons to Iran alone.

In individual scapegoating, victimizers fancy themselves superior to their scapegoats. The same is true in nation-state scapegoating. Nations that criticize Israel share the conceit that the nation-state is a worthwhile form of social and political organization. They project its failings onto Israel and persecute them there. The response of one part of Israeli society can be interpreted as: Leave us alone, we want to be able to exercise the right to be as disgusting as you are; that goes, after all, with being a nation-state. The response of another part of Israel, nearly as large as the former segment but not a majority and not in political power, can be interpreted as: We have no attachment to the more odious aspects of the nation-state; we are eager for Israel to fulfill its aspiration for peace and justice that continues to exist in tension with its military-nationalist tendency, but we are not, at least as yet, strong enough to move our society to implement the prophetic vision.

By contrast with both those inclinations, Israel’s response could be: Let us use our circumstances to reveal the need to move beyond the nation-state and let us use our creative survival energies to learn how to accomplish that. Israel cannot escape from the attack on the nation-state. Nor should it. Its very national being can be seen as basing itself on the delusion not only that the nation-state is a viable political form but that it is the only worthwhile one. Denied national sovereignty for almost two thousand years, it is understandable that Jews desperately turned to that political form as protection against further persecution; as the pogroms resumed in Europe in the late nineteenth century, many Jews saw the nation-state as salvation. Yet Jews came into the nation-state at almost exactly the moment that the nuclear possibility began to erode the nation-state’s possibility for continuing its existence as before. The horror of both Auschwitz and Hiroshima brings not only revulsion against killing in forms and quantities previously unknown in history, it also implies criticism of the nature of the political units that conceived and executed them.
It is the delusion of the majority of Israelis that none of this matters, that the nation-state is a final refuge for the Jewish people, its rock of security, the castle in which it will be forever its own master. In its infatuation with its castle, the Israeli state is determined not to examine the nation-state critically. Its castle is complete with romantic turrets (hilltop settlements), a moat ( electrified barbed-wire fences), damsels in distress (the long-suffering Jewish people), and knights in shining armor (the IDF).

The castle is built on peculiar foundations, none of them quite of rocklike quality: religious insistence (propagated by people with a disproportionate political influence due to a complex coalition system at the level of national government) that there is a God who eons ago assigned a small, unusual people to a specific piece of real estate, a God who has no regard for history and less for the realities of Palestinians than of Jews; devotion by some Jews to the nation-state as the highest expression of a people's will, determined by shortsighted leaders; an army that understandably represents the pride of a people able for the first time in nineteen hundred years to defend itself, but an army controlled by political leaders many of whom are unable to identify the limits of force in confronting situations calling for political resolutions; stubbornness or lack of experience in statecraft or a combination of both characteristics, as a result of which a tiny nation bullies its gigantic sponsor and expects to get away with that indefinitely; a history in which Jewish suffering has been so severe and so prolonged that anything Israel does to anyone is considered by some to be forgivable. Add to that a co-ethnic community in the United States that struggles with whether it best serves Israel's existence by writing blank checks or by taking a supportively critical stance and still inclines toward the former position.

These foundations of the Israeli occupation share this characteristic: they rationalize the brutalization of another people. That is a classic practice of the nation-state. Those not of the ruling family and its retainers are said not to belong there.

If Israel believes it can be accepted as just as depraved and cynical as other nations, this is a delusion. Just as Jews have for better and for worse represented the conscience of the Western world, so does Israel somehow wind up with the world expecting it to act as if it has what other nations ordinarily lack, a conscience. The striking feature of the nation as a form of organization without a conscience (justifying murder, plunder, exploitation of resources and labor) has brought the planet to the point of potential ecological disaster and nuclear omnicide. The problem is not technology per se but rather the political and social forms by which conscience is subordinated to power.

Israel exists in some agonizingly unclear relationship to Judaism, which in world-historical terms is the creator of the Western conscience. Through Moses, the prophets, and the complexities of Jewish history, Jews have long represented conscience, in a heightened way. The last part of the twentieth century is exactly the historical moment when conscience must be extended
to collective behavior on the largest scale. And this is tragically the moment when a substantial part of the Jewish people are trying to become a "normal" nation-state.

Those who advocate that path for Israel appear to intend to enjoy the euphoria (as they suppose it to be) of the exercise of power. This is part of what has become of the Revisionist Zionist Jabotinsky’s message, growing in strength since Begin’s victory in 1977. It is also a piece of the underside of the Labor tradition, which has never been fully clear about where it stands on the classic and continuing Jewish conflict between desires for normalcy and the prophetic tradition of criticism and tikkun olam, repair and renewal of the world.

Ironically, conscience can be seen as separating from religion in Israel. Though with exceptions, the tendency among orthodox rabbis, particularly those of the haredi or ultra-orthodox group, is to concentrate on gaining as much funding as possible for orthodox schools, synagogues, and other institutions and on laws of kashrut (kosher), conversion, sabbath observance, marriage and divorce laws, and so on. It is quite possible that by ignoring history, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, psychoanalysis, and virtually all forms of "secular" study, the consciousness of such clerics is focused almost solely on the traditional Jewish texts. This apparently leaves most ultra-orthodox Jews unable to comprehend, let alone analyze, their relationship to modern nationalism, the relationship of economic development to secularization, and so on.

Major currents in the religious community in effect leave to secular Jews the project of applying Jewish ethics to Israel’s current moment. As the conscience of Israel, the left and peace groups are scorned by all those, including many religious people, who try to unburden themselves of the paratribal implications of the Jewish conscience: prophetic calls to peace and justice.

Many Israelis seem perplexed by the disintegration of so many fond delusions: that Palestinians do not mind submission to Israel; that they will never be able to organize resistance; that improved standards of living for some Palestinians are enough of a thrill for them all that no serious objections will arise to the occupation, even from refugee camps; that its military might allows Israel to do what it wants regardless of Palestinian aspirations and world opinion; and that objections to Israeli policy are yet another piece of antisemitism and need not be heeded.

For most Israelis, their society’s delusions span these tragically incorrect assessments of occupation policy and extend to alternatives to the status quo. Israelis cling in large numbers to the hope that somehow they can maintain control of the territories. They post flags on the castle, proclaiming the “Jordan Is Palestine” formulation, the Alon Plan, Camp David autonomy, “transfer” as a viable option, Jordanian policing of the territories, and so on.
Objections to those flags from outside and within Israel are all but deafening, but the powers that be continue to wave them.

The intifada has drastically eroded delusions about the occupation, but where that erosion takes the growing numbers of disillusioned Israelis is not clear. The political system is only very gradually moving toward a resolution that could mean ending the occupation.

Jewish inventions of universalism and humanity, and ideals of peace and justice, persisted, in whatever transformations, in Judaism's daughter religions Christianity and Islam, and through Marx, in this century's secular religion, socialism. I say secular religion because the visions of peace and justice embodied in socialism are the same as the prophetic commitments, but transferred to a nonmystical, nontheological analysis called historical materialism. It is not by chance that that stream of Zionism committed to those goals of peace and justice drew them from turn-of-the-century Marxism rather than Judaism per se. Yet, it can be argued, they are the same visions, characterized in the secular case by historical analysis and in the other, by analysis of ethics based on divine injunctions interpreted by prophets, and for some, mystical notions of Messiah and divine redemption.

Whatever else they represent, Jews historically stand for conscience, for the conviction that there are ethically sublime values, beyond tribal/national self-interest, that can guide human behavior and ought to. If this is a major Jewish contribution to the world it is also a reason for the resentment of Jews.

One basis for antisemitism is the ambivalence all people feel toward conscience. Although conscience expresses a human hunger for relatedness, for connecting with humans beyond the self and the self's own group and for respecting the integrity of the other, conscience also is troublesome in signifying restraint. The psychoanalytic model helps to identify the self's relationship to conscience as a genuine conflict, between impulse and ideal. The tension between the two is permanent. Yielding to one implies forsaking the other, and guilt and shame are the universal indicators of that tension.

Within the Jewish community itself, in Israel and elsewhere, the same tension exists as among all peoples, between these two tendencies. It may seem ironic that Jews are also conflicted about the issue of conscience, but that is clearly the case.

It is the right wing of Israeli society that is involved in sustaining the micro-war that has, since the winding down of the Lebanon war, defined Israel principally as warrior. The nationalist tendency maintains the war tradition by defining the conflict between Israel and Palestinians (and more generally, the Arab nations) as fixed rather than as subject to historical changes.

Not only does this commitment depend on ignoring the real data of developments in history, it also depends on unquestioning loyalty to the adversary assumption. The right-wing world view, of permanent enemies and permanent needs for strong and expensive military defense, is a perfect expression
of the adversary compulsion. In Israel, the right wing is not only convinced of the perpetual nature of Jewish-Gentile conflict, it clearly would lose a fundamental aspect of its very raison d'être if this assumption could be unequivocally demonstrated to be false. It is this faction, of course, that also appears to take for granted the inevitability of further macro-wars.

Correspondingly if not symmetrically, the Palestinian side is also split between factions that would make war and eventually win (the rejectionists, maximalists, hard-liners) and the factions that by now are willing to settle for a two-state solution. The mistrust of that latter possibility within Israel is not only based on understandable apprehensions of the true intentions of a standing enemy, it is also integral to maintaining the adversary stance.

The PLO, through its commitment to armed struggle and terrorism, has defined itself, until the intifada and the 1988 meeting of the Palestinian National Council, as interested in pursuing the conflict only in adversary terms. Indeed it is a cliché that some Palestinians, like Issam Sartawi, who spoke of negotiated compromise with Israel, have lost their lives for their effort. They have dared to transgress the PLO commitment to the adversary paradigm. If the PLO does negotiate a compromise peace with Israel, a gigantic nail will have been struck into the coffin of the adversary compulsion, by both major contestants in the conflict.

As the world begins fitfully to move beyond the adversary assumption in order to survive the nuclear threat, it understandably mistrusts the possibility of accomplishing just that. And the assumption is not overtly examined as negotiable, let alone capable of being cast into Marx's famous dustbin of history.

Micro-war enables Israel, the Palestinians, and both parties' supporters to cling to adversary assumptions, to enact the adversary paradigm as if there were no way to a peaceful settlement that could define a new mode of intercommunal relating. But there clearly is an alternative.

To leave the occupied territories would mean heroic acts of a nonmilitary sort. Israelis would have to grant that the policy of settling the West Bank and Gaza was mistaken from the start, based on the misconception that, with guns and power, there are no limits on what Jews can do, and on a biblical fantasy that simply bore no relation to historical reality. It would have to be admitted that the settlement policy was a gigantic waste of funds that could have been spent developing Israel itself, its towns, its housing, its education system, its health care facilities.

As Yehoshafat Harkabi observes, ending the occupation and perhaps the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza would require Israel to develop a national process to come to terms with the death of the Greater Israel dream/nightmare. Settlers who would return to Israel would need to grieve their loss of home and nationalist romance. Survivors of soldiers and civilians killed in the conflict would have to move beyond mourning and revenge.

Israel would need to learn to relate to Palestinians as equals rather than conquerors. It would need to work to overcome the extreme nationalism that
goes with exploitation and that reflects the "identification with the aggressor" common to peoples who themselves have been dominated.

Whatever the genius of the Jewish people at various points in its history, it has the opportunity now to move beyond mimicking the idiocies and barbarisms of nationalism, that is to say, to dare to take the first steps beyond it. That project could contribute not only to making Israel a sane and viable place for its citizens, but to the progressive winding down of war in the world.

New approaches to peace could emerge from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Esoteric Eastern religions have gained a small foothold in Israel and could remain nothing more than marginal cults. But the sentiments they represent could take hold in other forms. It is partly because of their departure from the adversary paradigm that Eastern concepts of quietism as they appear in Buddhism and yoga are suspect in the West. But due to the increasingly problematic nature of the adversary paradigm, such Eastern notions have tentatively entered Western culture, to be sure in their most superficial and cultish forms, but nonetheless as suggestive leads into the possibility of the elevation of a nonadversary paradigm over the adversary one.

MICRO-WAR AND THE OBSERVER

The possibility of the nuclear omniextermination makes clearer than ever before the grotesquerie of war altogether. In some dialectical fashion, the hulking image of nuclear finality calls forth its complement, the vivid, empathable image of a human being clubbed, tortured, shot. War is about killing, about single lives ending brutally. That such murders can accumulate into terrifying statistics is less the point than the existential reality of individual, real deaths of babies, children, women, men, soldiers. Nor is it clear why soldiers may not also be classed as "innocents." Socialization, or brainwashing, can negate critical capacities that might otherwise object to war; all military training, unless it explores alternatives to war as fully as possible, is also a form of brainwashing.

Micro-war individualizes war. It returns our species to the most primitive weapons, rocks and clubs, and even hand-to-hand combat, or at least gun-to-gun, or the armed against the unarmed. At the same time, the terrorism form of micro-war collapses the face-to-face confrontation of early war into the anonymity of recent war; it pits aggressor against civilian. But in every case, there is a sense of specific human agents, not anonymous platoons or squadrons or divisions, engaged in the fight, and of specific combatants or passersby who are harmed or killed, not entire villages and cities.

When Israelis bitterly contrast the few hundred people killed in the intifada with the twenty thousand killed in one blow by Syrian president Assad in Hama, a town in which a few score antagonists located their base of resistance to Assad, they of course have a point. But they miss the reality that both forms of action are reprehensible, and also that Hama does not represent
the miniaturization of war that the intifada and Israel's reactions to it do. In Hama, a government killed rebels and the entire community where they located themselves. The killing was accomplished in a single act without resistance and without the duration that is required to define an encounter as war. If anything, Hama might best be called massive collective assassination.

By contrast, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict features on a very small scale all the standard criteria for war between nations: contending parties sustaining a conflict over a period of time, strategies and tactics, ideological positions, elaborate justifications for one's actions and for opposition to the other side, periodic wins and losses, etc. What is so distinctive about the Israeli-Palestinian war is the small, graspable terms of it all: actions in which a few or even just one person is hurt or killed, small and momentary advances and retreats, identifiable victims in very small numbers and in human terms, weapons the lethality of which evokes a particular horror.

If anything, the condensation of scale that marks the Israeli-Palestinian conflict makes war manageable both conceptually and emotionally. In contrast with Hama, one is at a loss as to what to feel and how to object, to those scenes of individual soldiers assaulting individual civilians in the West Bank and Gaza.

In micro-war, observers (through the media) tend to identify with victims unless they are closely connected with the perpetrators. It is not the supposed glory of the killing that moves the audience (unlike, say, the celebration of British and U.S. "victories" in the Falkland Islands and Grenada) but rather the innocence and the individuality of the victims. We did not see any of those twenty thousand Syrians, nor could we feel their anguish.

A major difference, then, between macro-war and micro-war is the relationship of the observer to the combatants. It appears that in micro-war, observers are more concerned with the attacked than with the attackers.

To identify with the victims rather than with the victors suggests that one's victimization, rather than one's anger, is engaged in one's reactions to attacks. If this is true, then micro-war of the sort apparent in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict indicates a massive shift from pleasure in victory (Grenada, Falklands) to agonizing with victims. It suggests the beginnings of a real shift from the adversarial position, which demands dehumanization of the other, to one of mutuality, which builds from empathy and identification with the other.

If micro-war and "armed struggle" are to end along with macro-war, what will be the outcome? To begin to imagine such a new direction in history, it is necessary to turn to an analysis of the social psychological dimensions of the adversary paradigm and its alternative, the mutuality paradigm.
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERSARIAL RELATIONS

What does it mean to oppose one's interests to those of another, to oppose one's being to another's? By turning to the concept of the unconscious, it is possible to illuminate depths of the issue that are impossible to discern otherwise.

At this point, many social scientists may cry foul. Most social science paradigms ignore, reject, or vociferously denounce psychodynamics as either wrong, trivial, irrelevant, or "reductionist" in regard to issues of large-scale social concerns like war, economics, and political behavior. Without rehearsing the relevant arguments or literature, I will simply state my conviction that most social science proceeds by trying to avoid the more complex, problematic human issues of inner conflict, intense emotions, and repression of early experiences. To put it another way, most social science lacks theories of complex motivation. Most social science also ignores the connections of developmental motives to institutional, "objective" structures and behavior. As the literature on this weighty controversy of the relationship of inner self to outer reality is vast, I will assume the reader is either sympathetic to my position and willing to read on, will turn to the relevant material before proceeding, or will pass up the remainder of my argument.

The psychoanalytic concepts of resistance and ego defense are crucial to an analysis of inner complexity. Problematic feelings can be "defended against" in favor of self-deception. Self-deception is also putative self-preservation, for emotional realities that are defended against are those the self perceives as impossible to resolve, too painful to address, or too mysterious to fathom.

The sociologically most pertinent "ego defense" is projection. The theory of projection assumes that people have not discovered, in any society so far, how to accept and enjoy all parts of themselves, including the threatening and tortured ones, but rather that a range of the permissible is established and that everything outside that range is defended against. For example, societies ordinarily do not allow their members full recognition of feelings of violence. Such feelings can be projected outward onto groups that are socially defined as exceptionally violent.

Projection means inventing the presence of one's own denied feeling in the other, for the projector need have no accurate picture at all of what the object of projection—the scapegoat—really feels, thinks, or means. Indeed, gaining a sense of the other's reality is a function of empathy and identification and not projection.

Ethnic minorities are usually accused of being more violent than their majority hosts. And sexuality lends itself to projection as easily as does violence. In classic antisemitism, for instance, Jews and other scapegoats are accused of being sexually uncontrolled, uncivilized, determined to poison pure Gentile blood.
Conflicts about conscience (a principle component of superego) allow the projection onto others of the amorality and immorality one fails to acknowledge in oneself and also the higher morality for which one also is taught not to take full responsibility. One ridicules and taunts people and groups said to be less moral than the self. But one also is inclined, however ambivalently, to respect and pay tribute to those of higher moral achievement. Clergy, moral exemplars like Gandhi and King, people who are unusually self-sacrificing, have projected onto them unfulfilled aspirations of conscience.

In people who fanatically oppose other people, there is often not only condemnation of what is rejected but a self-denied attraction. Vehement repudiation of anything may suggest fascination, perhaps even longing, for what is overtly condemned. The adversary tactic of projection reflects alienation from the self, or fragmentation of the self into socially acceptable and socially unacceptable parts.

It is widely acknowledged that in Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, an adversarial stance is suddenly being challenged. I believe that changes are under way there and in the relationship of the Soviet Union to the United States that suggest that Gorbachev understands the archaic nature of the adversary paradigm, is preparing his society to move beyond it, and is inviting others to make their own respective transitions:

Although the prospect of death in a nuclear war is undoubtedly the most appalling scenario possible, the issue is broader than that. The spiraling arms race, coupled with the military and political realities of the world and the persistent traditions of pro-nuclear political thinking, impedes cooperation between countries and peoples, which—East and West agree—is indispensable if the world’s nations want to preserve nature intact, to ensure the rational use and reproduction of her resources and, consequently, to survive as befits human beings....

True, the world is no longer the same as it was, and its new problems cannot be tackled on the basis of thinking carried over from previous centuries.

...we want to cooperate on the basis of equality, mutual understanding and reciprocity....

In adversary relationships of equals or near-equals, projection is more or less symmetrical. The utter hatred of Germans and French for each other until fairly recently suggests the same kinds of disgust and projections that also apply to Indians and Pakistaniis, Germans and Russians, Japanese and Koreans, etc. Typically, each side accuses the other of duplicity, depravity, unwarranted hostility, and the like.

In relations of inequality, it is likely that there is more symmetry of accusation than one might expect. Even (until recently, at any rate) history’s foremost wandering victims, Jews, accuse their tormentors of more or less the same excesses leveled at them: being sexually uncontrolled, overly violent, immoral, and failed in certain crucial areas of life (intellectual endeavor, for example). While it has often been true that in actions against Jews those
excesses have been enacted, it is also true that the persecutors are not granted by many Jews the complexity of differentiation (not all Russians were Cossacks, not all Germans were Nazis, not all Palestinians are terrorists, not all Gentiles hate Jews, etc.) or change.

Projection is a form of demonization. Rather than Israelis and Palestinians seeing each other as complicated, tormented peoples, each victimized by different historical processes in different periods, substantial numbers of each side see the other as hateful, driven to be destructive, not honoring the historical reality of the other, etc. The tendency is to make the other evil. Arabs cannot be trusted, or want to stab you in the back and will if given the opportunity, or understand only the language of force: these are standard clichés Israelis and their sympathizers use to demonize the Palestinian adversary. Jews want only to expand their land holdings, understand only the language of force, will never integrate properly into the Middle East: these are complementary clichés of demonization used by Arabs against Israel and Jews.

I do not deny that there are elements of each population to whom the clichés legitimately apply, at least to a degree, but in all cases, the reality of an entire people is collapsed into slogans that neither do justice to that reality nor allow for even the possibility of response, change, and growth toward accommodation to the other’s reality.

The adversary relation is hard to break not only because of the tenacity of its social psychological underpinning but also because of the learned cognitive disbelief that the relation can be otherwise. In the summer of 1986, I led a small group on a political study tour of Israel. One of our stops was a West Bank settlement where a very articulate settler presented a professional slide show and a moving talk promoting aliya (immigration) to the West Bank. In the discussion that followed, one of our number asked our lecturer, a woman somewhere in her forties and probably originally European, how she supposed a Palestinian woman her age, with children the same ages as hers, all living near the settlement we were visiting, would feel about the talk we had just heard.

Our interlocutor was startled. She visibly flinched backward as if slapped in the face, and stammered, “I don’t know, I have never been asked such a question, I don’t know how to answer it. I will have to think about it.” And think she did. We all remained quiet for a very long moment, and then she said, now with a tone of impatience, annoyance, and finality in her voice, “I cannot answer that question. I cannot afford to answer that question. Why do you ask me? You might as well ask me how I would feel if I were an Eskimo woman. I am not an Eskimo woman, I am not a Palestinian woman, I am an Israeli, and I am doing what I have to do.”

The most memorable moment of the tour for me, her reply struck me in its honesty and perceptiveness. Indeed, were she to take the reality of the Palestinian neighbor into account, how could our lecturer have continued to
act as if the West Bank is there for American Jews to enjoy along with her, with no regard for Palestinians she was daily dominating by her very presence? The paradigm issue is the woman’s capacity, seared into her by the adversary assumption, to disregard a reality that not only is obvious to the observer but that would impinge even more fully upon her life with the onset of the intifada two and a half years later.

The interchange also made me realize that part of the clue to the maintenance of the adversary relation is refusal to empathize with the other. What are the political implications of empathy?

Empathy means not only feeling with another, enabling oneself to feel into the emotional reality of another person, it also means accepting the feelings in oneself that correspond to the feelings in the other. For that settler to allow herself to acknowledge the humiliation, hatred, exasperation, and fear of her Palestinian counterpart would mean two consequences: facing those same issues in herself, and feeling her connection to those issues in her neighbor. In both cases, she would have to move beyond the simple, tenacious pleasures, as it were, of adversary victory.

The adversary principle assures focus on externals. It is the prize won or lost—land in the case of the settler—that defines the relationship. That attention to easily identified and measured objective matters is the essence of the simplicity of the adversarial encounter. Two athletes meet in Olympic competition. One is, finally, “better” than the other, even if by a tenth of a second or a point, and that settles the matter. Neither athlete nor audience inquires into the price paid by the contestants in terms of health (what damage is done to those bodies by the extraordinary training that precedes such performances of perfection?), personal freedom (given that in some societies there are enormous pressures on talented youth to dedicate a dozen of their formative years to personal excellence in the service of the state), inner anguish and loss (what does it mean to lose? why is it so important anyway? what other parts of the self, intellectual, spiritual, and social, may be sacrificed so that the Olympic athlete will excel in a sport?).

If war is no longer viable, then, by implication, the entire set of assumptions upon which war is based, objective measures of reality as of higher importance than subjective, mindless externalization (through projection) of inner reality, issues of victory and defeat, are not only thrown open to question, they are dialectically rendered obsolete.

The nuclear threat is the culmination of the entire historical tendency to segment humans into groups not only according to geography, language, and custom, but also according to the functions they serve as projectives, as Rorschach ink blots, as scapegoats, unwittingly even if reciprocally serving unacknowledged inner needs of others. Those tendencies have enhanced solidarity among the populations engaging in them at many levels, for it must be realized that the adversary compulsion operates not only among societies but also within them.

Relations among different national and ethnic groups in pluralist societies, between gender and generations, among religions, etc. allow for exactly
the same kinds of projections and persecutions as those among nations, even if usually with consequences that stop far short of war. The upsurge of ethnic assertion today, in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Spain, numerous parts of Africa, etc. testify to the possibility that interethnic confrontations will serve for a while as case studies in micro-war, channeling conventional war energies and dynamics to situations and scales both manageable and unthreatening to the integrity of the species and the planet.

THE MUTUALITY PARADIGM

If the adversary paradigm entails attention to externals, the other major paradigm with which to contrast it is not its opposite so much as its complement. I do not mean to suggest that adversarialism is over, can be over, or should be over. Rather, I suggest that the alternative paradigm, the mutuality paradigm, has always existed alongside the adversary paradigm and that the urgent question is not how to replace one with the other but rather how to shift their relative emphasis.

The mutuality paradigm recognizes the interdependence of human lives in their relationships. Prominent in one form or another in religion, ideologies of humanism, and certain aspects of daily life in any society, mutuality means the full recognition of the humanity of the other. It means not dehumanizing in any way but rather retaining the full humanity of others in one’s consciousness and in relationships with them. Where adversarialism is competition, mutuality is cooperation. Where adversarialism concentrates on triumph and submission, mutuality concentrates on empathy and on complementary recognition of the complexity of motives and aspirations; where adversarialism negates emotional reality, mutuality honors it; where adversarialism exploits the weakness of the other, mutuality supports strengths; where one is triumphant, the other is compassionate; where one scorns faltering and failing, the other honors the meaning, universality, and humanness of weakness; where one knows neither seeking nor granting forgiveness, the other knows that capacity to be essential to fully human relating.

In the mutuality paradigm, there is room for contrasting realities and a willingness to figure out how to accommodate them to each other. Compromise is the key to its functioning. Rather than focusing on the objective “loss” entailed in compromise (money, land, honor), attention is on the gains of harmonious living and on the mature pleasure in working out the emotional complexities of different people striving for different (or similar) goals. The mutuality paradigm embodies compassion; the adversary paradigm mocks it as weakness. Where one paradigm bases relationship on distance, coldness, and domination, the other favors closeness, warmth, and egalitarian acceptance.

The mutuality paradigm has never been absent in history. Good mothering is the model on which it is based; by now it is possible to say good
fathering as well. Love is a relationship of mutuality; indeed the mystique about love, about pure love, about falling in love and being in love reflects, among other things, the universal longing for mutuality. And community, however romanticized by intellectuals, has always had as the central part of its appeal, the romance of mutuality.

History can be read, among its multitude of meanings, as a dialectic between adversarialism and mutuality. Marx identifies the dialectic as one of adversarialism only, with mutuality somehow mysteriously emerging from the final confrontation of workers and owners in the late stages of capitalism. But it is not only that the objective interests of slaves and masters, serfs and lords, workers and owners contradict each other. It is rather that the interests oppose each other in a framework where the adversary paradigm holds sway over the mutuality paradigm. Rebels overcome the old order not only in order to end their own degradation, they also seek freedom from domination itself. But then they re-create it. In torment, bewilderment, and untold destructiveness, they find ways, which can only be explained social psychologically as compulsive, to renew the domination they dedicated themselves to terminating once and for all.

The social psychology of the problem of failed revolutions suggests that paradigms of proper behavior do not bend easily to ideological or material change because they persist not only in actors’ minds but also in their emotions, indeed even in their unconscious. Assumptions of what is proper may be cultural artifacts, but they cannot be put into mothballs once the proper political forces define the season for cold storage of what has become archaic.

Culture is transmitted through emotions rooted in unconscious processes as well as through instruction and institutional norms. What psychoanalysis identifies as the superego includes both conscience and that which is considered most desirable in a society. Where there is domination, substantial numbers of people may rise up and try to overthrow it. But however genuine their intentions, they have been socialized into the order they attempt to replace.

Even if subordinated to adversarial relations, mutuality appears in many institutional forms. The three major world religions, each of them promoting adversarialism more gloriously than mutuality, nonetheless celebrate the ideal of mutuality. The problem institutionally is that the ideal of mutuality is pursued within the framework of institutions that contradict and finally overwhelm it. Ritual recognition of the desirability of mutuality is contradicted by the pursuit of victory over the heathen or the irreligious of one’s own populations, gaining power and wealth, etc. Religion fails at least in part because efforts to further its ideals utilize unexamined adversary means that destroy those ideals even while ostensibly honoring them.

Mutuality is also institutionalized in art and social criticism, where contrasts between cruel realities and possibilities of mutuality are frequent themes.
Nation-states develop rhetoric of mutuality in speaking of themselves as a family or a community, in celebrating their services to all their citizens (albeit often hypercritically), and in idealizing what it means to be a citizen of one’s particular society.

Other institutions such as schools and corporations hint at the attractiveness of mutuality in myths they have about themselves as being harmonious, caring, and so on and in “family” metaphors created partly for social control and partly to express authentic yearning. What matters for the moment is the tenacity of the rhetoric more than its contradiction by actual conditions.

In all cases—religion, state, other institutions—the persistence of rhetoric suggests genuine desire; the absence of fulfillment implies perplexity rather than evil intentions or even the relatively greater weight of adversarial inclinations.

Although it is true that in most circumstances (healthy families are an important exception here) the adversary compulsion overrides what we can now call the mutuality intention, the continuing presence and restatement of the intention suggest rather that there is a helplessness in not knowing how to realize it, rather than indifference or hostility to the idea.

What is implied by this analysis is the possibility of deprojection and dedemonization. If adversarial relations are formed and sustained by projecting onto “enemies” what is so far considered unacceptable in one’s own sense of self, then deprojection (withdrawing the attribution of demonic qualities to the other and taking responsibility for their complex reality in the self) is an essential step on the way to mutuality.

By now, Iran and Iraq must have come to see each other as worthy opponents, not daunted by the other’s determination, religious conviction, or military power. Surely the Soviet Union has learned more than it cared to about the skills and effectiveness of the Afghan resistance, as has the U.S. about Vietnamese, Sandinista, and other resistance. In each case, an adversary relationship has not ended in the defeat of the “weaker” party by the “stronger.” To recognize the other party as worthy might be the first step toward transcending the adversary relation.

Both parties central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be coming to see each other as opponents with whom peace can and must be made. It may be that Palestinians are not just grudgingly admitting that they are unable to defeat the Israelis militarily, it may be that in the decades of confrontation, respect for the determination and tenacity of Israel have contributed to challenging and reshaping Palestinian views of Israelis. Correspondingly, Israelis have come, through their occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, especially since the onset of the intifada in December 1987, to see their adversaries not as passive and helpless nor only as angry and hate-filled. Indeed, at least half of all Israelis seem to have moved beyond neglect and/or scorn of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Israelis seem to have come to a grudging respect for their antagonists and to be stuck between admiring the discipline and persistence of the intifada and, within a significant part of
the Israeli population, fearing that its activists' long-range intentions are to
destroy Israel.

Whether or not the two parties are yet ready for mutual recognition of
rights to national self-determination, they are surely ready to recognize the
determination and skilled persistence of the other. Palestinians, part of a
larger Arab world that had for centuries conceived of Jews as passive and
weak, have come to acknowledge the Jews' persistence and military prowess,
however much they may hate being the target of this prowess. And corre-
spondingly, Jews who have mocked Palestinian national consciousness have
seen rather suddenly that the intifada is a form of confrontation cleverer than
the usual military one. Palestinians are finally learning that the pen in its
various manifestations can indeed be mightier than the sword. It is ironic, of
course, that at the same time that this realization is becoming part of
Palestinian consciousness, some Jews are unlearning that crucial lesson.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the paradigmatic case of micro-war. It
is also the paradigmatic case of the adversary paradigm, that model in, as it
were, its pure form. The majority of Israelis would like to come to terms with
the Palestinians by either continuing the occupation, expelling them, or just
waiting until they somehow disappear. Correspondingly, it is likely that the
majority of Palestinians would like to see an end to Israel and the emergence
for the first time in history of a Palestinian state in what is now called Israel
and the occupied territories.

This is the adversary paradigm plain and simple, for it reduces to a zero-
sum conceptualization of conflict. Palestinian rejectionists join Israeli rejec-
tionists in assuming not only the desirability of a decisive zero-sum victory
over the adversary but even the likelihood of that outcome, with enough
patience and brilliant strategy and, for some on both sides, divine interven-
tion.

By contrast, the U.S.-Soviet relationship remains adversary but not in
the zero-sum mode. President Reagan tried for a while to return to that
formulation with his rhetoric of the "evil empire," and in his first term some
of his advisors actually appear to have pushed extremely heavy arms spending
in order to force the Soviet Union into bankruptcy which, according to this
analysis, would prompt revolution and the destruction, finally, of the Soviet
government altogether. That could be seen as the last gasp of the pure form
of the adversary paradigm in U.S.-Soviet relations. The decision to accommo-
date, especially through arms reduction, suggests a serious element of a
mutuality relationship whereby the real economic, political, and other costs
of the arms race and the effect of those costs on the other society are seriously
taken into account in the arms reduction process.

The specter of nuclear annihilation appears to make it increasingly clear
to both the superpowers that adversarialism is too costly to pursue any longer
in its old, familiar forms. Indeed, in the confrontations of neighboring states
such as India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China, and even Iran and
Iraq during their long war, there was no question of one party destroying the
other. The only case in the world where that possibility exists as an option in the thinking and politics of crucial actors is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The problem is not just with the two sides of the conflict. It is also with the sympathizers. Israel has yet to be officially recognized by more than one of the twenty-two Arab states. The withholding of recognition not only feeds into Israeli security concerns, it also indicates an attachment to the rejectionist adversary position on the part of the governments of the twenty-one Arab states. (This is not to say that there are not informal contacts, even serious trade under various disguises, between Israel and several Arab countries.) About a third of the member states of the U.N. still do not have full diplomatic relations with Israel. Although some dozens of nations have recognized the recently declared Palestinian state, it has no authority and no U.N. membership. It is not only the two contending parties, then, but also significant numbers of nations in the world that have yet to transcend the adversary definition of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.

The challenge for both Israel and the Palestinians, I suggest, is to see the uniqueness of their circumstances in such a way as to join in authoring an end to it which could become a model for other conflicting parties to follow. Whatever historical innovation would satisfy the needs of both contenders for national self-determination and security, it would need simultaneously to address political, economic, and social psychological needs.

Within the Palestinian community, rejectionists are totally committed to what I am identifying as the archaic adversary paradigm. Those antagonists of Arafat who insist that all of historic Palestine must become an Arab Palestine are not only romantically asserting their nationalist claim, they are also resisting any questioning of the adversary assumption. Correspondingly, on the Israeli side, rejectionists on the surface also romantically want all of the historic Land of Israel (and also fear the determination of Palestinians eventually to reclaim all of Palestine). Below the surface, they reveal exactly the same inclination as their Palestinian counterparts: blind commitment to the adversary assumption and complete absorption in the adversary compulsion.

The case can be made that beneath the obvious antagonism of Palestinians and Israelis lies another, subtler yet more powerful antagonism, between those members of each population who are committed to the adversary assumption and those who see beyond it to the mutuality assumption. Both populations, then, contain within themselves adherents to outmoded approaches to confrontation, war, and victory, and also members of an avant-garde that recognizes, however implicitly, that the adversary game is over. Or nearly so.

This is to suggest that the world's most controversial case of micro-war is not only a paradigmatic battleground, but a potential proving-ground for the historic necessity to move beyond adversarialism to mutuality. A creative resolution to the conflict might include sharing a capitol (symbolically, this could be a very powerful symbol of mutuality), joint resource exploitation and
use, and coordinated economic development plans. Social class issues would need to be addressed too, but given what will at least initially be the bourgeois nature of both societies, that matter will not come up early on either or both national agendas.

Jews brought the world the gifts of the biblical period: monotheism, the Bible, the Western conscience, the sabbath, prophetic ideals and injunctions, the Word. In the Diaspora they developed textual analysis, esteem for study, elaborations of prophetic awareness of the distance between the desirable and the present, and the concept of tikkun olam—the moral injunction to work for the betterment of the world. In the last 150 years, secular extensions of these themes have proliferated: through Marx, Freud, Einstein, and numerous other geniuses, a disproportionate number of them Jewish, the use of the human mind to explore the universe and to reduce human suffering reached new heights.

It may be that in this period of renewed Jewish sovereignty, the greatest contribution Jews can make to the continuing evolution of human civilization is not an archaic national "normaley" but the presentation, with other people, of the first few steps beyond the nation-state.

If, to put it another way, the nation-state is rendered dangerous and irrelevant by the nuclear threat, then its transcendence must begin somewhere. Why not in the Middle East, where Jews have for complex historical reasons returned to national sovereignty just at a moment when that form of organization is beginning to be rendered historically obsolete?

It may be no more than coincidence that the renewal of Jewish sovereignty is almost simultaneous with the Hiroshima-Nagasaki tragedies that began to spell the end of the nation-state. It is probably also no more than coincidence that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict pits against each other the oldest continuous people who might be called a nation with the newest grouping that can be given that designation. Part of the set of endless ironies of the confrontation is that each contending party has clever ways of accusing the other of not being a true nation. Each people argues thus about language, residential contiguity, distinctiveness of customs, etc., as somehow absolute indicators of nationhood. Rather than exhaust themselves in self-serving and self-righteous definitions of nationhood, both peoples would do far better to concentrate their energies on finding forms that move beyond the nation-state and methods for realizing those forms.

MUTUALITY AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

It is not my task here to suggest the process or the specifics of a mutuality resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. Rather, I interpret the behavior of the most influential people on both sides as compulsively acting on the basis of the adversary paradigm without knowing either its limits or the possibility of an alternative paradigm.
It is inconceivable that this conflict can end without political negotiations; at best they can establish the terms of a complementary relationship. But a political settlement cannot possibly tackle in its fullness the problem of moving historically from the adversary paradigm to mutuality. Paradigm shift of this magnitude will have to engage all institutions. Which of those are most likely to contribute to the shift? Given the predominance of religion in both communities, religious figures who understand the need for the shift and its possibility can, as a very few of them do now, identify and elaborate appropriate texts that provide a familiar context in which some Jews and Palestinians will find it comfortable to proceed. With imagination and goodwill, clergy can find both poetic imagery and philosophic justifications for mutuality.

It would be illuminating to examine art and ritual from the point of view of the paradigm shift under consideration. What could this mean structurally? Could ritual and art meet the task of symbolically representing what would have been given up in action? Or could ritual and art be able to reorganize emotions so as to integrate and celebrate what has been displaced and denied in the self?

What does it mean to take full responsibility for parts of the self socially defined as impermissible? First of all, it must mean understanding the actions of everyone (cf. Marx’s “Nothing human is alien to me”) at some deep empathic level. The ultimate lesson of the Holocaust is that all people are capable of being Nazis (glorifying strength, ridiculing weakness, romanticizing beauty, scapegoating, dehumanizing, etc.). To grant that somewhere inside one, the jackboot, the gun, the gas, all of it is comprehensible even if reprehensible, is the beginning of that wisdom which will allow the end of war and other adversary encounters. Comprehensible means even, in some way, attractive, appealing. The shame of enjoying pornography is similar, perhaps, to the shame of enjoying violence. In each case, one can admit the interest and the tendency without acting it out. It must be remembered that children respond positively to the violence of fairy tales and comic films, and that the liberal tendency to clean all this up is not so much wise or necessary as it is an aspect of a subculture in which liberals deny their own sadistic and masochistic tendencies. Liberalism is based on much repression which the liberal, like anyone else, wants to force upon others. Socialization means, among other things, coercing the young into dominant repression patterns.

Wisdom means, first, granting the humanness of all actions. Second, letting oneself feel the emotions that go with hatred, murder, revenge, blame, lust, etc. Persistent and often gifted individuals throughout history have accomplished this kind of wisdom in one way or another. Recently, in the West, forms of therapy and growth have evolved which, while often overly individualistic and shallow, at least contain the germ of a possibility of growth in human self-awareness that could well translate itself into political terms. It is not yet clear how those forms of self-exploration that are rather new in history can become institutionalized through education, medicine, religion,
and perhaps even mass media, but I suspect that those movements are dry runs, in a manner of speaking, for a population far broader than the privileged few who have so far engaged in emotional self-study for whatever reasons.

Whether or not such institutions can formalize and promote self-awareness of the sort contemplated here remains to be seen. If the mutuality paradigm is to replace the adversary paradigm as the more salient ordering principle of relationships, then it will do so in all institutional contexts, just as adversary relations now permeate them all.

By miniaturizing war, reducing it to human scale, micro-war reminds the world what war is in essence, and offers itself as a symptom of the need for paradigm shift. It is too early to tell if micro-war will simply stabilize, with a few people killed now and then, to stand for whatever mass killings recent centuries' wars have represented. Or it could give way to macro-war again; or, it could lead still further in the direction of ending war. If that is the choice, then the panoply of war-promoting assumptions, beginning with the adversary paradigm, will undergo examination and transformation. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers the ideal starting place.

NOTES

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