Abraham Ashkenasi

Opinion Trends Among Jerusalem Palestinians

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INTRODUCTION

In a paper I wrote some years ago on the structure of ethnic conflict and Palestinian political fragmentation, I asked the basic question of "why there was so little violent Arab opposition to Israeli control and Jewish nationalist domination in the state of Israel."[1] I found this question particularly fascinating because I hypothesized that the kind of conflict that arose between Zionism and Arab nationalism in the geographical area of Palestine was historically and theoretically destined to be one of the most violent types of ethnic confrontation. I posited three rough typologies of ethnic confrontation: that resulting from conflict between indigenous ethnic groups who have resided in the same area for many centuries; that resulting from conflict between an imported ethnic group, imported migrants, guest workers, etc. and an indigenous population; and that which I called the "planted ethnic group" or the "settlers" or "colonial" type of ethnic invasion, conflict, and domination. I used questionnaires at that time to ascertain the views of high-schoolers and analyzed election and social behavior among Israeli Arabs. I was struck by the high level of fragmentation and felt that this lack of unity was the basic causal factor. Since that time I have become more and more interested in ethnically divided cities generally and in Jerusalem in particular, and so have asked some of the same questions I had asked in 1981.

This paper is an analysis of in-depth polling of the Palestinian community in Jerusalem. It is the fifth in a series of publications dealing with the problems of ethnic conflict in divided cities generally and in Jerusalem specifically.[2] These studies all deal with the political, social, and economic problems inherent in the close communal confines of an ethnically divided city. The basic questions in all these studies were:

1. How long do communal confrontations of this type remain locally manageable?
2. How powerful are national blandishments in the urban setting?
3. How do various subgroups within the ethnic communities react to various political, economic, and social developments?
4. What, in essence, is the tolerance level of populations in divided cities?

The questionnaires were conceived in the summer of 1987 and were based on the publication "Israeli Policies and Palestinian Fragmentation" (see note 2). That paper dealt with fragmentation within the Palestinian community in Jerusalem, and showed how this fragmentation had hindered a citywide development of Palestinian political expression. It also showed how this fragmentation had enabled the Jewish administration of Jerusalem to administer the city with a minimum of friction, and with a maximum of benefit to Jewish Israeli citizens. It also maintained that through a system of multifaceted contacts to the Palestinian community an uneven distribution of goods and services and of general security was also available to Palestinians on the basis of their cooperation with various elements of the Jewish administration of Jerusalem and/or the government of Jordan. Various major family units whose ties were to both institutions profited most from this arrangement. The paper also showed a deep longing for a Palestinian entity that was especially profound among younger Palestinians, especially those who had graduated from the various Palestinian universities on the West Bank. At the time of writing the paper, these younger Palestinians had very little influence over the oligarchic structure of Palestinian society in the city and even less over the workings of affairs in the city, which were dominated by the overwhelmingly Jewish city administration and to some extent by the Jordanian Ministry of Occupied Territories.

The *intifada* broke out as that paper was being completed. The *intifada* was and is as much a protest against the state of affairs within Palestinian society that led to fragmentation and relative docility as it is a revolt against Israeli occupation. It has reflected population pressures and concomitant social changes within Arab society, and it was an attempt by a new and demographically ever more powerful generation not only to get some influence but to assume leadership. Furthermore, it united social groups around national goals in many ways, but still left political divisions. The *intifada* seemed and seems to have unified the youthful leadership, but not much was known about the large and growing group of followers. Hence there is a need to probe this issue.

The respondents to these two questionnaires were all Palestinians residing in Jerusalem and/or holding Jerusalem identity cards. In other words, the overwhelming majority of the respondents live in an Israeli polity and are subject to Israeli law but are not Israelis. Most of the people polled hold Jordanian citizenship, yet a majority have relationships with Israeli institutions and for a significant minority this relationship is regular. Indeed, about half are directly dependent on the Israeli economy.

Two types of questionnaire were used. One was an open questionnaire that solicited commentary as well as simple answers. Twenty-two questions dealing with social, religious, and political preferences were circulated among the social, educational, and economic leadership of the Palestinian community in Jerusalem. Thirty-five of forty-two persons approached answered. Most of these respondents commented fully and openly. The second questionnaire consisted of thirteen questions dealing with some of the same complexes. It was simplified, however, and a random sample of 419 representing the "public at large" responded. (Later, in March 1989, a subsequent poll of 278 Arab twelfth-graders in Jerusalem was also completed.) The results were published in "Palestinian Views About Jerusalem" (see note 2). The raw results of the random sample are given on this page and the following page.

On the basis of the raw data in these polls some preliminary conclusions were drawn:

1. Jerusalem's Palestinian community overwhelmingly desires sovereignty for the Palestinian people and a Palestinian polity.

2. Within the community there are wide differences as to the political form and social structure of the political "state" of Palestine.

3. A significant percentage of the population (50 percent of the elite and 25 percent of the "public at large") want some sort of "open" solution for Jerusalem.

4. There is strong support, especially among the young and the religious, for total separation from any Jewish polity.

5. Some of the same attitudes, held probably by the same people, emerge in relation to current contacts and the desire to maintain them with Jews and the Jerusalem's municipal authority's institutions. Tentative readiness for significant relations is countered by total negation.

6. The above is true despite the overwhelming dissatisfaction with the services rendered by the city administration (an opinion held as well, apparently, by those in its employ).

1) Religion:
Christian	56
Muslim	352

2) Jerusalem should be:
East & West	223
Open city	106
Jordanian & Palestinian	29
Other (independent Palestinian)	60

3) Do you have a relationship with Israeli institutions?
Yes	156
No	262

4) Do you have regular relationships with Israeli institutions?
Yes	68
To some extent	90
No	257

5) Are you satisfied with the services rendered by the Jerusalem municipality?
Yes	15
To some extent	53
No	178
Not at all	171

6) Do the peace projects initiated until now take into consideration Palestinian legitimate rights (before Arafat's recent initiative)?
Yes	13
Partly	44
No	212
Not at all	149

7) The Jordanian regime is attempting to gain Palestinian support. Do you:

Support	19
Support under conditions	89
Against	175
Totally against	134

8) A future Palestinian state must be:

Secular	185
Islamic	93
Socialist	46
Not important	88

9) If confronted with a choice, which would you choose?

Palestinian state	366
Economic well-being	7
Family & community	--
Religion	41

10) Which of the four would you be ready to sacrifice:

Palestinian state	12
Economic well-being	151
Family & community	31
Religion	190

The results of these polls, ambivalent and questionable as they may be in some aspects of the polling and in some of the areas of response, still make one thing clear: changes must be made in the method of administration, probably in the political processes, and indeed in the political structure if the city is to avoid stagnation or, worse, the sort of violent ethnic conflict that has scarred Beirut, Belfast, and Nicosia.

Time is running out for a relatively peaceful, unified city. The dissatisfaction of the young and the dynamism of the city's demographic development would bode problems for any polity. The growth of religious fundamentalism and political intolerance, especially in the young, will be fueled by failed political and economic programs.

The polls indicate that there are elements in the Palestinian community that can be approached and worked with. In any peace process, Jerusalem must be the key. It is emotionally at the heart of the national problem. More than that, it is already a north-south hub for Palestinians and would continue to be that as well as an east-west hub for the whole area if a solution could be reached. Both sides will have to decide for themselves how much they can offer the other. For the Palestinians, the least they may be asked to accept is a significant and binding say over their own development and the social, economic, and political tools with which to develop. Otherwise the city will degenerate into a functional breakwater against the tides of national aspiration.

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF PALESTINIANS IN JERUSALEM

Analysis of the Random Samples

Although the overall analysis of the random samples in correlation with the analysis of the selected open questionnaire gave a rather detailed picture of Palestinian political goals in East Jerusalem, a detailed analysis of the random samples was necessary. The obvious effect that the Palestinians' fragmentation had had on their political goals in the past called for the in-depth analysis described above. In Policy Paper No. 24 (see note 2), fragmentation in Palestinian society was considered as a major source of Israeli strength in the policy conflicts between the state of Israel and the Palestinians. The Municipal Administration of Jerusalem was also able to manipulate Palestinian fragmentation to buttress its control of the city. Social and economic analysis of the Palestinian community in Jerusalem showed broad differences within it. These were verified to a degree in the previous analysis of the questionnaires. Just how deep these fissures might be, and how significant they were, was the basic element of in-depth analysis of the random samples.

Differentiation by Borough

The first element to be analyzed was the responses of the various boroughs referred to previously. The questions obviously correspond to those of the complete random sample and the borough results are listed from Tables A2 through A10.

These tables give the amount of people questioned in each borough (column total), the amount of those answering each particular segment of the question (row total), the percentage of those being polled, the row percentage of those answering questions in a certain fashion, and the column percentage, the percentage of those of the entire number of respondents answering in a given fashion.

A2

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	East- West	Open city	Jordan & Palestine	Other	Row total
Area						
Issawiya	1	8 34.8 3.6	9 39.1 8.5	2 8.7 6.9	4 17.4 6.7	23 5.5
Al-Tur	2	27 65.9 12.1	11 26.8 10.4	3 7.3 10.3		41 9.8
Abu Tor	3	8 57.1 3.6	4 28.6 3.8	1 7.1 3.4	1 7.1 1.7	14 3.3
Old City	4	50 57.5 22.4	17 19.5 16.0	6 6.9 20.7	14 16.1 23.3	87 20.8
Sur Bahir	5	15 50.0 6.7	8 26.7 7.5	2 6.7 6.9	5 16.7 8.3	30 7.2
Shoafat	6	16 47.1 7.2	6 17.6 5.7	4 11.8 13.8	8 23.5 13.3	34 8.1
Beit Hanina Dahri	7	50 65.8 22.4	13 17.1 12.3	5 6.6 17.2	8 10.5 13.3	76 18.2
Silwan	8	27 49.1 12.1	15 27.3 14.2	3 5.5 10.3	10 18.2 16.7	55 13.2
Beit Safafa	9	22 37.9 9.9	23 39.7 21.7	3 5.2 10.3	10 17.2 16.7	58 13.9
COLUMN TOTAL		223 53.3	106 25.4	29 6.9	60 14.4	418 100.0

Number of missing observations = 1

A3

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes	No	Row total
Area				
Issawiya	1	8 34.8 5.1	15 65.2 5.7	23 5.5
Al-Tur	2	13 31.7 8.3	28 68.3 10.7	41 9.8
Abu Tor	3	3 21.4 1.9	11 78.6 4.2	14 3.3
Old City	4	26 29.9 16.7	61 70.1 23.3	87 20.8
Sur Bahir	5	17 56.7 10.9	13 43.3 5.0	30 7.2
Shoafat	6	6 17.6 3.8	28 82.4 10.7	34 8.1
Beit Hanina Dahri	7	23 30.3 14.7	53 69.7 20.2	76 18.2
Silwan	8	18 32.7 11.5	37 67.3 14.1	55 13.2
Beit Safafa	9	42 72.4 26.9	16 27.6 6.1	58 13.9
COLUMN TOTAL		156 37.3	262 62.7	418 100.0

Number of missing observations = 1

A4

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Row total
Area					
Issawiya	1	5 21.7 7.4	3 13.0 3.3	15 65.2 5.8	23 5.5
Al-Tur	2	2 5.0 2.9	13 32.5 14.4	25 62.5 9.7	40 9.6
Abu Tor	3	1 7.1 1.5	2 14.3 2.2	11 78.6 4.3	14 3.4
Old City	4	5 5.9 7.4	19 22.4 21.1	61 71.8 23.7	85 20.5
Sur Bahir	5	7 23.3 10.3	5 16.7 5.6	18 60.0 7.0	30 7.2
Shoafat	6	2 5.9 2.9	6 17.6 6.7	26 76.5 10.1	34 8.2
Beit Hanina Dahri	7	7 9.2 10.3	20 26.3 22.2	49 64.5 19.1	76 18.3
Silwan	8	13 23.6 19.1	7 12.7 7.8	35 63.6 13.6	55 13.3
Beit Safafa	9	26 44.8 38.2	15 25.9 16.7	17 29.3 6.6	58 14.0
COLUMN TOTAL		68 16.4	90 21.7	257 61.9	415 100.0

Number of missing observations = 4

A5

Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes	To some extent	No	Not at all	Row total
Area					
Issawiya 1		2 8.7 3.8	17 73.9 9.6	4 17.4 2.3	23 5.5
Al-Tur 2			28 68.3 15.7	13 31.7 7.6	41 9.8
Abu Tor 3			11 78.6 6.2	3 21.4 1.8	14 3.4
Old City 4	3 3.5 20.0	16 18.6 30.2	25 29.1 14.0	42 48.8 24.6	86 20.6
Sur Bahir 5		2 6.7 3.8	13 43.3 7.3	15 50.0 8.8	30 7.2
Shoafat 6		4 11.8 7.5	8 23.5 4.5	22 64.7 12.9	34 8.2
Beit Hanina Dahri 7	1 1.3 6.7	1 1.3 1.9	44 57.9 24.7	30 39.5 17.5	76 18.2
Silwan 8	1 1.8 6.7	15 27.3 28.3	16 29.1 9.0	23 41.8 13.5	55 13.2
Beit Safafa 9	10 17.2 66.7	13 22.4 24.5	16 27.6 9.0	19 32.8 11.1	58 13.9
COLUMN TOTAL	15 3.6	53 12.7	178 42.7	171 41.0	417 100.0

Number of missing observations = 2

A6

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes	Partly	No	Not at all	Row total
Area						
Issawiya	1			15 65.2 7.1	8 34.8 5.4	23 5.3
Al-Tur	2			32 78.0 15.1	9 22.0 6.0	41 9.8
Abu Tor	3		1 7.1 2.3	12 85.7 5.7	1 7.1 .7	14 3.3
Old City	4	3 3.4 23.1	9 10.3 20.5	43 49.4 20.3	32 36.8 21.5	87 20.8
Sur Bahir	5		4 13.3 9.1	16 53.3 7.5	10 33.3 6.7	30 7.2
Shoafat	6	2 5.9 15.4	5 14.7 11.4	10 29.4 4.7	17 50.0 11.4	34 8.1
Beit Hanina Dahri	7	3 3.9 23.1	4 5.3 9.1	37 48.7 17.5	32 42.1 21.5	76 18.2
Silwan	8	1 1.8 7.7	5 9.1 11.4	28 50.9 13.2	21 38.2 14.1	55 13.2
Beit Safafa	9	4 6.9 30.8	16 27.6 36.4	19 32.8 9.0	19 32.8 12.8	58 13.9
COLUMN TOTAL		13 3.1	44 10.5	212 50.7	149 35.6	418 100.0

Number of missing observations = 1

A7

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Support	Support under CO	Against	Totally against	Row total
Area						
Issawiya	1	1 4.3 5.3	5 21.7 5.6	13 56.5 7.4	4 17.4 3.0	23 5.5
Al-Tur	2	1 2.4 5.3	4 9.8 4.5	28 68.3 16.0	8 19.5 6.0	41 9.8
Abu Tor	3		3 21.4 3.4	10 71.4 5.7	1 7.1 .7	14 3.4
Old City	4	6 6.9 31.6	20 23.0 22.5	29 33.3 16.6	32 36.8 23.9	87 20.9
Sur Bahir	5	2 6.7 10.5	9 30.0 10.1	7 23.3 4.0	12 40.0 9.0	30 7.2
Shoafat	6	3 8.8 15.8	5 14.7 5.6	9 26.5 5.1	17 50.0 12.7	34 8.2
Beit Hanina Dahri	7	3 3.9 15.8	13 17.1 14.6	34 44.7 19.4	26 34.2 19.4	54 18.2
Silwan	8	2 3.7 10.5	18 33.3 20.2	19 35.2 10.9	15 27.8 11.2	54 12.9
Beit Safafa	9	1 1.7 5.3	12 20.7 13.5	26 44.8 14.9	19 32.8 14.2	58 13.9
COLUMN TOTAL		19 4.6	89 21.3	175 42.0	134 32.1	417 100.0

Number of missing observations = 2

A8

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Secular	Islamic	Socialist	Not important	Other	Row total
Area							
Issawiya	1	16 69.6 8.6	3 13.0 3.2	4 17.4 8.7			23 5.5
Al-Tur	2	30 73.2 16.2	3 7.3 3.2	7 17.1 15.2	1 2.4 1.1		41 9.8
Abu Tor	3	9 64.3 4.9	3 21.4 3.2	2 14.3 4.3			14 3.3
Old City	4	32 36.8 17.3	20 23.0 21.5	8 9.2 17.4	26 29.9 29.5	1 1.1 16.7	87 20.8
Sur Bahir	5	8 26.7 4.3	6 20.0 6.5	5 16.7 10.9	11 36.7 12.5		30 7.2
Shoafat	6	11 32.4 5.9	14 41.2 15.1	1 2.9 2.2	7 20.6 8.0	1 2.9 16.7	34 8.1
Beit Hanina Dahri	7	37 48.7 20.0	26 34.2 28.0	5 6.6 10.9	6 7.9 6.8	2 2.6 33.3	76 18.2
Silwan	8	26 47.3 14.1	7 12.7 7.5	7 12.7 15.2	15 27.3 17.0		55 13.2
Beit Safafa	9	16 27.6 8.6	11 19.0 11.8	7 12.1 15.2	22 37.9 25.0	2 3.4 33.3	58 13.9
COLUMN TOTAL		185 44.3	93 22.2	46 11.0	88 21.1	6 1.4	418 100.0

Number of missing observations = 1

A9

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well-being	Religion	Row total
Area					
Issawiya	1	23 100.0 6.3			23 5.6
Al-Tur	2	41 100.0 11.2			41 9.9
Abu Tor	3	13 92.9 3.6		1 7.1 2.4	14 3.4
Old City	4	75 90.4 20.5	1 1.2 14.3	7 8.4 17.1	83 20.0
Sur Bahir	5	27 90.0 7.4		3 10.0 7.3	30 7.2
Shoafat	6	24 70.6 6.6	2 5.9 28.6	8 23.5 19.5	34 8.2
Beit Hanina Dahri	7	66 86.8 18.0		10 13.2 24.4	76 18.4
Silwan	8	53 96.4 14.5		2 3.6 4.9	55 13.3
Beit Safafa	9	44 75.9 12.0	4 6.9 57.1	10 17.2 24.4	58 14.0
COLUMN TOTAL		366 88.4	7 1.7	41 9.9	414 100.0

Number of missing observations = 5

A10

Count Row Pct Col Pct	Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Family & community	Religion	Row total
Area					
Issawiya 1		9 40.9 6.0		13 59.1 6.8	22 5.7
Al-Tur 2		6 14.6 4.0	1 2.4 3.2	34 82.9 17.9	41 10.7
Abu Tor 3		5 41.7 3.3		7 58.3 3.7	12 3.1
Old City 4	8 9.9 66.7	30 37.0 19.9	7 8.6 22.6	36 44.4 18.9	81 21.1
Sur Bahir 5	1 4.3 8.3	9 39.1 6.0	1 4.3 3.2	12 52.2 6.3	23 6.0
Shoafat 6		19 65.5 12.6	1 3.4 3.2	9 31.0 4.7	29 7.6
Beit Hanina Dahri 7		28 40.6 18.5	3 4.3 9.7	38 55.1 20.0	69 18.0
Silwan 8		21 38.2 13.9	7 12.7 22.6	27 49.1 14.2	55 14.3
Beit Safafa 9	3 5.8 25.0	24 46.2 15.9	11 21.2 35.5	14 26.9 7.4	52 13.5
COLUMN TOTAL	12 3.1	151 39.3	31 8.1	190 49.5	384 100.0

Number of missing observations = 35

A2: Significant for question A2 are the boroughs with high percentages opting for an open city: Issawiya and Beit Safafa, with 39.1% and 39.7%, respectively. These percentages are significantly above the 25.4% of all those polled. Since a large percentage of those polled in Beit Safafa were Israeli citizens, and since the village is divided between Palestinians with Jordanian passports and Israeli Palestinians (or Arabs with Israeli passports), the high percentage of those opting for an open city is not surprising. Issawiya, as we pointed out previously, contains a large percentage of population working in the Jewish sector in Jerusalem. Both Issawia and Beit Safafa, with 34.8% and 37.4%, respectively, have the lowest totals of those opting for an east-west division of Jerusalem. If we continue to consider those answering "other" to desire more radical Palestinian solutions for the problem of Jerusalem, then it is also interesting to note that Shoafat, the refugee camp, leads all others polled in this regard. They also have the highest percentage (11.8%) of those supporting a Jordanian-Palestinian Jerusalem. These results may very well reflect the Islamic Jerusalem orientation of the refugee camp, which we will analyze later.

Silwan's results are significant in that in a highly volatile borough that should be more radical than the rest, a high percentage opt for an open city. But Silwan has the second highest "other" response as well, and indeed the borough seems one of the most divided internally. A certain trend is already initiated here in the boroughs of Al-Tur and Beit Hanina and to a lesser extent in Abu Tor and the Old City. These boroughs opt for positions supported by the PLO. This is especially true for Al-Tur throughout the survey and is already reflected in this column of answers.

A3/A4: The interesting aspect of A3 and A4, which deal with relationships with Israel, is the high percentage of Palestinians in the village of Sur Bahir who have some relation with Israeli institutions. Beit Safafa, again unsurprisingly, shows the highest percentage of contact, whereas the refugee camp Shoafat manifests the least. If we look at the intensity of contact, regular relationships with Israeli institutions, we then see Issawiya creeping up on Sur Bahir. Interestingly enough, and this may account for the high percentage of open city responses in Silwan, Silwan with 23.6% maintains the second highest total of regular contacts with Israeli institutions. Again Al-Tur and Beit Hanina, Abu Tor and the Old City give very low responses for intense contact with Israeli institutions. This is surprising with regard to Al-Tur, which, as analyzed in Policy Paper No. 24, has a minhalot, a neighborhood council that is partly budgeted by the city administration. The neighborhood

council does not seem to have led to an intense regular relationship with Israeli institutions, or at least, if so, people are not admitting to it.

A5: The general dissatisfaction with services rendered by the Jerusalem administration is indicated in A5. However, the highest levels of satisfaction are to be found, again not surprisingly, in Beit Safafa with 39.6%. That is more than twice as high as the average for Jerusalem. In Al-Tur and Abu Tor there is absolutely no satisfaction, even though—as previously mentioned— Al-Tur enjoyed a neighborhood council with a city budget and was actually the Jerusalem Administration's model for cooperative developments, both in sewage system and road building. Abu Tor's dissatisfaction may result from invidious comparisons that Palestinians there make with Jewish Abu Tor (the borough is divided between Jews and Arabs). Beit Hanina's negativism toward the administration of Jerusalem continues. It is interesting to see that the richest borough is one of the least satisfied.

A6: The negative attitude toward the peace process is shared by almost all boroughs, but here again Beit Safafa seems the most optimistic.

A7: Interestingly enough, support for Jordan under certain conditions is highest in Silwan. The results of this poll indicate again that Silwan is a highly polarized borough, and apparently family contacts account for the differences in responses to these questions. Particularistic interests in Silwan seem to be stronger than in some of the other boroughs. The village, along with the agrarian borough of Sur Bahir with its conservative social structure, is the second highest supporter of a Jordanian role in the future of Jerusalem. The impressions that we are getting from Beit Hanina and Al-Tur continue through this series of questions. This is all the more interesting in that Al-Tur was receiving funds from Jordan for its neighborhood council until the *intifada*. (This funding was continuing as of Fall 1989 according to the secretary of the council.)

A8: The interesting question on the possible political and social future of a Palestinian state drew surprising results. Shoafat, the poorest borough, and Beit Hanina, the richest, indicated the most support for an Islamic state. Al-Tur, Issawiya, and Sur Bahir, despite its conservative social structure, return the highest preferences for socialism. The high number of "not important" responses in Beit Safafa may reflect the large number of Israelis there who might show no preference in regard to a future Palestinian state. On the other hand, when Beit Safafa is analyzed more intensely later in this paper (see Appendix), we will see that the number of Islamic-oriented

Palestinians is highest among Israeli Arabs, so that some of these may have opted for the Islamic future.

A9, which deals with the willingness to sacrifice and the major goals desired, confirms the impression that we have been getting from Al-Tur. Its 100% option for the Palestinian state above any other goal in life is almost too emphatic to be believed. The boroughs that sank below 90% plus option for a Palestinian state are Shoafat, Beit Hanina, and Beit Safafa. Here there were minority preferences for religion, in all instances Islamic, and it is only in its limited Islamic preferences that Beit Hanina leaves the PLO consensus—or does it? (The PLO is striving to absorb Islamically oriented Palestinians. The reverse, of course, is also true of Hamas.) The lower percentage in Beit Safafa can also probably be attributed to its Israeli citizens. The lower percentage in Shoafat reflects the high incidence of Islamic preference in that borough, which was also indicated in A2. Beit Safafa is obviously a borough with some religious polarization within its Muslim community. It returned the lowest percentage of those willing to sacrifice religion to achieve other goals.

A10: Generally, the answers to A10 confirmed a high level of secularism in Al-Tur, Abu Tor, Sur Bahir, Beit Hanina, and Issawiya. The low level of those willing to sacrifice religion in Beit Safafa and in Shoafat indicates that these boroughs have the highest level of Islamic preference. If we look at Silwan once again, we notice that there is a division here too, among preferences for sacrifice. The fact that almost no one in Arab society, either Israeli or Palestinian in East Jerusalem (28 of our respondents are Israeli Arabs), wished to sacrifice a Palestinian state simply verifies the overall analysis of the random samples.

There are differences, however, within the boroughs in Jerusalem as to political preferences. It is obvious that the refugee camp Shoafat with its high percentage of Islamic preferences and the borough of Beit Safafa with its high percentage of Israeli respondents differ significantly from the rest. Al-Tur and Beit Hanina seem the most PLO-oriented boroughs, although there is significant support for Islam in Beit Hanina. The Old City of Jerusalem seems to most accurately reflect the Palestinian community. Other differentials within the boroughs are a reflection of particularist developments; this seems particularly obvious in Silwan. (See Appendix.)

Differentiation by Generation

It seemed obvious to any observer of the *intifada* that it was being sustained by the younger generation. Indeed, many observers feel that the uprising is being planned and carried out by the generation under 30. In order to assess the opinions of this portion of Arab society, we divided our random sample into those below 30 and those above 30. A word of caution here: we did not ask for date of birth, so that the cutoff date of 30—in any event a heuristic, statistical cutoff—is less an expression of actual date of birth than of occupational and social standing within the community. These figures were readily derived from the questionnaire. The possibility of actual age error is very low, and sociologically those who are in the below-30 category belong there. Our expectation was for a far more radical society in the younger age bracket. The young appear far more oppositional, not only toward the Israeli authorities but toward their elders as well. The young are far more attuned to a confrontational course, and a society more inclined to activism. Analysis, however, proved this expectation to be incorrect at least for the questionnaire, as Tables B2 through B10 show.

The first response indicated a widespread differential within the generation below 30. This implied a more differentiated opinion in the younger generation—or, put differently, a higher level of fragmentation—than in the respondents above 30. The latter adhered to the strategy of an East-West city. Over two-thirds of those polled preferred a redivision of Jerusalem. In other words, the over-30 society seems to be more firmly in the camp of mainline Fatah opinion. The below-30 generation, which includes most of the *intifada*'s leaders, showed a 38% response in support of an East-West division. The two interesting statistics are 28.9% for an open city—a rather surprising response if we remember that "open city" seems to be a code word for a moderate Palestinian position; and 24.7% answering other, which is the code response for a more radical Palestinian position. The radicalism might have been expected, since the below-30 group includes many university and high school graduates without suitable employment or without employment at all.

But the more moderate preference for an open city, almost 30% higher than that of the respondents above 30, could not have been expected.

Much of the same was true for other responses. More members of the below-30 generation have relationships with Israeli institutions and their relations tend to be far more intensive (B3-B4). Astonishingly enough, the younger generation is more satisfied with the services rendered by the

B2

Count Row Pct Col Pct		East- West	Open city	Jordan & Palestine	Other	Row total
Below 30	1	63 38.0 28.9	48 28.9 48.0	14 8.4 50.0	41 24.7 78.8	166 41.7
Above 30	2	155 66.8 71.1	52 22.4 52.0	14 6.0 50.0	11 4.7 21.2	232 58.3
COLUMN TOTAL		218 54.8	100 25.1	28 7.0	52 13.1	398 100.0

Number of missing observations = 21

B3

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	No	Row total
Below 30	1	73 44.0 48.0	93 56.0 37.8	166 41.7
Above 30	2	79 34.1 52.0	153 65.9 62.2	232 58.3
COLUMN TOTAL		152 38.2	246 61.8	398 100.0

Number of missing observations = 21

B4

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Row total
Below 30	1	36 22.0 54.5	33 20.1 37.5	95 57.9 39.4	164 41.5
Above 30	2	30 13.0 45.5	55 23.8 62.5	146 63.2 60.6	231 58.5
COLUMN TOTAL		66 16.7	88 22.3	241 61.0	395 100.0

Number of missing observations = 24

B5

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Not at all	Row total
Below 30	1	10 6.0 71.4	24 14.5 47.1	55 33.1 32.2	77 46.4 47.8	166 41.8
Above 30	2	4 1.7 28.6	27 11.7 52.9	116 50.2 67.8	84 36.4 52.2	231 58.2
COLUMN TOTAL		14 3.5	51 12.8	171 43.1	161 40.6	397 100.0

Number of missing observations = 22

B6

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	Partly	No	Not at all	Row total
Below 30	1	6 3.6 54.5	26 15.7 63.4	62 37.3 30.1	72 43.4 51.4	166 41.7
Above 30	2	5 2.2 45.5	15 6.5 36.6	144 62.1 69.9	68 29.3 48.6	232 58.3
COLUMN TOTAL		11 2.8	41 10.3	206 51.8	140 35.2	398 100.0

Number of missing observations = 21

B7

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Support	Support under CO	Against	Totally against	Row total
Below 30	1	7 4.2 46.7	38 23.0 44.2	57 34.5 33.3	63 38.2 50.4	165 41.6
Above 30	2	8 3.4 53.3	48 20.7 55.8	114 49.1 66.7	62 26.7 49.6	232 58.4
COLUMN TOTAL		15 3.8	86 21.7	171 43.1	125 31.5	397 100.0

Number of missing observations = 22

B8

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Secular	Islamic	Socialist	Not important	Other	Row total
Below 30	1	46	41	23	53	3	166
		27.7	24.7	13.9	31.9	1.8	41.7
		26.0	47.1	52.3	62.4	60.0	
Above 30	2	131	46	21	32	2	232
		56.5	19.8	9.1	13.8	.9	58.3
		74.0	52.9	47.7	37.6	40.0	
COLUMN		177	87	44	85	5	398
TOTAL		44.5	21.9	11.1	21.4	1.3	100.0

Number of missing observations = 21

B9

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Religion	Row total
Below 30	1	131	6	26	163
		80.4	3.7	16.0	41.4
		37.6	85.7	66.7	
Above 30	2	217	1	13	231
		93.9	.4	5.6	58.6
		62.4	14.3	33.3	
COLUMN		348	7	39	394
TOTAL		88.3	1.8	9.9	100.0

Number of missing observations = 25

B10

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Family & community	Religion	Row total
Below 30	1	10 6.8 83.3	74 50.7 52.9	16 11.0 53.3	46 31.5 25.1	146 40.0
Above 30	2	2 .9 16.7	66 30.1 47.1	14 6.4 46.7	137 62.6 74.9	219 60.0
COLUMN TOTAL		12 3.3	140 38.4	30 8.2	183 50.1	365 100.0

Number of missing observations = 54

B11

The preferred solution for East Jerusalem at the current stage

School	Open city with Israeli-Arab competition, in %	East Jerusalem belongs to Palestinians, in %	East Jerusalem with Islamic orientation, in %
Abdullah	2	37	50
Ma'mouniyeh	0	83	17
Dar al-Tifl	13	50	38
Private Christian	45	36	0
Amal Vocational	11	61	31
General Beit Safafa	19	30	46
Israeli Beit Safafa	15	27	52
Jordanian Beit Safafa	24	33	39

B12

Readiness to live in Jerusalem with a Jewish majority and equal rights and duties

School	Yes, if possible, in %	Maybe, if possible, in %	No, even if possible, in %
Abdullah	5	5	90
Ma'mouniyeh	15	15	70
Dar al-Tifl	6	11	80
Private Christian	28	39	33
Amal Vocational	17	17	66
General Beit Safafa	5	33.5	52
Israeli Beit Safafa	10	52	34
Jordanian Beit Safafa	15	15	70

B13

Relations with Jews

School	Have relations, in %	Seldom, in %	Hardly ever, in %	None, in %
Abdullah	15	13	10	62
Ma'mouniyeh	15	12	9	61
Dar al-Tifl	13	12	10	60
Private Christian	15	10	5	70
Amal Vocational	17	19	6	58
Israeli Curriculum Beit Safafa	83	17	0	0
Jordanian Curriculum Beit Safafa	40	22	10	28

Jerusalem administration (B5), with over 20% indicating some degree of satisfaction. But again, at the opposite spectrum of complete negation, 46.4% reject services completely, as compared to 36.4% of their parents.

The same differentiation emerges clearly in Table B6. The below-30 generation is more optimistic in regard to the peace projects. But they also are more heavily represented at the extreme of complete negation. In all instances negation outweighs acceptance, but in all instances acceptance is higher than in the above-30 generation.

The same tendency is discernible in the question dealing with Jordan, B7, although the spread here is not quite as significant. The answers to question B8 also reinforce this trend. The most interesting response is probably the higher attachment to an Islamic polity that the younger generation evinces, and also their relative indifference to the political construction of a future Palestinian state—almost three times as many answer "not important" as in the generation above 30. Again, the above-30 generation espouses the middle-of-the-road Fatah position, a secular Palestinian state.

Astonishingly enough, Table B9 shows a relatively high (16.0%) preference for religion over a Palestinian state. One should not exaggerate the significance of this; 80% plus of the younger generation would still choose a Palestinian state over anything else, but the preference for religion is three times that of the older Palestinians. And some of the young were willing to choose "economic well-being" as the first option on their list. True, the proportion is tiny; but this answer called for a great deal of candor.

Figure B10 confirms the rest of the sampling. Only a third of the youth would be willing to sacrifice religion, as compared to two-thirds of the older respondents. A small but interesting percentage would be willing to sacrifice a Palestinian state, something the older respondents would not be willing to do. On the other hand, over half of the younger Palestinians would be willing to sacrifice economic well-being, compared to a third of their older correspondents. These responses seem to indicate that the younger generation is less bound to the political positions of Fatah, and has more secular radicals and more religious fundamentalists than does the above-30 generation. Jerusalem's Palestinian society, as we pointed out previously, has always been generally secular and relatively moderate in its political goals. There is a strong element of moderation and secularism in the below-30 group, but the cohesiveness of the secular moderate society seems to be weakening at the extremes. Since we felt that 30 might have been too advanced an age for a generational differentiation, we decided to poll high school students in the 12th grade—those working toward the Taujiah in the Jordanian-curriculum

school system of East Jerusalem and those Israeli Arabs working toward the Bagrut in the Israeli-curriculum Beit Safafa school. (Beit Safafa is the one Jerusalem school with two curricular systems, one Jordanian and one Israeli. It is the only school of this nature in Jerusalem; the rest of the Palestinians work toward the Taujiah.)

The sample included 278 Arab students from Jerusalem, 134 males and 144 females. We concentrated somewhat on females because they had been notable by their absence in the random samples. In other words, when we were polling randomly in the city, men usually came forward to answer questions; the female portion of the society stayed in the background. We could avoid this characteristic of Arab society in the school polling since the Arab schools with Jordanian curriculum are divided by gender. We polled (a) Abdullah High School, 60 male students, a school administered by the city of Jerusalem for male students; (b) Ma'mouniyeh High School, 60 female students, a school administered by the city of Jerusalem; (c) Dar al-Tifl, a private Muslim school for girls, 40 females; (d) the private Christian school Mitre, with 20 students; (e) the Amal vocational school, 36 males, administered by the city; and (f) Beit Safafa High School—on the Jordanian curriculum, 33 students; on the Israeli curriculum, 29 students. Almost all of the students professed a middle-class socioeconomic position in society. We did not differentiate between males and females at Beit Safafa High School, which is integrated, or at Mitre. Here one must add that the high schools in Jerusalem that remain open are relatively moderate schools. Some publicly administered high schools, like Rashadia (males), were closed because of demonstrations, and probably the most prestigious private school in the city, Ibrahamia, for males, was also closed. In addition, some of the Christian schools refused to allow polling. Despite this, the data that emerged from the results were interesting both as a verification of what emerged from the random samples and in themselves.

B11: The high percentage of Christians opting for an open city is certainly significant. As we shall see further on in the analysis of random samples, Christians are in almost all responses more moderate than Muslims, and more open to compromises with Jewish authorities. What is also interesting in this particular poll is the female rejection of an open city, and strong female attachment to the East-West division solution—fully 83% of the secularly educated girls in Ma'mouniyeh, and 50% of the women in Dar-al Tifl (these students are all approximately 18 years old). The most interesting result, however, is the strong male orientation toward an Islamic polity. Some 50% of the boys at Abdullah supported a Muslim orientation in East Jerusalem,

compared to only 17% of the girls from a similar social background and in a similar school. The percentage of women supporting a Muslim polity at a Muslim private school was indeed high at 38% (but small compared with Beit Safafa in the Jordanian curriculum, 39%, and the highest percentage of all in Jerusalem in the Israeli-oriented study program of Beit Safafa, 52%). This was a further indication that Israeli Arabs in Jerusalem are more prone to support an Islamic political orientation than their Palestinian compatriots from East Jerusalem.

Two further points of interest arise here. The Israeli Arabs in Beit Safafa are also not interested in a joint open city with Israeli-Arab cooperation. The students studying the Jordanian curriculum are more inclined to favor this solution, and indeed are the second highest group polled with this orientation. Incidentally, if we were looking for a PLO orientation among these potential graduates of the Jerusalem high school system, we would find it in the vocational students. These are young men studying to be electricians, mechanics, and so on. Question B12 deals with readiness to live in Jerusalem with a Jewish majority and equal rights and duties.

B12: The results verified the answers to B11, and also showed a significant readiness for some sort of cooperation with Jewish authorities among young Arabs (about 30% on average). Obviously this is true of Israeli Arabs studying in Beit Safafa, but it is also true for the Christians who were polled and, interestingly enough, for over a third of the vocational students. This is true even though large majorities from Abdullah (63%), Ma'mouniyeh (73%), Amal (64%), and a smaller majority from the Jordanian-curriculum Beit Safafa students indicated, when they were asked to list effects of the *intifada* on them, the beginning of hatred for Jews. (These groups of responses will appear in a later study.)

We also wished to know about current relationships with Jews. In the random sample the younger generation had indicated a higher percentage of relationships with Israeli institutions than the older generation. We asked the 12th graders for relations with Jews and non-Israeli institutions (Fig. B13).

Four of the six schools polled, as noted, are municipal schools whose teachers' salaries are paid by the administration of Jerusalem, but most students seem unaffected by this. Approximately 15% of all the students indicated that they had steady relationships with Jews, and another 10% to 19% indicated that they have such relationships off and on. Obviously, the Israeli-curriculum students at Beit Safafa, who are Israeli, have extensive relations with Jews, and of course their Jordanian-curriculum costudents are

more open to Jewish society with 62% having some relationships or continuing relationships with Jews. What is interesting here is that the Christian students, who were astonishingly moderate in their answers and surprisingly open to an Israeli polity, have the least contact with Jews. (This may be one reason for their relative moderation, since contact can also mean contact with the police or other unpleasant authorities.) They have less off-and-on contact than the female Muslim students at Ma'mouniyeh and Dar al-Tifl, but the same percentage of Christian students have continuing relationships with Jews.

The answers at the Palestinian high schools in Jerusalem confirmed what had emerged from the random samples, and were in themselves highly interesting. There was readiness for some sort of cooperation in about 30% of the students, and this is about equal to the amount in the random sample of those below 30. The preferences for Islamic social and political solutions are even more pronounced among the male Muslim students, and especially, apparently, among Israeli Arabs in Jerusalem—a fact that was confirmed in the random sample, as we shall see in Tables C2-C10. This is true even though large percentages of the Muslim students reported that they have been physically assaulted by the police or that they or members of their families have been arrested. The figures for being assaulted or arrested are much lower among the girl students, and lower again among the Christians whose percentages are similar to those of Beit Safafa. For example, no member of a Christian's family has been arrested, as compared to 36% of the families of the girls in Ma'mouniyeh. Arab youth in Jerusalem, although it seems to be suffering proportionally more than any other group within the community, has not been disproportionally radicalized. In addition, there does not seem to be one unifying polity that could unite this youth. Here as elsewhere the dominant political opinion is that which is shaped by Fatah. More and more male students, however, seem to be gravitating toward Islamic movements. And the attitudes of women in the school system who are not getting a high school diploma—in other words, those women who leave school earlier in their lives with lower career expectations and opportunities and perhaps a more traditional attitude—are unknown at present.

Differentiation by Religion Within the Random Samples

Although Christian spokesmen and Palestinian leaders generally deny any difference of opinion between Muslims and Christians, my own research into this question (see Policy Study 24) indicates that significant differences do exist. These also emerge from the random samples—not with the surprising clarity of the questionnaires in the Jerusalem school system, but with definite statistical significance.

The results in Tables C2-C10 verified these differences. Christians are far more favorable toward an open-city solution than Muslims—although, interestingly enough, the basic Fatah position is supported by almost the same percentage of Christians as Muslims. Where Muslims differ from Christians is in the answer "other," i.e., the more radical solution. There are very few Christians opting for this fourth alternative. The results in C3 and C4 indicate the higher percentage of Christian relationship with Israeli institutions, and twice as many Christians are satisfied with the services rendered by the administration in Jerusalem as are Muslims (C5). The question on peace prospects shows no significant difference between Christians and Muslims, but a higher percentage of Christians support Jordanian attempts to find a solution for the problem of Palestine. Obviously the Christians do not support an Islamic polity, although in our random sample one Christian consistently responded in a pro-Islamic fashion, which may be his error or ours. Nevertheless the results here are clear, and the growing strength of political support for Islam probably accounts for subliminal Christian moderation in dealing with the Jewish polity as well. Christians, however, by an overwhelming majority, support the creation of a Palestinian state as the most important thing in their lives. Only 1.6% of the Christians indicated that economic well-being was the most important option for them. Again, the religious option was almost exclusively chosen by Muslims. And Christians profess a high degree of secularism. Some 81.5% of them (Table C10) would sacrifice religion, whereas only 40.4% of the Muslims would be willing to do so. There are obviously large differences between Christians and Muslims in sociological structure, and in their goals for the future. Since the Christian society in Jerusalem is diminishing in size, perhaps their positions are not as important as they had been in the past. Many of the spokesmen for the traditional Fatah factions, however, are Christian—Hana Siniora, the Kata brothers, Saman Khouri, and so on. But the Christian community as a whole is probably seeking some way out of a prospective hard and fast polarization in Jerusalem. In the Muslim community some of the same fears

of a radicalized society exist. On the other hand, Islamic political orientation is growing within the Muslim community. Here, too, many of the older Muslims as well as secular Jerusalem Muslims are uniting behind the political organizational format offered to them by a newly moderate Fatah. As long as this secular bridge can be maintained, most Christians and a high percentage of Muslims will support Fatah positions in Jerusalem.

For the Christians, however, a minimalistic Palestinian solution in cooperation with the Jerusalem administration, if not Israel, also seems an acceptable outcome of the *intifada*. That means, in other words, some sort of compromise in the future which would not leave them totally at sea within an Islamic polity.

C2

Count Row Pct Col Pct		East-West	Open city	Jordan & Palestine	Other	Row total
Christian	1	31	21	2	2	56
		55.4	37.5	3.6	3.6	13.8
		14.1	20.4	7.1	3.6	
Muslim	2	189	82	26	54	351
		53.8	23.4	7.4	15.4	86.2
		85.9	79.6	92.9	96.4	
COLUMN		220	103	28	56	407
TOTAL		54.1	25.3	6.9	13.8	100.0

Number of missing observations = 12

C3

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	No	Row total
Christian	1	28 50.0 18.4	28 50.0 11.0	56 13.8
Muslim	2	124 35.3 81.6	227 64.7 89.0	351 86.2
COLUMN TOTAL		152 37.3	255 62.7	407 100.0

Number of missing observations = 12

C4

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Row total
Christian	1	11 19.6 16.9	18 32.1 20.2	27 48.2 10.8	56 13.9
Muslim	2	54 15.5 83.1	71 20.4 79.8	223 64.1 89.2	348 86.1
COLUMN TOTAL		65 16.1	89 22.0	250 61.9	404 100.0

Number of missing observations = 15

32

C5

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Not at all	Row total
Christian	1	1	13	28	14	56
		1.8	23.2	50.0	25.0	13.8
		7.1	25.0	15.8	8.6	
Muslim	2	13	39	149	149	350
		3.7	11.1	42.6	42.6	86.2
		92.9	75.0	84.2	91.4	
COLUMN TOTAL		14	52	177	163	406
		3.4	12.8	43.6	40.1	100.0

Number of missing observations = 13

C6

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	Partly	No	Not at all	Row total
Christian	1	2	7	32	15	55
		3.6	12.5	57.1	26.8	13.8
		18.2	15.9	15.3	10.5	
Muslim	2	9	37	177	128	351
		2.6	10.5	50.4	36.5	86.2
		81.8	84.1	84.7	89.5	
COLUMN TOTAL		11	44	209	143	407
		2.7	10.8	51.4	35.1	100.0

Number of missing observations = 12

C7

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Support	Support under CO	Against	Totally against	Row total
Christian	1	2 3.6 10.5	15 26.8 17.2	24 42.9 14.0	15 26.8 11.6	56 13.8
Muslim	2	17 4.9 89.5	72 20.6 82.8	147 42.0 86.0	114 32.6 88.4	350 86.2
COLUMN TOTAL		19 4.7	87 21.4	171 42.1	129 31.8	406 100.0

Number of missing observations = 13

C8

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Secular	Islamic	Socialist	Not important	Other	Row total
Christian	1	40 71.4 21.9	1 1.8 1.1	10 17.9 22.7	5 8.9 6.1		56 13.8
Muslim	2	143 40.7 78.1	92 26.2 98.9	34 9.7 77.3	77 21.9 93.9	5 1.4 100.0	351 86.2
COLUMN TOTAL		183 45.0	93 22.9	44 10.8	82 20.1	5 1.2	407 100.0

Number of missing observations = 12

C9

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Religion	Row total
Christian	1	53 96.4 14.9	1 1.8 16.7	1 1.8 2.4	55 13.6
Muslim	2	303 87.1 85.1	5 1.4 83.3	40 11.5 97.6	348 86.4
COLUMN TOTAL		356 88.3	6 1.5	41 10.2	403 100.0

Number of missing observations = 16

C10

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Family & community	Religion	Row total
Christian	1		7 13.0 4.8	3 5.6 10.0	44 81.5 23.7	54 14.4
Muslim	2	12 3.8 100.0	139 43.4 95.2	27 8.4 90.0	142 44.4 76.3	320 85.6
COLUMN TOTAL		12 3.2	146 39.0	30 8.0	186 49.7	374 100.0

Number of missing observations = 45

Analysis of Differentiation by Employment

We divided the random samples into two economic categories, one by occupational status—unemployed or student, salaried or self-employed, and the other place of employment, or "national dependency" in employment, Israeli business, Palestinian business, foreign company or agency, or self-employed. The occupational status is indicated in Tables D2-D10; place of employment in E2-E10.

The analysis of Palestinian society by occupational status was not as significant as the generational, religious, and borough analyses. Nevertheless, certain interesting aspects emerged. Question D2 showed, not surprisingly, that the unemployed and the students shared opinions held by the young in our generational analysis. The 35.1% positive answer for an open city seems surprising in this group. Again, in the category "other," which is the radical category, over twice the percentage of the unemployed and students opted for this solution as did salaried or self-employed. The self-employed generally were the most constant in support of the Fatah positions in Jerusalem. Many of the salaried employees also conform, of course, to the category "work for Israeli businesses" (E2-E10), so that there is a certain tendency here toward more moderation in dealings with Israel. The contact with Israelis on the part of the salaried members of the Palestinian community is obvious in D3 and D4: a much higher percentage has contacts with Israeli institutions. Also in terms of satisfaction with services rendered by the Jerusalem administration (D5), over 20% of the salaried Palestinians responded positively. This is twice as high as the percentage of the entire community and three times as high as the self-employed. The relation to the peace initiatives does not differ significantly within the three groups, but again in dealing with attitude toward Jordanian political efforts in Jerusalem we find the salaried group evincing more positive reactions than either of the other two groups. Interestingly enough, a relatively large percentage of the unemployed and students, over 25%, would support a Jordanian regime's attempts to influence the future of Jerusalem under certain conditions. Again, the self-employed are least likely to support Jordan or are the least susceptible to Jordanian blandishments. However, as in the younger generation the "totally against," the category of strongest rejection, is rather regularly prevalent among the students and unemployed. The tendency toward Islamic orientation is much higher among the unemployed (D9). Here again the self-employed evinced the strongest support for the Fatah position.

As was to be expected, the self-employed are less socialistically oriented than either salaried employees or the unemployed. But socialist feeling in Jerusalem is, although definitely a minority point of view, more significant among the unemployed, students, and salaried employees.

The answers to D9 and D10 verify the trends that had already developed throughout the questionnaire. Religion plays a greater role in the political desires of the unemployed and students. The difference between salaried and self-employed here is not overly significant. The only interesting exception is in the readiness to sacrifice. Only 30% of the self-employed would be willing to sacrifice economic well-being, whereas 41.7% of the salaried would be so inclined. Again not surprisingly, the unemployed and students show a very high percentage of readiness—60%—to sacrifice an economic well-being that they do not have.

D2

Count Row Pct Col Pct		East- West	Open city	Jordan & Palestine	Other	Row Total
Unemployed	1	14	20	3	20	57
		24.6	35.1	5.3	35.1	13.6
		6.3	18.9	10.3	33.3	
Salaried	2	102	43	14	26	185
		55.1	23.2	7.6	14.1	44.3
		45.7	40.6	48.3	43.3	
Self- employed	3	107	43	12	14	176
		60.8	24.4	6.8	8.0	42.1
		48.0	40.6	41.4	23.3	
COLUMN TOTAL		223 53.3	106 25.4	29 6.9	60 14.4	418 100.0

Number of missing observations = 1

D3

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	No	Row total
Unemployed	1	6 10.5 3.8	51 89.5 19.5	57 13.6
Salaried	2	94 50.8 60.3	91 49.2 34.7	185 44.3
Self- employed	3	56 31.8 35.9	120 68.2 45.8	176 42.1
COLUMN TOTAL		156 37.3	262 62.7	418 100.0

Number of missing observations = 1

D4

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Row total
Unemployed	1	1 1.8 1.5	5 8.9 5.6	50 89.3 19.5	56 13.5
Salaried	2	57 31.1 83.8	38 20.8 42.2	88 48.1 34.2	183 44.1
Self- employed	3	10 5.7 14.7	47 26.7 52.2	119 67.6 46.3	176 42.4
COLUMN TOTAL		68 16.4	90 21.7	257 61.9	415 100.0

Number of missing observations = 4

D5

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Not at all	Row total
Unemployed	1	3	7	9	38	57
		5.3	12.3	15.8	66.7	13.7
		20.0	13.2	5.1	22.2	
Salaried	2	10	33	71	71	185
		5.4	17.8	38.4	38.4	44.4
		66.7	62.3	39.9	41.5	
Self-employed	3	2	13	98	62	175
		1.1	7.4	56.0	35.4	42.0
		13.3	24.5	55.1	36.3	
COLUMN TOTAL		15	53	178	171	417
		3.6	12.7	42.7	41.0	100.0

Number of missing observations = 2

D6

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	Partly	No	Not at all	Row total
Unemployed	1	3	8	16	30	57
		5.3	14.0	28.1	52.6	13.6
		23.1	18.2	7.5	20.1	
Salaried	2	6	22	92	65	185
		3.2	11.9	49.7	35.1	44.3
		46.2	50.0	43.4	43.6	
Self-employed	3	4	14	104	54	176
		2.3	8.0	59.1	30.7	42.1
		30.8	31.8	49.1	36.2	
COLUMN TOTAL		13	44	212	149	418
		3.1	10.5	50.7	35.6	100.0

Number of missing observations = 1

D7

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Support	Support under CO	Against	Totally against	Row total
Unemployed	1	1 1.8 5.3	15 26.3 16.9	12 21.1 6.9	29 50.9 21.6	57 13.7
Salaried	2	8 4.3 42.1	49 26.6 55.1	70 38.0 40.0	57 31.0 42.5	184 44.1
Self- employed	3	10 5.7 52.6	25 14.2 28.1	93 52.8 53.1	48 27.3 35.8	176 42.2
COLUMN TOTAL		19 4.6	89 21.3	175 42.0	134 32.1	417 100.0

Number of missing observations = 2

D8

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Secular	Islamic	Socialist	Not important	Other	Row total
Unemployed	1	13 22.8 7.0	17 29.8 18.3	8 14.0 17.4	17 29.8 19.3	2 3.5 33.3	57 13.6
Salaried	2	75 40.5 40.5	43 23.2 46.2	25 13.5 54.3	41 22.2 46.6	1 .5 16.7	185 44.3
Self- employed	3	97 55.1 52.4	33 18.8 35.5	13 7.4 28.3	30 17.0 34.1	3 1.7 50.0	176 42.1
COLUMN TOTAL		185 44.3	93 22.2	46 11.0	88 21.1	6 1.4	418 100.0

Number of missing observations = 1

D9

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Religion	Row total
Unemployed	1	45 80.4 12.3		11 19.6 26.8	56 13.5
Salaried	2	160 87.9 43.7	4 2.2 57.1	18 9.9 43.9	182 44.0
Self- employed	3	161 91.5 44.0	3 1.7 42.9	12 6.8 29.3	176 42.5
COLUMN TOTAL		366 88.4	7 1.7	41 9.9	414 100.0

Number of missing observations = 5

D10

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Family & community	Religion	Row total
Unemployed	1	1 2.0 8.3	30 60.0 19.9	5 10.0 16.1	14 28.0 7.4	50 13.0
Salaried	2	8 4.8 66.7	70 41.7 46.4	14 8.3 45.2	76 45.2 40.0	168 43.8
Self- employed	3	3 1.8 25.0	51 30.7 33.8	12 7.2 38.7	100 60.2 52.6	166 43.2
COLUMN TOTAL		12 3.1	151 39.3	31 8.1	190 49.5	384 100.0

Number of missing observations = 35

E2 to E10 indicate the results of the questionnaire by place of occupation—those who work for Israeli businesses, those who work for Palestinian businesses, those who are employed by foreign agencies, and those who are self-employed. There is a slight differential between those who consider themselves self-employed and those who were classified as self-employed on the basis of their answers to the sociological questions that introduced the questionnaire. Not unexpectedly, those employed in Israeli businesses indicated a higher than average preference for an open city, but interestingly enough the highest percentage of supporters for an open city are those employed by foreign agencies and foreign businesses in Jerusalem. Only sixteen of the respondents to the questionnaire are employed by foreign agencies, but these Palestinians have a prominent opinion input through their foreign connections. The category "unemployed," "self-employed" verified the results of the D2-D10 segment; the interesting aspect here is the high percentage of foreign employees who opt for "other," i.e., the more radical of the Palestinian positions. Those employed by Israeli businesses have, of course, a higher level of relationship with Israeli institutions. It is interesting here that the self-employed also must maintain a rather high degree of contact with Israeli institutions, whereas Palestinians who work for foreign agencies have the lowest level of contact with Israeli institutions, lower even than those who work for Palestinian businesses. The returns of the random sample verified impressionistic analysis made in Jerusalem that Palestinians employed by foreign agencies try to ignore Israeli authorities and/or the Jerusalem administration. In terms of satisfaction with services, again those employed by Israeli businesses evince a far higher level of satisfaction than anyone else, and indeed although once again the peace-projects question does not show a very wide differentiation, those who work for Israeli businesses are the most positively inclined toward the process and, interestingly enough, toward the Jordanian regime as well. Here, however, the differentiation between the groups is much less than along generational or other sociological lines. The high preference for an Islamic polity by those working for Israeli businesses (E8) again confirms the trend that we have seen throughout the questionnaire: the relationship with Israel leads to an increased pro-Islamic position. The unimportance of a specific political organization for Palestine for a larger percentage of those employed by foreign agencies is also puzzling and interesting.

Again, the analysis of desires and readiness to sacrifice (E9-E10) shows that economic differentiation does not lead to great differences in attitude.

Only the category "religion," again positively strongest with those Arabs employed by Israeli businesses, reaffirms previously salient trends. Generally, it is interesting that place of employment does not seem to have as much of an effect on the political desires of the Palestinian community as one might have expected. Economic influences, then, seem to play less of a role than other, particularist social influences—i.e., where one lives, what family one has grown up in, or one's religion, or one's generation—in forming a Palestinian opinion.

E2

Count Row Pct Col Pct		East-West	Open city	Jordan & Palestine	Other	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	50	32	8	18	108
		46.3	29.6	7.4	16.7	27.7
		23.6	32.7	28.6	34.6	
Palestinian	2	56	26	9	21	112
		50.0	23.2	8.0	18.8	28.7
		28.4	26.5	32.1	40.0	
Foreign	3	5	6		5	16
		31.3	37.5		31.3	4.1
		2.4	6.1		9.6	
Self-employed	4	101	34	11	8	154
		65.6	22.1	7.1	5.2	39.5
		47.6	34.7	39.3	15.4	
COLUMN TOTAL		212	98	28	52	890
		54.4	25.1	7.2	13.3	100.0

Number of missing observations = 29

E3

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	No	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	71 65.7 47.3	37 34.3 15.4	108 27.7
Palestinian	2	24 21.4 16.0	88 78.6 36.7	112 28.7
Foreign	3	1 12.5 1.3	14 87.5 5.8	16 4.1
Self- employed	4	53 34.4 35.3	101 65.6 42.1	154 39.5
COLUMN TOTAL		150 38.5	240 61.5	390 100.0

Number of missing observations = 29

E4

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	49 45.8 74.2	20 18.7 23.5	38 35.5 16.0	107 27.6
Palestinian	2	6 5.4 9.1	16 14.4 18.8	89 80.2 37.6	111 28.6
Foreign	3		3 18.8 3.5	12 81.3 5.5	16 4.1
Self- employed	4	11 7.1 16.7	46 29.9 54.1	97 63.0 40.9	154 39.7
COLUMN TOTAL		66 17.0	85 21.9	237 61.1	388 100.0

Number of missing observations = 31

E5

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	To some extent	No	Not at all	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	8 7.4 61.5	25 23.1 50.0	32 29.6 19.0	43 39.8 27.7	108 27.8
Palestinian	2	2 1.8 15.4	10 8.9 20.0	41 36.6 24.4	59 52.7 37.3	112 28.8
Foreign	3	1 6.3 7.7	1 6.3 2.0	5 31.3 3.0	9 56.3 5.7	16 4.1
Self- employed	4	1 1.3 15.4	14 9.2 28.0	90 58.8 53.6	47 30.7 29.7	153 39.3
COLUMN TOTAL		13 3.3	50 12.9	168 43.2	158 40.6	389 100.0

Number of missing observations = 30

E6

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	Partly	No	Not at all	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	5 4.6 50.0	19 17.6 44.2	48 44.4 23.9	36 33.3 26.5	108 27.7
Palestinian	2		9 8.0 20.9	55 49.1 27.4	48 42.9 35.3	112 28.7
Foreign	3	1 6.3 10.0	2 12.5 4.7	6 37.5 3.0	7 43.8 5.1	16 4.1
Self- employed	4	4 2.6 40.0	13 8.4 30.2	92 59.7 45.8	45 29.2 33.1	154 39.5
COLUMN TOTAL		10 2.6	43 11.0	201 51.5	136 34.9	390 100.0

Number of missing observations = 29

E7

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Support	Support under CO	Against	Totally against	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	4 3.7 22.2	31 29.0 36.9	35 32.7 21.1	37 34.6 30.6	107 27.5
Palestinian	2	5 4.5 27.8	30 26.8 35.7	38 33.9 22.9	39 34.8 32.2	112 28.8
Foreign	3		3 18.8 3.6	6 37.5 3.6	7 43.8 5.8	16 4.1
Self- employed	4	9 5.8 50.0	20 13.0 23.8	87 56.5 52.4	38 24.7 31.4	154 39.6
COLUMN TOTAL		18 4.6	84 21.6	166 42.7	121 31.1	389 100.0

Number of missing observations = 30

E8

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Secular	Islamic	Socialist	Not important	Other	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	33 30.6 18.9	31 28.7 35.2	16 14.8 37.2	26 24.1 33.3	2 1.9 33.3	108 27.7
Palestinian	2	53 47.3 30.3	23 20.5 26.1	13 11.6 30.2	21 18.8 26.9	2 1.8 33.3	112 28.7
Foreign	3	4 25.0 2.3	3 18.8 3.4	3 18.8 7.0	5 31.3 6.4	1 6.3 16.7	16 4.1
Self- employed	4	85 55.2 48.6	31 20.1 35.2	11 7.1 25.6	26 16.9 33.3	1 .6 16.7	154 39.5
COLUMN TOTAL		175 44.9	88 22.6	43 11.0	78 20.0	6 1.5	390 100.0

Number of missing observations = 29

E9

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Religion	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	89 82.4 26.1	3 2.8 50.0	16 14.8 41.0	108 28.0
Palestinian	2	97 89.0 28.4		12 11.0 30.8	109 28.2
Foreign	3	14 93.3 4.1		1 6.7 2.6	15 3.9
Self- employed	4	141 91.6 41.3	3 1.9 50.0	10 6.5 25.6	154 39.9
COLUMN TOTAL		341 88.3	6 1.6	39 10.1	386 100.0

Number of missing observations = 33

E10

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Family & community	Religion	Row total
Israeli bus.	1	5 5.2 41.7	47 49.0 33.3	11 11.5 44.0	33 34.4 18.4	96 26.9
Palestinian	2	3 3.0 25.0	37 37.4 26.2	7 7.1 28.0	52 52.5 29.1	99 27.7
Foreign	3	1 6.3 8.3	8 50.0 5.7	1 6.3 4.0	6 37.5 3.4	16 4.5
Self- employed	4	3 2.1 25.0	49 33.6 34.8	6 4.1 24.0	88 60.3 49.2	146 40.9
COLUMN TOTAL		12 3.4	141 39.5	25 7.0	179 50.1	357 100.0

Number of missing observations = 62

CONCLUSION

The in-depth analysis of Palestinian opinion in Jerusalem shows:

1. A majority take a moderate Fatah position. This support is especially strong among "established Jerusalemites" (self-employed, Christians, Muslims over 30) and in large boroughs like Beit Hanina, Al-Tur, the Old City, and so on. This group has not, however, crystallized politically. It still has within it many disparate groups (conservative Hebronite families—some of whom, like the Sonqrat family, support Hamas—*intifada* leaders, Christian intellectuals, etc.); as long as no formal structure exists to organize and hold these groups together, Palestinians in Jerusalem will continue to be disadvantaged politically. Articulation, action, and compromise are determined in various centers, and current majorities in opinion have not been molded into a clear statement of political goals.

2. At the edges of Jerusalem's Palestinian society—among youth, especially high-schoolers, young academics, and in some of the boroughs—majority opinions are fraying. The chances are that if there is no satisfactory solution for Palestine and Jerusalem in the near future, the current consensus will start to crack. The Jerusalem administration knows how to deal with fissures in Palestinian society in Jerusalem. The Israeli government, however, in recent years has shown a remarkable ability to foster unity. The fragmentation in Palestinian society in Jerusalem will not become politically critical if Israeli pressure continues to fuse the society into a whole. But even here time is not necessarily the friend of Jerusalem's Palestinians, since a radicalization of their society—a distinct possibility among the young, among Muslim men, and in certain boroughs—will not, in my opinion, work to their advantage.

The conclusions drawn at the end of Part II of the initial study continue to be valid, but are somewhat modified by the findings that have emerged.

APPENDIX

Since Beit Safafa is clearly the most moderate of the boroughs in Jerusalem, we decided to scrutinize the results that came from there. We divided our respondents by nationality—i.e., Israeli and non-Israeli Arabs. The results were in many ways quite interesting.

Beit Safafa's Israelis indicated a high preference for an open city, but not much higher than their Palestinian counterparts in the borough. "Open city" is the most preferred option of the four offered. The answer "other" is also higher among Israeli Beit Safafans. This is the only significant deviation in the category A11. Israeli Arabs have quite a lot of contact with Israel, but non-Israeli Beit Safafans also show a much higher percentage of satisfaction than does the rest of Jerusalem. Israeli Arabs are by far the most optimistic regarding the peace process; here, non-Israeli Beit Safafans are much less optimistic. Israeli Arabs do not think much of Jordan, and the non-Israeli Beit Safafans are also less positive toward Jordan than the rest of Palestinian Arabs in Jerusalem. The category A17 indicates a high Israeli Arab attachment to an Islamic polity. Also significant is the high percentage of Israeli Arabs, 41.2%, who do not specify their wishes as to what kind of state a future Palestinian state might be. The figure for the non-Israelis is also quite high. Whether this indicates indifference or the feeling that is is not going to be "their" state in any event is difficult to say. But certainly, as category A18 indicates, Beit Safafans are only a little less desirous of a Palestinian state than the rest of Arab Jerusalem. Israeli Arabs evince a significantly lower percentage, 58.8%, than the rest of Jerusalem. But the non-Israeli Beit Safafans, with 82.9%, are on the lowest rung of what one might still call average for Jerusalem. Again, the Israeli Beit Safafans evince a high percentage of preference for religion as the most important thing in their lives—35.3% for Israeli Arabs compared with 9.8% for non-Israeli Arabs, or four times higher.

In category A19 the same trend is evident, with very few Israeli Arabs being willing to sacrifice religion in order to establish their other preferences. More than twice as many non-Israelis would be willing to do so. The figures for Beit Safafa are of course weighted by the high percentage of Israelis (17 out of 58 in the poll). On the other hand, the non-Israeli Beit Safafans also generally evince a more moderate position than their counterparts in the rest of Jerusalem. In all, 28 Israeli Arabs were polled out of the 419 random samples; of these, six were Christians, 20 were Muslim, and two did not report their religion. The figures for Israeli Arabs vary to some extent from thefigures for Israeli Arabs in Beit Safafa alone. Generally, Israelis spread around the city and not concentrated in one borough tend to take on more of the characteristics of the boroughs in which they live. An in-depth analysis of all Israeli Arabs included in the sample (but not in this paper) indicates this quite clearly.

A11

Count Row Pct Col Pct	East- West	Open city	Jordan & Palestine	Other	Row total
Israeli 1	7 41.2 31.8	7 41.2 30.4	1 5.9 33.3	2 11.8 20.0	17 29.3
Non-Israeli 2	15 36.6 68.2	16 39.0 69.6	2 4.9 66.7	8 19.5 80.0	41 70.7
COLUMN TOTAL	22 37.9	23 39.7	3 5.2	10 17.2	58 100.0

Number of missing observations = 0

A12

Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes	No	Row total
Israeli 1	17 1.00 40.5		17 29.3
Non-Israeli 2	25 61.0 59.5	16 39.0 100.0	41 70.7
COLUMN TOTAL	42 72.4	16 27.6	58 100.0

Number of missing observations = 0

.

A13

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes	To some extent	No	Row total
Israeli	1	13 76.5 50.0	4 23.5 26.7		17 29.3
Non-Israeli	2	13 31.7 50.0	11 26.8 73.3	17 41.5 100.0	41 70.7
COLUMN TOTAL		26 44.8	15 25.9	17 29.3	58 100.0

Number of missing observations = 0

A14

	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes	To some extent	No	Not at all	Row total
Israeli	1	3 17.6 30.0	6 35.3 46.2	5 29.4 31.3	3 17.6 15.8	17 29.3
Non-Israeli	2	7 17.1 70.0	7 17.1 53.8	11 26.8 68.8	16 39.0 84.2	41 70.7
COLUMN TOTAL		10 17.2	13 22.4	16 27.6	19 32.8	58 100.0

Number of missing observations = 0

A15

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Yes	Partly	No	Not at all	Row total
Israeli	1	2 11.8 50.0	7 41.2 43.8	5 29.4 26.3	3 17.6 15.8	17 29.3
Non-Israeli	2	2 4.9 50.0	9 22.0 56.3	14 34.1 73.7	16 39.0 84.2	41 70.7
COLUMN TOTAL		4 6.9	16 27.6	19 32.8	19 32.8	58 100.0

Number of missing observations = 0

A16

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Support	Support under CO	Against	Totally against	Row total
Israeli	1		3 17.6 25.0	8 47.1 30.8	6 35.8 31.6	17 29.3
Non-Israeli	2	1 2.4 100.0	9 22.0 75.0	18 43.9 69.2	13 31.7 68.4	41 70.7
COLUMN TOTAL		1 1.7	12 20.7	26 44.8	19 32.8	58 100.0

Number of missing observations = 0

A17

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Secular	Islamic	Socialist	Not important	Other	Row total
Israeli	1	3 17.6 18.8	5 29.4 45.5	2 11.8 28.6	7 41.2 31.8		17 29.3
Non-Israeli	2	13 31.7 81.3	6 14.6 54.5	5 12.2 71.4	15 36.6 68.2	2 4.9 100.0	41 70.7
COLUMN TOTAL		16 27.6	11 19.0	7 12.1	22 37.9	2 3.4	58 100.0

Number of missing observations = 0

A18

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Religion	Row total
Israeli	1	10 58.8 22.7	1 5.9 25.0	6 35.3 60.0	17 29.3
Non-Israeli	2	34 82.9 77.3	3 7.3 75.0	4 9.8 40.0	41 70.7
COLUMN TOTAL		44 75.9	4 6.9	10 17.2	58 100.0

Number of missing observations = 0

A19

Count Row Pct Col Pct		Palestinian state	Economic well- being	Family & community	Religion	Row total
Israeli	1	2	7	3	2	14
		14.3	50.0	21.4	14.3	26.9
		66.7	29.2	27.3	14.3	
Non-Israeli	2	1	17	8	12	38
		2.6	44.7	21.1	31.6	73.1
		33.3	70.8	72.7	85.7	
COLUMN		3	24	11	14	52
TOTAL		5.8	46.2	21.2	26.9	100.0

Number of missing observations = 6

NOTES

1. A. Ashkenasi, *The Structure of Ethnic Conflict and Palestinian Political Fragmentation,* Freie Universitat Berlin, FGS AP—O.P. 2/1981.

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