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International Islamic Solidarity and its Limitations

Nehemia Levtzion

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FOREWORD

Annual meetings of the Islamic Conference have been held regularly since 1970, bringing together the foreign ministers of forty countries from the Middle East, Asia and Africa, as far apart as Guinea and Malaysia. The conference represents the most consistent and comprehensive achievement of international Islamic solidarity.

The present essay is an historical overview in which problems at the national, regional and international levels are dealt with in relation to achievements and failures on the way to Islamic solidarity, specifically:

1. The changing role of Islam in the internal and external politics of individual countries;
2. Islam as a factor in regional politics in the Middle East, Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia;
3. Islam in world politics and the function of international Islamic organizations.

Our attempt to correlate developments across the Muslim world in the limited space of this essay must be at the expense of an elaboration of specific themes, which we hope to undertake in forthcoming publications.*

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I have been greatly helped by my research assistant, Mrs. Miriam Frankel, whose unpublished paper provided much of the factual data on international Islamic organizations and conferences between 1949 and 1974.

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PAN-ISLAM BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The unity of the Muslim world is an important element in the political theory of Islam, according to which the boundaries of the community of the "believers" should be identical with those of the body politic. The Arabic term *umma* (literally, "nation"), which was first applied by the prophet Muḥammad to his followers in Medina, referred both to a religious and a political community. This concept was later extended to the world-wide Muslim community, which, ideally, should be united in one state. This ideal, however, was a reality for a brief period only, and its failure was due, almost paradoxically, to the military and political success of the Muslims. Within the span of a single century, they created an enormous empire, the Caliphate, whose very vastness precluded political cohesion. As of the second century of the Islamic era (*hijra*), distant provinces in the west and in the east of the empire asserted their independence of the Caliphate, first in practice and later formally as well.

The political unity of Islam was never regained, but the ideal has continued to be a source of inspiration, a sentiment of cohesion, and a rationale for disregarding internal boundaries within the Muslim world. In past centuries powerful Muslim rulers conquered and annexed Muslim lands to create empires in the name of Islamic unity. In our day, Arab nationalist leaders such as Egypt's Nasser and Libya's Qadhāfi have interfered in the affairs of other states in the name of Arab unity. Pan-Arabism, though influenced by nineteenth-century European nationalist movements, has clearly inherited the sentiments and visions of this political concept in Islam. Arab unity may be considered by some an attainable political target, but few politicians expect the realization of Islamic unity. In this essay we shall attempt to trace the efforts to achieve Muslim international solidarity as an alternative to the ideal of political unity.

Systematic political activity in the name of pan-Islam began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. At the ideological level the most articulate exponent of pan-Islam was Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-1897). He advocated reforms in Islam in order to meet the challenges of modern times and called for political unity of the Muslims in order to oppose the onslaught of Western imperialism. At the same time, the Ottoman sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid II (1876-1909), in reaction to the secular and liberal trends of the reforms (*tanẓīmāt*), reiterated the political significance of Islam. In order to enhance the loyalty of Muslims within the empire and to rally Muslims from outside

the empire to support him, he emphasized his status as Caliph to whom all Muslims should pay allegiance.¹

By the end of the nineteenth century, large Muslim nations in India, Indonesia, Central Asia and North Africa had come under European (and Christian) domination. The Ottoman empire, the largest Muslim power, was unable to respond to appeals for aid from those regions. But agents of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd II tried to stir agitation and arouse the resistance of Muslims to Christian-European rule. With the development of communications (especially the telegraph and the press), the Muslim world was brought closer together, as news of events in one region (such as the occupation of Tunisia by the French in 1881, Egypt by the British in 1882, and Eritrea by the Italians in 1885) reverberated among Muslims in parts of the world as far away as India or Indonesia. Muslims separated by thousands of miles became more aware of the common threat they faced. Like a huge drum, the vibrations at one end of the Muslim world are felt at the other.²

At the same time, the improvement of transportation, and especially the introduction of the steamship, facilitated the pilgrimage to Mecca. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the number of Muslims from the outlying lands of Islam who came to study in Arab countries increased. Islamic reformist and modernist movements in the Middle East influenced Muslims in India, Central Asia, Indonesia and Africa. Al-Afghānī's message was diffused through the more systematic teachings of Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), whose disciples created the modernist Salafiyya movement calling for the return to the original, pure sources of Islam. It also implied the reinvigoration of the political content of Islam.

At the periphery of the Muslim world, reform movements, often under Middle Eastern inspiration, strove for the purification of Islam from local cultural and religious accretions. Emphasis on the knowledge of Arabic and the cultivation of the universal aspects of Islam gave Muslims the feeling of belonging to a world-wide Muslim community and strengthened sentiments of Islamic solidarity. The leaders of reformist movements in Indonesia and Africa were more receptive to pan-Islamic ideas than were the traditional

1. N. Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II," *Middle Eastern Studies* 3 (1926): 46–67; J. M. Landau, "Al-Afghani's Panislamic Project," *Islamic Culture* 26, 3 (1952): 50–55; B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1968), pp. 123–124, 340–344.

2. P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 120; A. Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Journal of Asian Studies* 26 (1967): 267–283; E. Burke, "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to the French Colonial Penetration, 1900–1912," *Journal of African History* 13 (1972): 97–118.

Muslim leaders, and were considered by the European colonial authorities as a potential political danger.³

European powers — Britain, France, Italy and Holland — became sensitive to the pan-Islamic peril and feared the repercussions of Islamic agitation. The Islamic factor gained weight in international politics with the mounting tensions that heralded the approach of World War One. Germany had relatively few Muslims in its colonies and, as an ally of the Ottoman sultan, promoted the cause of pan-Islam. On November 23, 1914, the supreme religious authority in the Ottoman empire, the *shaykh al-Islām*, declared a holy war (*jihād*) against the enemies of the caliph. Muslims governed by Britain, France and Italy were instigated to rise against their rulers. The effect of the call to *jihād* was mainly psychological, as the colonial authorities were cautious not to antagonize Muslims under their rule and nervously kept an eye on suspected agitators. Measures were taken to restrict communications with the Ottoman empire, including the holy places in Arabia. But in most territories it became evident that the local Muslim leaders preferred to safeguard their own interests and loyally cooperated with the colonial governments. There were signs of sympathy with the Ottoman empire, and there were a few attempts by individuals and small groups to act in the service of the Turks; but there were no cases of general uprising in response to the *jihād*. Only the militant order of Sanūsīs in Libya and ‘Alī Dinār, the ruler of Darfur in the Sudan, who were then at the height of their struggle against colonial domination, officially joined the *jihād*.⁴

At this crucial period in the history of the Ottoman state, the last Muslim empire, Islamic solidarity failed not only to arouse Muslims outside the empire, but also to secure the loyalty of Muslim nations within the empire. Arab nationalists called for a restructuring of the Ottoman empire in order to give the Arabs an equal share in government. When the Young Turks, who were then in power, did little to satisfy the Arabs’ political aspirations,

3. H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1947); A. Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964* (London, 1967); L. Carl Brown, “The Islamic Reformist Movement in North Africa,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 2 (1964): 55–63; D. Noer, *The Reformist Muslim Movement in Indonesia* (London, 1973); W.R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (New Haven, 1967); L. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa* (Evanston, 1974).

4. A. Emin, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven, 1930); A.J. Toynbee, “The Ineffectiveness of Panislamism,” in idem, *A Study of History*, vol. 8 (London, 1954), pp. 692–695; J. Osuntokun, “The Response of the British Colonial Government in Nigeria to the Islamic Insurgency in the French Sudan and the Sahara During the First World War,” *Odu* n.s. 10 (1974): 98–107; E. Burke, “Moroccan Resistance, Pan Islam and German War Strategy, 1914–1918,” *Francia* 3 (1975): 434–464.

militant Arab nationalists resolved to promote the dissolution of the Ottoman empire. The Arab revolt was perceived by the Turks as treason, and must have affected Turkey's postwar decision to turn its back on Islamic solidarity and shun any alliance with the Arabs.⁵

While modern Turkey dissociated itself from the pan-Islamic tradition of the Ottoman empire and abolished the Caliphate, other Muslims attempted to salvage the unity of the Muslim world by reestablishing the Caliphate. In India Muslim activists created the Khilafat movement in order to reassert political identity at home and Muslim solidarity abroad around the idea of the Caliphate. The Indian Muslims were willing to accept an Arab caliph. The *sharīf* of Mecca, Ḥusayn, declared himself caliph; but the same year (1924), he was ousted by 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn Sa'ūd, who extended his authority over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The split within the Arab world became evident in 1926, when two all-Islamic congresses were convened, separately, in Cairo and in Mecca. In Cairo the Egyptians failed to effect the choice of the Egyptian King Fuad as caliph, but in Mecca Ibn Sa'ūd succeeded in achieving a more limited political program when agreement about the conduct of the pilgrimage under the authority of the puritan Wahhābis was reached.⁶

In the 1920s, pan-Islamic ideologists and activists were concerned mainly with the renewal of the Caliphate. But this issue created more divisions than unity, and it had to be explicitly removed from the agenda when the Mufti of Jerusalem, *al-ḥājj* Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, had to mobilize support for the proposed Islamic Congress in Jerusalem in 1931. This congress was called for a new cause: to support the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle against Zionism.

The idea of convening the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem emerged during the funeral of Muḥammad 'Alī, leader of the pan-Islamic Khilafat movement in India, who was buried in Jerusalem in January 1931. The burial of a pan-Islamic leader in the courtyard of the Holy Shrine (*al-ḥaram al-sharīf*) in Jerusalem consecrated it as a pan-Islamic pantheon whose protection was the concern of all Muslims. Shawkat 'Alī, brother of Muḥammad 'Alī and his

5. Z.N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut, 1958); Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī, *Al-Bilād al-'Arabiyya wa'l-Dawla al-'Uthmāniyya* (Beirut, 1960); D.H. Khalid, "The Kemalist Attitude Towards Muslim Unity," *Islam and the Modern Age* 6 (1975): 23-40.

6. A.J. Toynbee, "The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement," in idem, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, vol. 1 (London, 1927), pp. 311 ff.; A.C. Niemeijer, *The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924* (The Hague, 1972); A. Sékaly, "Les deux congrès musulmans de 1926," *Revue du monde musulman* 64 (1926): 3-219; E. Kedourie, "Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-1952," in idem, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies* (London, 1970), pp. 177-212.

sucessor to the leadership of the Khilafat movement, assisted the Mufti in the organization of the congress. Numerous obstacles along the way were cleared at the price of compromise between conflicting interests in the Arab world. During the proceedings the atmosphere was loaded with personal jealousies and political rivalries. The congress had few concrete results, and the failure to raise funds forced the Mufti to abandon the idea of establishing a Muslim university in Jerusalem (to counterbalance the Hebrew University of Jerusalem).⁷

But the congress had its effect on the status of the Mufti, who emerged from it as a leader of international standing in the Muslim world. During World War Two he was in the service of Nazi Germany and attempted to mobilize Islamic solidarity against the British and their allies. After the war the Mufti regained respectability and was prominent in several pan-Islamic organizations. And the Palestinian issue, which he had first brought to prominence in the forum of the congress, has since then become the most powerful sentiment of Islamic solidarity.

At the end of World War Two, the Arab League emerged as the framework for Arab solidarity. The Arabs saw Arab rather than Islamic unity as the more realistic and effective instrument in their political struggle. It was again in the Indian subcontinent that the banner of pan-Islam was raised.

7. Rashid Riḍā, "Al-Mu'tamar al-islāmī al-'ām fī Bayt al-Maqdas," *al-Manār* 32 (1932); 113-132, 193-202, 284-292; A. Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference at Jerusalem," *The Moslem World* 22 (1932): 340-354; Y. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929-1939: From Riots to Rebellion* (London, 1977), pp. 8-13. The Islamic Congress in Jerusalem is dealt with in great detail in U. Kupferschmidt, "The Supreme Muslim Council 1921-1937: Islam Under the British Mandate for Palestine," Ph.D. dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978, pp. 321-373.

PAKISTAN AS THE CHAMPION OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY (1949-1954)

Pakistan is the only modern state established on the basis of Islamic political identity. During the period immediately preceding the creation of Pakistan, religiously oriented groups expected that the new state would adopt a constitution based on Islamic law (the *shari'a*) and inspired by Islamic political ideas. But the political leadership of the Muslim League, about to become the ruling party of Pakistan, was a predominantly Westernized one with a clear secular orientation. It was determined to establish a secular modern state, paying only lip service to Islam. In order to lessen the tensions that arose from their secular internal policy, the Pakistani leaders adopted an Islamic-oriented foreign policy.

The *raison d'être* of Pakistan was the principle that the religion of Islam conferred a distinct national identity on its adherents. If Islam was the authentic nationality of Muslims everywhere, then the political divisions of the Muslim world must be considered temporary. The constitution of Pakistan therefore declared that the state should endeavor to strengthen the bonds of unity among the Muslim nations.⁸

Political unity was the ultimate goal, and until this was achieved, Pakistan expected to benefit from Islamic solidarity, based on the principle of mutual, unqualified support among Muslim states in their conflicts with non-Muslims. This principle, when endorsed by other Muslim states, should have secured support for Pakistan in its quarrel with India. Pakistan's relative weakness in the confrontation with India was due not only to India's size and to its military superiority, but also to the fact that India was accepted in Asia and Africa as the legitimate successor state to the anticolonial struggle, whereas Pakistan, having been created by the British and dependent on them, was held responsible for the partition of the subcontinent. Pakistan had to justify its very existence as a political entity.

From the first day, Pakistan supported the cause of Muslim states; but it was soon to learn that this was not always reciprocated. Indonesian indepen-

8. L. Binder, "Pakistan and Modern Islamic Nationalist Theory," *Middle East Journal* 11 (1957): 382-396; *ibid.*, 12 (1958): 45-56; A. Ahmad, "Activism of the 'Ulamā' in Pakistan," in N. Keddie, ed., *Scholars, Saints and Sufis* (Berkeley, 1970), pp. 257-272; G.W. Choudhury and P. Hasan, *Pakistan's External Relations* (Karachi, 1958), pp. 18-19; K. Callard, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (New York, 1959), p. 4.

dence was celebrated in Pakistan as a public holiday, but Indonesia felt much closer to India, with whom it shared the principles of secularism, nonalignment and socialism. In December 1950, President Sukarno of Indonesia had publicly referred to Nehru as his "political father." And in November 1951, the foreign minister of pre-Nasserite Egypt declared that his country looked to India for moral support in its struggle for national liberation. Egypt's alignment with India became more obvious under Nasser. Pakistan maintained more cordial relations with conservative governments of Muslim (Iran and Turkey) and Arab (Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) countries.⁹

Outside the Arab world, Pakistan was the most persistent supporter of the Arab Palestinians. Its first foreign minister, Sir Zafrulla Khan, brilliantly defended the Arab cause in the United Nations. On the basis of this record, Pakistan hoped for support in its attempts to promote pan-Islamic activities at two levels: first, through nongovernmental organizations; secondly, in efforts to create a framework for cooperation among governments of Muslim countries.

In February 1949, eighteen representatives of Muslim organizations from different countries met in Karachi, Pakistan, to establish the "World Muslim Congress" (*mu'tamar al-'ālam al-islāmī*). The election of *al-hājj* Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, as chairman of this congress implied that it was a continuation of the prewar Islamic Congress. Pakistan, as the sponsor of the congress and its host in subsequent meetings as well, controlled its proceedings and guided its resolutions. It was in reaction to this official patronage and as an expression of the rising tensions between the political authorities of Pakistan and militant '*ulamā*' that in January 1952 a new organization was founded. Its name, the "Congress of the Muslim Peoples" (*mu'tamar al-shu'ūb al-islāmiyya*), signified disappointment at the position of Muslim governments who preferred their own interests to the realization of Islamic unity. This congress, which adopted extreme anti-Western resolutions, held only two meetings and its activities were apparently curtailed by the authorities in Pakistan.¹⁰

At the intergovernmental level, Pakistan hosted the Islamic Economic Conference which met in Karachi in December 1949. The resolutions, calling for bilateral trade agreements between Muslim states and for regional cooperation in the development of heavy industry, remained on paper only. But the establishment of a permanent secretariat in Karachi promised the continuity of efforts in this direction. The second meeting of the conference

9. S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (London, 1973), p. 67.

10. *Islamic Review*, May 1949, pp. 32-33; *ibid.*, May 1951, p. 41; *ibid.*, June 1951, pp. 24-35; *ibid.*, July 1952, pp. 26-27; *Hamizrah Hehadash* 3 (1951-52): 308.

was held in Teheran, Iran, in December 1950, but it was boycotted by several Arab countries in protest against Iran's recognition of Israel earlier that year.

In any case, most Arab countries were not enthusiastic in supporting this Islamic organization. Egypt, which dominated the Arab League, was wary of a rival organization. When Pakistan officially proposed the creation of an Islamic treaty organization in March 1952, it was greeted with an extremely cool reception. Only Iraq, then led by Nūrī Sa'īd, supported Pakistan's plan, and this in order to weaken the Egyptian-dominated Arab League. Pakistan also failed to gain the approval of the non-Arab Muslim states of Asia. Afghanistan had been hostile to Pakistan since the latter's creation because of rival claims to some border provinces. Indonesia refused to join an Islamic organization sponsored by Pakistan which might be employed against India. Iran was at that time mired in the oil crisis. And Turkey had never favored an Islamic bloc.¹¹

Turkey, however, participated in a pan-Islamic forum for the first time when it attended the third meeting of the Islamic Economic Conference in Karachi in April 1954. This shift in Turkey's attitude was undoubtedly associated with the growth of closer ties between Turkey and Pakistan. On February 19, 1954, a joint communiqué released simultaneously in Karachi and Ankara, Turkey, declared that the two countries had agreed to study methods of closer collaboration in the political, economic and cultural spheres, as well as ways of strengthening peace and security. The prime minister of Pakistan described it as "the first concrete major step towards strengthening the Muslim world."¹² In practice this was the first step toward the Baghdad Pact, which proved detrimental to Pakistan's pan-Islamic drive, as it brought the latter's relations with the Arab countries to their lowest ebb.

11. *Hamizrah Hehadash* 1 (1949-50): 128; *ibid.*, 2 (1950-51): 131-132, 184; *ibid.*, 3 (1951-52): 365-366; *Islamic Review*, June 1954, p. 35.

12. S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp. 163-164.

EGYPT TAKES OVER (1954–1961)

In 1954 Nasser emerged as the undisputed ruler of Egypt, and after he had signed the Suez Canal agreement with Great Britain (July 1954), he was free to pursue a more active and aggressive foreign policy. In his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, published as a pamphlet in 1953, Nasser had already outlined the three circles of Egypt's role in world politics, of which the third was:

the circle of our brethren in faith who turn with us, whatever part of the world they are in, towards the same *qibla* in Mecca As I stood in front of the Kaaba and felt my sentiments wandering with every part of the world where Islam had extended I found myself exclaiming: "Our idea of the pilgrimage should change The pilgrimage should be a great political power . . . as a regular political congress wherein the leaders of Muslim states . . . draw up in this universal Islamic Parliament the main lines of policy for their countries and their cooperation together until they meet again . . ." When I visualize these millions united in one faith I have great consciousness of the tremendous potentialities that cooperation amongst them all can achieve; a cooperation that does not deprive them of their loyalty to their countries but which guarantees for them and their brethren a limitless power.¹³

Nasser recognized not only the potential power of Islamic solidarity, but also the centrality of the holy city of Mecca. Indeed, one conclusion which will emerge in the course of this essay is that the Arabs must be at the center of an effective movement of Islamic solidarity, and that this can be achieved only in cooperation between Egypt, the largest Arab nation with al-Azhar University as a central Islamic institution, and Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest Arab state and the guardian of the holy shrines of Islam.

An opportunity for such cooperation to effectively take place came about in 1954. Saudi Arabia's King Sa'ūd, who succeeded his father 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ūd in November 1953, adopted a more militant policy towards Britain, as was made clear when Saudi Arabia sent its forces to take over the Buraimi oasis, which had been a British protectorate. King Sa'ūd strongly opposed

13. Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Buffalo, New York, 1959), pp. 76–78.

the idea of the alliance which eventually led to the Baghdad Pact, fearing that it would also add strength to the Hashimites (the descendants of the *sharīf Ḥusayn*), who were the erstwhile rivals of the house of Sa'ūd. Common opposition to the Baghdad Pact prepared the ground for a rapprochement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia despite their disparate politics and regimes.¹⁴

Significantly, it was during the season of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, in August 1954, that Nasser came to meet King Sa'ūd. They were joined by Ghulam Khan, the governor-general of Pakistan, and the three held a tripartite summit. Pakistan was invited not only because of its commitment to Islamic unity, but mainly in an attempt to dissuade it from joining the Baghdad Pact, which was then in the process of crystallization.

The three leaders resolved to establish an Islamic congress (*al-mu'tamar al-islāmī*) "to strengthen the ties of confidence and Islamic brotherhood . . . and coordinate efforts to achieve cooperation and unity." The congress was supposed to bring together pan-Islamic organizations and coordinate activities with the Arab League and the Afro-Asian movement. King Sa'ūd became the president of the congress and Anwār al-Sādāt its secretary-general.¹⁵

Despite Sādāt's efforts, the number of participating members did not grow; and during the following season of pilgrimage, August 1955, another tripartite summit took place. But the Pakistani head of state was absent from the third meeting, held in April 1956, as Pakistan had officially signed the Baghdad Pact in September 1955.¹⁶

For more than a year Pakistan wavered between two conflicting orientations in its foreign policy: Islamic solidarity vs. pro-Western alliance. In view of its prolonged conflict with India and the escalating border dispute with Afghanistan, Pakistan finally decided in favor of Western military aid and the more reliable political support of Iran, Turkey and Iraq. But in order to reconcile the conflicting orientations and to placate public opinion at home,

14. G. Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, 1956), pp. 452-453; G. Jean Louis Soulié and L. Champenois, *Le royaume d'Arabie saoudite face à l'Islam révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1966), p. 30.

15. D.N. Crecelius, "The 'Ulamā' and the State in Modern Egypt," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967, pp. 387-389; T. Ismael, *The U.A.R. in Africa: Egypt's Policy under Nasser* (Evanston, 1971), pp. 146-147. From its inception there was some confusion about the status of the Islamic Congress, between its international character and its being an agency of the Egyptian presidency. P.J. Vatikiotis does not even mention the summit in Mecca, saying only that the establishment of the Islamic Congress was decreed in November 1954 by the Revolutionary Command Council of Egypt. See *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, 1961), pp. 191-192.

16. *Al-Ahrām* (Cairo), September 7, 1955; *Majallat al-Azhar*, August 1955, p. 942; *al-Jumhūriyya* (Cairo), April 23, 1956.

the new alliance was presented as an Islamic pact of four Muslim states at the northern tier of the lands of Islam poised against Soviet imperialism, communism and atheism.

Pakistan's decision to join the Baghdad Pact was described by Radio Mecca as "a stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim states." It was perhaps under Nasser's influence that King Sa'ūd drew closer to India and, to the indignation of Pakistan, commended Nehru's policy towards the Muslims in India and extended a warm reception to him when he paid an official visit to Riad in September 1956.¹⁷ Pakistan saw the dreams of Islamic solidarity completely shattered, and the foreign minister of Pakistan is reported to have said in October 1956: "Pak-Islamism and not Pan-Islamism should now be the slogan."¹⁸

These words of despair and disillusion were pronounced in the midst of the Suez crisis, which marked the height of Pakistan's alienation. Public opinion in Pakistan was anti-British and sympathetic to Egypt; but the government of Pakistan, guided by its pro-Western policy, failed to give Egypt unqualified support. Nasser felt betrayed and firmly refused to admit a Pakistani unit to the United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai; but he did, in fact, accept an Indian unit.¹⁹

With the withdrawal of Pakistan, only Egypt and Saudi Arabia remained members of the Islamic Congress. Common opposition to the Baghdad Pact had brought the two rival regimes together; but this partnership did not endure, as Nasser strengthened his ties with the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia settled back to its traditional pro-Western policy. In 1957 the Saudis discontinued support of the Islamic Congress, which remained (as it had actually been since its inception) under Egyptian control and became instrumental in extending Nasser's influence in Africa and Asia.

Nasser entrusted the Islamic Congress to the hands of Sādāt, who always exhibited strong Islamic sentiments. Under the direction of the secretariat of the congress, teachers and missionaries were sent to Africa and Asia to reinforce Islamic culture and to encourage the teaching of Arabic. African and Asian students were awarded scholarships to study at al-Azhar. The political function of al-Azhar — "carrying the burden of the Islamic missions to all nations" — was underscored during the reorganization of al-Azhar in

17. S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp. 204-205.

18. Cited in T. Cuyler Young, "Pan Islamism in the Modern World: Solidarity and Conflict Among Muslim Countries," in J.H. Proctor, ed., *Islam and International Relations* (London 1965), p. 199.

19. S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp. 181-188; R.E. Ward, "West Asia in Indian Foreign Policy," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970, pp. 15-30, 108-118, 191-249, 325-326.

July 1961. One year earlier (July 1960), Nasser had created the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, directly responsible to the presidency. It assumed many of the functions of the secretariat of the Islamic Congress, which practically ceased to exist.²⁰

As Nasser intensified his attacks on the "reactionary regimes" of certain Arab and Muslim countries, he ceased promoting international Islamic solidarity at the governmental level; but he continued to pursue it on a popular level. In August 1953 the Arab Islamic Conference of the Liberation Organizations was held in Cairo "to discuss the means to liberate the Islamic world from imperialism." In March 1964 and May 1965, two meetings of the Afro-Asian Islamic Conference took place in Cairo. In between, Egypt sponsored or sent delegations to other international Islamic conferences that were all part of an effort to present Islam as the religion of the Third World, emphasizing its revolutionary and anti-imperialist thrust.

Nasser turned Islam into an instrument of his aggressive foreign policy not only in Asia and Africa, but also in inter-Arab rivalries, attacking both Left and Right. When the communists reached the peak of their influence in Iraq in 1959, Nasser invoked Islam to denounce the atheist and alien nature of communism. He stressed the role of Islam in the Arab socialism that he fostered and contrasted it with the reactionary and exploitative forms of Islam that prevailed in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.²¹ At that time, in the early 1960s, Nasser was committed to the eradication of "reactionary regimes" in the Arab world, and the rulers of Saudi Arabia, who were among his prime targets, realized that it was time to assert themselves as the protectors of the Arab and Muslim world against the aggression, subversion and heresy of Nasserism.

20. D.N. Crecelius, "The 'Ulamā' and the State in Modern Egypt," pp. 389-398; T. Ismael, *The U.A.R. in Africa*, pp. 146-152; M. Berger, *Islam in Egypt Today* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 46-50.

21. J. Vatikiotis, "Islam and the Foreign Policy of Egypt," in J.H. Proctor, ed., *Islam and International Relations*, pp. 102-103.

FAISAL VS. NASSER: "THE ISLAMIC PACT" (1960s)

While Egypt turned al-Azhar into an instrument of foreign policy, Saudi Arabia was late in taking advantage of its own Islamic assets, the holy shrines and the institution of the pilgrimage to Mecca. A change in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy became apparent in the early 1960s, when it set out to curb Nasser's influence under the banner of Islam and the call for Islamic solidarity.

In May 1961, during the season of the pilgrimage, a conference was convened in Mecca with the participation of Islamic-oriented politicians (such as Ahmadu Bello, the premier of Northern Nigeria; and 'Alāl al-Fāsī of Morocco) and religious activists (e.g., the Pakistanis al-Mawdūdī and In'āmullāh Khān; the exiled leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, Sai'īd Ramaḍān; and the former Mufti of Jerusalem, al-ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī). They adopted a Saudi proposal to establish the "World Muslim League" (*al-Rābiṭa al-islāmiyya al-'ālamīyya*) in order to combat "the dangerous plots by means of which the enemies of Islam wish to sway the Muslims."²² The reference was to the communists and their allies in the Muslim world. In the second convention of *al-Rābiṭa* (as this organization became known), during the next season of the pilgrimage, in April 1962, a committee was appointed to prepare an all-embracing Islamic conference.

With the financial and political support of the Saudi government, *al-Rābiṭa* soon became the dominating international Muslim organization, even paying subsidies to other organizations. *Al-Rābiṭa* also became the coordinator of the activities of such older organizations as the World Muslim Congress of Karachi and the General Islamic Conference of Jerusalem, which had been created in 1953.²³

The revolution in Yemen (September 26, 1962) and the prolonged war that followed raised tensions between Egypt and Saudi Arabia to a new pitch. With the accession of Faisal to the throne in November 1964, Saudi Arabia gained a king who was ready and able to challenge Nasser's leadership. But Nasser dominated the Arab League, where the number of radical states increased, and Faisal sought to create an alternative international forum by calling an Islamic summit conference.

22. *Al-Ḥayāt* (Beirut), May 31, 1961.

23. M.S. Kramer, *An Introduction to World Islamic Conferences*, The Shiloah Center Occasional Papers (Tel Aviv, 1978), pp. 19–20, 23–24.

In April 1965, a resolution calling for an Islamic summit was adopted at a conference of *al-Rābiṭa*.²⁴ In the following months King Faisal devoted much time and energy to promoting this idea. He hosted Muslim heads of state and paid official visits to several Muslim countries. Communiqués released after these meetings expressed support for Islamic solidarity and stressed the need for an Islamic summit. Faisal's initiative was endorsed by the monarchs and presidents of the conservative pro-Western states: the king of Morocco, the Shah of Iran, and the presidents of Tunis, Pakistan and even Turkey. King Hussein expressed only qualified support in order not to aggravate his relations with Nasser.²⁵

In the opposing camp, Nasser had the support of the radical Arab states: Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Algeria. In launching his campaign against Faisal's plan, Nasser described it as an imperialist scheme aimed at paring down progressive forces in the Arab world. Faisal had spoken of an "Islamic summit" (*dhurwa islāmiyya*), but Nasser consistently referred to it as an "Islamic pact" (*ḥilf islāmī*), associating it with the notorious Baghdad Pact. He pointed out that Faisal was supported by three members of the Baghdad Pact — Pakistan, Iran and Turkey — and that the last two maintained relations with Israel. Nasser reiterated that he was not opposed to the concept of Islamic unity, but that Islamic solidarity would come into being only after the Muslim peoples liberated themselves from colonialism and the influence of the imperialist powers. Otherwise it could only serve the interests of Washington and London rather than the cause of Islam.²⁶

In the mid-1960s, at the height of the so-called Arab cold war, the Islamic summit became one of the important issues. The opposition of Egypt and its allies to the summit continued even after the 1967 war, despite the fact that the conquest of the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem and Hebron could have been effectively used to mobilize international Muslim solidarity in the struggle against Israel. In October 1968 four nongovernmental international Muslim organizations held a joint meeting in Amman, Jordan, and appealed

24. *Islamic Review*, July-August 1965, pp. 5-6.

25. *Islamic Review*, November-December 1965, p. 4; *ibid.*, April 1966, pp. 7-8. Declarations for and against the proposed summit are recorded in *The Arab World*, June 10, 1965; January 11, 1966; January 27, 1966; March 5, 1966; May 1, 1966; June 22, 1966; September 19, 1966.

26. These arguments appeared in a publication by the U.A.R. consulate in Singapore: "UAR and Islamic Solidarity," December 9, 1966. *The Arab World*, February 22, 1966, reported a speech by Nasser in which he said: "Cooperation between Muslim states should be for God and for Islam and not in the interests of America and Britain No one can believe that the Shah of Iran and Bourguiba will combat atheism and spread the teaching of Islam."

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to the Muslim heads of state to convene an Islamic summit.²⁷ Nasser refused and insisted that the problem could only be dealt with in an Arab forum. But even Nasser was unable to withstand the pressure and emotions generated by the fire in the mosque of al-Aqṣā in Jerusalem in August 1969.

27. *Islamic Review*, November 1968, pp. 28–30.

THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT IN RABAT, SEPTEMBER 1969: A FALSE START OR A BREAKTHROUGH?

The fire in al-Aqsā helped those in the Arab world who sought to accentuate the Islamic dimension of the Middle East conflict and the need for a concerted effort by all Muslims. Four days after the fire, on August 25–26, 1969, the Arab foreign ministers held an emergency meeting and, under the impact of the recent events, Saudi Arabia succeeded in passing a resolution calling for an immediate Islamic summit. In order to mitigate Egypt's opposition, the summit was to be held in Rabat, Morocco, rather than in Mecca, and the invitations were sent not by Faisal but by King Hasan of Morocco.

Reluctantly, Nasser agreed that Egypt would take part in the summit. But Syria ignored the invitation sent by Morocco, with which Syria had severed diplomatic relations in 1965 (in the wake of the Ben Barka affair²⁸). Iraq boycotted the summit after two conditions it had presented were not accepted: that all the participating states should immediately, and before the summit, sever diplomatic and economic relations with Israel; and that a preparatory meeting of the Muslim foreign ministers should precede the summit.²⁹

It is significant that in putting forward these two conditions, Iraq proved to have pointed out problems which later became real obstacles. The inclusion of Muslim states which maintained relations with Israel (Iran, Turkey, Senegal and Niger) prevented the adoption of extreme anti-Israeli resolutions. Also, the absence of an approved agenda and drafts of resolutions, which are usually agreed upon in a preparatory meeting, left numerous stumbling blocks during the proceedings of the summit which more than once threatened to disrupt the conference.

But disagreement between radicals and conservatives was so tense that any attempt to reach agreement on the agenda and the draft resolutions in a meeting of all the foreign ministers would certainly have failed and forced the cancellation of the summit. For the sponsors, led by Faisal and Hasan, the event of the summit itself was of such importance that they could not

28. Radical Arab states blamed the Moroccan authorities for the abduction and murder in Paris of the opposition leader Ben Barka. Syrian *'ulamā'* protested in pamphlets and sermons against the Syrian government, which had stayed away from an all-Islamic summit and cabled greetings to the conference in Rabat (*al-Ḥayāt*, September 27, 1969).

29. Radio Baghdad, September 22, 1969; *al-Ahrām*, September 23, 1969; *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), September 24, 1969.

risk its running aground at the level of foreign ministers. Instead, a preparatory committee was appointed with representatives of seven countries, all of which had supported the idea of the Islamic summit: Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Niger, and Somalia.

Egypt had demanded that the summit deal with the Middle East crisis in its wider context; but quite a few non-Arab states gave warning that they would boycott the summit if discussions were not limited to issues pertinent to an Islamic conference, i.e., the fire in al-Aqṣā and the protection of the Muslim holy shrines in Palestine. The preparatory committee, anxious to secure the largest number of participants, decided on a limited agenda. The militants were also defeated in the controversy over the criteria to determine which states would be invited. These criteria were not officially disclosed, but they had been devised so that African countries with a significant Muslim minority (say, above twenty percent), like the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Upper Volta, Tanzania, and Nigeria, could be invited (although none of these accepted the invitation), whereas communist countries (the Soviet Union and China), as well as India, were excluded.³⁰

Only ten of the twenty-five participating states were represented by their heads of state, and among them only two — the presidents of Algeria and Yemen — belonged to the radical camp. Nasser expressed the reluctance of Egypt's participation by staying away, and he was represented by Vice President Sādāt. In Rabat, as in other international summits, heads of state carried more weight than other representatives. The four monarchs — Faisal, Hasan, the Shah and Hussein — dominated the proceedings. In this respect the Islamic conference in Rabat differed from any other solidarity conference of the Third World in which the radicals lead the way.

In order to maintain control over the proceedings and to minimize the weight of the radical Arab states, Faisal and Hasan had to cooperate with the Shah. The moderating influence of Iran (together with Turkey, Senegal and Niger) was accordingly of greater significance in this summit than in any other Islamic conference where the Arabs were more united. It is against this background that one may explain the fact that the resolutions of this summit on the Middle East went no further than those of the United Nations General Assembly. Israel was not even directly blamed for the fire in al-Aqṣā.³¹

Pakistan had successfully prevented the invitation of India to the conference, but under the pressure of Algeria and Egypt a compromise was

30. "La conférence islamique au sommet," *Maghreb*, November-December 1969, pp. 30-31. *Middle East Record* (1969-70, pp. 420-421) suggests three criteria, none of which, however, would have admitted the African countries mentioned above.

31. *Al-Ahrām*, September 25 and September 26, 1969.

reached "to accord representation to the Muslims of India." The government of India interpreted it as an official invitation and instructed its ambassador in Rabat to join the conference. The Pakistani president, Yahya Khan, objected to the presence of the ambassador, who happened to be a Sikh, because the invitation was to the Muslims of India, not to its government. Turkey, Iran and Jordan supported Pakistan and, after much commotion and excitement, the Indian delegation was excluded. In its indignation India recalled its ambassador from Rabat and its chargé d'affaires from Amman. At home, the Indian government was severely criticized for the humiliation inflicted upon the nation by its unfortunate persistence to be invited to an Islamic conference. Other critics even demanded a reassessment of India's relations with the Arab world.³² This episode is one illustration, to be followed below by others, of problems in diplomatic relations with non-Muslim states which arose in the pursuit of Islamic solidarity.

The radical Arab states considered the summit a failure, a vindication of their claim that the idea of an "Islamic pact" was a reactionary and imperialist strategy, and that the locus of the struggle against Israel should be based on Arab, not Islamic, unity.³³ Saudi Arabia and its allies considered the summit a great achievement, not only because it had taken place at all, but also because it confirmed Faisal's leadership in the Muslim world. Moreover, Faisal maintained the initiative through a resolution that called for a follow-up of the summit in a conference of the foreign ministers of the Muslim states to be held in Jedda in March 1970.

32. R.E. Ward, "West Asia in Indian Foreign Policy," pp. 254-270; S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp. 373-374.

33. *Al-Ahrām*, September 27, 1969; the Syrian weekly *al-Talī'a*, October 1969. For positive evaluations of the Rabat summit, see a series of articles by "Karīm" in *al-Ḥayāt*, September 23-27, 1969; see also the Jordanian *al-Dustur*, September 26, 1969; and the Saudi *al-Bilād*, September 25, 1969.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (1970-1972)

When the Muslim foreign ministers met in Jedda in March 1970, Faisal scored another victory toward the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the Islamic Conference. The creation of an organizational framework indicated the intention to give this forum an active and continuous role in international politics. Tunku Abdur-Rahman, the former prime minister of Malaysia, was elected the first secretary-general of the Islamic Conference. The appointment of such a high-ranking politician reflected the importance attached to this office. The choice of a non-Arab gave expression to the commitment and involvement of non-Arab Muslim countries in the conference, concomitantly helping to circumvent inter-Arab rivalries.

The split in the Arab world still loomed over the conference. The decision to establish the secretariat was adopted despite the opposition of Egypt, which again had only reluctantly attended the conference, this time with its new ally, Libya; during his first year in power (since the revolution of September 1, 1969, until Nasser's death on September 27, 1970) Qadhāfi considered himself a disciple of the Egyptian president. Syria, Iraq and South Yemen were absent.³⁴

Nine months later, in December 1970, the second meeting of the Islamic Conference at the level of foreign ministers was held in Karachi. The frequency of the meetings indicated not only the sustained enthusiasm of the original sponsors — Saudi Arabia and its allies — but also an important change in the Arab world: Although barely three months had elapsed since Nasser's death, Egypt abandoned its grudging stance towards the conference and became actively involved in the proceedings.³⁵

In Rabat, Sādāt had participated as Nasser's deputy and had been critical of the Iranian Shah and the "reactionary" Arab states. But upon assuming power he sought to establish a new pattern of inter-Arab relations based on closer ties between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A rapprochement between Cairo and Riad, as we have already suggested, was vital for bettering the prospects of Islamic solidarity. A temporary alliance between the two coun-

34. See reports on the conference in *al-Ḥayāt*, March 22-27, 1970; *Islamic Review*, March 1970, pp. 3-6.

35. *Al-Nahār* (Beirut), December 12 and December 27, 1970; *Islamic Review*, December 1970, pp. 3-11.

tries in 1954–56 had resulted in the creation of the Islamic Congress (with Sādāt himself serving as secretary-general). On the other hand, the rift between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the 1960s precluded any concerted pursuit of Islamic solidarity.

Though in terms of population the Arabs are only a minority in the Muslim world, they form its center. Greater political cooperation among Arab states rendered their involvement in the Islamic Conference more effective. This tendency was further developed in the third session of the Islamic Conference (February 29–March 3, 1972, in Jedda), when Syria decided to join after having stayed away from the summit in Rabat and from the first two conferences for foreign ministers.

Syria's changing attitude towards the Islamic Conference was related to developments within the Syrian Ba'th Party after the November 1970 coup that had brought Asad to power in place of Salah Jdid. Asad deviated from Jdid's doctrinarian approach and adopted a more pragmatic and flexible policy, which was reflected also in the attitude towards Islam and the '*ulama*'. In order to broaden the base of popular support for his regime, Asad was more lenient towards the traditional middle class. Unlike his predecessor, he agreed to include references to Islam in the constitution, and he himself attended public prayers and religious ceremonies. This change was evident in inter-Arab politics as well, where Asad showed willingness to cooperate with the conservative Arab countries, and in particular with Saudi Arabia.³⁶

Syria's decision to join the Islamic Conference was undoubtedly influenced also by the growing importance of this organization. The number of the participating countries increased from twenty-two at the first annual conference in March 1970 to thirty at the third conference, two years later. At this session Saudi Arabia achieved the ratification of the Islamic Charter (*al-mithāq al-islāmī*), which had been previously strongly opposed by Nasser.³⁷ Turkey, however, did not sign the charter because it conflicted with the secular principles of its own constitution. Although Turkey attended all the meetings of the conference, it was not in fact able to assume full membership in the international Islamic organization because of constitutional complications.

The consolidation of the Islamic Conference encouraged a general desire to advance beyond verbal declarations of solidarity. But at this stage, the

36. M. Kerr, "Hafiz Asad and the Changing Pattern of Syrian Politics," *International Journal* 28 (1975): 689–706; M. Ma'oz, *Syria Under Ḥafiz al-Asad: New Domestic and Foreign Policies*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 15 (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1975), pp. 7–12.

37. On the Islamic Charter and other resolutions of the conference, see *al-Ḥayāt*, March 4–5, 1972.

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participants were content to concentrate on drafting plans for future activities: the establishment of an international Islamic bank, an international Islamic news agency, and a number of Islamic cultural centers in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Some of these plans were at least partly realized at later dates.

The Middle East conflict was the central topic of all meetings of the Islamic Conference, and it was easily presented as a pan-Islamic issue. From time to time individual members raised international problems that involved Muslim countries, as well as problems of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries. These often caused tensions among member-states and with states outside the Islamic Conference. More than any other state, Libya was responsible for involving the conference in sensitive international problems.

LIBYA AND INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC MILITANCY

The third annual conference, held at the beginning of March 1972, took place shortly after the Indian invasion of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh (November-December 1971). Pakistan failed to pass a resolution condemning the creation of Bangladesh, which became the second-largest Muslim-populated state (after Indonesia), but it succeeded in passing strong anti-Indian resolutions.

The most extreme anti-Indian position was that of Qadhāfi who, in December 1971, had called all Muslim countries to join in a *jihād* against India.³⁸ Qadhāfi's approach to this and to some other international disputes was guided by the simple and clear principle that the international Muslim community should give active and unqualified support to Muslims in their conflicts with non-Muslims, regardless of the particular circumstances of the conflict, and with no regard whatever to any diplomatic complications that might result from a foreign policy based on religious considerations.

Qadhāfi considered himself guardian of Muslim minorities the world over. In the early 1970s, before he himself became a close ally of the Soviet Union, he had reviled the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for their suppression of Muslim minorities.³⁹ In October 1970 he unexpectedly attacked the rulers of Tanzania for having liquidated all the Muslims in Zanzibar (*sic*). (The accusation was ridiculous, because President Nyerere of Tanganyika, as Tanzania was then known, had little or nothing to do with the revolution of 1964 in which the Arab rulers of Zanzibar had been overthrown by radical Africans, who were themselves Muslims.) In a passionate speech before the International Conference for the Propagation of Islam in Tripoli (December 1970), Qadhāfi called for a *jihād* against the infidels in Palestine, Eritrea and Zanzibar. At the end of 1972 he again castigated Tanzania, then in conflict with Uganda, whose ruler, Idi Amin, had become Qadhāfi's ally.⁴⁰

Qadhāfi's militant Islamic policy was grounded on the assumption that he had the right to actively intervene in the affairs of sovereign countries in support of Muslim minorities there. Arab states had long supported the

38. E. Sheenan, in *The New York Times Magazine*, February 6, 1972.

39. Radio Libya, October 7, 1970, cited in BBC Monitoring Service, October 10, 1970 (ME/4114).

40. BBC Monitoring Service, February 14, 1970 (ME/3559); *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam), November 6, 1972.

Eritrean liberation movements, but never overtly, in order to avoid an open breach of the universally accepted rules of international conduct. But Qadhāfi publicly declared that he had given arms and money to Muslim dissidents in the Philippines and Eritrea.⁴¹ (Qadhāfi's *volte-face* five years later, shifting support from the Eritrean Liberation Front to the Ethiopian government — a clear deviation from his highly principled Islamic-oriented policy — will be discussed later in this essay.)

Qadhāfi had come to power a mere three weeks before the Islamic summit in Rabat; the imprint of revolutionary Libya was not yet felt there. But six months later, at the first conference of the Muslim foreign ministers in Jedda, Libya's militancy was clearly evident. Its foreign minister brought tensions to a high pitch by demanding that the four member-states that maintained relations with Israel immediately break them off or else face exclusion from the conference. Saudi Arabia, which still needed the support of those states, overruled Libya's ultimatum.⁴²

With Nasser's death, Qadhāfi became his self-appointed successor in leading a militant Arab nationalism. Qadhāfi's own blend of Arab nationalism, however, comprised strong Islamic ingredients. He viewed the Arab countries as the pioneering core and spearhead of the Muslim world. Whereas Nasser had been wary of forming a structured Muslim bloc,⁴³ Qadhāfi sought to strengthen the Islamic Conference, and to dominate it as well. To the extent that the rivalry between Qadhāfi and Faisal in the 1970s was a sequel to the antagonism between Nasser and Faisal in the 1960s, the inter-Arab contest went through an interesting transformation. It now involved two countries with strong Islamic commitments and with oil revenues to back up pan-Islamic activities. Consequently, Saudi Arabia found it more difficult to maintain its grip over the Islamic Conference.

Libya's opportunity to play the leading role in the Islamic Conference came when it hosted the fourth meeting in Benghazi on March 24–27, 1973. The venue of the conference had an immediate effect on its composition and nature. Three monarchies that had been among the earliest sponsors of the Islamic Conference — Morocco, Jordan and Iran — were absent. They did not maintain diplomatic relations with Libya; and Qadhāfi made no secret of his objective of overthrowing the three monarchs. Saudi Arabia was left without its conservative allies (all of which had cooperated in dominating

41. *The Times* (London), August 17, 1972; *Conflict Studies*, No. 41, December 1973.

42. *Al-Hayāt*, March 25, 1970.

43. Nasser is reported to have said in Pakistan in April 1960: "I do not wish to use Islam in international politics." He made the statement while expressing his opposition to the formation of an Islamic bloc (E.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 304).

the proceedings of the Rabat summit). The radical camp, on the other hand, gained strength as Iraq and South Yemen sent their representatives to Benghazi (though only as observers at that stage). Other countries, mainly from the moderate camp, were also absent because of strained relations with Libya. The number of participating states thus decreased from thirty in Jedda a year before to twenty-five in Benghazi.⁴⁴

Some of the resolutions adopted in Benghazi bore Qadhāfi's distinct imprint, such as the decision to create a "*jihād* fund" and the reinforcement of Islamic cultural centers in Europe, a continent that Qadhāfi considered a target for the propagation of Islam. Resolutions on international issues were also guided by Qadhāfi. India was censured for the maltreatment of Pakistani prisoners-of-war, and Ethiopia was accused of supporting Israeli expansionism in the Red Sea. The conference also expressed its sympathy for the Eritrean Liberation Front. But the most controversial issue was the Muslim rebellion in the Philippines. Qadhāfi insisted on a full-scale discussion of this issue despite the opposition of the two Muslim neighbors of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.

44. The Benghazi conference was reported in *al-Ḥayāt*, March 27 and March 28, 1973.

THE PHILIPPINES IN THE BONDS OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY

For decades Muslims in the southern Philippines had been exposed to the pressure of Christian migrants and colonists from the north, who had the support of the central government in Manila. Grievances and bitterness which had accumulated over many years erupted in 1971 in a Muslim revolt.⁴⁵ Although the reasons for the revolt were basically grounded in internal problems of the Philippines, two external Muslim factors were responsible for its escalation and endurance. These two were Qadhāfi of Libya and Tun Mustapha Harun, the chief minister of Sabah (formerly North Borneo), part of the Federation of Malaysia. Simmering discontent reached its boiling point less than a year after Qadhāfi had come to power, undoubtedly because Libya sent arms and money to the rebels in the Philippines through Sabah, which is separated from the Sulu Islands, where the revolt centered, by a hundred miles of sea.

Like Qadhāfi, Tun Mustapha Harun was a fervid Muslim, determined to turn the Muslim minority in Sabah into a majority and to make Islam the official religion of the territory.⁴⁶ At the receiving end of the financial and military aid, Islamic zeal was also apparent. It was reported that in their strongholds, in the mountains and swamps, the Muslim rebels pursued a devout Muslim way of life, combining political militancy with strong religious commitment.

The revolt disrupted life in the southern Philippines and caused suffering to the population. Fighting the rebels stretched the military and financial resources of the Philippines to the limit. President Marcos of the Philippines combined military operations to suppress the revolt with efforts to solve basic problems by social and economic development. He also promised guarantees

45. For the background to the Muslim rebellion in the Philippines and its development until 1974, I rely mainly on Moshe Yegar, *The Muslim Rebellion in Thailand and the Philippines* (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah Institute, 1975). See also C. A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973); and A.J. Abubakar, "Muslim Philippines: With Reference to the Sulus, Muslim-Christian Contradictions and the Mindanao Crisis," *Asian Studies* (Manila) 11 (1973): 112-128.

46. E.B. Fiske, "Islam Growing Fastest in a Malaysian State," *The New York Times*, September 18, 1974. See also R.S. Milne and K.J. Ratnam, *Malaysia — New States in a New Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia* (London, 1974), pp. 61 and *passim*.

to protect the interests of the Muslims in the south against the encroachment of the more prosperous and modernized Christian colonists. Moderate Muslims in the traditional leadership were prepared to cooperate with the government in this direction; but the leaders of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) held far-reaching political objectives: secession from the Philippines and the creation of an independent "Moro Republic."

The Muslim revolt had repercussions on the Philippines' relations with its two Muslim neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia was largely responsible for the changing patterns in regional politics. In the mid-1950s, when Sukarno had launched his expansionist policy of "Greater Indonesia," he had demanded the annexation of the Muslim regions of the Philippines (which he considered a natural extension of Indonesia). But in the early 1960s, opposition to the creation of the Malaysian federation became his main concern. Subsequently, tensions between Indonesia and the Philippines had eased, and President Macopagal of the Philippines even assumed an aggressive attitude towards Malaysia by advancing a claim to North Borneo (which was about to join the Malaysian federation as the state of Sabah). The Philippines challenged the legality of an 1878 agreement by which the Sultan of Sulu (now part of the Philippines) had surrendered North Borneo to the British.⁴⁷ The fall of Sukarno in 1966 brought about reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Subsequently, newly elected President Marcos shelved the claim to Sabah, although he never relinquished it altogether.

The Philippines' challenge to Malaysia, at a time when the integrity of the federation had been threatened, was not forgotten. When Sabah became the supply base for the Muslim rebels in the Philippines, the federal government of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur was not prepared to test its authority over Tun Mustapha in order to relieve the Philippines. The growing power of the Islamic Party in Malaysia, and the increased involvement of Malaysia in pan-Islamic affairs, also made it difficult for the federal government to curtail support for the Philippines rebels. In order to avoid regional tensions, the Philippines was careful not to accuse Malaysia publicly of aiding the rebels. In the post-Sukarno era, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were members of the pro-Western Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The two Muslim states were anxious to prevent the interference of other countries (including the Arabs) in Southeast Asia, and therefore made efforts to avert a discussion of the Muslim rebellion at the Islamic Conference.⁴⁸

Libya first introduced the issue at the third meeting of the conference, at

47. R.S. Milne and K.J. Ratnam, *Malaysia*, pp. 2, 4.

48. C.M. Seah, "The Muslim Issue and its Implications for ASEAN," *Pacific Community* 6 (1974): 139-160.

Jedda in March 1972; but the discussion was postponed, mainly through the efforts of Indonesia. Qadhāfi, host to the following conference, in Benghazi in March 1973, was determined to lead a full-scale discussion of the plight of the Philippines Muslims. Indonesia expressed its reservations by reducing the level of its representation in the Benghazi conference. The head of its delegation was a deputy-director of the foreign ministry instead of the foreign minister himself.

In the opening session of that conference, the Libyan foreign minister and the secretary-general of the conference, Tunku Abdur-Rahman (former prime minister of Malaysia), presented reports which amounted to an indictment of the Manila government, accusing it of persecuting Muslims and evicting them from their lands. As a concession to Indonesia and Malaysia, the ambassador of the Philippines in Cairo, himself a Muslim, was invited to present his government's case. But his speech was dramatically interrupted by the appearance of a seven-year-old Muslim boy whom the Libyans presented as alleged testimony to the atrocities of the Philippines army: his parents had been murdered and his own ear and hand had been amputated.

Libya proposed a drastic resolution, bidding the Muslim states to sever diplomatic relations with the Philippines, to impose an embargo and to file a complaint against the Philippines in the United Nations. Indonesia and Malaysia had to exert their influence to soften the resolution which, in its amended form, censured the Philippines and appointed a delegation of four Muslim foreign ministers to visit the Philippines, meet President Marcos, and investigate the situation.

President Marcos faced a difficult dilemma. By accepting an investigative mission of what he considered an internal problem, he would have recognized it as an international issue, involving an international Islamic organization and Muslim countries that were basically sympathetic to the insurgent minority. By rejecting the mission he would have risked an oil embargo (which became an even more real threat several months later, in October 1973). Moreover, both his military operations and his socio-economic reforms had failed to put an end to this revolt. The rebels, on the other hand, were dependent almost completely on Libya's support, and Marcos entertained some hopes that by cooperating with Libya, through the Islamic Conference, he might achieve a settlement and termination to the revolt.

Marcos' acceptance of the delegation ignored earlier experience. In 1972 a Libyan-Egyptian delegation had visited the southern Philippines and had met government officials and moderate Muslim leaders. In Manila, members of the delegation had expressed their positive impressions; but shortly after their departure they met representatives of the MNLF, and in its final report the delegation reiterated previous accusations against the Philippines and

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supported the extreme political demands of the rebels. The visit of the official delegation of the Islamic Conference followed a similar sequence. In the middle of August 1973 the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Libya, together with the Senegalese ambassador to Cairo, concluded their visit with a press conference in Manila where their comments were phrased in positive terms. But the final report that they submitted was totally negative. In his efforts to prevent the publication of the report, President Marcos exposed himself to further pressure and was obliged to make several pro-Arab gestures.

The Manila government found itself in the trap of Islamic solidarity. Libya ensured that the issue remained alive; and it came up again in the fifth Islamic Conference in Kuala Lumpur in June 1974.

THE AFRICANS' COMMITMENT TO ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY

During the first decade of African independence, in the 1960s, Islam played only a limited role in the external relations of African states. Even states with a Muslim majority, like Mali, Guinea, Niger, Gambia, and Senegal, jealously maintained a secular political orientation, although they considered Islam one of the cultural components of their national heritage. In this respect they differed from Mauritania and Somalia, which emphasized their Islamic political identity (and eventually even joined the Arab League). Indeed, of all the African states south of the Sahara, only Mauritania and Somalia did not establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

African states, particularly those with large Muslim populations, were often under pressure from the Arab countries to break off relations with Israel. Inside Africa such demands were supported by groups of Muslims who had been educated in al-Azhar or other centers of learning in Arab countries and who, because of their better knowledge of Arabic, remained open to influence from the Middle East and North Africa. In their own communities these Muslims were dedicated to the advancement of Islamic education and to the purification of African Islam from its local increments, from those parochial and particularistic elements that had alienated African Muslims from the universal Islamic community. In political terms, they wanted to achieve greater commitment to Islamic solidarity. For a long period, however, their influence was limited; and they also faced the opposition of the traditional Islamic leadership in African communities, whose position the reformists threatened.⁴⁹

One area in West Africa where an intensive political articulation of Islam made itself felt was the region of Northern Nigeria. The political and religious leadership there carried on the heritage of a militant reform movement that had created, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Fulani empire, guided by the legal and political principles of Islam. The former premier of Northern Nigeria, the Sardauna of Sokoto, pursued an Islamic-oriented policy at home and abroad. Until his death in a military coup in January 1966, he was among the most powerful advocates of pan-Islamism. In June 1961 he was reported to have declared in Karachi that he was touring

49. I am now engaged in a comprehensive research project on "Islam in African Politics — Past and Present." All the problems which are briefly referred to in this section will be dealt with in greater depth and detail in my forthcoming publications.

Muslim countries in order to explore "the possibility of promoting a pan-Islamic commonwealth or confederation." There was an immediate, furious reaction in the non-Muslim press of Nigeria warning against any attempt to mix Islam with politics and reminding all those concerned that the Sardauna was the premier of one region only in the Nigerian federation, and that foreign policy was the exclusive domain of the federal government.⁵⁰

Inter-African alignments were determined not by religious affiliation but by political orientation in domestic and international affairs. The cleavage was between the radical regimes, which were committed to change the socio-political order as well as the political map of Africa, and conservative pragmatic regimes, which supported the status quo. Hence, the predominantly Muslim states of Guinea and Mali were allies of Ghana in the anti-Western Casablanca bloc, while predominantly Muslim states like Senegal and Niger joined the Ivory Coast in the opposing Brazzaville bloc.

One could demonstrate that even the attitude towards Israel was influenced more by the political orientation of the regime than by the weight of Islam, if considered in terms of the percentage of Muslims in the population. Guinea and Mali, both radical and both with a Muslim majority, consistently supported the Arabs against Israel (though only Guinea broke off diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967). But while radical regimes like those of Burundi and Congo, where Islam is of no significance, adopted a clear anti-Israeli attitude, conservative regimes like those of Niger and Gambia, with a pronounced Muslim majority, maintained friendly relations with Israel for many years. Heads of predominantly Muslim states, however, had to be somewhat cautious in their relations with Israel in order to avoid the protest and criticism of those Muslim elements in their countries who held strong sentiments of solidarity with the Arabs.

The Islamic Congress and al-Azhar, as we have already said, were instruments in Nasser's foreign policy in Africa. But his efforts to use Islam in order to weaken Israel's position in Africa produced very few concrete results. Nasser's support of subversive movements in independent African states made African governments apprehensive of Egypt's cultural and religious activities. Nasser was sometimes criticized there even by the militant Muslim reformists, the Arabs' most ardent supporters, because of his secular policies at home and his persecution of the *Ikhwān*, the Muslim Brethren.⁵¹

50. C.S. Phillips, *The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy* (Evanston, 1964), pp. 83-84.

51. For overviews of the role of Islam in Africa's international relations in the 1960s (the decade of Nasser in Africa), see J. Baulin, *The Arab Role in Africa* (Penguin, 1961); V. McKay, "The Impact of Islam on Relations Among the New

Nasser's role as champion of the Arab cause in Africa was taken over by Qadhāfi. His Islamic militancy and radicalism — both in internal and external affairs — had greater appeal in Africa, particularly among the reformists. They shared his vision of Islam as an effective political force; and he was willing to grant funds for the advancement of Muslim education. Funds for Muslim educational and religious aims in Africa were also offered by Faisal. In 1966 he had visited Africa in order to promote his scheme of the Islamic summit and in order to offset Nasser's influence. In 1972, Faisal again visited Muslim African states, this time in competition with Qadhāfi. Inter-Arab rivalry was therefore extended to Africa; but this competition had the overall impact of increasing the financial resources of Muslim institutions in Africa.

Qadhāfi's African policy, a combination of financial inducement, diplomacy, pressure and subversion, engendered mixed feelings in African countries: fear and admiration, hostility and dependence. If the achievements of Islamic and Arab policies in Africa are measured according to the harm done to Israel's position in Africa, then Qadhāfi achieved remarkable success. He could rightly claim credit for his direct contribution to the severance of diplomatic relations between Israel and three of the first four countries that precipitated the snowball process of 1972–73: Uganda, Chad, and Niger.

For almost a year after he had come to power, Uganda's Idi Amin continued the military and technical cooperation with Israel that had begun under Milton Obote, the former president. But when he realized that Israel was not prepared indefinitely to support his military build-up (for the confrontation with Tanzania), he turned to Qadhāfi. In Libya Idi Amin sought not only financial aid but also a new alignment that would release him from political isolation in Africa. Qadhāfi soon made capital of the fact that Idi Amin was a Muslim, and, after a meeting between the two in February 1972, in Tripoli, they declared in a joint communiqué their commitment to guide the revolution and development of their countries according to the ideals of Islam.⁵² Idi Amin's hitherto close relations with Israel would suggest that his own faith had been of little political significance. But in following a new political orientation, and in strengthening solidarity with the Arab states, Idi Amin put on the garb of a Muslim head of state. Muslims in Uganda, however, represented no more than ten percent of the population, and in order to

African States," in J.M. Proctor, ed., *Islam and International Relations*, pp. 158–191; A. Mazrui, "Africa and Egypt's Four Circles," in idem, *On Heroes and Uhuru Worship* (London, 1967), pp. 96–112; I. Abu-Lughod, "Africa and the Islamic World," in J. Paden and E.W. Soja, eds., *The African Experience*, vol. 1 (Evanston, 1970), pp. 545–567; T. Ismael, *The U.A.R. in Africa*.

52. *Uganda News*, February 15, 1972, cited in A. Oded, *Islam in Uganda* (Tel Aviv, 1974), p. 315; *Africa Contemporary Record* 1972–73, B 282–86.

broaden the base of public support, Idi Amin led an official campaign, aided by Arab funds, for conversion to Islam. But Uganda's links with the Islamic Conference were tenuous, and its withdrawal from that organization immediately followed the fall of Idi Amin in April 1979.

On March 30, 1972, Idi Amin broke off relations with Israel. His idiosyncrasies seemed at first to have mitigated the impact of this drastic action (the first since Guinea had gone the same way, alone, in June 1967). But in perspective, one must admit that his example was not ignored. Qadhāfi himself was encouraged by the dramatic reversal in Uganda's foreign policy, as well as by the apparent vulnerability of Israel's position in Africa. For Chad, the next African state that came under Libya's pressure, Idi Amin had provided a precedent for severing diplomatic relations with Israel, a step which would otherwise have been more difficult to conceive.

Libya had supported the Muslim revolt in northern Chad before Qadhāfi came to power. But President Tombalbaye of Chad accused Qadhāfi of supporting not only the rebels in the north, but also a revolutionary plot in the capital; and in August 1971 Chad broke off relations with Libya. In April 1972 President Diori of Niger, with the backing of France, mediated between Libya and Chad and succeeded in achieving the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Qadhāfi changed his tactics and offered to strike a bargain: Libya would withdraw support from FROLINAT and would give Chad financial aid, in return for which Chad would break off relations with Israel. Like President Marcos of the Philippines, Tombalbaye hoped that he might terminate the revolt by means of a deal with the rebels' external supporter. The pressure on Chad was even stronger because it was in Qadhāfi's backyard. Chad paid the price and severed relations with Israel on November 28, 1972.⁵³

The role of President Diori of Niger in mediating between Libya and Chad was part of the reorientation of his foreign policy. In the 1960s he allied himself with Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and his relations with his Arab neighbors were strained, especially since Algeria harbored his

53. C. Casteran, "La rébellion au Tchad," *Revue française d'études politiques africaines* 73 (January 1971): 35-53. On the changing relations between Chad and Libya, see *Africa Contemporary Record* 1972-73, B 519-524, 526-527; 1974-75, B 568; 1975-76, B 465-466. Libya continued to harbor the leaders of FROLINAT and to permit supplies for the rebels to cross its territory. In May 1973 Libya occupied an area of 27,000 square miles in the northwestern part of Chad. Exploiting Chad's vulnerability, Qadhāfi has continuously played the double role of meddler and mediator in offering his services to solve Chad's internal problems in the north — problems that Libya itself has helped to create. For a recent attempt in examining this situation, see *West Africa*, April 17, 1978, pp. 746-747; *ibid.*, May 1, 1978, p. 865.

political rival, Djibo Bakary. In the early 1970s Niger's relations with the Ivory Coast cooled, and Diori sought to cultivate better relations with the Arabs to the north, hoping that Algeria and Libya would withdraw support from opposition in and out of the country. In cultivating friendship with Qadhāfi, and lured by promises of financial aid, Niger accepted the Libyan terms and on January 4, 1973, severed relations with Israel, with whom Niger had maintained friendly relations for more than ten years.

King Faisal's visit to Niger in November 1972 added weight to the Islamic factor in the reorientation of Niger's foreign policy. At that period observers had detected the strengthening of active Islamic influences in Niger, a country with an overwhelming Muslim majority.⁵⁴ Whether as a unifying sentiment in Niger or as a divisive political factor in Chad, Islam was used by the Arab countries (mainly Libya) to effect changes in the foreign policy of these countries. Generally viewed, Islam was of great importance in *initiating* Israel's setback in Africa; other factors should be taken into account in explaining the political avalanche of October and November 1973.⁵⁵

Fourteen African states had been invited to the Islamic summit in Rabat in September 1969, but only five sent their representatives: Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Chad. Four of these five states at that time maintained diplomatic relations with Israel. Senegal and Niger even cooperated with Iran and Turkey in moderating anti-Israeli resolutions. In the first conference of the Muslim foreign ministers, in Jedda in March 1970, Libya's demand that all participating states immediately break relations with Israel brought about a harsh confrontation between Libya and Senegal. From the Arabs' point of view, continuing relations with Israel compromised the Africans' commitment to Islamic solidarity. It was therefore with great satisfaction that the fourth conference of the Muslim foreign ministers, in Benghazi in March 1973, commended Chad, Niger and Mali for having broken off relations with Israel in the preceding months. By then Senegal was the only African member-state of the Islamic Conference that maintained relations with Israel.

In the second Islamic summit in Lahore (February 1974), the five original African member-states were joined by three others. One was Gambia, a predominantly Muslim state; but the other two — Uganda and Gabon — were predominantly non-Muslim. They were present at the summit because

54. *Africa Contemporary Record* 1973-74, B 718.

55. C. Legum, "Israel's Year in Africa," *Africa Contemporary Record* 1972-73, A 123-136; idem, "Africa, the Arabs and the Middle East," *ibid.*, 1973-74, A 3-14; S.A. Gitelson, *Israel's African Setback in Perspective*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 6 (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1974); R.I. Vineberg, "Israel and Black Africa: The Rupture of Diplomatic Relations," unpublished M.A. dissertation, McGill University, 1977.

their heads of state were Muslims, and their adherence to a conference of Islamic solidarity indicated the growing political relevance of Islam in Africa.

In its location on the equator, Gabon was well outside the sphere of Islamic influence in Africa, and the few thousand Muslims in Gabon were all foreigners. It came therefore as a great surprise to those who are acquainted with Islam in Africa when President Bongo announced his conversion to Islam in September 1973, shortly after his return from the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers and a subsequent visit to Libya. Gabon is a relatively wealthy country, and Bongo was not lured by offers of financial aid; his conversion to Islam was politically motivated. For many years Gabon had been a devoted follower of France and the Ivory Coast and had enjoyed little prestige in Africa. In 1973 Bongo decided to change this "policy of isolation." In his meetings with Qadhāfi and Boumedienne he discovered that Islam was the religion of the progressive Third World.⁵⁶ Significantly, after his conversion, Bongo, now called *al-ḥājj* 'Umar Bongo, became more visible in international forums. In 1976 he earned the gratitude of President Marcos when, after a visit to the Philippines, he sent messages to fellow Muslim heads of state praising the efforts of the Manila government to improve the conditions of Muslims in the southern Philippines.⁵⁷ In 1977 he hosted the annual meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and became the chairman of that African organization.

In the post-1973 period the Islamic Conference became more attractive to African states, *inter alia* because of the growing wealth and prestige of some of its members, the oil-producing countries. Countries with a Muslim minority, like Cameroon, Upper Volta and Guinea-Bissau, considered it advantageous to join the Islamic Conference. It is significant, however, that none of the English-speaking countries with significant Muslim minorities — such as Tanzania and Sierra Leone — joined the Islamic Conference. Even Nigeria, which has the largest Muslim population in Africa, refused to join an Islamic international organization, making its position clear in an official statement:

As a secular state it would be invidious for it to participate, at government level, in any form of religious conferences. The Government considers that in consonance with its declared policy of non-alignment, any act which so positively identifies Nigeria with any religious bloc would not only weaken her influence in world affairs, but would also

56. *Africa Contemporary Record* 1973-74, B 601, 603.

57. *The Philippines Daily Express*, August 18, 1976.

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tend to introduce a new element of division and dissension into the national life of the country.⁵⁸

Since 1976, however, Nigeria seems to have overcome some of its inhibitions, and in order not to completely lose the advantages of being associated with the Islamic Conference, a Nigerian delegation participates in the annual meetings as an observer.

In 1979 (following the admission of the Comoro Islands and Djibuti and the withdrawal of Uganda), there were twenty-one African states in the Islamic Conference, nine of which were members of the Arab League. These twenty-one states form about one-half the membership of each of two international organizations, namely, the OAU and the Islamic Conference. The weight of this bloc could have been of greater importance were it united and were the two international organizations more effective.

58. Federal Press Release no. 669, July 10, 1971, cited in A. Oded, "Slaves and Oil: The Arab Image in Black Africa," *The Wiener Library Bulletin* 27 (1974): 37-38. The relevance of the difference in foreign policy between French- and English-speaking countries is evident also from the fact that, with the exception of Uganda, there were no English-speaking countries among the first fourteen African states that broke off relations with Israel.

LAHORE — THE SUMMIT OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY

Muslims have always idealized the first centuries of the *hijra*, when Islam was a triumphant religion; in recent history, however, they have experienced defeat and humiliation, first in confrontation with Christian Europe, and then in successive wars against Israel. One may therefore appreciate the significance of the October 1973 war for the Arabs. The war was laden with Islamic symbols; it broke out during the fast of Ramaḍān and was code-named *Badr*, after the first victory of the prophet Muḥammad in a battle which also took place during Ramaḍān. Egyptian soldiers reported seeing the prophet crossing the Suez Canal with them. Whatever military analysts may say about the outcome of the war, for the Muslim Arabs this was a victory and the beginning of a new era of regained honor for Islam.

The successful use of oil as an economic and political weapon added another dimension to the military achievement. Muslim countries gained confidence in their economic assets, and could boast that they had brought the powerful industrial West to its knees. They knew well that this had been achieved because of cooperation and coordination among the oil-producing countries, most of which were Muslim.

In October 1973 the Arabs also recorded their greatest diplomatic success against Israel, as one African country after the other severed relations with her. The whole continent rallied behind the Arabs, and those Muslim countries in Africa which for so long had been inhibited by their bonds with Israel became free to express unqualified commitment to Islamic solidarity.

All these factors contributed to an exhilaration in the Muslim world. The upsurge of aspirations to Islamic solidarity was carried on waves of renewed confidence and euphoria. It was in such an atmosphere that the second Islamic summit convened in Lahore on February 22–24, 1974. The success of this summit contrasted starkly with the uncertainties and recurring crises that had bedevilled the first summit in Rabat four and one-half years earlier.⁵⁹

Divisions within the Arab world were undoubtedly the most important obstacle before and during the Rabat summit; the high spirits in Lahore, on the other hand, encouraged reconciliation between adversaries. Qadhāfī, who

59. All commentators in the Arab press considered the Lahore summit a great success. See *al-Nahār*, February 25, 1974; *al-Dustūr* (Amman), February 25, 1974; *al-Ḥayāt*, February 26, 1974; *al-Ḥawādith*, March 1, 1974.

had been quarreling with Sādāt, stopped over in Cairo to join Sādāt's plane to Lahore. Jordan withdrew its objection to giving Arafat the status of a head of state (although Hussein preferred to stay behind in Amman). President Bhutto of Pakistan embraced President Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh to signal reconciliation between the two Muslim states of the Indian subcontinent. Only Afghanistan, represented at an ambassadorial level, considered it appropriate to mar the atmosphere of solidarity by raising the issue of its border conflict with Pakistan.⁶⁰

Thirty-seven states participated in the Lahore summit, compared to twenty-five in Rabat, including eighteen heads of states and seven prime ministers. But of the four monarchs who had dominated the Rabat summit, three did not come to Lahore (just as their foreign ministers had been absent from the Benghazi conference in March 1973): King Hasan of Morocco, King Hussein of Jordan, and the Shah of Iran (who refused to appear in the same forum with Qadhāfi, Nasser's successor as leader of the Arabs' anti-Iranian campaign). Sādāt was hailed as the hero of the Arab and Islamic victory of Ramaḍān. His ally in the war, President Asad of Syria, marked his first appearance at an Islamic conference with a speech that praised the unifying force of Islam in terms derived from the socialist-revolutionary jargon.⁶¹ In the four and one-half years since the Rabat summit, the idea of Islamic solidarity had changed from "reactionary" to "progressive."

The Lahore summit had been well prepared, and the foreign ministers who had convened three days earlier agreed on the agenda and prepared draft resolutions. In order to avoid controversial issues which might spoil the harmony of solidarity, it had been agreed that the agenda would include only two topics: the Middle East, and economic cooperation between Muslim countries. A resolution censuring states that maintained ties with Israel was directed against Iran and Turkey, as the African states had by then exonerated themselves of this offense. Extreme anti-Israeli resolutions were easily passed in the course of dealing with the Middle East conflict, but the issue of economic cooperation raised quite a few difficulties.

The rise in oil prices at the end of 1973 brought high revenues to oil-producing Muslim countries, but at the same time caused severe economic difficulties to other Muslim states. The latter expected a "Muslim oil policy" to emerge from the Islamic summit, which would translate words into deeds and would substantiate Islamic solidarity. Qadhāfi expressed his own commitment to Islamic solidarity by suggesting that oil be sold to Muslim

60. *Al-Ahrām*, February 22-23, 1974; *al-Nahār*, February 21-23, 1974; *al-Ḥayāt*, February 24, 1974; *al-Dustūr*, February 24, 1974.

61. *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), February 23, 1974.

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countries at lower prices. Other oil-producing countries considered this proposal unrealistic. Instead they proposed to consider programs for diverting some of the oil revenues to the benefit of poorer Muslim countries. It was decided to establish an "Islamic Bank" and a "Muslim Economic Council" to determine and channel economic aid. An "Islamic Solidarity Fund" was also created in order to finance religious and cultural activities throughout the world.

Pakistan, which hosted the summit, considered it a boost to its flagging international prestige. India was left out of the Islamic Conference, but was given a promise that issues of the subcontinent would not be raised in Lahore. Such an assurance was also needed to encourage reconciliation with Bangladesh, which at the time was still India's ally. Soon after the closure of the summit, Sādāt visited New Delhi in order to dispel any fears that growing Islamic solidarity was directed against India.⁶²

India's apprehensions at the time of the Lahore summit reflected a more general problem encountered almost every time the Islamic Conference was convened outside the Arab world. Because of existing tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim countries in different parts of the world, or problems of Muslim minorities, Islamic solidarity might have implications for the regional politics of international subsystems. This became evident when the fifth annual conference was held in Kuala Lumpur in June 1974.

62. A. Haydar, "The Islamic Summit Conference of 1974: An Assessment," *Asian Profile* 3 (August 1975): 391-404.

ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS: MUSLIM MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In the 1970s Malaysia was deeply involved in international Islamic politics, and its former prime minister, Tunku Abdur-Rahman, was the first secretary-general of the Islamic Conference. But Malaysia's commitment to Islamic solidarity was a relatively late development. In the first years after its independence in 1957, Malaya (as it had been known before the creation of the Federation of Malaysia) pursued a conservative pro-British foreign policy and shunned militant solidarity movements.

Malaysia became aware of its relative isolation in world politics during the confrontation with Indonesia. The latter took advantage of its international status as an active member of the Afro-Asian bloc in order to recruit support for its challenge to the creation of the Malaysian federation. In March 1965 Indonesia even tried to exploit sentiments of Islamic solidarity by calling an Afro-Asian Islamic congress. Saudi Arabia withdrew from the congress because Malaysia had not been invited; Iran and Turkey were also absent. Anti-Malaysian resolutions were rejected by the participants, who refused to take a stance in a conflict between two Muslim states.⁶³

Supported by China, Indonesia's attempt to create a meaningful Afro-Asian Islamic organization failed at a time when the call for Islamic solidarity came from Saudi Arabia and its allies in the conservative camp. Malaysia had cultivated closer relations with those states and had received support for its position against Indonesia from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Iran. Only Pakistan, which in all other international issues joined this group, was then one of Indonesia's closest allies.⁶⁴

The involvement of three Muslim states — Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia — in two regional conflicts produced intriguing patterns of relations among them. We have already mentioned that, despite Pakistan's enthusiastic support of Indonesian independence, Sukarno felt much closer to Nehru. Sino-Indian tensions in the early 1960s were reflected in the relations between Sukarno and Nehru, while Pakistan and Indonesia were brought closer to each other through their common friendship with China. India established

63. D. Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World* (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 191.

64. P. Boyce, *Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy* (Sydney, 1968), pp. 170–172, 175, 182.

cordial relations with Malaysia, which reciprocated by supporting India not only in its conflict with China in 1962, but also in its war with Pakistan in 1965. The Pakistanis were shocked by the hostile speech of the Malaysian representative in the U.N. Security Council during the debate on the Indo-Pakistani war. They considered it a betrayal by a Muslim sister-state, claiming that despite its close relations with Indonesia, Pakistan had been careful not to support Indonesia in its confrontation with Malaysia. Pakistan severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia in September 1965, and these were renewed only a year later through the mediation of the Shah of Iran.⁶⁵

Tensions and pressures in Malaysian international relations were eased after Sukarno's downfall in 1966 put an end to the confrontation with Indonesia. Malaysia continued to strengthen its ties with Muslim countries, and more so when the increased electoral power of the Muslim Party (PAI) permitted it to join the coalition and the federal government in 1973. The PAI had come to power earlier in the state of Kelantan in northern Malaysia. With the consent of the state authorities, Kelantan became the operational base of a separatist Muslim movement in southern Thailand.⁶⁶

In the southern part of Malaysia, the state of Sabah, under the rule of Tun Mustapha Harun, served as a supply and training base for the rebels in the southern Philippines. Thus at the two ends of the Malaysian federation, local militant Muslims supported dissident Muslims in two neighboring states, both of which were Malaysia's partners in ASEAN. These delicate problems came into focus when Malaysia served as the venue for the fifth annual Islamic Conference on June 19–25, 1974, where the problem of the Muslims in the Philippines was to be discussed.

The delegation of foreign ministers that had visited the Philippines in August 1973 presented its report to the conference in Kuala Lumpur. Its conclusions called for a political solution with the participation of the MNLF. Adam Malik, the foreign minister of Indonesia, succeeded in passing a moderate resolution that called for negotiations, under the auspices of the Islamic Conference, between the Manila government and the MNLF. Such talks were held in January 1975 in Jedda, but failed to produce a settlement.⁶⁷

During the conference in Kuala Lumpur, representatives of the MNLF in

65. S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp. 67, 307–310, 356.

66. W.R. Roff, *Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State* (Kuala Lumpur, 1974); Y.M. Marican, "Malay Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaysia," *Islamic Culture* 16 (1977): 291–301.

67. A report on the talks in Jedda was included in an official memorandum of the secretariat to the seventh annual conference of the Muslim foreign ministers in Istanbul, May 1976.

the Philippines and of the Pattani Liberation Front in Thailand were present in the Malaysian capital, but were not given the opportunity to appear officially before the conference. It is significant, however, that Muslim subversive activities in southern Thailand increased as the date of the conference approached. The Thai government invited the new secretary-general of the Islamic Conference, the Egyptian Hasan al-Tuhami, to Bangkok. Thailand, like the Philippines, was obliged to recognize the interest of the Islamic Conference in what Thailand would have liked to consider its own internal problem. Al-Tuhami's invitation, however, was a preventive action; and at the end of his visit, among other verbal declarations, he promised that the claims of the Muslims in southern Thailand would not appear on the agenda of the Islamic Conference in Kuala Lumpur.⁶⁸

Preparations for the Islamic Conference in Kuala Lumpur generated tensions in Singapore as well, where a new Muslim organization appeared with a memorandum claiming injustice towards Muslims and violation of freedom of worship. Newspapers and government officials in Singapore were quick to react against this attempt to mix religion with politics and to attract international attention to problems that had been heretofore of little concern. This Muslim agitation in fact drew little or no attention outside Singapore.⁶⁹

At the conference in Kuala Lumpur, Libya and Pakistan sought to encourage the Islamic Conference's involvement in the problems of Muslim minorities in sovereign states, proposing to utilize the resources of the Islamic Solidarity Fund to support Muslim minorities. Egypt, Iran and other countries objected to the intervention of the conference in internal affairs of non-member-states. It was decided, as a compromise, that Muslim minorities should be the concern of the World Muslim League (*al-Rābiṭa*), a non-governmental organization.⁷⁰

The Pakistani-Libyan initiative was viewed by the Indian press as directed against India; the Islamic Conference was attempting, India felt, to make itself the guardian of the Indian Muslims.⁷¹ Pakistan, in fact, has never let

68. *Bangkok Post*, January 4, 1975. For a documented study of the Muslim rebellion in Thailand, see M. Yegar, *The Muslim Rebellion in Thailand and the Philippines*. Yegar's survey is updated to September 1974.

69. See the two newspapers of Singapore, *The Straits Times*, June 22 and July 18, 1974; and *The New Nation*, July 18, 1974. Outside Singapore the agitation was reported in neighboring Malaysia (*Berita Harian*, July 19, 1974) and in India (*The Times of India*, June 23, 1974), the latter being particularly sensitive to appeals of Muslim minorities to the Islamic Conference.

70. The activities of *al-Rābiṭa* in affairs of Muslim minorities were reported in *al-Bilād*, February 11, 1975; and *Akhbār al-'ālam al-Islāmī*, September 8, 1975.

71. *The Times of India*, June 21-22, 1974.

an opportunity escape it to attack India in the conference. Only one month before the conference convened in Kuala Lumpur, India had held its first nuclear test. The foreign minister of Pakistan demanded an explicit censure of the Indian nuclear test; but because of objections by Pakistan's adversaries (and India's friends), Afghanistan and Bangladesh, the conference only adopted a general resolution condemning nuclear tests and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. India was not mentioned by name, but Pakistan insisted on passing similar resolutions in subsequent conferences.⁷²

In 1975 India lost one of its two allies in the Islamic Conference when, following a military coup, Bangladesh reversed its political orientation and moved away from support of India. In the seventh Islamic Conference (Istanbul, May 1976) Bangladesh obtained international Islamic support in its conflict with India over the waters of the Ganges River.⁷³ At that meeting the Islamic Conference became entangled in another regional problem of international significance, that of Cyprus.

72. Ibid., June 21, 24 and 26, 1974; *al-Nahār*, June 23, 1974.

73. Reuters reports from Istanbul, May 12-14, 1976.

TURKEY'S ADHERENCE TO ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY

It had been decided in Kuala Lumpur that the sixth Islamic Conference would be held in Cairo, but in April 1975 Cairo announced that it was unable to host the conference. Sādāt was probably reluctant to have a militant Islamic conference in Cairo when Kissinger was shuttling between Cairo and Jerusalem, negotiating the second interim agreement in Sinai. There seems to have been a measure of incompatibility between conferences of Islamic solidarity and peace movements in the Middle East.

The sixth Islamic Conference was therefore held in Jedda on June 12–15, 1975. It was at this conference that a resolution to expel Israel from the United Nations was first adopted. The Arabs also expected to carry this resolution through the annual meetings of the Organization of African Unity in Kampala, Uganda, and the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Lima, Peru, and then in the General Assembly of the United Nations itself. Assuming that member-states consider themselves bound by resolutions of one international organization when they cast their votes in the meeting of another international organization, the Arabs should have had no problem in gathering more support for the resolution as it proceeded from one conference to the next. But this assumption proved invalid in Third World solidarity organizations, where resolutions are passed not by a majority vote, but by a consensus reached in the momentum created by the rhetoric and the pressure of the militants. There is no place in such conferences for dissident voices; but away from the conference, when the spell is over, individual states often do not consider themselves bound by resolutions reached under the intoxication of rhetoric. African states, members of the Islamic Conference, spoke at the OAU meeting against the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations.⁷⁴ Following their failure to gain enough support for such a resolution in the General Assembly, the Arabs pressed for a verbal rather than operational resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism.

It is significant also that the central resolution in the next — the seventh — Islamic Conference was also not carried through in the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries. It was, as we shall see, a pro-Turkish resolution about Cyprus, which was of great significance for Turkey. It was in order to obtain international support that Turkey stepped up its involvement in the

74. Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, "The Organization of African Unity," *Africa Contemporary Record* 1975–76, A 69.

Islamic Conference. In doing so it compromised the principle of secularism which had been central to Atatürk's revolution.

Secularism implied not only the separation of religion and state in domestic politics, but also the dissociation from pan-Islam in foreign policy. The Arab revolt during World War One had left the Turks with a residue of bitterness against the Arabs. The conflict over the town and district of Alexandretta — which in 1939 had been transferred from Syria to Turkey — and Turkey's relations with Israel, as well as the role of Turkey in the Baghdad Pact, were among the factors that contributed to the cool relations between Turkey and most of the Arab states. The latter even inclined to support the Greek position in Cyprus. Since the mid-1960s, however, Turkey had endeavored to improve its relations with the Arabs, and there were signs of rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt. Mutual official visits and joint declarations served Turkey's purpose in linking the Middle East and the Cyprus problems, paralleling recognition of the rights of the Palestinians with those of the Turkish community in Cyprus.⁷⁵

Although it was a member of NATO, Turkey had ambivalent attitudes towards Western Europe, which, even after many years of a secular ethos in Turkey, was perceived as part of the alien Christian world. The hostile reaction of the United States and Europe to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 was interpreted in Turkey as an expression of the Christians' sympathy to the Greeks. It generated anti-Western feelings in Turkey at a time when Islamic sentiments had already been more evident than ever before. On the other hand, Qadhāfi's unqualified support of the Turkish war effort in Cyprus, which he considered a Muslim *jihād*, left a strong impression on public opinion as well as on politicians in Turkey. Qadhāfi generously gave Turkey aid in terms of money, oil and arms, initiating a period (which is not yet over) of close cooperation, including military assistance, between Turkey and Libya.⁷⁶

Before 1974, Libyan money had reached Turkey through unofficial and disguised channels in support of the activities of the National Salvation Party (NSP), an Islamic-oriented party. In October 1973 the NSP achieved the

75. B. Gilead, "Turkish-Egyptian Relations, 1952-57," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (1959): 353-363; O.A. Okyar, "A Survey of Arab-Turkish Relations," *Middle East Forum* (March 1966): 43-54; O.E. Kürkuoglu, "Recent Developments in Turkey's Middle East Policy," *Diş Politika* (1971): 93-99. See also sections on Turkey's foreign policy in all volumes of *Middle East Record*.

76. On Libya's military aid to Turkey, see *Africa Contemporary Record* 1975-76, B 73. Libya's support of Turkey on the basis of Islamic solidarity did not hamper Qadhāfi's cultivating of relations with Cyprus' Makarios in pursuit of his Mediterranean policy. See *ibid.*; and *ibid.*, 1974-75, B 68.

greatest political success of an Islamic political movement in modern Turkey when it won forty-eight of the four hundred fifty seats in the Turkish National Assembly. In the multi-party system of Turkey, this small party, with just more than ten percent of the seats, held the balance in parliament and played a crucial role in forming and dissolving coalitions.⁷⁷

After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, NSP propaganda claimed that its leader, Erbakan, had played a major role in the government's decision to undertake military action in Cyprus, insinuating that Prime Minister Ecevit might otherwise have hesitated. This was denied, but there is no doubt that the presence of NSP ministers in the cabinet contributed to a more militant policy towards Cyprus, which the NSP considered the focus and sequel to the age-old confrontation between Islam and Christianity.

The embargo imposed by the U.S. Congress on Turkey encouraged the NSP ministers to press for a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy, away from the West. They pointed to alternative sources for financial and political aid. By then the Muslim bloc was no longer the weak and beaten area of the world on which Turkey had turned its back after World War One. The growing importance of Asia and Africa in world politics, the weight of their votes in the United Nations, and the economic power of the oil-producing countries were all assets that Turkey would have liked to be associated with.⁷⁸

Turkey, which had been almost completely isolated on the issue of Cyprus, greatly appreciated the fact that Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish community in Cyprus, was invited to speak before the sixth Islamic Conference in Jedda in June 1975, where a pro-Turkish resolution was adopted. This sympathetic attitude had an exhilarating effect, and the foreign minister of Turkey was granted permission to extend an invitation to hold the next conference in Istanbul. At that point it had already been agreed to hold the next conference in Tripoli, but the foreign minister of Libya graciously gave way, emphasizing the historical significance of holding the Islamic Conference in the former capital of the Ottoman empire.

The NSP and other Islamic-oriented groups exploited the preparations for the Islamic Conference in order to create a highly-charged emotional atmosphere. The past glory of Istanbul was invoked in articles and speeches and the public was called on to respect Islamic values and norms. The NSP pressured the government, sometimes under the threat of bringing down Prime Minister Demirel's cabinet, to adopt policies that would tend to elicit sympathy for Turkey at the Islamic Conference. Turkey agreed in principle

77. J.M. Landau, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey," *Asian and African Studies* 11 (1976): 1-58.

78. See article by S.V. Roberts in *The New York Times*, May 25, 1976.

to open a PLO office in Ankara, and undertook to sign the Charter of the Islamic Conference and become a full member of the conference. This formal step, which deviated from the principle of secularism, necessitated an amendment to the Turkish constitution.

In its meeting in Istanbul, on May 12–15, 1976, the Islamic Conference rewarded Turkey for its gestures of good will. Rauf Denktash was invited to be the first speaker, and the resolutions on Cyprus included all the elements requested by Turkey. The extent of Turkey's success was apparent in the Greek press, which was greatly concerned about the support given to Turkey's position by a bloc of about forty states.⁷⁹

In certain political circles in Turkey, satisfaction with the achievements at the Islamic Conference was mixed with doubts about the continuing support of Muslim states in wider international forums. The first setback came only two weeks after the close of the Islamic Conference. Following a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers (May 30–June 2, 1976), the representative of Sri Lanka (host of the forthcoming Conference of Non-Aligned Countries) announced that Turkey's request to attend the conference had been rejected because of its membership in NATO. The spokesman of the Turkish foreign ministry immediately denied that Turkey had ever made such a request. The government of Cyprus under Archbishop Makarios, however, was a respectable member of the conference. In Colombo (August 25, 1976) the euphoric atmosphere of Istanbul faded away and the non-aligned states (many of them Muslim states) adopted a pro-Greek resolution.

Another anti-Turkish resolution was passed in the U.N. General Assembly on November 12, 1976. It was similar to the resolutions that had been passed in the two preceding assemblies. Two of the sponsors of the resolution, Algeria and Mali, were members of the Islamic Conference and had supported the pro-Turkish resolution in Istanbul a few months earlier. But outside the forums of Islamic solidarity, Muslim states seemed to have other, stronger, interests and constraints.

The Turks could have derived some comfort from the fact that the number of states that supported the anti-Turkish resolution dropped from 117 in 1975 to 94 in 1976. Several Muslim states that had voted against Turkey in 1975 abstained or were absent in 1976. But the mild erosion in the support of the Greeks, probably under the influence of the Islamic Conference in

79. "The Istanbul Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers," *Diş Politika* 5 (1975): 18–22; see also Reuters reports from Istanbul, May 12–14, 1976. An official document of the resolutions adopted by the conference was published by the secretariat of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah.

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Istanbul, was not enough to bring Muslim states to identify positively with Turkey. As in the two previous assemblies, Turkey remained alone again in voting against the resolution; even Libya preferred to stay away.⁸⁰ The Muslim states that had failed to support Turkey in other international conferences repeated pro-Turkish resolutions and gestures in the ninth Islamic Conference in Tripoli.

80. On the Cyprus issue at the Colombo conference and at the United Nations, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* 1976, 27979; and 1977, 28290.

ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY UNDER THE SHADOW OF INTER-ARAB RIVALRY (LIBYA VS. EGYPT)

Libya seems to have been the only country that emphasized the absolute primacy of Islam over all other considerations in its foreign policy. But even Qadhāfi's commitment to Islamic solidarity had its limitations. In his conflict with Egypt, Qadhāfi moved closer to the Soviet Union to become Nasser's successor in yet another role, as the Soviets' ally in the Arab world and Africa. Quite unexpectedly Qadhāfi found himself also aligned with the revolutionary Marxist regime in Ethiopia. For some time before the Soviets began to supply arms directly to Ethiopia, Qadhāfi had provided Ethiopia with Soviet arms. In Ethiopian hands the arms were turned against Muslims in Eritrea and Somalia.

In his opening speech to the eighth Islamic Conference, held in Tripoli on May 16–22, 1977, Qadhāfi explained that he had supported the Eritreans so long as they had fought against Haile Selassie, an agent of Zionism and imperialism. But after the downfall of the emperor, Qadhāfi called on the Eritreans to join hands with the revolutionary government. Qadhāfi even discovered — and announced — that sixty-five percent of the Ethiopians were Muslims, whereas the Muslims were not in a majority among the Eritreans. Thus he saw no betrayal of the cause of Islam when he shifted his support from the Eritreans to the Ethiopians.⁸¹

Syria, Iraq, Somalia and other delegations to the Islamic Conference criticized Libya's position on Eritrea, but failed to secure a resolution of continuing support for the Eritrean liberation movements. Instead Libya passed a noncommittal resolution calling on the OAU to solve the Eritrean problem within the framework of Afro-Asian solidarity.

The problem of the Muslims in the southern Philippines was once again on the agenda of the Islamic Conference. About six months before the conference, in December 1976, Libya had mediated between the Manila government and the MNLF on behalf of the Islamic Conference and brought about

81. Qadhāfi's speech was reported by the Libyan News Agency and by Reuters, May 17, 1977. The proceedings and resolutions of the Tripoli conference were reported by Reuters and by the Arab News Agency on May 20–22, 1977. Qadhāfi's statistics are dubious; there are no exact figures for the number of Muslims in Ethiopia, and though Islam is still making progress there, the proportion of Muslims in the population has not yet reached forty percent.

a cease-fire agreement reached in Tripoli. President Marcos praised Qadhāfi as a man of peace and good will and expected him to be present when the final agreement was signed in Manila on April 7, 1977. At the beginning of March, however, the negotiations on the implementation of the agreement had to be suspended. President Marcos, who had conceded the creation of an autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao, insisted on holding a referendum in which the people of thirteen southern provinces would decide whether they wanted to join the autonomous region. The MNLF objected to the referendum and was supported by the secretary-general (Karim Gaye of Senegal) and the chairman (Turkey's foreign minister) of the Islamic Conference. The results of the referendum, which became known on April 20, 1977, indicated that the people of the southern provinces refused to join in one autonomous region under the rule of the MNLF.

The Islamic Conference in Tripoli held the Manila government responsible for the failure to reach agreement. In order to demonstrate its support of the MNLF, the conference invited the MNLF representative to join the discussions in the official capacity of observer. Malaysia and Indonesia preached moderation, and Qadhāfi also favored another attempt to reach a settlement. It was therefore decided to establish a commission that would bring about the resumption of negotiations between Manila and the MNLF. Similar allegations against the government of Manila were repeated in sessions of the Islamic Conference in Dakar (1978) and Fez (1979).

By the end of 1978 there seemed to have been little progress toward a settlement. Reports from the southern Philippines indicated that the official cease-fire was marred by frequent provocations on the part of both sides and that incidents involving the loss of life continued. The Islamic Conference sent its official representative in Manila to monitor the cease-fire and to offer his services as mediator to the two parties.

Following the cease-fire agreement, many thousands of rebels laid down their arms and were given funds for rehabilitation. The position of the rebels had been weakened somewhat already in April 1976, when a new government under Muḥammad Fuad replaced that of Tun Mustapha in Sabbaḥ. Although a devout Muslim, Fuad decided to end Sabbaḥ's role as the operational base for the Muslim rebels in the Philippines, and imposed restrictions on their activities. The Libyans deny that they continue to supply arms to the rebels in the Philippines.⁸²

82. *Al-Akḥbār* (Jordan), January 17, 1979. The foregoing brief survey of developments in the southern Philippines is based on reports in the Philippines press (mainly *The Times Journal*, *The Philippines Daily Express* and *Bulletin Today*) which, between the end of 1976 and May 1977, was very sympathetic to the Libyan efforts. See also

At this stage, one cannot draw conclusions about the future of the southern Philippines. But our concern is more with the role of the Islamic Conference, and whatever the final outcome of the negotiations, it is apparent that the Islamic Conference had a real influence in directing political developments in the Philippines. In this case, Qadhāfi proved that his policy of Islamic militancy, which disregarded some conventional diplomatic norms, could have some dividends.

At this eighth Islamic Conference in Tripoli, Libya presided over the adoption of a series of resolutions for which there was little enthusiasm — sometimes even overt resentment — among member-states. The momentum of Islamic solidarity was a long way from the peak that had been reached just over three years earlier in Lahore. We have stressed more than once in this essay the importance of a measure of agreement within the Arab world as a condition for the advancement, or even maintenance, of Islamic solidarity. In May 1977 the rift between Egypt and Libya was complete. For weeks and months before, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran had made great efforts to postpone the meeting in Tripoli and to change the venue. Libya successfully resisted these attempts, and when thirty-eight countries (all the member-states except Egypt, the Sudan and Iran) sent their representatives to Tripoli, Qadhāfi triumphantly noted that Egypt and its allies, rather than Libya, were in political isolation.

The delegates did come to Tripoli, some of them quite reluctantly, in order to keep the Islamic Conference going. It had become so fragile at that stage that any interference with the seven-year-old rhythm of annual meetings could have been disastrous. No one wanted to see the Islamic Conference, the greatest achievement of Islamic solidarity, dissolve.

Six months later, in November 1977, Sādāt made his historic visit to Jerusalem. During the next Islamic Conference session, in Dakar (April 24–28, 1978), Egypt came under the attack of the militant Arabs, but the Saudis helped to avoid the complete isolation of Egypt. But following the signing of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, Saudi Arabia joined the other Arab states and dissociated itself from Egypt. Egypt attempted to gain some support from non-Arab Muslim states. On the eve of the Islamic Conference in Fez (May 8–12, 1979), Vice President Mubarak of Egypt visited Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh, while Sādāt's adviser, Mamduh Salem, visited a number of Muslim countries in Africa. According to Egyptian sources, some Asian and

records of events in *Asia Research Bulletin* and *Asia Recorder*. A Belgian journalist, who had stayed with the MNLF rebels in Mindanao, Sulu and Sabah, reported on BBC television (May 2, 1978) that guerrilla fighting was going on and that the MNLF continued to use Sabah as its base of operations.

African states opposed Egypt's suspension from the Islamic Conference, but they were overawed by the Arabs.⁸³

The Islamic Conference adopted the Arabs' line. Saudi Arabia and Libya became partners to an uneasy alliance in opposition to Sādāt's peace with Israel. Egypt, which, according to our analysis thus far, has a central role to play in the promotion of Islamic solidarity, has been left out because of its decision to pursue the path to peace. Peace with Israel seems incompatible with Islamic solidarity, the binding force of which has been, for over half a century, the support of the Arabs' struggle for Palestine.

83. *Al-Ahrām*, May 7, 1979.

IRAN: ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY

Commitment to Islamic solidarity was a principal issue during the fifty-year conflict between the Shī'ī '*ulamā*' and the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. Muḥammad Riza Shah continued the modernizing policies of his father Riza Shah (1925–1941), which had met with opposition from the clergy. The Shah considered many Islamic institutions obstacles to progress and sought to glorify the pre-Islamic heritage of Iran and to underscore Iranian cultural identity as distinct from that of the Arabs. The Shah's recognition of Israel in March 1950 is sometimes presented as a sequel to the liberal tradition of the Persian King Cyrus, whose royal decree in 538 B.C. signalled the return of the Jews to Israel from their exile in Babylonia. The '*ulamā*', who insisted on the Islamic identity of Iran, condemned the recognition of Israel and even inflamed popular emotions against the Jews.⁸⁴

In 1951 the Shah was compelled to hand over power to Dr. Mossadegh, who formed a government of the National Front. In mobilizing popular support, Mossadegh was aided by Ayatullāh Kashānī, the most prominent religious activist in Iran. Kashānī also went abroad to recruit the support of Muslim countries for the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran. Under the influence of his religious allies, Dr. Mossadegh recalled the Iranian mission in Israel, and relations between the two countries were frozen. The religious-nationalist alliance did not survive and disagreements between Mossadegh and Kashānī precipitated the downfall of Mossadegh.⁸⁵

Following the restoration of his authority in August 1953, the Shah pursued a pro-Western policy, centered on the Baghdad Pact. The pact put strains on Iran's relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The *entente* with Iraq within the Baghdad Pact came to an end with the 1958 revolution in Iraq, and old conflicts between the two countries once again came to the surface: the dispute over shatt al-Arab, Iran's support of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq, and Iraq's support of the secessionist movement in Khuzistan, the largely Arab-populated Iranian province.

Iran's growing alienation from the Arab countries paved the way for the renewal of Iran's recognition of Israel, publicly announced by the Shah in

84. E.E. Shaul, "Cultural Values and Foreign Policy Decision Making in Iran: The Case of Iran's Recognition of Israel," Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 1971, pp. 175–190.

85. Ibid., pp. 194–222.

July 1960. Nasser reacted by severing diplomatic relations with Iran, and 150 *'ulamā'* from al-Azhar called on Muslims "to adopt an attitude of *jihād* against the Shah's recognition of Israel." At home the religious opposition, led by Ayatullāh Khomaiṇi, pointed at Israeli experts in Iranian agricultural projects as proof that the Shah's agrarian reforms, which the *'ulamā'* condemned, had been inspired by Israel. Opposition from the religious classes culminated in serious riotings in the capital and the major provincial cities in the summer of 1963. The Iranian government officially accused Nasser of supporting religious subversive groups in Iran.⁸⁶

Although Nasser posed as leader of an all-Arab attack on Iran, the Shah was able to exploit internecine rivalries among the Arab states. Iran cultivated relations with those Arab states — e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia — that had also been targets of Nasser's subversive propaganda. Since his meeting with Faisal in December 1965, the Shah had become one of the principal supporters of Faisal's efforts to convene an Islamic summit. In the Rabat summit of September 1969, the three conservative Arab monarchs (Faisal, Hussein and Hasan) needed the cooperation of the Shah against the Arab radicals. The Shah was therefore in a position to prevent passage of extreme anti-Israeli resolutions.

Following the consolidation of the Islamic Conference, and with better understanding existing among the Arab states, Iran could no longer prevent the adoption of resolutions which it opposed. Iran followed Turkey's practice of presenting the secretariat of the conference with a document listing its reservations about resolutions that were not in accord with the principles of Iran's foreign policy.

In the 1970s Iran's relations with most Arab states improved, in particular with Sādāt's Egypt. Top-ranking leaders of the two countries exchanged visits, and Egypt received substantial financial aid from Iran. Within OPEC Iran cooperated with the oil-producing Arab countries, and in the wake of OPEC's achievements in 1973, the Shah spoke more favorably than ever of Islamic solidarity, offering (verbal) support for the Arab cause in the Middle East. It was after an OPEC meeting in Algiers that the host country played an important role as mediator in bringing about the March 1975 agreement between Iran and Iraq in which the outstanding issues between the two countries were settled.

In the 1975 agreement Iraq undertook to prevent anti-Iranian subversive agitation from its territory. Consequently, groups of Iranian exiles had to leave Iraq, and some of them moved to Tripoli in Libya, which became the

86. Ibid., pp. 227–345.

center of anti-Shah activities.⁸⁷ Iran was absent from the two Islamic conferences (in 1973 and 1977) held in Libya, and the Shah's absence from the Lahore summit (in February 1974) has been explained by his unwillingness to share that forum with Qadhāfi.

The real threat to the Shah's regime came not from the Iranian exiles in Libya, but from the Ayatullāh Khomeini, who made his residence in Paris after he had been obliged to leave Iran.

The Islamic revolution in Iran brought to power a government committed to the centrality of Islam in domestic and foreign politics. Iran broke off relations with Israel and enthusiastically embraced the cause of the PLO. More tacitly, Iran supports the Islamic opposition to the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. One could therefore have expected that under Khomeini Iran would step up its involvement in the most important organization of Islamic solidarity. But the Iranian delegation to the Islamic Conference in Fez was composed of third- and fourth-level officials, and remained very marginal. Iranian delegates expressed their frustration with the politicking which dominated the proceedings of the conference, and even considered the need for a new organization "of a more truly Islamic nature."⁸⁸

Iranian involvement in international Islamic solidarity must also have been influenced by the uneasy relations of the new Iranian regime with certain Arab states. There were cool relations with Morocco, the host country, which had offered shelter for some time to the exiled Shah. From Libya the Shī'ī leaders of Iran demanded a clarification of the mystery that shrouded the disappearance of the Shī'ī leader of Lebanon, the Imam Ṣadr, during a visit to Libya.

Most disturbing, however, were the relations with Iraq, which had deteriorated again in the post-revolutionary period. Iraq is accused of instigating disturbances in Khuzistan (or Arabistan), where the Arab population demands secession from Iran. On the other hand, the ruling élite in Iraq, which is Sunnī, is apprehensive of the repercussions the Iranian revolution might have on the Shī'īs of Iraq. Iran therefore presents yet another case in which strong sentiments of Islamic solidarity are frustrated by earthly political realities.

87. During the eighth Islamic Conference in Tripoli, groups of Iranian exiles exhibited posters in the name of the Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabistan. This demonstration caused embarrassment to Iraq, which had withdrawn its claim to Khuzistan (referred to as Arabistan by the Arabs) in the agreement with Iran in March 1975. (Reported by Reuters from Tripoli, May 17, 1977.)

88. V. Perry in *The Herald Tribune*, May 14, 1979.

OIL AS A SOURCE OF SOLIDARITY AND DISSENSION

Oil power and oil revenues lent Islamic solidarity an important boost. Some of the wealthier Arab oil-producing countries considered the Islamic Conference the international organization most deserving of their financial support. In 1975 five Arab countries — Saudi Arabia (\$5.5 million), Libya (\$4.5 million), Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (\$1.5 million each) — contributed a total of \$14.5 million to the Islamic Solidarity Fund. Other member-states added only modest contributions, from \$10,000 (Uganda and Malaysia) to \$250,000 (Pakistan).

In 1975, a survey mission of the Islamic Solidarity Fund had toured Muslim countries, mainly in Africa, and its report served the council of the fund in preparing its budget. The largest sum (\$5.2 million) was allocated for the propagation of Islam, \$3 million for the establishment of two Islamic universities, in Uganda and Niger, \$1 million for other educational projects, \$700,000 for the construction of new mosques, and \$500,000 to the Islamic Research Institute in Islamabad, Pakistan. The sum of \$1.5 million was given as relief aid to Muslim refugees (from Eritrea, Cyprus and Cambodia) and to earthquake victims in Turkey, \$1 million to help Muslims in the Philippines, and \$1.5 million for what has been described as the anti-Judaization campaign (presumably in support of the Arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).⁸⁹

The Islamic Solidarity Fund is therefore concerned with political, cultural and religious activities, all of which are geared to increase the political influence of Islam in general and of the Arabs in particular. Similar activities are also financed directly by Libya and Saudi Arabia. In evaluating the Arab's intensive activities in Africa in the post-1973 period, an African Muslim scholar reported: "Most Muslims [in Africa] wish that Arabs were involved in Africa's projects for development rather than merely in the construction of mosques and Islamic Centers."⁹⁰

Poorer Muslim countries shared great expectations that their adherence to Islamic solidarity would be reciprocated by financial aid and investments from the Muslim (mainly Arab) oil producers. Economic issues were in fact

89. Report (dated January 1976) by the Council of the Islamic Solidarity Fund to the Seventh Islamic Conference in Istanbul.

90. L. Kaba, "Islam's Advance in Tropical Africa," *Africa Report* 21, 2 (March-April 1974): 41.

on the agenda of almost every meeting of the Islamic Conference, but the resolutions adopted had little substance. One resolution, however, was implemented when the Islamic Development Bank was inaugurated in July 1975, with its headquarters in Jedda. The bank had three main objectives: to finance development projects in Muslim countries, to encourage trade between Muslim countries, and to extend economic aid to Muslims in non-Muslim countries. With a capital of \$900 million, the bank is expected to grant loans free of interest, in accordance with Islamic law. Information about the implementation of its policy is yet to come.⁹¹

Islamic solidarity is only one aspect within the wider context of relations between Black Africa and the Arab world. Africans bitterly expressed disappointment and disillusion when the Arabs were not quick to alleviate the serious economic problems that had been caused by the rise in oil prices. Among non-Muslim Africans (in Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, and Southern Nigeria), reactions brought to the surface anti-Arab hostility; but criticism came also from Muslim statesmen and from the media in Senegal, Tanzania and Cameroon.⁹²

Gradually Arab financial aid did begin to flow into Africa, but at nowhere near the level demanded by the Africans. The Arabs preferred to give aid through bilateral agreements between the donor and recipient states or through the newly created (1975) Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA). Both channels left control of the funds exclusively in Arab hands, allowing them to employ financial aid as political leverage. The Africans, who had already proved their solidarity with the Arabs by severing relations with Israel, demanded that a greater proportion of Arab aid be channelled through the African Development Bank and other international organizations in order to lessen Arab pressure on individual African countries.⁹³

91. It is significant that, under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Conference was concerned not only with economic development but also with the creation of an Islamic economic system. An Islamic Economic Conference was held in Jedda in April 1975 to discuss the formulation of monetary and fiscal policies guided by Islamic law.

92. For criticism of the Arabs in the African press, see A. Oded, "Africa Between the Arabs and Israel," *Hamizrah Hehadash* 25 (1975): 184-185, 203. Criticism from states that are members of the Islamic Conference are on record from Senegal (*Le Monde*, June 4, 1974), Mali (*Lettre d'Afrique*, January 30, 1974), Cameroon (Radio Yoaunde, September 9, 1973), Gabon (*Le Monde*, July 7-8, 1974), and Uganda (Radio Kampala, May 13, 1974; *The Observer*, May 12, 1974).

93. The best survey of relations between the Arabs and Africa is in C. Legum's essays in *Africa Contemporary Record* 1973-74, A 3-14; 1974-75, A 102-113; 1975-76, A 76-87. For a critical view by Africans, see S.K. Buo, "The Illusion of Afro-

Protracted negotiations had failed to produce an agreement even during the meeting of African and Arab foreign ministers on the eve of an Afro-Arab summit in Cairo in March 1977. But on the opening day of the summit, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia (in the absence of King Khalid, who was ill) dramatically pledged one billion dollars to African development. He was followed by the rulers of Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, who together pledged \$456 million. This unprecedented amount of Arab financial aid turned the summit into a success, though even before its close quite a few Africans expressed skepticism because most of the promised aid was left to the discretion of the donor Arab states and because the period over which the money would be given out had not been disclosed.⁹⁴

Skeptical about the outcome of the Afro-Arab summit, and rather reluctant to forge a new Afro-Arab bloc, most African heads of states did not come to Cairo. Only 11 of the 39 countries from Black Africa were represented by their heads of state, compared to 15 of the 20 members of the Arab League, who showed greater concern for this meeting. It is significant also that 8 of the 11 heads of state from Black Africa present in Cairo were members of the Islamic Conference. It is clear that these African states had a greater stake in relations with the Arab world, and they also received the lion's share of Arab aid. But even they expected the Arabs to be more generous and more considerate:

Muslims in Africa think that there is a gap between the ideal of Muslim brotherhood and the attitudes of rich Arab countries The criticism is not against the validity of the role of Islam in contemporary Africa, but the exploitation of its ties by statesmen.⁹⁵

Behind the scenes of the Afro-Arab summit, inter-Arab rivalry was intense. Sādāt, who had promoted the summit and was its host, could not himself offer any financial aid; but he served as the link between the African states and the wealthy and conservative Arab states of Kuwait, Qatar, the

Arab Solidarity," *Africa Report* (September-October 1975): 45-48; and A. Akinsanya, "The Afro-Arab Alliance: Dream or Reality," *African Affairs* 75 (1976): 511-529. The Arabs' position is presented in C. Ayari, "The Reality of Afro-Arab Solidarity," *Africa Report* (November-December 1975): 7-9; A. Bourgi, "Afrique noir — monde arabe: de la solidarité politique à la coopération institutionnelle," *Revue française d'études politiques africaines* (December 1976): 22-34.

94. A. Oded, "The First Afro-Arab Summit Conference: Its Background and Impact on the Relations between Africa and the Middle East," unpublished paper presented to a colloquium on *Africa and the Middle East*, African Studies Association of Israel, Jerusalem, May 31, 1977 (Hebrew).

95. L. Kaba "Islam's Advance in Tropical Africa," p. 41.

United Arab Emirates, and, above all, Saudi Arabia. Although the main objective was to cement ties between Arabs and Africans, the summit was also aimed at offsetting Libya's influence in Africa. Qadhāfī had objected to the summit and predicted its failure; hence the generous pledge by Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states to secure its success.

Oil revenues and Islam were used by both Saudi Arabia and Libya to advance their conflicting political orientations. The rivalry between these two Arab countries often rocked the boat of Islamic solidarity, but probably could not scuttle it. Saudi Arabia succeeded in maintaining its grip on the institutions of the conference and its affiliated bodies. But during the rhetoric rituals of the annual meetings, Qadhāfī had the upper hand.

As Libya became more closely identified with Soviet interests in the Middle East and Africa, tensions within the Islamic Conference increased. In recent years Saudi Arabia has been concerned with the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Africa (through Cuban intervention in Angola and Ethiopia) and in Southeast Asia (through Vietnam). The greater emphasis on the need to stop the Soviet advance has been reflected in the distribution of Saudi Arabia's foreign aid to the non-Arab countries in Africa and Asia. In 1975 all the recipients of Saudi aid, except Rwanda, were member-states of the Islamic Conference. But in 1976 the non-Muslim state of Zaire, then threatened by invasion from Angola, received more financial aid from Saudi Arabia than the Muslim states of Africa. Thailand, then facing pressure from Cambodia and Vietnam, was second only to Pakistan in the scale of Saudi aid in Asia. One may say, therefore, that anti-communism was given priority over Islamic solidarity in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia.⁹⁶

96. See Judith Perara, "Saudi Arabia and Iran as Regional Powers," *The Middle East* (Beirut) 43, May 1978.

CONCLUSIONS

The Islamic revolution in Iran was a dramatic manifestation of the growing importance of the role of Islam in politics. This process had already been detected by more experienced observers.⁹⁷ In the Arab world Qadhāfi had brought Islam to the center of the political arena. Egypt experienced Islamic activism, some of it clandestine. In Syria religious agitation now threatens the stability of the regime. In Asia, the Muslim leadership of Indonesia helped bring down Sukarno and his communist allies. In Malaysia and Turkey Islamic-oriented parties achieved electoral gains (though in Turkey this was followed by a setback), joined coalition governments and increased their political influence. In Pakistan the military regime of General Ziaul Haqq seeks to enforce Islamic values and norms. In Afghanistan opposition to the pro-Soviet regime is led by religious leaders. In Africa south of the Sahara, signs of Islamic political activism are not as obvious as in Asia or in the Arab world; but there too a general trend toward the politicization of Islam is evident. In the 1970s, more than in the first decade of African independence, some political leaders emphasize their Islamic identity, and Muslim religious leaders have become involved in politics.

The growing weight of Islam in politics reflects popular sentiments among Muslims who desire to see the reinvigoration of Islam as a potent political factor. In the 1950s and 1960s, governments were criticized for pursuing foreign policies inimical to Islamic solidarity. In the 1950s Sukarno's friendship with India at the expense of Pakistan was denounced by Muslim leaders in Indonesia.⁹⁸ Public opinion in Pakistan militated against the government's betrayal of Egypt during the Suez crisis. In Iran religious leaders consistently agitated against the Shah's relations with Israel and pressed for greater solidarity with the Arabs. The achievement of a measure of Islamic solidarity within the Islamic Conference has therefore met with general popular approval.

97. B. Lewis, "The Return of Islam," *Commentary*, January 1976, pp. 39-49.

98. C.P. Woodcroft-Lee, "From Morocco to Merauke: Some Observations on the Shifting Pattern of Relationships between Indonesian Muslims and the World Islamic Community as Revealed in the Writings of Muslim Intellectuals in Indonesia," paper presented to the *International Conference on Islam in Asia*, Jerusalem, April 1977. Woodcroft-Lee suggests that the same Muslim leadership has recently demanded Indonesian support of the Muslim rebels in the Philippines, whereas the official policy of Indonesia is the containment of the rebellion.

More than twenty years ago W. C. Smith said about pan-Islam :

Pan Islam is, and always has been, primarily a sentiment of cohesion. It was not cohesion itself, or any institutional or practical expression of it. The unity of the Muslim world is a unity of sentiment. Attempts to activate it into concrete form, to express the unity on political and other levels, have in modern as in earlier history broken on the rocks of restive actuality.⁹⁹

Islamic solidarity, rather than Islamic unity, was given a better chance in the 1970s. The adherence of forty states to the Islamic Conference, which has achieved a remarkable measure of permanence and continuity, with the vast financial resources of some of its members, enhanced the role of Islam in international politics. But Islamic solidarity has its limitations, which in fact have already been pointed out by W. C. Smith: sentiments of solidarity are often disregarded when they are in conflict with economic or political, regional or global, interests of sovereign states.

99. W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (New York, 1957), pp. 68-69.

APPENDIX

A DECADE OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCES

September 1969 — First Islamic Summit — Rabat
March 1970 — First Islamic Conference — Jedda
December 1970 — Second Islamic Conference — Karachi
February–March 1972 — Third Islamic Conference — Jedda
March 1973 — Fourth Islamic Conference — Benghazi
February 1974 — Second Islamic Summit — Lahore
June 1974 — Fifth Islamic Conference — Kuala Lumpur
June 1975 — Sixth Islamic Conference — Jedda
May 1976 — Seventh Islamic Conference — Istanbul
May 1977 — Eighth Islamic Conference — Tripoli
April 1978 — Ninth Islamic Conference — Dakar
May 1979 — Tenth Islamic Conference — Fez

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