



האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים

THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM

המכון ליחסים בינלאומיים ע"ש לאונרד דייוויס

The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations

**AFRICA AND ISRAEL**  
**AFRICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD RESUMPTION**  
**OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS**

by

**ARYE ODED**

Tel Aviv University

Policy Studies ★ 18

December 1986



**האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים**

**THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM**

**המכון ליחסים בינלאומיים ע"ש לאונרד דייוויס**

**The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations**

**AFRICA AND ISRAEL**  
**AFRICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD RESUMPTION**  
**OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS**

by

**ARYE ODED**

Tel Aviv University

Policy Studies ★ 18

December 1986

## Contents

Abstract

Introduction 1

African Arguments for Renewing Diplomatic Relations With Israel 2

Zaire's, Liberia's, and Côte d'Ivoire's Renewal of Relations With Israel 12

African Arguments Against Renewal of Ties 19

Reactions to Zaire's Initiative 22

Reactions to Liberia's and Côte d'Ivoire's Moves 23

Conclusions 25

Notes 26

## ABSTRACT

Arguments calling for the resumption of ties with Israel were already heard in Africa in 1974, a short time after most African countries had severed their diplomatic relations with Israel. These arguments were voiced mainly in moderate, pro-Western African countries with Christian majorities, but also in the press of other African countries. These calls were frequently connected with African disappointment at Arab aid and the wish to press Arab countries to increase their financial assistance.

The main argument of those advocating the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel is the "Egyptian argument." It is claimed that with Egypt's decision to conclude a peace agreement with Israel, the OAU resolution of 1973 calling on members to sever relations with Israel no longer makes sense. That resolution, after all, was passed to support Egypt in its struggle against Israel and as a gesture of African solidarity with her.

The main arguments of Israel's detractors are: (a) As long as the Palestinian problem is not solved, Africa should not resume diplomatic relations with Israel. This argument demonstrates Arab success in turning the Palestinian issue into an "African issue." (b) Israel's relations with South Africa, especially in the military field, are a bar to renewed diplomatic ties.

In Nigeria, the issue of relations with Israel was also raised for internal political reasons during election campaigns, and in the disputes between Muslims and Christians.

The reactions of African countries to Zaire's, Liberia's, and Côte d'Ivoire's (Ivory Coast) renewal of relations with Israel were, on the whole, moderate and had no influence on these three countries' relations with other African countries.

At this stage, it seems that the arguments against resumption of relations with Israel are still the stronger ones in most African countries. The prevailing opinion is against renewal of ties with Israel as long as no significant progress is made in solving the Palestinian problem.

## INTRODUCTION

With Côte d'Ivoire's renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel on 12 February 1986, following those of Zaire (14 May 1983) and Liberia (13 August 1983), the question was again raised as to whether other African states should resume diplomatic ties with the Jewish state. Predictions made in the Israeli and international media that more African countries were on the verge of renewing ties with Israel brought reactions in the African media and rekindled the debate on this subject.

This controversy has been aired for some time. It started, in fact, immediately after Africa's severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973, and has come up from time to time in connection with different episodes in Afro-Arab or Afro-Israeli relations.

For example, at the OAU Mogadishu conference in June 1974 when African delegates angrily expressed their disappointment with Arab aid, articles simultaneously appeared in the African press calling for the renewal of ties with Israel.<sup>1</sup> Similar calls were made on the eve of the first Afro-Arab summit in Cairo in March 1977, and when Egypt and Israel signed their peace agreement in 1979. News reports on meetings between African and Israeli leaders also raised expectations and prompted arguments for the renewal of relations. This happened, for example, when Yitzhak Rabin, then the Israeli prime minister, met with Côte d'Ivoire president Houphouët-Boigny in November 1976 and again in February 1977, and when ten years later, in January 1986, Prime Minister Shimon Peres met with Houphouët-Boigny. In Nigeria, internal developments stimulated the debate. Thus, during the 1983 presidential campaign, the question of resumption of ties with Israel was one of the issues raised by the contending parties. Again, when Nigeria joined the Organization of Islamic Congress in January 1986, the question of Nigeria's relations with Israel came up in the ensuing controversy between Muslims and Christians.<sup>2</sup>

The earliest appeals for resumption of relations with Israel were, of course, made in the more moderate African countries. In countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire, where the press is relatively free and can reflect, to some extent, opposing views, the topic of renewal of ties with Israel has occupied a prominent place in editorials, readers' letters, and official announcements.

In this prolonged debate among Africans, certain arguments were repeatedly used by Israel's supporters and her detractors. The aim of this article is to describe some of the principal arguments used by both sides during the last decade, illustrating them with characteristic quotations from official announcements and from the mass media.

## AFRICAN ARGUMENTS FOR RENEWING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

### *Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement*

The principal and most widely used argument is that, since Afro-Israeli relations were severed out of solidarity with Egypt, a leading member of the OAU whose territory was occupied by Israel, there is no reason—now that Egypt itself has renewed relations with Israel—why African countries should continue boycotting Israel.

This argument was raised by the Liberian foreign minister, Gabriel M. Matthews, in his address to the UN General Assembly on 27 September 1980 in which he supported the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. He asserted,

My government believes that the time has come for all states that have severed diplomatic links with Israel to begin a re-examination of their policy with a view to the establishment of some links, however limited, that would facilitate communication. For us that re-examination seems all the more appropriate since our sister African state, Egypt, in whose support our diplomatic ties with Israel were severed, has now established formal ties with that country.<sup>3</sup>

Nigerian foreign minister Ishaya Audu, in an interview with the *Sunday Times* of Lagos, remarked that, in light of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, Nigeria should also reconsider its stand toward Israel.<sup>4</sup> A similar statement was issued to the press by the governor of Ondo State, Chief Michael Ajasin of the ruling NPN Party, who said, "Egypt and Israel have settled their differences, why should Nigeria not re-open relations with Israel?"<sup>5</sup>

Nigerian opposition leaders and the press were even more vocal. In May 1982, E. C. Ebo moved a draft motion in the National Assembly, on behalf of 106 members, entitled "On the Renewal of Diplomatic Relations with Israel by Nigeria and Other African States." In its second paragraph the motion stated:

Cognizant of the fact that Israel and Egypt, the principal belligerents, have already established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial levels; and that the two Heads of State exchanged visits; and that some African States, in sympathy with Egypt, severed normal relations with Israel in 1973, but have not, unfortunately, relaxed their decision; that delay lacks merit, that policy is now baseless, and overtaken by events. . . . Be it hereby resolved that this House directs that Nigeria should, with immediate effect, reestablish, renew and seek normal diplomatic, consular, trade and cultural relations as well as technical cooperation with Israel at ambassadorial levels.<sup>6</sup>

During Nigeria's 1983 presidential election campaign, the issue of relations with Israel was raised by all three contenders. Obafemi Awolowo of the United Party of Nigeria (UPN) and Nnamdi Azikwe of the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) declared that they would consider reestablishing relations with Israel if elected, while the incumbent president, Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), opposed the idea. Favorable attitudes toward Israel were also expressed in Nigeria's semiofficial newspapers, although less frequently. The *Daily Times* asserted: "Anwar Sadat of Egypt made an equally moral sacrifice by giving up on war and hostility and by entering into a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, our agreement upon the survival of the State of Israel could be expressed most profitably and morally by reopening diplomatic relations with Israel."<sup>7</sup> In the opposition newspapers this argument was raised repeatedly. The *Nigerian Sunday Observer*, in an article entitled "Time to Think," stated:

In 1973 Africa, especially Black Africa, broke with Israel because of Israel's occupation of African soil and because of the Israeli war with Egypt. Both reasons have now been neutralized. The exchange of ambassadors is the final act of Egyptian recognition of Israel. If this is the case, Africa's arguments for maintaining hostilities with Israel have [collapsed].<sup>8</sup>

According to another opposition daily, *The Punch*, about 70 percent of Nigerians polled favored renewing diplomatic relations with Israel, and many explained that since Egypt and Israel had resolved to normalize relations, Nigeria should follow suit.<sup>9</sup>

The issue of normalizing relations with Israel was also intensively discussed in Ghana. Ghana's press, both governmental and opposition, hotly debated the issue. For example, the state-owned *Ghanaian Times* urged the government to renew diplomatic relations with Israel: "Egypt, the nation which led the Arabs to get the OAU to break relations with Israel, signed a treaty with Israel. . . . In that case the rationale for the continuous hostility towards Israel is no longer there." The writer further warned that "we shall appear extremely ridiculous in the eyes of right-thinking people if Africans should continue their blind opposition to Israel when the man [Sadat] Africa appears to be supporting made peace with his enemy."<sup>10</sup> The Ghanaian weekly *Palaver*, in an editorial entitled "Resume Diplomatic Relations with Israel," argued that "with the Camp David Agreement coming into force, the OAU decision with regard to diplomatic relations with Israel no longer makes sense. This is because Egypt, which spearheaded the war against Israel, has not only restored relations with Israel but has also opened her doors to the Jewish State in pursuit of peace in that turbulent part of the world." The editorial concluded: "If the century-old African adage that 'our friend's enemy is also our enemy' is true in the case of Egypt and Israel, then by the same token, Israel, which has become Egypt's friend under the Camp David accords, should also be our friend."<sup>11</sup>

In Kenya, this theme was raised by members of Parliament. Chief Whip J. D. Kali said in Parliament in July 1979 that Kenya should renew diplomatic relations with Israel "because African nations broke their relations with that country only because of Egypt."<sup>12</sup>

While the Monrovia OAU summit in 1979 was discussing the Middle East issue, Liberia's only Sunday newspaper, the *Sunday Express*, called on African countries to resume relations with Israel without further delay: "With rapprochement now a political fact of life between Egypt and Israel, member countries of the OAU no longer feel bound to maintain a diplomatic break with a country which can offer so much in the transfer of technology to them."<sup>13</sup> Indeed, when Zaire and Liberia eventually renewed



diplomatic relations with Israel the "Egyptian argument" topped the list of reasons given to justify their move.<sup>14</sup>

### *Disappointment with Arab aid in the oil crisis*

Another argument used by those supporting the resumption of relations with Israel stems from Africa's disappointment with Arab aid. The Arabs, it is maintained, have not fairly repaid the Africans for their full support for the Arab side during the 1973 Middle East war. This argument was already heard in 1974, a short time after the severance of relations, especially in Kenya and East African states but also in West Africa. In Kenya, which imported most of its oil product requirements from Arab countries and was greatly affected by the high oil prices, sharp criticism of the Arabs was voiced in the mass media and in Parliament immediately after the June 1974 OAU conference in Mogadishu, which dealt mainly with the oil crisis. Martin Shikuku, assistant minister for home affairs, recalled that Kenya had together with the rest of Africa gone out of its way to support the Arabs in good faith. "But how much did we get from the Arabs?" he asked, noting that "the Africans forebore projects and aid given by Israel in support of the Arabs." Shikuku further asked: "Must we continue to sever diplomatic relations while the Arabs are reestablishing and opening diplomatic relations with European countries and the USA? African countries will remain the biggest fool."<sup>15</sup> Shikuku was supported by Minister for Local Government James Osogo and other MPs.<sup>16</sup>

The Kenyan press vigorously joined those who called for renewing diplomatic relations with Israel. An editorial in the *Daily Nation* complained: "African nations were to experience a high rate of inflation caused by the oil embargo in the way of costly imported raw and finished materials, and yet the Arab nations did not either increase their volume of trade or aid to compensate Africans for the oil-price rise and inflation. Instead, most of the Arab aid has been going to Islamic nations."<sup>17</sup> And an editorial in the *Sunday Nation* explained the paper's support for resuming Kenya's diplomatic relations with Israel and objected to blindly following the Arabs, asking: "With such friends, who needs enemies?"<sup>18</sup> Numerous letters to the editor also appeared in the press advocating the resumption of relations with Israel.<sup>19</sup>

In Tanzania, which was much less sympathetic to Israel, there were not as many official expressions of support as in Kenya, but even so there was a vigorous debate in the press for and against resuming diplomatic relations.<sup>20</sup> In Ethiopia, the *Ethiopian Herald* wrote:

Ever since the total break of diplomatic relations between Israel and Africa a great deal of rethinking has been going on in many African States. Here in Ethiopia, although this issue did not get to be debated through the mass media, a significant portion of opinions advanced charges that we were fools. Others simply feel that was the greatest diplomatic error in Ethiopian history. . . . Ethiopia has always been a friend of the Arabs as well as of the Israelis. She must remain so.<sup>21</sup>

In West Africa there were similar expressions of friendship toward Israel, most of them nonofficial and many of them in letters to the editor, especially in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin.<sup>22</sup> *Afriscopes* published an article entitled "Anger Against the Arabs" claiming that African anger against the Arabs had reached a point "where not only Kenya but other African countries are repeatedly putting out feelers for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel."<sup>23</sup>

An interesting official comment was that of Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko in 1975. According to *Newsweek*, he complained to a visiting Arab economic mission that Africans received only "moral aid" and much higher oil prices from the Arabs. He would not be surprised, Mobutu told his Arab visitors, "if certain African nations resume diplomatic relations with Israel."<sup>24</sup> During a debate in the Zambian Parliament, several MPs called on the minister of rural development to get rid of "expatriate" civil servants and bring back the Israelis to boost agricultural production. "We want the Israelis back," said one of the MPs. "Ten of them did more for us than a thousand of the present advisors." Interestingly enough, this provided the main headline for the *Times of Zambia*, the country's national daily.<sup>25</sup>

### *Israel's aid needed*

An often-heard parallel argument is that, since Arab aid and technical assistance have been disappointingly low, Africans should not forgo Israel's useful and effective aid and know-how. Israel's assistance in the areas of agriculture, irrigation, and youth movements is often cited, areas in which the Arabs did not or could not help.

When an Israeli delegation arrived in Lagos in April 1982 to participate in the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting, numerous editorials, especially in the opposition press, called for the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel. Particularly emphasized was the importance of Israel's aid in agriculture, in which Nigeria's performance had greatly deteriorated in recent years, and on which the Nigerian government had decided to concentrate with a new "green revolution" program. The *Nigerian Tribune* commented: "We say that Nigeria should renew relations with Israel immediately to see how Green Revolution fertilizer does not mean bloated fertilizer contracts."<sup>26</sup> The *Satellite* said: "There is much to learn from the Israelis, who, out of sheer industry, hard work and determination to survive, amazed the world that not long after successfully establishing a nation-state, they have turned their barren homeland into a first-class agricultural and industrial country."<sup>27</sup> Similar opinions were expressed in the progovernment press. For example, the *Daily Times*, a semiofficial newspaper, stated: "Despite the break of diplomatic relations with Israel, she has played a great part in our agricultural and construction industries. We need the Israelis to help in the battle against desert encroachment. We need them in our hospitals. . . . We need them for quick development of our agriculture."<sup>28</sup>

In March 1982, members of the House of Assembly from Nigeria's Ogun State adopted a motion calling on the federal government to change its policy toward Israel and restore diplomatic relations. They pointed out that such a step would promote Nigeria's national interests in that the country would benefit tremendously from Israel's help, especially in the development of modern agriculture.<sup>29</sup>

In Ghana, one of the first African countries to receive Israeli technical aid, many assert that ties with Israel should be restored in order to renew technical cooperation. Ray Karaba-Quarshie, in an article in *The Echo* entitled "Don't Pawn Ghana's Freedom for

Arab Gold," wrote:

I am yet to be told how many projects the Arabs are undertaking in this country while on the other hand I can easily name some of the projects which Israel has been undertaking in this country: the Central Accra Sewerage system, poultry farms, technical aid in the field of training of agricultural police and Trade Union personnel and social workers, to name only a few. It is interesting to note that our breaking of relations with the State of Israel notwithstanding, Ghanaians continue to go to Israel for training in several fields.<sup>30</sup>

Another Ghanaian writer, J. W. K. Dumoga, said:

Ghana must reestablish relations with Israel . . . because of the technical aid Ghana was receiving from Israel, especially in agriculture before the break in 1973. Israeli agricultural extension officers can help Ghana in food production. Please do not forget that it was Israeli technical experts who helped in the establishment of the Workers/BUILDERS Brigade, the State Construction Corporation, the Black Star Line and several other national agencies.<sup>31</sup>

There were many similar articles in Ghana's press, and these arguments were also heard in other countries such as Zambia and Kenya.<sup>32</sup>

### *Making Israel more amenable to compromise*

Another reason advanced for renewing relations with Israel was that such a move would encourage a more favorable attitude toward compromise in Israel. This was neatly expressed in an article in the *Nigerian Daily Times*: "It will be a step towards getting Israel to feel secure enough to consent to Palestinian rights."<sup>33</sup> A Kenyan writer who also dealt with this theme added that the "strategem of isolation [of Israel] had the reverse effect and made Israel harder for the Arabs to bargain with."<sup>34</sup>

*Israeli-South African relations should not be an obstacle*

Those African leaders who object to the reestablishment of African-Israeli ties often stress Israeli collaboration with South Africa. The supporters of Israel, however, maintain that the Israeli-South African connection should not hamper the reinstitution of African-Israeli relations. In Nigeria, the *Sunday Observer* wrote:

To claim that Israel deals with South Africa is only a belated attempt at fault-finding. First, we have to remember that this reason was not the original one given for breaking relations with Israel. It was more of an afterthought. Secondly, was it not the African cut-off of relations with Israel that drove the latter to apartheid South Africa? And, in any case, when was it decreed that African states should have no relations with states that fraternize with South Africa? Do the United States, Britain, West Germany, China, the whole of Western and Eastern Europe and South America not fraternize with South Africa? Do we not have relations with these countries and those regions of the world? If foreign policy is based on the interests of states, then it is about time Africa normalize her relations with Israel.<sup>35</sup>

In Ghana, the semiofficial *Ghanaian Times* published an article by a reader who objected to an editorial of a few days earlier:

You wrote that Israel was South Africa's ally and that anyone seeking friendship with Tel-Aviv must be prepared to wine and dine with the apartheid monsters of Pretoria. Are you seriously suggesting that all the states that have diplomatic relations with South Africa and the State of Israel at the same time are wining and dining with the monsters of Pretoria? If that is so then they are indeed in good company. These states include the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Canada, to mention just a handful. Don't you know that diplomatic relations are established with states not necessarily because they are friends, but essentially to protect the national interests of the parties concerned?<sup>36</sup>

In Kenya, the *Daily Nation* elaborated:

When [the Arabs] condemn South Africa, they are merely playing with our feelings while having business contacts with her. Iraq sells oil to South Africa, Egypt until 1976 was sending teachers there, South Africa used to offer package tours to Egypt, and Saudi Arabia buys gold and diamonds from South Africa. Israel is condemned for her overt business dealings with South Africa, which amount to less than one percent of South Africa's foreign trade, while covert Arab business deals are colossal compared to Israel's.<sup>37</sup>

Israel's defenders also claim that it has done no harm to any African interests. Kenya's assistant minister for tourism and wildlife advocated in parliament the establishment of relations with Israel, adding that Africa should not harm Israel by the continuation of the diplomatic boycott.<sup>38</sup>

### *Direct contact with Israel will promote peace in the Middle East*

It is also argued that if Africa wishes to play an active role in bringing peace to the Middle East, it must remain neutral in its relations with the two sides of the conflict. Liberia's head of state, Samuel Doe, emphasized this point several months before he restored Liberia's diplomatic relations with Israel. In a speech in June 1983, Doe disclosed that Liberia would give due consideration to the establishment of ties with Israel and that he was seeking the consent of the People's Redemption Council to open talks with Israel to "determine the role Liberia can play in helping to establish a genuine peace in the Middle East." Doe said that while he remained committed to the Arab cause, he had noticed that in the few years since Liberia and other countries had severed relations with Israel, in accordance with the decision of the OAU, progress toward the achievement of peace in the Middle East had not been satisfactory: "This is because we avoided direct talks with Israel."<sup>39</sup> The same opinion was expressed in Nigeria's *Sunday Observer*:

Africa should look upon her role in the Middle East as that of a searcher for peace. Maintaining no relations with Israel has given Africa no leverage with Israel and so she has not been in any position to play a positive role in the search for a Middle East peace. Ironically too, neither has she been able to exercise any influence with the Arabs either, since the latter look upon her as a very malleable and expendable ally.<sup>40</sup>

*The issue of diplomatic relations should be decided  
by the states concerned*

Another argument frequently used by Israel's supporters in Africa was expressed by R. Karaba-Quarshie in the state-owned *Ghanaian Times*: "The establishment or otherwise of diplomatic relations between states is primarily a matter within the jurisdiction of sovereign states and has nothing to do with dictation from outside bodies. The OAU therefore has no business forcing its member-states to maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations with any state."<sup>41</sup> And indeed the presidents of Zambia, Benin, and Burkina-Faso, on the occasion of Zaire's resumption of diplomatic ties with Israel, emphasized that every state is free to decide on its internal or external policies. Liberian journalist Alex Barning, in a long analytical article entitled "The Organization of African Unity and Israel," also stressed this point: "In the best interest of our people, individual countries should not hesitate in asking for restoration of ties with Israel. We would not look up to the OAU for a decision because it is bogged down by African politics, which has blocked the economic advancement of the continent."<sup>42</sup>

During his visit to Saudi Arabia in July 1985, Gambian president Daudi Jawara was asked in an interview with the Saudi newspaper *Ukaz* to comment on Zaire's and Liberia's renewal of ties with Israel. He replied that the issue of diplomatic relations is within the sovereignty of each country and that the OAU has no right to intervene in this area.<sup>43</sup>

### *Moral contradictions*

William R. Ocheng of the University of Nairobi adduced political and moral arguments for the resumption of relations with Israel. In an article entitled "What's Africa's Business with Middle East War?" he argued: "How is it that we Black Africans always only identify injustices when they are committed outside our continent? Why should Black African States sever diplomatic ties with Israel because she is killing 'brother Arabs' and yet keep deep diplomatic links with some independent Black African States where hundreds of thousands of Africans are still being butchered in cold blood and made homeless." Moreover, he claimed, when Africans sever diplomatic ties with one side in a conflict they lose possible influence over them, and thus do not contribute toward a solution. He concluded: "Black African States should begin to re-examine their stand in the Middle East in the light of the moral contradictions of their policies."<sup>44</sup>

Another point made was that, by severing relations, the Africans had taken a more extreme step than the Arabs themselves were prepared to take against their adversaries. One writer noted that because of economic interests the Arabs had resumed relations with Western countries including the United States, (after severing them in 1967) and asked: "Are we not in fact being more Arab than the Arabs themselves?"<sup>45</sup>

### ZAIRE'S, LIBERIA'S, AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE'S RENEWAL OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

Some of these arguments were cited by Zaire, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire when they renewed diplomatic relations.

Zaire cited Israel's withdrawal from Sinai as the main reason for resuming ties. President Mobutu explained that when Zaire announced at the United Nations on 4 October 1973 that it was breaking relations with Israel,



this sovereign decision was occasioned by the fact that the African lands of Egypt had been occupied by the Jewish state. It was a reaction against this occupation by Israel of the African lands of Egypt which slighted African dignity and the rights of the African peoples on their own soil. After 25 April 1982, Zaire, following the same logic, declared that the reasons that had prompted it to break with Israel no longer applied, since the Jewish occupation had come to an end and the African territories of Egypt had been restored. It must also be pointed out that in Zaire's historic stand in 1973 there was never a question of Arab lands as such, but rather of the African lands of Egypt, although Egypt is an Arab state. This point must be clearly stated.<sup>46</sup>

It is clear that Zaire also acted for other reasons. One of these was Mobutu's basically sympathetic attitude toward Israel; the decision to renew ties was in fact made by him personally. Mobutu had always admired Israel's prowess, its military ability and its know-how in various spheres of economic development. He had himself visited Israel and undergone parachute training there. His decision no doubt required a great amount of personal courage and determination, considering that quite a few African leaders avoid ties with Israel out of fear for their own safety especially after President Sadat's assassination. There were also economic reasons: Mobutu wanted to recruit the Jewish and Israeli lobby in the US Congress to help him obtain more aid to alleviate Zaire's deep financial troubles. He believed that Israel could help in improving his image and standing in Washington. And, indeed, Israeli prime minister Begin promised Mobutu to build up Zaire's image in America.<sup>47</sup> When Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Zaire in December 1982, he said that Israel would make special efforts to recruit American Jewish investments for Zaire.<sup>48</sup>

Also, it seems that Mobutu was disappointed with Arab aid. Although from 1974 to 1981 Arab aid commitments to Zaire came to \$411.4 million,<sup>49</sup> net disbursement was only \$150 million and of this only \$53.6 million was in soft loans; the rest was in standard loans at market interest rates. The gap between Arab promises and deeds was wide. Moreover, actual Arab disbursement was not significant considering that Zaire's foreign debt came to \$5 billion and the deficit in the balance of payments in 1981 came to \$700 million. At the same time, Arab donors pressed Zaire to start repaying the

loans. In comparison, in 1981 alone development assistance from the West was \$273 million; of this, \$220 million was in grants.<sup>50</sup>

Mobutu, who greatly appreciated Israel's military acumen, also needed Israeli assistance to bolster his regime and wanted Israel to send military experts and advisors to Zaire. Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon's 1981 visit to Zaire strengthened Mobutu's expectations. Indeed, military cooperation between the two countries became an important element in the framework of Israeli technical aid to Zaire. During Sharon's visit to Zaire in January 1983 a number of military accords were signed, and upon returning to Israel Sharon disclosed that he had agreed to help Zaire reconstruct and enlarge its army on the basis of a five-year strategic plan drawn up at Mobutu's request. He added that Israel would help Zaire develop an antiterror unit, train its naval unit, and sell Zaire weapons and communications equipment.<sup>51</sup> In February 1982, Zaire's defense secretary had visited Israel and signed an accord detailing Israeli aid programs, such as the training of Zaire's Kamanyola division for the mineral-rich Shaba province. Israel also undertook to train a special presidential brigade.<sup>52</sup> During his visit to Washington in August 1983, President Mobutu confirmed that Zaire was receiving agricultural, technological, and military training and advice from Israel.<sup>53</sup>

To the above factors should be added the generally pro-Western and anti-Communist attitudes of Mobutu and the fact that the Muslim community in Zaire is small, coming to less than five percent of the total population.

Since the renewal of relations, Israel's activity in Zaire has increased significantly. Israeli officers have trained and expanded the presidential brigade and the Kamanyola division, and Israeli experts have established a center for agricultural training. Israel also undertook to participate in setting up a medical center and granted thirty scholarships to Zaireans to be trained in agriculture, irrigation, and other civil subjects. In January 1984 Israeli president Chaim Herzog paid an official visit to Zaire, heading a delegation that included representatives of Israeli companies and investors.<sup>54</sup>

On a five-day visit to Israel in May 1985, President Mobutu signed agreements expanding economic and technical cooperation while Israel agreed to guarantee Israeli investments in Zaire.<sup>55</sup> Israel also agreed to provide easy credit terms to Zaire for the purchase of Israeli equipment. In an interview President Mobutu hinted that Zaire, by

resuming relations with Israel, had lost some Arab aid; but he added: "I do not aim at interests in my policies. It is the honouring of a word given that counts. Zaire had undertaken to renew relations with Israel as soon as that state restored to Egypt that portion of territory it occupied during the 1967 war. This precondition having been fulfilled, Zaire honoured its promise."<sup>56</sup>

At the same time Zaire's press expressed expectations that Israeli and Jewish businessmen would participate in Zaire's efforts to improve its economy.<sup>57</sup> And, indeed, in January 1985 Leon Tamman, a leading Jewish entrepreneur, visited Zaire and it was disclosed that he had signed an agreement to invest \$400 million in various development projects there.<sup>58</sup>

Israel made special efforts in Zaire in the hope that, if the planned projects were implemented and other Israeli and Jewish investors would also agree to contribute to Zaire's economic development, this might encourage other African countries to follow Zaire's example.

A second Israeli breakthrough in Africa occurred on 13 August 1983 when the Liberian government announced its decision to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, Liberian head of state Samuel Doe became the first African president since 1973 to pay an official visit to Israel when he arrived for four days on 22 August 1983.

Like Zaire, Liberia emphasized in its official statement the Egyptian argument, saying that the main reason for severing ties with Israel in 1973 was the wish to show solidarity with Egypt over the occupation of its territory by Israel. "This reason," the statement explained, "no longer exists, since Egyptian territory has been restored and Egypt has established diplomatic relations with Israel."<sup>59</sup> Another reason Doe cited both in Jerusalem and later on a state visit to Sierra Leone was that Israel's continued isolation by other countries would not help resolve the Middle East problem.<sup>60</sup>

A combination of factors led to Liberia's renewal of links with Israel. Liberia is traditionally a pro-Western country receiving its main assistance from the United States. The bloody coup led by Doe in April 1980, however, in which President William Tolbert and a score of ministers were executed, caused apprehension and distress in America. Like Mobutu, Doe thought that America's goodwill could be strengthened through gaining the sympathy of the influential American Jewish community by rapprochement with Israel.

Indeed, during Doe's visit to Israel Foreign Minister Shamir was asked by journalists if Israel would lobby for Liberian interests in the United States and he replied, "Liberia knows Israel has good contacts in the U.S. and thinks perhaps rightly that those contacts will help Liberia."<sup>61</sup> Doe also believed that he could recruit financial and economic assistance from the American Jewish community. While in Israel, Doe met the American mission of the United Jewish Appeal and invited them "to come and join with us and participate fully in this historic period of transition."<sup>62</sup>

American influence in Liberia also probably helped motivate Doe's action. Washington hurried to welcome Liberia's decision to resume diplomatic relations with Israel while stressing that the African country had chosen this course on its own.<sup>63</sup>

President Doe was also interested in the technical assistance he could obtain from Israel, and here he was influenced by his veteran minister of foreign affairs, Earnest Eastman, who admired Israeli ability. On his return to Monrovia from Israel, Doe delivered a speech to the nation in which he summed up his agreements with Israel: "The two sides agreed on wide-ranging areas of cooperation. These included economic development, defense, national security, road construction, housing, agriculture, communications, shipping, air transport, marketing, manpower development and banking." He added that the joint communiqué issued on the last day of his visit "contained a firm commitment by the Israeli government to assist Liberia in the above-mentioned areas of cooperation."<sup>64</sup> Israel's press reported that Israel had promised to establish an agricultural company, AGRIMECO, which would be responsible for developing agriculture in Liberia and would recruit experts for evaluation of agricultural projects. The Israeli government also promised to encourage major Israeli construction companies to help Liberia procure both international financing and equipment for road and other construction projects. A major Israeli shipping company was to send a team to Monrovia with a view to setting up a Liberian shipping line.<sup>65</sup> Foreign Minister Eastman, in an interview on Israel Television, stated that Israeli medical experts were to visit Monrovia to reopen an eye clinic that was set up by Israeli doctors in the 1960s and later stopped functioning after they had left.<sup>66</sup>

It should also be noted that Arab aid to Liberia was small, especially when compared with US aid. From 1975 to 1982 BADEA's (in English ABEDA, African Bank for Economic Development of Africa) commitments to Liberia came to \$10.7 million, and all Arab multilateral and bilateral aid commitments totaled \$50.1 million. From 1974 to 1981 Liberia actually received \$13.6 million in repayable loans. But this amount is insignificant when compared with Liberia's foreign debt, which, according to its minister of finance, came to \$1.2 billion in 1984 with interest of \$4 million due each month. Arab aid was small also in comparison to the Western world's assistance. In 1981 Liberia received \$82 million in assistance from the world's developed countries, \$53 million of which was in grants.<sup>67</sup> US aid to Liberia in 1982 was \$46 million, in 1983 \$71.2 million, in 1984 it was set at \$77 million; and for 1985 \$91.7 million was requested.<sup>68</sup>

Another factor was Liberia's fears of Libya's Colonel Qadhafi and Doe's wish to utilize Israeli intelligence ability to deal with Libyan subversion. This factor was emphasized by the Israeli and Western media.<sup>69</sup> The *Daily Telegraph*, quoting Israeli Foreign Ministry officials, wrote, "Doe has a feeling that he is a target of Libya's since he ousted the friends of Libya and the friends of the Eastern bloc from his government."<sup>70</sup> Doe himself, at a state dinner in Jerusalem, expressed his attitude toward Libya when he said that the latter's continued intervention in Chad "is viewed by Liberia with utmost regret and dismay."<sup>71</sup> In an interview in *Time*, Doe even claimed that Colonel Qadhafi had inspired an assassination attempt against him.<sup>72</sup> At a press conference in Israel, Earnest Eastman disclosed that "the life of the Head of State had been threatened over a year ago and there was ample evidence as to the source of that threat."<sup>73</sup>

Interestingly, Egypt, reacting to Liberia's restoration of links with Israel, blamed Libya as the main cause and warned that "Qadhafi's policies will only drive more African nations into Israel's arms."<sup>74</sup> In the joint communiqué published at the end of Doe's visit, both Israeli president Herzog and General Doe denounced "Libyan expansionism."<sup>75</sup> And according to Israeli sources, Israel agreed to assist Liberia also in setting up its intelligence apparatus and to give it access to intelligence material on Libyan activities in Africa.<sup>76</sup>

In contrast to Zaire, Liberia did not ask for military assistance. Both Doe and his foreign minister denied signing a military accord with Israel and laid special stress on technical cooperation in the civilian sphere.<sup>77</sup>

The fact that the Muslim community in Liberia is small—about 10 percent of the total population—is not united and has no political influence, also made it easier for Liberia to resume diplomatic relations with Israel.

To sum up, in both Zaire and Liberia there was a combination of factors that led each of them to renew relations with Israel. There were also some common factors, among them: both rulers were military men with the ability to take decisive action; both were able to ignore the attitudes of those who opposed their decision; both regimes were pro-Western and believed they could benefit from Israeli know-how, especially security assistance, and from the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States; both were disappointed with Arab aid; both resented Qadhafi's militant policies, especially his involvement in Chad; and in both countries the Muslim population was small and uninfluential.

As for Côte d'Ivoire, the main reason for its resumption of relations with Israel was no doubt President Houphouët-Boigny's friendship toward the Jewish state, which did not cease even after Côte d'Ivoire broke its diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973 in accordance with the OAU resolution. This friendship was manifested by the continuation of a formal Israeli presence in Abidjan consisting of an Israeli interest office run by an Israeli diplomat who, in fact, acted as an ambassador. Also, Israeli companies continued to work on a large scale in Côte d'Ivoire in the fields of construction and agriculture, and dozens of Israeli experts carried out a wide range of projects.

The dialogue between President Houphouët-Boigny and Israeli leaders never stopped, and from time to time meetings were held usually in Europe. It was often assumed that Côte d'Ivoire would be the first African country to renew diplomatic ties with Israel. Arab aid to Côte d'Ivoire was negligible, mainly because of the country's cooperation with Israel, and especially when compared with Western aid. As in the cases of Zaire and Liberia, the Muslim community in Côte d'Ivoire was small (10–20 percent of the population) and had no political influence. Finally, Israel's resumption of relations with Zaire and Liberia no doubt encouraged Houphouët-Boigny to cease postponing his decision on this matter. Côte d'Ivoire eventually announced its renewal of

relations with Israel on 12 February 1986, in spite of heavy Arab pressure on Houphouët-Boigny not to do so.

## AFRICAN ARGUMENTS AGAINST RENEWAL OF TIES

### *Israel's withdrawal from Egypt was not enough*

Against the arguments advanced by Israel's supporters calling for the reestablishment of ties, others justify the continued rupture.<sup>78</sup> These critics most commonly claim that since Israel's conquest of Egyptian territory in the 1973 war was one of the major causes of the break in relations, and since in the meantime Israel has done other things that go against OAU principles such as expanding her links with South Africa and her attitude to the Palestinians, Israel's withdrawal from Egyptian territory was not enough to justify the lifting of the ban.<sup>79</sup> This argument was used by the Egyptians themselves to justify their opposition to African-Israeli ties.

### *Israel's relations with South Africa*

This is one of the most-cited arguments. It is claimed that since 1973 Israel has strengthened ties with South Africa in the political, economic, and military spheres. Their cooperation in developing nuclear weapons, as alleged by the Arabs, was considered especially serious. The military cooperation, it was emphasized, not only encouraged South Africa to continue its apartheid policy but also endangered the security of African countries. According to Professor A. B. Akinyemi, director-general of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, "thanks to Israel, the strategic and security imbalances between Nigeria and South Africa have been adversely and negatively widened to the detriment of Nigeria and Africa as a whole."<sup>80</sup> This argument, fully exploited by the Arabs, was mentioned by nearly all of Israel's detractors but especially by Nigeria, which regarded the struggle against South Africa as one of the main planks of its foreign policy. For example, when Nigerian president Shagari explained his objections to

resuming ties with Israel, he stressed that Israel's close links with South Africa frustrated all prospects of coming to an agreement with it.<sup>81</sup> Shagari and others claimed that, unlike Israel, the Arabs rejected diplomatic relations with South Africa and helped to enforce the diplomatic boycott against that country, and that this "sacrifice" was made solely in order to show solidarity with Africa. Thus, this argument ran, Africa should also show solidarity with the Arab countries.<sup>82</sup>

In an editorial explaining why Nigeria should not resume diplomatic relations with Israel, *West Africa* commented: "The most intractable problem facing Africa, apart from poverty, is how to end colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa. In facing this problem, there is clearly greater advantage in allying with the Arabs for whom it is also an issue, than with Israel."<sup>83</sup>

### *The matter should be decided by the OAU*

Another often-heard argument is that since the decision to cut relations with Israel was passed by the OAU, any change in this stance must be taken collectively by that organization. Otherwise, it is claimed, the power and prestige of the OAU would be severely damaged.<sup>84</sup> The notion that the OAU was the proper forum to decide about relations with Israel was also supported by Kenyan president Moi when he chaired the OAU, even though his country was considered friendly toward Israel and maintained economic and technical cooperation projects with it.<sup>85</sup>

### *The Palestinian issue*

Some Africans also argue that as long as the Palestinian problem is not solved, it is necessary to maintain the boycott against Israel. This argument is cited by some African countries considered moderate, such as Kenya,<sup>86</sup> which have called on Israel to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. President Senghor of Senegal, who was active in trying to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, frequently declared that as long as Israel would not withdraw from the occupied territories he would not resume



relations with it. Many Africans emphasize the need to show solidarity with the Palestinians as "front-line fighters against a neo-colonialist outpost."<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, it is claimed that the crux of the Middle East conflict is the Palestinian problem and, therefore, as long as it is not solved the tension in the area will continue. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, for example, while visiting Sudan in 1985, conditioned the renewal of relations with Israel on the solution of the Palestinian question.<sup>88</sup> And Kenya's *Weekly Review* editorialized that the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai was not enough: "The very Camp David accords which won back the Sinai for Egypt logically call for Israel to address herself to the next stage of the peace negotiations that involves direct participation by the Palestinians in determining their own future. Without the Palestinians, peace in the Middle East will remain elusive."<sup>89</sup>

### *The Muslim factor*

In African countries where Muslims constitute an important segment of the population, it was also argued that there was a need to show solidarity with the Muslim world. Nigerian president Shagari, during the election campaign of 1983, criticized his rival for demanding renewal of relations with Israel when such a step would alienate Saudi Arabia, the "spiritual home" of Nigeria's Muslims.<sup>90</sup>

### *Arab aid*

All of the above arguments have been stated publicly, but some of the real causes deterring Africans from resuming relations with Israel were, for obvious reasons, not publicly mentioned. The fear of Arab reprisals, such as the stopping of financial aid or even possible subversive activities against their regimes, also worked to deter Africans from reestablishing ties with Israel. Commenting on Arab aid, *West Africa* editorialized: "Even on the matter of poverty the Arabs clearly have a greater capacity to help, if not Nigeria, then poorer African countries."<sup>91</sup> It also seems that some African countries, such as Kenya, adopt an attitude of realpolitik: Why lose the benefits of Arab friendship

when they can get what they need from Israel without establishing diplomatic relations?

## REACTIONS TO ZAIRE'S INITIATIVE

When Zaire reestablished diplomatic ties with Israel, most of the arguments mentioned above were raised by those who disapproved of the move. Most African countries stated that they had no intention of following Zaire's lead, indicating that the resumption of ties depended on solving the Palestinian problem. This was the reaction of Ghana, Gabon, Togo, the Central African Republic, Benin, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mali, Senegal, and Cameroon.

Interestingly, among the first to react publicly were those moderate countries that had accepted an Israeli diplomat as interest officer, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon, and Togo. The reason can probably be traced to press reports published in Israel and abroad and naming those countries as likely to resume relations with Israel. Côte d'Ivoire, for example, reacted at that time by refuting all speculations, announcing in May 1982 that "it has no intention of resuming its diplomatic ties with Israel."<sup>92</sup> Ghana emphasized that it would not renew its links with Israel because of Israel's connections with South Africa.<sup>93</sup> Gabon, whose president Omar Bongo had converted to Islam, stressed its loyalty to the Islamic Congress Organization's resolutions and its commitment to solidarity with the Islamic world.<sup>94</sup> These announcements probably strengthened the obligation these countries felt in sticking to Arab policies that objected to the renewal of relations with Israel. It seems that the negative reactions of moderate African states such as Côte d'Ivoire were also influenced by the fact that President Mobutu did not consult them before taking his decision, and that they did not wish to appear to be influenced by him.

A small group of African countries (including Chad, Comoro, Congo, and Mauritius) denounced Zaire's move. Others, such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania, did not react officially.

Some countries, while expressing reservations about Zaire's step, found it necessary to add that all decisions pertaining to the establishment or rupture of diplomatic relations were the sole responsibility of the country concerned, and that each sovereign

country was free to take its own decisions on its internal and external relations without outside interference. Thus President Kaunda of Zambia announced that while he did not intend to resume ties with Israel "as long as Arab lands were occupied and the Palestinians were deprived of their rights," he was of the opinion that each country was entitled to determine its own foreign relations. Therefore, Kaunda did not denounce Zaire, even though he made the above statement when he was on tour of the Gulf countries.<sup>95</sup> A similar stand was taken by Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Cameroon. Benin's government, for example, while expressing its full support for the PLO and its struggle for an independent state, stated that Benin would not intervene in other countries' affairs and in their sovereign decisions.<sup>96</sup> The same attitude was expressed by Gambian president Daudu Jawara during a visit to Saudi Arabia in July 1985.<sup>97</sup> It is clear that if more and more African states adopt this opinion, it is bound to weaken the 1973 OAU decision calling for the severing of ties with Israel.

## REACTIONS TO LIBERIA'S AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE'S MOVES

African reactions to Liberia's move were few in number and, in general, moderate in tone. Even those who expressed reservations did not condemn Liberia, but directed their criticism against Israel. It seems that Liberia's move did not provoke the same strong repercussions in Africa as had Zaire's, which came first.

In an interview on Israeli television (24 August 1983), Liberian foreign minister Eastman said, "We communicated with all our brothers, informing them that it was the time to disengage from nonreality, and we got no negative response." In fact, Liberia gave notice of its intention at the OAU's 19th summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1983 when Liberian head of state Samuel Doe called on African leaders to "adopt a new and more constructive attitude to Israel."<sup>98</sup> Liberia had already expressed similar views at the UN General Assembly, and its action was not altogether unexpected.

Senegal, which strongly denied any intention of resuming diplomatic relations with Israel, was one of the few to react to Doe's decision. It seems that Senegal found it necessary to react publicly because the French weekly *L'Express* had written that in the wake of Liberia's move, African representatives from Senegal, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire,

Gabon, and the Central African Republic would meet in September 1983 in Abidjan to discuss the possibility of resuming ties with Israel. Senegal denied the report, saying that it would not resume diplomatic relations with Israel as long as the Palestinian people were denied their rights to a state of their own.<sup>99</sup>

Zimbabwe's prime minister Robert Mugabe, at a press conference at the United Nations, expressed disappointment that Zaire and Liberia had recognized Israel: "It was regrettable. The Palestinian cause cannot be served by normalizing relations with Israel." Mugabe added that Zimbabwe would not follow suit.<sup>100</sup>

In Kenya, although the press did not denounce Liberia, the general opinion was that the time was not ripe for the resumption of relations with Israel as long as the OAU had not changed its resolution and as long as Israel maintained wide-ranging cooperation with South Africa. The *Daily Nation* expressed the general view when it wrote in an editorial:

Israel has not provided African nations with convincing reasons why they should renege on their obligation to the OAU. So far all it has offered is a promise of technical cooperation. While many African nations need it, it is not enough to offset the political and economic considerations involved in boycott. It may be true that Arab aid has been far short of African expectations, but it is much more than what Israel could possibly offer. . . . Israel has identified itself closely with South Africa, and is cooperating with it in raising its military capability. Renewing links without Israel cutting its links with the racist regime will be rewarding collusion with an enemy.<sup>101</sup>

Both African and Arab reactions to Liberia's move were on the whole less harsh than in the case of Zaire. It is also clear that the Arab aid factor was important in deterring other African countries from following in Zaire's and Liberia's footsteps.

Reactions to Côte d'Ivoire's resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel came mainly from the Arabs, and were generally moderate in tone. The secretary-general of the Arab League sent a protest note to President Houphouët-Boigny, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development announced that it would stop giving loans to Côte d'Ivoire. These loans, however, were small compared to loans given to other African countries.<sup>102</sup> Individual Arab states did not react publicly and those Arab countries that

had diplomatic missions in Abidjan-Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon-did not close them.

In contrast to the cases of Zaire and Liberia, there were almost no protests from black African countries.<sup>103</sup> It seems that their attitude was influenced by the prestige of Houphouët-Boigny, a veteran leader who is generally respected in Africa and regarded as experienced, careful, and judicious. Moreover, Houphouët-Boigny's action was not as surprising as that of the leaders of Zaire and Liberia. It had been expected for a long time that Côte d'Ivoire would renew relations with Israel, because of the close cooperation between the two countries that continued even after the formal break. Many observers had predicted that Côte d'Ivoire would be the first African country to renew ties with Israel, and that its president was just waiting for an opportune moment.

In general, African reaction to the resumption of ties with Israel grew milder as time went on, and more Africans felt that the issue of diplomatic relations should be decided by the individual sovereign country. Houphouët-Boigny's prestige made his step much more significant than those of Zaire and Liberia, and it is bound to have more impact particularly on the more moderate African states.<sup>104</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

The issue of relations with Israel receives considerable attention in Africa among decision makers, scholars, and journalists as well as at the OAU. African criticism of Israel is usually made on ideological and moral grounds, and emphasizes African solidarity with the Arabs and especially the Palestinians. But, in actual fact, Arab threats of a political and economic boycott of those African countries that resume ties with Israel have a significant influence on African attitudes toward the Middle East conflict.

Moreover, the Arab countries have succeeded, to a great extent, in inducing the OAU to make a political and ideological connection between the Palestinian and South African issues and between apartheid and racism on the one hand and Zionism on the other. Therefore, it seems that there is a fear within the OAU that resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel before significant progress is made in solving the Palestinian problem will influence Arab-Muslim support regarding the South African problem.

As we have seen, African reactions to the renewal of relations between African countries and Israel became more moderate as time went on. The view that the issue of diplomatic relations should be left to the sovereign decision of each country also gained support. Even the Arab states' reactions to Côte d'Ivoire's move in February 1986 were less harsh than their reactions to Zaire's actions four years earlier. It seems that this mellowing of the Arab attitude was a result of growing African resentment at the political strings attached to Arab aid. Indeed, lately the Arabs have been trying to influence their African allies more by persuasion than by threats. In the meantime, the main effect of the arguments raised by Israel's supporters has been to awaken the Arabs and spur them to increase their activities in Africa in order to check further Israeli advances on the continent.

## NOTES

1. *Daily Nation*, Kenya, 6 June 1974; *Daily News*, Tanzania, 17 July 1974.
2. *West Africa*, London, 3 March 1986, p. 443.
3. *UN General Assembly Papers A/35/PV13*, 27 September 1980.
4. *Sunday Times*, Nigeria, 27 January 1980.
5. *Daily Nation*, Nigeria, 21 February 1980.
6. The draft motion is quoted in full in *Nigerian Forum*, July-August 1982, pp. 740-745.
7. *Daily Times*, Nigeria, 20 September 1979.
8. *Sunday Observer*, Nigeria, 24 February 1980.
9. *The Punch*, Nigeria, 17 April 1980. For other dailies adopting this stand, see *Nigerian Chronicle*, 10 January 1980; *Sunday Observer*, Nigeria, 24 February 1980; *Nigerian Tribune*, 20 April 1980; *Satellite*, Nigeria, 20 April 1982.
10. *Ghanaian Times*, 26 January 1980.
11. *Palaver*, Ghana, 17 July 1979; *The Mirror*, Ghana, 6 July 1979; *The Echo*, Ghana, 20 April 1980, 22 June 1980.
12. *Daily Nation*, Kenya, 12 July 1979.

13. Quoted in the *New York Times*, 11 February 1980.
14. *Jerusalem Post*, 14 August 1983.
15. *Daily Nation*, Kenya, 19 June 1974.
16. *Ibid.*, 24 May 1974, 20 June 1974.
17. *Ibid.*, 9 February 1978; see also *The Standard*, Kenya, 10 March 1978.
18. *Sunday Nation*, Kenya, 16 June 1974.
19. See, e.g., *East African Standard*, Kenya, 1-2 July 1974, 9 July 1974.
20. *Daily News*, Tanzania, 27 June 1974, 17 July 1974.
21. *Ethiopian Herald*, 25 August 1974.
22. E.g., the editorials in *Fraternite Matin*, Abidjan, 3,5,8 February 1974; *The Echo*, Ghana, 13 August 1976; *Jeune Afrique* published a letter from a reader in Benin, 3 August 1974; *Africa* no. 43, March 1975, published several letters to the editor to this effect.
23. *Afriscopes*, September 1974, pp. 23-25.
24. *Newsweek*, 5 May 1975; see also Dieudonne Oyono, "Israel et L'Afrique noir," *Le Republicain*, Cameroon, no. 84, 29 April 1986, p. 10. Oyono is from the Institute of International Relations of Cameroon.
25. *The Times of Zambia*, 6 May 1975.
26. *Nigerian Tribune*, 20 April 1982.
27. *Satellite*, Nigeria, 20 April 1982; similar views were expressed in the *Nigerian Tribune*, 24 February 1980.
28. *Daily Times*, Nigeria, 11 December 1979.
29. *Nigerian Tribune*, 30 March 1982.
30. *The Echo*, Ghana, 3 February 1980.
31. *Ghanaian Times*, 3 November 1979.
32. See, e.g., *Christian Messenger*, Ghana, December 1979, vol. 4, no. 12; *Liberator*, Ghana, 24 February 1980; *The Pioneer*, Ghana, 5 February 1980.
33. *Daily Times*, Nigeria, 20 September 1979.
34. *Daily Nation*, Kenya, 15 June 1979.

35. *Sunday Observer*, Nigeria, 24 February 1980. The same opinions were also expressed in a letter to the editor in *Daily Times*, Nigeria, 20 December 1979; also in *Satellite*, 20 April 1982.

36. *Ghanaian Times*, 3 November 1979. Similar views in *Daily Times*, Nigeria, 20 December 1979; *Daily Graphic*, Ghana, 24, 29 February 1980; *Satellite*, Nigeria, 20 April 1982.

37. *Daily Nation*, Kenya, 12 July 1979.

38. *The Standard*, Kenya, 12 July 1979.

39. *Fraternite Matin*, Abidjan, 20 June 1983; *Jerusalem Post*, 28 June 1983.

40. *Sunday Observer*, Nigeria, 24 February 1980; see also *Le Republicain*, Cameroon, 29 May 1985, 29 April 1986; *The Pioneer*, Ghana, 5 October 1984; and the letter to the editor in *West Africa*, 12 December 1983, p. 2893, from Mussali Mlemba of Ethiopia.

41. *Ghanaian Times*, 24 January 1980; see also *Daily Graphic*, Ghana, 24 January 1980.

42. *Footprints Today*, Liberia, 8 August 1985, p. 5.

43. *Ukaz*, Saudi Arabia, 24 July 1985.

44. *Afriscopes*, February 1974, pp. 40-42.

45. *East African Standard*, Kenya, 9 July 1974.

46. *L'Agence Zaire-Presse*, Kinshasa, 21 May 1982.

47. *Israel Radio*, 20 May 1982.

48. *Yediot Aharonot*, Israel, 1 December 1982.

49. *BADEA Annual Report*, 1983, p. 73.

50. *Development Cooperation*, 1982 Review, OECD, Paris 1982.

51. *Jerusalem Post*, 24 January 1983.

52. *Ibid.*, 14 February 1983.

53. *Ibid.*, 7 August 1983.

54. *Ibid.*, 22 January 1984.

55. *Elima*, Zaire, 23, 27 May 1985.

56. *Daily Report*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, 22 May 1985, p. 51.



57. *Solongo*, Zaire, 25, 26 May 1985.
58. *Elima*, Zaire, 28 January 1985.
59. *Jerusalem Post*, 14 August 1983.
60. *Reuters*, 4 September 1983.
61. *Jerusalem Post*, 28 August 1983.
62. *Ibid.*, 25 August 1983.
63. *Ibid.*, 16 August 1983.
64. *West Africa*, 5 September 1983.
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Jerusalem Post*, 26 August 1983.
67. *Development Cooperation*, 1982 Review, OECD, Paris 1982, p. 224.
68. US Hearing and Markup, Congress Subcommittee, pp. 34, 35.
69. E.g., *Times*, London, 23 August 1983; *Time*, 5 September 1983; *Maariv*, Israel, 15 August 1983.
70. Quoted in *West Africa*, 21 August 1983.
71. *Jerusalem Post*, 24 August 1983.
72. Quoted in *West Africa*, 5 September 1983.
73. *Jerusalem Post*, 26 August 1983.
74. *October*, Egypt, 28 August 1984.
75. *West Africa*, 5 September 1983.
76. *Yediot Aharonot*, Israel, 24 August 1983.
77. *Jerusalem Post*, 26 August 1983; *West Africa*, 5 September 1983.
78. Most of the arguments against Israel can be found in A. Bolaji Akinyemi's "Open Letter to Members of the National Assembly on Nigeria-Israel Relations," *Nigeria Forum*, July-September 1982, pp. 731–739. Akinyemi, who was the director-general of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and is at present the minister of external affairs, wrote this letter in reaction to the Draft Motion of 106 members of the Nigerian National Assembly demanding the renewal of relations with Israel. On arguments against Israel, see also the *Ghanaian Times*, 8 January 1980, 25 February 1980.
79. Akinyemi, "Open Letter . . .," p. 736.

80. Ibid., p. 737. See also Akinyemi's remarks on this issue as minister of external affairs in an interview published in *West Africa*, 31 March 1986, p. 671.

81. *Nigeria Times*, 21 January 1980.

82. Akinyemi, "Open Letter . . .", p. 734.

83. *West Africa*, 3 March 1986, p. 443.

84. This explanation was given, for example, by Nigerian president Shagari in his above-mentioned statement, *Nigeria Times*, 21 January 1980.

85. *Daily Nation*, Kenya, 16 December 1981.

86. *Yediot Aharonot*, Israel, 29 March 1979.

87. Akinyemi, "Open Letter . . .", p. 732, and in his interview with *West Africa*, 31 March 1986, p. 671.

88. *Haaretz*, Israel, 30 May 1985.

89. *Weekly Review*, Kenya, 30 April 1985.

90. *Yediot Aharonot*, Israel, 3 August 1983.

91. *West Africa*, 3 March 1986, p. 443. The fear of Arab economic sanctions is also mentioned in Akinyemi, "Open Letter . . .", p. 737.

92. *Fraternite Matin*, Côte d'Ivoire, 21 May 1982.

93. AP, 21 May 1982, quoted in *Davar*, Israel, 21 May 1982.

94. *L'Union*, Gabon, 18 May 1982.

95. *al-Riad*, Saudi Arabia, 17 May 1982.

96. *Bulletin d'Afrique*, 22 May 1982.

97. *Ukaz*, Saudi Arabia, 24 July 1985.

98. *Daily Nation*, Kenya, 15 August 1983.

99. *West Africa*, 9 May 1983; *Le Matin*, Senegal, 12 October 1983.

100. *New York Times*, 23 September 1983.

101. *Daily Nation*, Kenya, 15 August 1983; see also *Sunday Nation*, Kenya, 30 August 1983, and *Weekly Review*, Kenya, 2 September 1983, for the same view.

102. According to the Arab Bank for Economic Development's *Annual Report*, 1983, p. 73, the total bilateral and multilateral Arab aid commitments to Côte d'Ivoire in 1974-1981 came to \$58 million. Of this, \$6 million was in concessional loans and \$52 million was unconcessional. The actual disbursement was not mentioned, but it was

probably much smaller. For comparison, Arab aid to Guinea during the same period was \$647 million, of which \$621 million was concessional and \$26 million unconcessional.

103. Since the time that Houphouët-Boigny announced his intention to renew diplomatic relations with Israel, the only protest made so far has come from Burkina-Faso, which criticized Côte d'Ivoire for betraying the Palestinian cause (Radio Ouagadougou, 18 December 1985, according to *Monitor-Dienst*, Bonn, 20 December 1985).

104. *Le Republicain*, Cameroon, April 1986, p. 10.

## המכון ליחסים בינלאומיים ע"ש לאונרד דייוויס פרסומי מדיניות

יוסף גוברין ואחרים

עתיד יחסי ברית המועצות ישראל

שלמה גזית

מודיעין, הערכה והתרעה (יוני 1981)

מאיר אבידן

היבטים עיקריים ביחסי ישראל-ארה"ב בשנות ה-50 (אפריל 1982)

דן הורוביץ

הקבוע והמשתנה בתפיסת הביטחון הישראלית (פברואר 1982)

שלום רייכמן ואחרים

שיקולים להתווית הגבול המזרחי של מדינת ישראל (אפריל 1982)

צבי רפיח

ארה"ב: גורמי פנים והשפעתם על עיצוב מדיניות החוץ במזה"ת (מאי 1983)

L. Y. Laufer

U.S. AID TO ISRAEL, PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES (May, 1983)

מרדכי גזית

הרכש הצבאי של ישראל מארה"ב (מאי 1983)

מאיר מנדס

הוטיקאן וישראל (ספטמבר 1983)

מנחם מילסון

ירדן והגדה המערבית (ינואר 1984)

גבי שפר ומנחם הופנונג

השקפותיהן ועמדותיהן של קבוצות חברתיות בארה"ב כלפי ישראל: מצאי והערכה

(יוני 1984)

L. Y. Laufer

U.S. AID TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA: POLICY DILEMMAS (May, 1985)

Olusola Ojo

THE POLITICS OF ARAB AID TO AFRICA (August, 1985)

גבי שפר

יחסי פטרון וקליינט: תלות ישראל בארה"ב (ינואר 1986)

ששון סופר

מנחם בגין בועידת קמפ-דיוויד: פרק בדיפלומטיה חדשה (מאי 1986)

Ran Marom

ISRAEL'S POSITION ON NON-PROLIFERATION (June, 1986)

S.N. Eisenstadt

The Internal Repercussions of the Lebanon War (August, 1986)