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Negotiations as a Mechanism for Resolution in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Introduction

Theoretical work on negotiation indicates a number of crucial concepts that mark the path to successful achievement of outcomes. One can be singled out at each of three phases of the process–its beginning, its middle, and its end. To begin negotiation, a quality of ripeness is necessary, even if not sufficient, for the parties to turn from conflict to reconciliation. Ripeness is not an objective condition but a perceptual one–albeit with an objective referent–that can be cultivated. In the process of crafting an agreement, justice is an element, also necessary but not sufficient, counterbalancing the more frequently cited causal concept of power. Studies show that parties will refuse an agreement that they do not consider just, and that the parties to the conflict must negotiate a common sense of justice, out of many, which will govern their subsequent search for an agreement. At the end of the negotiating process lies the problem of follow-through. Parties can craft an agreement by understanding each other as motivated human beings, but the more successful they are at this effort, the more they run afoul of an unchanged opinion in their publics when they return home. Ripeness, justice, and follow-through are necessary to success and must be cultivated if success is to be sustained.

Ripeness

The idea of a ripe moment is crucial to diplomats. "Ripeness of time is one of the absolute essences of diplomacy," asserted Campbell (1976, 73). "You have to do the right thing at the right time." "The success of negotiations is attributable not to a particular procedure chosen but to the readiness of the parties to exploit opportunities, confront hard choices, and make fair and mutual concessions," wrote George Shultz as secretary of state (1988). Few

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diplomats, however, have tried to identify what it is that provides that essence or readiness, leaving its identification to a sense of feel. Henry Kissinger (1974) did better, recognizing that "stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement." Conversely, practitioners often are heard to say that certain policies, including mediation initiatives, should not be pursued because the conflict just is not yet ripe.

Ripeness theory is intended to explain why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others' efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiation. Ripeness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the opening of negotiations, bilateral or mediated. It is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing; it must be seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, through the persuasion of a mediator. But unless the moment is ripe, as defined below, that search for an agreed outcome cannot begin.

It therefore follows that ripeness is not identical to its results, which are not part of its definition, and therefore it is not tautological. It has its own identifying characteristics, which can be discerned through research independent of the possible subsequent resolution or of efforts toward it. Although ripeness theory is not predictive in the sense that it can tell when a ripe moment will appear, it is predictive in identifying the necessary elements for the productive inauguration of negotiations. This type of analytical prediction is the best that can be obtained in social science, where stronger predictions could only be ventured by eliminating free choice (including the human possibility of blindness and mistakes). As such it is of great prescriptive value to policymakers seeking to know when and how to begin a peace process; and that is of no small importance.

The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties' perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending or recently avoided catastrophe (Zartman 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995; Touval & Zartman 1985; Haass 1990; Kriesberg & Thorson 1991; Stedman 1991; Zartman & Aurik 1991; Bar-Siman-Tov 1994; Green 1995; Druckman & Goodby 1996; Hampson 1996; Aggestam & Jönson 1997; Pruitt 1997; DeSoto

1998; T. Olson 1998). The idea behind the concept is that the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate their way out and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons). The catastrophe provides a deadline or a lesson indicating that pain can be sharply increased if something is not done about it now; catastrophe is a useful extension of the notion of an MHS but is not necessary either to its definition or to its existence. If this notion of implied equal blockage is too static to be realistic, the concept may be restated dynamically as a moment when the upper hand slips and the lower hand rises, both parties moving toward equality, with both movements being painful to the parties. The other component of ripeness besides the MHS is less complex: the perception that there is a Way Out.

The basic reasoning underlying the MHS lies in cost-benefit analysis, which assumes that parties change their course when they find themselves on a pain-producing path that motivates them to look for a more advantageous alternative. This calculation is consistent with public-choice notions of rationality (M. Olson 1965; Sen 1970) and public-choice studies of negotiation (Brams 1985, 1990; Brams & Taylor 1996), which assume that a party will choose the alternative that it prefers, and that a decision to change is induced by means of increasing pain associated with the present (conflictual) course. It is also consistent with prospect theory, currently in focus in international relations, which indicates that people tend to be more risk averse concerning gains than losses and therefore that sunk costs or investments in conflict escalation tend to push parties into costly deadlocks, creating the situation of an MHS (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; A. Stein 1990; J. Stein & Pauly, 1993; Mitchell 1995, 4–6).

The ripe moment is necessarily a perceptual event, not one that stands alone in objective reality; it can be created if outside parties can cultivate the perception of a painful present vs. a preferable alternative, and therefore can be resisted so long as the party in question refuses or is otherwise able to block out that perception. As with any other subjective perception, there are

likely to be objective referents or bases to be perceived. These can be highlighted by a mediator or an opposing party when they are not immediately recognized by the parties themselves, but it is the perception of the objective condition, not the condition itself, that makes for an MHS. Since such a stalemate is a future or contingent event, referring to the impossibility of breaking out of the impasse–"It can't go on like this"–any objective evidence is always subject to the recognition of the parties before it becomes operative. If the parties do not recognize "clear evidence" (in someone else's view) that they are in an impasse, an MHS has not (yet) occurred, and if they do perceive themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the "evidence," the MHS is present.

Although ripeness can be very helpful in identifying appropriate times and tactics for negotiations and mediation, it also has its negative implications. The need for a perceived MHS means that heightened conflict is necessary for conflict resolution, and also that conflict management–the reduction of conflict from violent to political means–can reduce the pain and therefore reduce the pressure for conflict resolution. It also means that a staged process of resolution necessarily moves away from its motivating impetus as it moves toward a final solution. The lessons of these implications are sharp. Conflict management needs to contain a commitment to further progress toward resolution, or it will contain the seeds of its own failure. Staged management or resolution processes need to build in the growing promise of a new and positive relationship between the parties, to provide a pull factor toward resolution as the push factor of ripeness becomes more distant.

The history of progress in the Arab-Israeli negotiations has been marked by repeatedly ripe moments that have been effectively seized and carried through to an agreement, just as earlier moments, unmarked by any MHS, failed to produce negotiations, let alone agreement (Touval 1982; Bar-Siman-Tov 1994). There is no need to belabor the point; it should suffice to recall the moments without exhausting the details. The June War of 1967 ended in a crushing victory for Israel, with the pain all on one side; the

defiant response from the Arab side was the Three Nos of Khartoum (Korn 1992, 84–86). The October War of 1973 was different; it ended in almost a caricature of an MHS–two armies mutually encircling each other on the west bank of the Suez Canal. More broadly, the ripe moment was defined by the short-term shock of the occupying country balanced against the restored honor of the occupied, giving rise to the direct talks of the two parties at Km 101, then transformed into three rounds of disengagement agreements under Kissinger's mediation and finally the Camp David accords and Washington Treaty under President Jimmy Carter's mediation (Zartman 1981; Quandt 1986, 1993). The step-by-step process over the decade moved toward an agreement that had something in it for both sides–territory and security–as it moved away from the motivating pain of the initial stalemate.

Analysts agree that there was no hurting stalemate to trigger the Madrid process (Spiegel 1992). The Palestinians were hurting a lot, and stalemated, and their participation could buy their return to U.S. graces. Although the intifada launched in 1987 initially evened the playing field and compensated for Palestinian pain by inflicting it on Israelis as well, the Israeli response successfully tilted the playing field again by returning the pain to the Palestinians and increasing it through a denial of its intended effects (Hunter 1993). By 1991, the pain of an unsuccessful intifada had been compounded by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat's disastrous support for Iraq in the second Gulf War and by the consequent loss of financial support from the Gulf states. Israel, on the other hand, was enjoying newfound legitimacy relative to the Gulf coalition along with most other states in the Middle East.

The absence of an MHS, which may explain why the Madrid process was so slow to start and lame to proceed, made it necessary for the mediator and convener to produce some other incentive (Baker 1998). Madrid may be a rare and interesting example of a Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO), where it is the prospect of a better situation at the end of negotiations alone that pulls the parties to the table rather than a worse and worsening

situation's pushing them at the beginning of negotiations. In the case of an MEO, relations with the mediator may be the key to the improved situation, occasioning a mediator's role as manipulator (Touval & Zartman 1987; Zartman & Touval 1996). Thus, Israel and the PLO engaged in the Madrid process in November 1991 halfheartedly and for entirely different reasons. For Israel, it was clearly a matter of improving relations with the United States, which played a very specific role as a manipulator by withholding loan guarantees in connection with settlements in the occupied territories as a pressure on the Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir to join the talks. There was no Israeli intention of joining or producing any movement toward the process, only to register a presence. For the Palestinians, Madrid offered a golden opportunity for recognition and status improvement. The PLO itself was also interested in progress in the talks, given the squeeze of its current position and the fact that it was *demandeur* in the process.

With the defeat of the Likud government in the 1992 elections, the Madrid talks took on a new direction, with both sides in search of movement and an outcome, although still not necessarily the same. Originally engaged in the process as a static presence, both the Israelis and the Palestinians now became more committed to the process as a dynamic, and their political fortunes became increasingly dependent on the production of outcomes from it. In addition, both parties faced rising pressure from their common enemy among the Palestinians, the Islamic Social Movement (Hamas). Hamas brandished the Islamic appeal, posed as an alternative to the "foreign" PLO leadership, and berated the PLO both for making the Madrid commitment and for not obtaining any results from it. Beyond the goldfish-bowl, publicity-heated nature of the meetings, the problem was that the Palestinian delegation was a West Bank group, connected to the PLO but unable to be its direct representative because PLO presence and recognition were blocked by Israel and even by the mediator, the United States. Thus, by the beginning of 1993 the Madrid process had run dry.

In sum, if there was a ripe moment in the Middle East peace process in the 1990s, it was in the process itself in 1993, not in the setting up of the process in 1991 (Pruitt 1997). Launched from a well-contrived Mutually Enticing Opportunity, the Madrid process in 1991 pulled the parties into an escalating engagement that led to an unusual, process-related stalemate that was painful to both parties. Locked into the process by their fear of a common enemy and betting their tenures on the production of results, the Israeli Labor government and the PLO leadership faced a steadily worsening situation and needed a way out. The moment was ripe for an Oslo–that is, for secret, direct talks that would produce a breakthrough.

Is the moment ripe now? Mutually Hurting Stalemates and Enticing Opportunities are in the eye of the beholder, and so are Ways Out. There is no doubt about a stalemate in 1998 and 1999. Yet both sides seem to hold the view that they can escalate their way out of the current impasse–the occupier through repression and expanded occupation, the occupied through renewed threat of intifada and unilateral declaration of statehood, although the present reality of repression outweighs the future threat of reaction, and the provoked reaction would only prove the need for the repression. The Palestinians are caught in the vicious circle intended by the Israeli government. At the same time, the mediator is not offering any Mutually Enticing Opportunities, only little details of reinforcement (strategic guarantee, intelligence cooperation).

Yet the stalemate and its pain are present for the looking; the objective referents to a subjective perception abound. Repression and expansion are only provocations to react at the first opportunity, and a weakening of the Palestinian Authority only strengthens Hamas. There is pain enough to go around, and to make a wholehearted agreement look good, if only the parties would feel it and if only the mediator would help them do so. By the same token, the staged nature of the negotiations, as specifically provided in the Oslo agreements, means that the parties should by now be building close relations to pull them to final agreement. Phased negotiations that continually reproduce Mutually Hurting Stalemates to push the parties

forward are merely updating conflict rather than building a future that should draw them to resolution.

Justice

The predominant explanation of negotiated outcomes is based on power (Edgeworth 1881; Zeuthen 1930; Hicks 1932; Schelling 1960; Ikle 1964; Walton & McKersie 1965; Zartman 1974; Harsanyi 1977; Bartos 1987; Brams 1990), defined as actions taken with the intent of inflecting the other party's behavior in an intended direction (Rubin & Zartman 1995). Power is not everything, however (Zartman et al., 1996). If it were, the structural dilemma–whereby weak parties negotiating with strong ones gain favorable (even asymmetrically favorable) and refuse unfavorable outcomes–would not exist. Power alone, by any but a tautological definition, does not always account for vetoes over conflict-resolving proposals; conflict is often preferred over a negotiated order by weaker parties under great pressure, because weaker parties, who may have more at stake, simply refuse proposed solutions that they do not consider just. In any process of negotiating the exchange or division of items contested between them, the parties come to an agreement on the notion of justice that will govern this disposition; if they do not, the negotiations will not be able to proceed to a conclusion. Power alone cannot either produce or explain agreement and cannot substitute for justice determination in the process of negotiation (Gauthier 1986; Barry 1989; Elster 1992; Young 1994; Zartman 1995; Zartman et al., 1996).

Thus, agreement on a formula for justice represents a necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for a negotiated outcome. Individual notions of justice provide a substantive veto on agreement, and must be coordinated and accepted at the first stage of negotiation. The agreed notion of justice constitutes a formula on the basis of which parties then proceed to the disposition of details. The formula can be a determination of appropriate terms of trade, or one or more principles of justice on which such terms

can be based (Zartman 1978; Zartman & Berman 1982). The theory is based on a recognition of the fact that there are many ideas of justice, not just one overarching one, and that the parties negotiate their joint definition of justice before they can go on to a disposition of the details of their dispute.

The most prominent notion of justice is that of equality or impartiality. Equal treatment is seen as fair treatment and equal outcomes are just deserts. Equality in its many forms is a common point of agreement for combining competing claims, forming a floor (and hence, bilaterally, a ceiling) on relative gains and providing an acceptable formula for agreement as split-the-difference in the end when other criteria have run out. It is also the basic element in the entire procedural ethos under which negotiation takes place, that of reciprocity or the equal exchange of equal concessions (Keohane 1986; Larson 1988). Where equal justice is desired but cannot or need not be determined, a looser form known as equivalent justice is often used. The basis of justice in these cases is simply an exchange deemed appropriate or roughly similar, and justice is to be found not in the relative size of the shares but in the mere fact of the exchange, as opposed to receiving the first item as a gift.

There are also well-established principles of inequality that serve notions of justice in particular circumstances–equity (or merit or investment), in which the party that has or contributes the most receives the most, and compensation (or need or redistribution), in which the party that has the least receives the most. Even inequalities are equalizing measures, however, exchanged for some past or future equalizer, in the case of equity or compensation, respectively. Compensation is based on equalizing payments to one side, and "entitlement" and "deserving" are brought about through exchange for some external or nontangible good from the receiving side, or for a good somewhere else on the time dimension (past or future). Thus, unequal-justice norms can also be interpreted as a different kind of equality, not in exchange for the other party's contribution but in exchange for one's own contribution. The justifying criterion has shifted from an interactional

(between-party) to an internal (within-party) exchange. Such equalizing is the meaning and purpose of equity in the legal sense, where various instances of compensatory justice are invoked to temper the severity of priority-justice principles, as discussed below (Homans 1961; Adams 1965; Messe 1971; Deutsch 1985; Luke 23:41-42). Without recognition of such exchanges, unequal divisions are unacceptable and negotiations stalemate.

A third type of justice principle is equal only in that it is to be equally applied ("equality before the law"), but it designates a winner (or loser) according to an established rule or generalized formula. Priority (partial) justice refers to principles from external sources that decree a particular outcome–"First come first served," "Finders keepers," "Winner take all," "Polluter pays," "Riparian rights," "Noblesse oblige," "No expansion by conquest," "Primogeniture," "National self-determination," and many others. These principles are usually absolute, incontrovertible, and indicate total allocation, not sharing. Since they are principles that favor one side, they are usually adopted to justify opening positions or the wants, needs, and interests of each side, but they may also be used as the basis of agreement under the equal application principle. To be considered just, however, they must be equally applicable–"All finders are keepers," "All polluters pay"–and not self-serving–"My God says this belongs to me."

Thus, principles of justice can all be grouped into three categories–*priority* (sometimes called partial), *equality* (sometimes called partial or impartial) including equivalence, and *inequality* (sometimes called proportional) including equity and compensation (Aristotle 1911; Cook & Hegtveldt 1983; Deutsch 1985; Stolte 1987; Zartman 1987; Young 1994). Outcomes are negotiated first among expressions of these principles, until deductively or inductively a formula is arrived at to govern the negotiated agreement. Sometimes the stakes are such that a single, simple principle can constitute that formula; in other circumstances, they may be complex enough to require a formula of compound justice, involving a pairing or combination of principles to constitute the agreement.

The process of arriving at an agreed principle of justice in negotiation

can be seen as evolving through three stages: absolute, comparative, and jointly determined. Different parties may begin with different notions of justice (often priority justice) that favor their positions (were they to decide the outcome unilaterally). However, they must place their own position ("Justice for me") within a social context ("Justice for me compared to you"). Although a party acting alone would most likely adopt a self-serving notion of justice ("I deserve the goods"), the fact that it has to negotiate means that winning outright is not an option and a different notion of justice is needed; all things being equal, equality is the most frequently held norm ("I deserve to do at least as well as you"). When the two comparative or social evaluations of justice are combined, a jointly determined outcome is (or is not) produced, and the negotiation can go on to apply it. It should be remembered that these are analytical stages and their neat, discrete quality is not always reflected in the messy world of reality.

The final step in establishing the negotiation in justice concerns the referent or application of the principle: equality or inequality or priority of what? If parties want to maintain their parity or equality in arms, they must decide which of many parts or measures of armaments they will use. When the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians came to an understanding about the semifederative relation within Bosnia at Wright Patterson Air Base in late 1995 (the referent question first), they then had to decide the type of justice that would govern relations within and between the parts (the principle question). When legislators on a tax reform bill establish the new code on the basis of equality (flat rate), equity (regressive), compensation (progressive), or some priority principle, they still have to decide what is to be the referent of the principle (income, sales, head, or other).

When the UN Security Council enunciated the equivalence formula of "territory for security" for the Middle East in Resolution 242 in 1967, it only started the process of determining what was territory and what was security in each of the occupied territories along the Israeli border, which was in turn the necessary prelude to the detail question of how much territory for how

much security. Recent negotiations between Israel and Syria illustrate the concept: whereas one side wanted to gain total territory for partial normalization (security), the other wanted total normalization as security in exchange for part of the territory. The talks stalled, as is known. In a word, the other negotiations, from the disengagement talks in the mid-1970s to the Washington Treaty at the end of the decade, were able to move to an agreement on details once the equivalence formula of "territory for security" was accepted on both sides as the basis for the talks. Similarly, at Oslo, since "territory for security" was inadequate because it did not address the status of the Palestinian population and territory, attempts were made at other equivalence formulas–the functionalist notion of "political divorce and economic cooperation," the amended Camp David notion of "autonomy through trusteeship"–until the compound-justice formula of "phased autonomy for paced security" became the basis of the agreements in Norway and thereafter (Corbin 1994; Peres 1994; Abbas 1995; Makovsky 1996; Pruitt 1997; Savir 1998).

Reciprocity is the current password as an expression of justice, but the referent question is: reciprocity for whom from what? Justice, as noted, is not merely an ethical expression of power but rather a translation of basic status needs. Notions of equality, equivalence, and equalizing express basic expectations of negotiation, and revolutions of falling satisfactions are the outcome of failed revolutions of rising expectations. As the negotiations head toward the final settlement, viable territory as well as adequate security on both sides need to be addressed as a balanced expression of a justice that meets the needs of both parties and gives both a reason to maintain rather than rectify the agreement reached.

Follow-Through

There is much less well-developed theory about the problem of follow-through (including a comprehensive name for it), above all because the whole subject of postnegotiation implementation is only beginning to

develop. Bits and pieces are available, waiting to be put together but, nonetheless, representing a coherent thrust. Follow-through as a problem begins with reentry (Kelman 1992, 1997), the challenge of conveying the effects of interparty understanding gained throughout the negotiation process to a public that has not been through the same interpersonal experience. It continues into the need to build support for the agreement between (former) enemies, into the need to establish implementation and problem-solving mechanisms that carry the agreement forward into subsequent times and situations that otherwise could return relations to conflict.

From the study of prenegotiation come several ingredients that are useful to have in place before the negotiation process begins and necessary to be established before it ends (J. Stein 1989). Among them are an understanding of risks and costs associated with the negotiations and gradual agreement on risks and costs associated with agreement. The South African negotiations in 1990-1993 spent much effort in assuring each side of these elements. Another is the development of domestic support for the negotiation process and gradually for the emerging outcome, accompanied by efforts to develop support for the negotiating partner in *his* home constituency. Thus, in South Africa, Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress took actions to increase support for F. W. de Klerk of the National Party, their opponent, in his 1992 referendum (Zartman 1995, 161).

Similarly, a growing literature on conflict transformation underlines the need for reconciliation and the development of a positive relationship between the parties as the necessary ingredient in conflict resolution, without which the parties merely pull apart, vulnerable to a new outbreak of conflict (Zartman & Rasmussen 1997; Lederach 1998). In a related vein, the large literature on regimes shows the need for institutionalization of relations as insurance against renewed conflict, and also for the inclusion in such regimes of conflict management mechanisms to handle new conflicts or new outbreaks of the old conflict rather than allowing them to undermine

the points of agreement already achieved (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger 1996; Zartman 1999).

These activities are highlighted in the appeal of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali for peacebuilding in addition to and as a preventative for the other crisis-related functions of the United Nations (Boutros Ghali 1995). Peacebuilding–"action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (ibid., 46, 61–62)–is presented as the necessary, but not sufficient, activity for the effective prevention of renewed conflict. Relations, institutions, structures, and mechanisms all refer to regularized, dynamic, permanent contacts for cooperation, without which peace agreements and negotiated settlements are only transient events. Agreements to end conflict also need to be agreements to nurture peace (Hampson 1996).

The first step of this activity involves preparation of the home terrain for agreements worked out between adversaries through negotiation (direct or mediated). Specific efforts are required and useful: programs to convince specific sources of opposition; establishment of mediating organizations that bring second-level elites into cooperation (Lederach 1998); training sessions for dialogue group leaders; dialogue groups that include both opponents and moderates; continuous channels between dialogue groups and official structures (Saunders 1996), to name a few. Unless follow-through is prepared, the carefully established relations between negotiating delegations will be drowned in the hostility of the unreconstructed conflict from the landing at the airport onward. Put positively, parties to an agreement need to expend as much effort and planning on preparing a supportive structure at home for an agreement as they have expended on negotiating it.

Follow-through was the problem of the Oslo negotiators. In the peculiar Middle Eastern cultural setting, the parties have become used to the conflict and have come to find it useful; it has been integrated into national myths on both sides, justifying otherwise unrelated aspects of policy and attitude

(in some ways as the Cold War did for the superpowers). It is enormously difficult to turn off such perceptions. In the context of a closed and secret series of interactive sessions among fellow human beings, trust and cooperation can be established, but it has little impact on the outside world that has not been through the experience. Indeed, the reentry problem is only magnified by the gap between the new partners and their old adversarial reference groups. The more the new partners have been won over by the cooperative process, the more they become suspect of being hoodwinked by the old adversary in the eyes of their reference groups. The only convincing evidence against this suspicion would have to come from the agreement itself, which can easily be discounted as a trick by the devious opponent, the more positive the evidence of the agreement appears to be. The necessary secrecy of the negotiations, and the necessary deception of the front-channel teams by the back-channel process, gave the Oslo process an air of procedural deviousness that the substantive suspicion reinforced. Many Israelis and Palestinians alike vow that never again will policy be made behind their backs, a feeling that fuels the opposition to Arafat and fed the defeat of Peres at the polls. Paradoxically, the successful process of Oslo was its own undoing. As a result, Oslo killed Rabin and Hamas elected Netanyahu.

There are two ways of preparing follow-through after negotiations. One is to sell the product of one's efforts through the organization of publicity and rallying of supporters, installation of supportive structures of explanation and implementation, and provision of positive incentive for the other side to uphold the agreements. The other is to return as a reluctant signatory forced to make concessions and dedicated to keeping the agreement within its narrowest limits, proclaiming common identity with the opponents of the agreement and skepticism about the other party's intentions. One is a step to resolving the follow-through problem, the other accentuates it and strengthens the agreement's opponents.

Conclusion

This is not the place to conclude but rather to open. This paper has focused on three necessary but still insufficient conditions for the initiation, negotiation, and application of agreements for conflict management, resolution, and transformation. The gap between necessity and sufficiency is in the hands of the negotiator himself–to seize the ripe moment or ripen the moment yet unripe, to create the formula of justice that attracts both parties to an agreement, and to conduct a follow-through strategy that will carry the agreement into acceptance and implementation. Concepts in negotiation only codify good practice, opening the way for skilled, committed negotiators who seek to end conflict.

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