

8th Eurasian Peace Science Conference – Abstracts

Fahima Abbas, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “*The Participation of East Jerusalem Middle Class in the Israeli Economy and Space.*”

The participation of middle class members of the East Jerusalem population in the Israeli space has not been accorded in-depth treatment in previous studies. These have focused on the periphery of the East Jerusalem space, manifested by the employment of blue-collar workers in Western Jerusalem. In recent years, evidence is growing to show a rise in the participation of middle class East Jerusalemites in the Israeli space. This was evident in the increase of academically educated residents in the Israeli labor market.

The goal of this paper is to examine these developments, which are occurring within the relations between East Jerusalem’s middle class and the Israeli space, focusing on the process of employment in Western Jerusalem. In order to measure the intensifying links of East Jerusalem space with the Israeli space, deriving from the processes of spatial segregation from the West Bank (the erection of the Separation barrier) and modernization. The research is based on a survey carried out by the author in 2017-2018 among those residents of East Jerusalem with an academic education. The survey included 115 interviewees who were identified through the ‘snowball’ sampling, as well as 15 in-depth interviews among organizations that works with employees from East Jerusalem.

Uriel Abulof, Tel-Aviv University, and Shlomo O. Goldman, Ariel University, “*A Democratic Peace Gap: Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa*”

The democratic peace theory makes two core observations: democratic dyads are peaceful, and democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies. While the dyadic, and less so the monadic, theses typically hold at the global level, this paper demonstrates a “democratic gap” in the Middle East and North Africa: Middle Eastern democracies are more prone to interstate fatal conflicts, particularly against other democracies, whether in the region or outside it. We propose a new theoretical understanding of the nexus between regime type and war by distinguishing peacefully electing powerful incumbents out of office from mere electorates, holding free and fair elections.

Sarai Aharoni, Alisa Lewin, and Amalia Sa’ar, Ben-Gurion University, “*What’s In a Gun? Attitudes and Justifications of Norms Regarding the Use and Misuse of Light Weapons by Security Forces and Civilians in Israel*”

Small arms pose an emerging threat to personal security in Israel, which is the country to show the most significant increase (+57%) in the proportion of homicides committed with firearms when comparing 2005-2010 to 2011-2016 (Global Violent Deaths 2017). Drawing on data from a survey conducted in September 2017 (n=721) in Hebrew, Arabic, and Russian, we use multivariable descriptive statistics to assess the availability of small arms in Israeli households and to understand public opinion regarding the use and misuses of light weapons by security forces and civilians in Israel. We find that in 13% of Israeli households there is some sort of weapon. Attitudes reflect a clear differentiation between military and civilian-held small arms regarding legitimate use,

regulation, and sense of security. While the vast majority of respondents think that military arms *increase* the sense of security in public spaces, the numbers are much lower regarding civilian held small arms. Jews tend to have more positive attitudes towards firearms than Arabs. Furthermore, gender and national identity seem to impact various attitudes concerning the use and misuse of small arms with Arab women being the group most likely to support any form of state/community regulation and disarmament.

Tamar Arieli, and Yehudit Kahn, Tel-Hai Academic College, *“Post-conflict Normalization through Trade Preferential Agreements: Israel, Jordan and the QIZ initiative”*

The Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) model of border-located, duty and quota-free industrial regions is a policy tool designed to capitalize on cross-border cooperation to facilitate post-conflict normalization. Using mixed methods, this study presents and evaluates the implementation of the 1996 U.S. initiated Israel-Jordan QIZ agreement and economic and political results, contributing to broader debates regarding the potential and limitations of post-conflict normalization through trade preference agreements.

The Israel-Jordan QIZ period is coming to an end after twenty years yet there are lessons to be gained from the mechanisms of the QIZ implementation which contributed to its minimal political and economic impacts. We found that economic brokerage fostering trade and industry cross-border cooperation can serve one-sided economic interests while minimizing spillover to political or social realms, contrary to original intentions. The QIZ experience demonstrates the importance of self-motivation of each of the parties regarding specific cooperative ventures in realizing the potential of cross-border cooperation.

Daniel Arnon, Emory University, *“Radicalizing Alone: Are Lone Wolves Political Entrepreneurs or Aggrieved Avengers?”*

The increasing prominence of lone actor political violence has led scholars to theorize what radicalizes individuals to commit such acts alone. Three main theories have arisen to explain this phenomenon. The first argues that radicalization is driven by isolated and idiosyncratic circumstances and are therefore unpredictable and rare. The second argues that personal and political grievance events may lead to systematic variation in lone actor violence. The third argues that not only are there systematic drivers to radicalizing alone, but these are in fact political entrepreneurs coordinating their actions with other like-minded individuals through violence. Previous work has examined the commonalities between lone actors, but due to data sparsity are not able to compare these actors to a relevant ‘untreated’ group and cannot distinguish between the competing theoretical mechanisms. In this article, I examine the case of the Palestinian wave of lone actor attacks against Israelis. By exploiting temporal and spatial variation in the lived environment of assailants, I find that these attacks are systemically associated with grievances Palestinian localities experience, at the hands of Israeli security forces. Specifically, I find that when Palestinians are killed by Israelis this causes lone actor attacks to increase.

Daniel Bar-Tal, Tel-Aviv University, “*Conflict and Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Case*”

Humans are the decision-makers and therefore the psychological aspects embedded in human characteristics must be addressed in order to change human behavior. Later, if they begin to view the conflict situation differently, individuals may decide to disseminate the idea about the necessity of peacemaking and mobilize society members for this goal. Hopefully, addressing the socio-psychological repertoire will create various socialization and mobilization mechanisms for peacemaking and peace building. It is thus of crucial importance to advance knowledge that will shed light on the conditions, the contents, and the processes that convince members of society not only to embark on the peace building process in times of conflicts, but also that socialize them to prevent vicious and destructive conflicts and hate-cycles with heavy costs to begin with.

Galia Press-Barnathan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “*Popular Culture and the Making (and Challenging) of Peace*”

In the paper I explore explores the relationship between the production and consumption of cultural goods like music, movies, art, sports etc.) and "peace". It starts by problematizing the already vague concept of peace, distinguishing between 'peace' and 'peace-making' as a dramatic, state-level, event, and what I term peace as an everyday practice. The latter conception can be associated with concepts such as "warm peace" or "normal peace" or "normalization." Popular culture can play different roles with regard to these notions of peace, and these are explored in the paper. It can be used in a more straight forward sense to actively promote peace and dialogue (a tool of various peace entrepreneurs- both private actors and state actors), or promote reconciliation at later stages. Shared consumption of pop- culture products can also have long-term impact that is not necessarily controlled by states. When thinking about peace as an everyday practice, pop culture (often associated with the everyday) comes to play a central constitutive role, which is presented here. An additional implication of this observation is that the consumption of/ cooperation around pop culture production becomes a very political act. It also helps us understand the rationales driving cultural boycotts, which is based on this understanding that popular culture interactions can normalize situations that, for opponents, should not be normalized. If peace is in part about have "normal everyday relations", then PC can serves both as a tool to promote such normalcy, and as an arena and a tool to contest it.

Reşat Bayer, “*Changes in Levels of Interstate Peace*”

While quantitative examinations of war have received more attention, recent years have seen the creation of several data sets on interstate peace. These data sets enable scholars to study peace without assuming that what explains war also explains peace. By relying upon a theoretical framework that captures several levels of peace, this paper discusses and quantitatively evaluates how powerful third parties influence the transitions to higher levels of peace among hostile pairs of countries through event history analysis, in particular Cox hazard regression analysis. It highlights the importance of considering both the duration and quality of peace in the post-1815 era. Specifically, it demonstrates the limited role of major power norms but highlights how alliances with major powers can both nudge as well as curb prospects of interstate reconciliation.

Yuval Benziman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *“Sorry Seems to Be the Hardest Word: Israeli Peace-oriented NGOs Lack of Apologetic Discourse”*

Societies engaged in protracted conflicts fear the outcome of apologizing: apology is not only saying "I'm sorry," it could also have concrete implications which might interfere with society's self-definition and self-justification for its actions. Yet, it could be expected that NGOs who oppose the official government's actions would produce a different kind of discourse, which does not shy away from concepts of forgiveness and apology.

In the paper, I discuss the discourse of Israeli left-wing peace-camp NGOs who oppose Israel's action towards the Palestinians. These NGOs are marginalized in the Israeli public sphere and at times are even called "traitors" by the establishment. Yet although having this position in the Israeli public, they also do not engage in an apologetic discourse.

Four theoretical explanations will be presented which could account for these surprising findings:

1. The NGOs might be preserving parts of the mainstream narrative while supposedly opposing it since they are part of the Israeli in-group even when opposing its actions.
2. They might see their role as acting only towards the ingroup and therefore an apologetic discourse towards the "other" is not thought of or not considered imperative to obtain their goals.
3. As some scholars claim, apology might not be a 'must' in reconciliation processes.
4. These NGOs might be differentiating between themselves and Israeli society as a whole, and therefore believe that while Israel should apologize to the Palestinians, the subgroup that opposes Israel's actions does not have to do so.

Thibaud Bodson, Freie Universität Berlin, *“Power Sharing in Divided Cities: The Case of Brussels”*

The adaptation of the state's institutions to evolving political circumstances often constitute a necessary and yet highly destabilizing phase for deeply divided societies. This paper further discusses this issue at the hand of the Brussels Capital Region (BCR) example. The relevance of the BCR's case lies in the Region's original combination of alternative and incrementally demanding procedures for institutional reforms with an extensive set of institutional incentives for cooperation between the French-speaking majority and the Dutch-speaking minority. These two characteristics have largely contributed to the BCR's remarkable capacity both to adapt to evolving demands raised by its two ethno-linguistic groups and to keep the inter-community tensions at a very low level. In this paper, I argue that this double achievement makes the BCR a highly dynamic form of power-sharing. I call this form of power-sharing "living consociationalism."

Mario Chacón, New York University, *“Ballots vs. Bullets: The Electoral Origins of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal”*

We explore how competitive elections influence the onset of political violence in new democracies. Specifically, we use an original dataset to systematically examine local-level electoral outcomes and their relationship with the onset of violence against government officials during the initial stages of the Nepalese Civil War (1996-2006). Our empirical strategy uses a regression discontinuity design taking villages with close margins of victory and defeat for the

incumbent party (Nepali Congress), and identifies the effect of the party's control in the local-level elections preceding the onset of hostilities by Maoist insurgents. Our findings suggest a positive and significant effect of a Nepali Congress victory on the likelihood of Maoist attacks and on patterns of recruitment during the early stages of the conflict. Our analysis contributes to the comparative politics literature exploring the link between democracy and conflict and to the formal literature on democratization and revolutions

Manas K. Chatterji, Binghamton University SUNY, “*Conflict and Peace in South Asia*”

The objective of this presentation will be to discuss the conflict and peace in South Asia with special reference to India and Pakistan. The countries to which I shall make reference are India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Extensive descriptive materials for those countries are available but analytical, quantitative approaches are lacking. My emphasis will be to show how the methods and techniques of Peace Science and Peace Economics can be used for analyzing the political situations in South Asia. For quite some time, the relationship of these countries was linked to superpower confrontation, but now, it has been replaced by multipolar factors. In addition, such items as terrorism, globalization, human rights, religion, and fundamentalism are influencing these relations. A critical element in this relationship is the Nuclear Proliferation in the subcontinent. I shall discuss how the nuclear power competition is affecting in the relationship between India and Pakistan. Besides, a special emphasis will be given on the relationship of India and Pakistan to United States, Russia, China, and Middle Eastern countries.

Yossi David, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, “*Gendering the Other: Gendered and Sexualized Images in Social Media*”

While attacks against gendered others have increased around the world, there is a paucity of research examining a gender-biased climate that normalizes and excuses racialization and dehumanization. In particular, there are scant empirical studies investigating the role of gendered and sexualized discourses in political conflicts and in social media. This study aims to begin filling this gap by examining social media discourse in Israel during the 2014 Gaza war. It reveals how Palestinians are gendered and sexualized in Israeli social media, and it analyzes the central role this plays in demonizing, emasculating, commodifying and constructing outgroups as unwanted and contaminated. Analysis of gendered and sexualized discourses about outgroups exposes the role of gendered stereotypes and social media in disseminating racialized and discriminatory constructions.

Maya de Vriest, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “*The Voice of Silence: Practices of Participation among East Jerusalem Palestinians*”

Waves of escalating violence in Israel during the 2014 Gaza war, initiated a fundamental dispute regarding the role of social media as a tool for the mobilization and participation of Palestinians in the recent violent confrontation. This issue became more dramatic after the Israeli minister of public security was quoted saying that “the victims' blood is on Zuckerberg's hands”. To cope with this issue, new legislation was advanced to remove offensive content from social media sites,

thus raising critical questions regarding freedom of speech online. Against this background, the current study aims to explore why and when people are silent on Facebook?

Findings from 13 in-depth semi-structured interviews with East Jerusalem Palestinians between the ages of 20–35, point to three themes: 1. State monitoring, 2. Kinship monitoring and 3. Self-monitoring, thus conceptualization them under the term “participation avoidance”.

Roberto Domínguez, Suffolk University and WISC, “*Sustainable Regional Security Governance*”

In the past two decades, scholarly works based on security governance have proliferated with the goal of developing frameworks of analysis more inclusive of the variety of topics and actors related to the production of security at the national, regional and global levels (Adler and Greve 2009, Kirchner and Dominguez 2011, Breslin and Croft 2012). This paper argues that, while different frameworks of security governance have advanced a comprehensive understanding of security around the world, an emerging analytical challenge is how to keep a broad picture of security challenges and to identify a hierarchy of priorities in the regional agendas to allow the development of instruments to prevent or ameliorate potential or current sources of disruption to stability and peace. More precisely, this paper lies in the assumptions of polycentric systems of security governance, which, along the lines of several regional security approaches, explain common threats and risks usually composed by a number of security nodes or regional/global consensuses that are independent of one another, but take account of each other in relationships of co-operation or conflict and where no single node dominates all the rest (Berg 2015, Ostrom 1990, Shackelford et al. 2017). In order to illustrate the premises of the analysis, the paper focuses on the case of Latin America and more particularly on political conflicts as categorized by the Conflict Barometer (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2018) . The Latin American subcontinent conceives national, regional and international security through its historical and geopolitical lenses, setting security priorities and consequently consensuses with other actors within and outside the region. In contrast to the United States, for example, nuclear threats or terrorism are not ranked as top security priorities of Latin American countries. On the other hand, similar to other countries in the global south, a common denominator across Latin America, Africa and some Asian sub-regions is the overall concern with security issues related to economic and political development (and underdevelopment), and the so-called domestic insecurity dilemma (Kacowicz 2018).

Ehud Eiran and Nizan Feldman, University of Haifa, “*Guns, Firms, and Deals: Naval Power and Effects of Trade on International Conflict*”

This study argues that the effect of third-party trade on dyadic conflict is conditional on the naval power of both the potential conflict initiator and its potential target state. This conditional effect is mainly because naval power empowers the ability of trade integrated states to decrease their trade dependence with a given trade partner and its allies more easily. As about 80 per cent of the volume of international trade is carried by sea, naval capability has an important influence on the ability of combatant states to substitute trade during conflict and to mitigate trade-related costs, thereby on the relationship between third-party trade and conflict. The findings of our statistical analyses support our theoretical expectation that third-party trade may pacify dyad relations under

certain circumstances, yet the pacifying effect diminishes as the initiator's naval power increases and intensifies with the naval power of its potential target.

Abby Fanlo and Avshalom Schwartz, "*Hobbes and Locke on Religious Toleration: The Relationship between Regulation of the Religious Economy and Civil Disorder*"

Is a state religious monopoly conducive to political order, or is the absence of state regulation a better way to resolve potential competition between different players in the religious market? While both Hobbes and Locke believed religious authorities could hold more power over subjects' behavior than the sovereign, this shared belief in religion's primacy led to different answers to those questions. For Hobbes, religious pluralism is a major cause of unrest, and therefore, he demanded a state religious monopoly. For Locke, such regulation would breed political instability, and therefore, he argued in favor of a free religious marketplace. To adjudicate between these competing hypotheses, we use existing data on state regulation of the religious economy and civil unrest from 1990-2014. Our analysis draws new insights from the old theoretical debate between Hobbes and Locke and contributes to contemporary debates about the relationship between religion and politics.

Amélie Férey, Tel-Aviv University and CERI Sciences Po, "*Jus in Pace: Law as a Substitute of War?*"

The current academic discussion on war is mostly focused on just war theory, *i.e.* under what conditions war is justified. Realists scholars offer the main alternative by investigating why States resort to war more than if they should. Both theories dismiss pacifism, doomed to be only a default position, unrealistic and unsustainable. War is always assumed to be a justifiable violence, a claim that pacifism rejects. Therefore, pacifism is often pictured as a personal philosophy rooted in an ethical commitment to nonviolence more than a suitable politics.

This paper departs from such a view by analyzing pacifism from the hypothesis that it can constitute a relevant foreign policy, and that pacifism is not equivalent to passivity. This contribution offers to analyze a specific instance of "jus in pace", *i.e.* what are the means acceptable in resorting to pacifism, by asking the following question: Can Law be a substitute for war? This idea is advocated by the proponents of lawfare, a contraction of the words "law" and "warfare" that has recently attracted much attention by academics and practitioners. Understood as value-neutral term, lawfare has first been coined by Gen. Charles Dunlap, who refers to the use of law as a substitute for military operations. Drawing from empirical cases, this paper investigates the ways in which Law can be used to promote a pacifist agenda being a substitute of war. I distinguish what I call judicial lawfare, *i.e.* the use of international jurisdictions as battlefield, from "tactical lawfare", *i.e.* integrating Law in actual military operations on the ground. In the first part, I will analyze the Fatah's strategy to use International Law to promote its agenda in a non-violent way. Mahmoud Abbas wrote in a 2011 op-ed in the *New York Times* that UN recognition of Palestine as member state "would pave the way for the internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not a political one." In addition to this turn to international institutions, NGOs have filed lawsuits in Europe against companies supplying Israel with weapons or security technologies. This strategy worked in part, as Israel decided to trade 104 political prisoners in exchange of a pause in applying

to international institutions. In the second part, I will focus on Hamas's use of law and subsequent lawfare tactics deployed by the Israeli army. In conclusion, I will question the potential dangers of a 'militarization' of law, and provide avenues to assess the pitfalls of lawfare.

Michael Freedman, MIT, and Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *"Religious Credibility and Compromise: Experimental Evidence from Religious Leaders in Israel"*

Why are some religious leaders able to help resolve conflict while others have little impact? In this project, we will examine to what extent religious leaders are able to generate a greater willingness among local populations to make political compromises with out-groups in conflict situations. We propose a theory that argues that religious leaders with political and religious credibility are uniquely situated to propose political compromises. Since people typically choose what religious leaders and messages they expose themselves to, it is hard to measure the causal impact due to the confounding effects of self-selection. We overcome this identification problem by using a novel experimental design with different populations that lie upon the religious spectrum in Israel. Initial pretests suggest that religious leader credibility does contribute to a greater willingness to make political compromises. Overall, this research will make important contributions regarding the potential for hardline religious leaders to moderate religiously motivated political claims.

Hillel Frisch, Bar-Ilan University, *"Explaining the Expansion and Narrowing of Regional Conflicts: The Israeli-Arab and the Post-Arab Spring Conflicts Compared"*

Why do conflicts, especially domestic conflicts spiral into complex conflicts and others narrow? The Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict has been characterized by a decreasing number of participants and increasingly over time dyadic as opposed to multi-party rounds. By contrast, the Syrian, Yemen, and Libyan conflicts have been characterized by the widening of conflict from local civil war to three level games between multiple actors domestically, regional and international actors. The paper addresses this divergence in dynamics between these conflicts and argues that the critical difference, in the Tillian and Skocpol tradition, lies in the power of the state, in this case the Israeli state that has proved both its domestic and external strength due to its combination of democratic governance that enables it to be supple in overcoming domestic crises and offensive resolve in dealing with its enemies. The argument also echoes nicely Fearon and Laitin's seminal article on the incidence and recurrence of civil war. The long-term implications of this study is that advanced democracies have the edge in containing conflicts around them compared to autocratic, more brittle states.

Erik Gartzke, University of California, San Diego, *"Rethinking Rational Deterrence Theory"*

Classical models of deterrence are poorly framed in terms of recent insights about the nature of war and peace. Deterrence is also largely agnostic about the effects of the means actors use to deter. Combining bargaining theory with a means-based perspective produces a novel set of predictions that also help to explain certain empirical anomalies. Deterrence actually comprises a set of objectives that are differentially affected by attributes of the capabilities used to warn or win.

Deterrence can focus on minimizing the likelihood of conflict by reducing uncertainty about interests, actions or consequences. Alternately, they can minimize concessions by altering the local balance of power or the costs associated with aggression. Beginning with a standard formal deterrence model, I add an endogenous bargaining stage and introduce a cost term for maintaining deterrence that can correlate with the probability of victory, should deterrence fail. The model suggests ways that attributes of military means might do more or less to change deterrence costs, the probability of victory, or uncertainty about model parameters. The result is a framework in which how states deter is as important as whether they seek to do so.

Rob Geist Pinfold, INSS, and Yotam Rosner, Bar-Ilan University, *“Who Leads and Who Leaves? Leaders’ Beliefs and Territorial Withdrawal”*

Why do states withdraw from occupied territory? Despite the policy and academic implications of this question, the research area of territorial withdrawal has received scant scholarly attention. The few existing studies emphasize either systemic or unit-level causal factors. By contrast, our study highlights the agency of leaders. We argue that since territorial retrenchment is a highly complex, risky choice with unclear implications, leaders rely heavily on their beliefs while contemplating whether to withdraw. Thus, leaders with different belief systems will make different decisions. This study compares the beliefs of multiple leaders in four cases of withdrawal, enacted by two states: the US and Israel. Employing quantitative analysis, we found a variance between the beliefs of leaders who withdrew and those who perpetuated the territorial status quo. These findings therefore illustrate the causal role of leaders and their beliefs and demonstrate the limitations of existing academic approaches to explaining territorial withdrawal.

Clila Gerassi-Tishby, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *“Threat, Language, and Boundaries: Acquiring the Hebrew Language among the Palestinian Minority in East Jerusalem”*

This study employed a thematic content analysis of in-depth interviews with East Jerusalem Palestinians who studied Hebrew in an Israeli institute in West Jerusalem. The findings indicate that this population perceives a variety of realistic threats, characterized by growing unemployment, instability, and existential insecurity. They learn Hebrew to gain access to the Israeli labor market, cope with the Israeli public domain, and diminish risks in encounters with the Israeli security forces.

In studying Hebrew, this population must traverse mental boundaries and physical borders: prior to building the separation wall, the East Jerusalem Palestinians were isolated from Israeli society. Hebrew was perceived as the “language of the Israeli occupier,” and there was a resistance to learning it. Thus, paradoxically, the motivations to acquire Hebrew can be seen both as a tool to deal with a reality of oppression, reducing the perception of threats, and as an act of resistance and empowerment.

Denis S. Golubev, Saint Petersburg State University, *“Internationalization of Intrastate Armed Conflicts in the MENA Region: Factoring in the Role of Russia”*

The paper builds on the author's conceptualization of conflict internationalization in the MENA region as occurring along three dimensions: 1) horizontal escalation (spatial spillovers and regional diffusion of organized violence); 2) vertical escalation (external direct or indirect, high intensity or low-intensity interventions as well as conflict externalization); 3) systemic escalation (political expansion of conflict's relevance within a larger international system, including "proxy-fication"). By examining the interplay between these processes as well as Russia's own contemporary policies in the Middle East and North Africa, the author argues that at least in vertical and systemic dimensions Russia's involvement has been a major factor in the internationalization of both internal armed conflicts and conflict management efforts. At the same time, the contrasting cases of Syria, Libya, Palestine and Yemen demonstrate that the level of involvement and the resulting contribution to internationalization varies across different conflicts depending on a combination of Russia's own motivations and opportunities.

Toby Greene, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, "*New Political Purposes behind the 'Judeo-Christian Construction'*"

The division between two competing notions of European identity – Europe as defined by a distinct civilizational heritage, and Europe defined by universal values of democracy and human rights – has emerged as a major cleavage within the EU and a major challenge to European integration. This study argues that the notion of Europe as a specifically 'Judeo-Christian civilization' is being re-constructed for new political purposes by right wing and populist-nationalist parties and leaders across the EU. It builds on the theoretical insight of Peter Katzenstein that: 'Making civilizations primordial is a political project that aims at creating a taken-for-granted sense of reality that helps in distinguishing between self and other and right and wrong.' It is argued that whereas in the twentieth century the notion of 'Judeo-Christian civilization' served a liberal political purpose of including Jews and Judaism within the boundaries of 'Western civilization', today by contrast, it serves an illiberal political purpose of excluding Muslims. This project includes drawing an identity boundary that unites Israel with the West but excludes the world of Islam. The paper shows the contingent nature of the Judeo-Christian construction by comparing it to competing notions of European identity that contradict the core notion of its promoters on the right: that of an inevitable clash between the West and the Islamic world. It is argued that the outcome of this contest to define Europe's identity will significantly impact the political character of the EU and its members.

Ayelet Harel-Shalev, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, '*A Room of One's Own?*' in *Battlespace: Women Soldiers in War Rooms*

Women serve in a variety of combat roles and combat support positions in various militaries around the globe. In parallel, new technologies of warfare are transferring more and more soldiers, including women, from the sidelines into the heart of the battlespace. More women soldiers are thus becoming significant participants in war by virtue of their assignment to strategic war rooms. As one of the women soldiers interviewed in this study explained: "In the war-room, you see everything. You see more than the soldiers in the field see; you see the whole picture..." Even though such women soldiers are not located physically in the battlefield, they do indeed participate

in war—by promoting ‘security’ for their countries and for their comrades in arms and by being responsible for injuring the ‘other.’ The stationing of women in war rooms located on the borders of conflict zones, which are equipped with the latest technologies that bring the reality of the warzone into the war room, may challenge traditional concepts of security, war, and gender roles. The narratives of women soldiers serving in such war rooms can thus provide critical insights into ‘experiencing war’ and ‘making war’ in battlespace. Personal interviews with thirty Israeli women whose mandatory military service was spent in war rooms revealed multiple narratives of war, including the intertwining of protection, security, and insecurity. The paper thus sheds new light on the role of women in the military by exploring women “in a room of their own” in battlespace.

Ibrahim Hazboun, “*Contested Spaces: Social Media for Marginalized Communities: The Case of Palestinians in Jerusalem*”

This study explores the use of social media platforms by Palestinian journalists covering events in Jerusalem within the context of the asymmetrical conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Our findings, based on data gathered from 10 in-depth interviews, reveal that social media platforms allow journalists to construct an autonomous space for sharing witnesses’ accounts while enabling them to partially avoid restrictions on reporting stemming from conditions of the asymmetrical conflict. The interviewees perceive social media platforms as a potential gateway for spreading alternative narratives to both local and international news arenas, however, our findings suggest that authorities in power still manage to impose restrictions on journalists that mirror the reporting restrictions that existed prior to the advent of social media.

Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Fulda University, “*Mutual Recognition versus The Clash of Civilizations*”

In the twenty-first century the rise of the newly industrialized nations respect to the Global South, the “Rise of the Rest” (Zakaria) is inevitable, which leads to struggles for re-recognition. Although Huntington’s concept of a clash of civilizations has been widely criticized by liberal commentators, it has been overlooked that such a clash is based on the recognition that there are different civilizations in the world, not just cultures or religions. We aim to explore a floating balance (Clausewitz, Hegel and Confucius) among some of the world civilizations in order to avoid the trap of aiming at a universal civilization (which hardly could conceal that it would be the Western civilization). At the same time, we also do not aim at a mere multiplicity of civilizations in the footsteps of Acharya, which inevitably leads to a kind of culture relativism.

Dennis Kahn, Lund University and IDC Herzliya, Fredrik Björklund, and Gilad Hirschberger, Lund University, “*Political Rightists and Leftists Differ in Their Perception of Different Collective Threats*”

The present paper deals with threat perception among the political left and political right. While most of the dominant theoretical perspectives assume the political right is more motivated by

uncertainty and threat than the political left (e.g., Duckitt, 2006; Jost, et al., 2007), bases we challenge this assumption and suggest that the political left and right are equally afraid, but emphasize different societal threats and perceive them at different psychological distance. Using large-scale data from 36 different countries across six studies, we show that collective threat is a multidimensional rather than unidimensional construct and that the political right and left differ in their relative valuation and their perception of distance to these different threats. The research challenges the dominant perspective in the literature and has important implications for several areas of research, including conservatism as a motivated social cognition, right-wing authoritarianism, the dual process model of ideology and prejudice and construal level theory.

Yoav Kapshuk, Kinneret College and LSE, and Michael Kochin, Tel-Aviv University, *“Transitional Justice and Territorial Acquisition in the Syrian Civil War – A New New World Order?”*

This paper examines the Syrian civil war and its resolution attempts as a test case of a possible historical transformation of world order, from the '1945 rules' that is reflected in liberal values of human rights and state sovereignty, to a beginning of a new world order. We focus on two issue areas that are crucial for assessing whether the world is transitioning into new principles of order: 1) the issue of transitional justice, designed to come to terms with the legacy of large-scale past abuses, which is one of the expressions of the liberal values of human rights, especially since the 1990s. 2) The issue of illegitimacy of territorial changes by force. These two issues will be examined in the case of the Syrian civil war, which until now around half million Syrians have been killed, over 12 million have been displaced, and number scenarios of partition were considered. So far, attempts to reach resolution between the regime and the opposition have included only modest references to transitional justice. Moreover, despite a fair amount of punditry about redrawing borders and partitioning Syria to mitigate ethnic and religious conflict, it now appears that the Syrian civil war will be resolved without any changes on the map. Therefore, despite possibilities seemingly floated and now rejected, the Syrian case does not show signs of the transformation of world order.

Kerim Can Kavakli, Bocconi University, *“Communal Clashes between Syrian Refugees and Natives in Turkey”*

When does violence break out between refugees and citizens of the host nation? The literature on this topic is mostly cross-national or focused on Western countries even though the level of native-refugee violence varies within a country, and most refugees are hosted by developing countries. To address this gap we conduct the first analysis of clashes between refugees and natives in Turkey, the country with the largest refugee population in the world. We use a novel dataset of clashes from 2014 to 2017 to explore why some provinces experienced more clashes than others. Our main findings are that rising unemployment, crimes against property, higher support for nationalist parties, and higher numbers of refugees are associated with more clashes. Moreover, we find that a province is more likely to have clashes if its neighbors had clashes in the preceding two months. These findings suggest that violence between refugees and natives stems from

structural factors such as insecurity, xenophobia, and intergroup contact, but also spatial diffusion of violence from one location to others.

Michael R. Kenwick and Beth A. Simmons, Pennsylvania State University, “*Border Orientation in a Globalizing World: Concept and Measurement*”

While border politics have become an increasingly salient component of high international politics, political scientists have made few attempts to systematically analyze variation in national border policy. To make analytic headway in this area, we develop the concept of “border orientation” to describe the extent to which the State is committed to the authoritative display of capacities to control the terms of penetration of its national borders. We then introduce a first-ever effort to develop a geo-spatial database of the world’s major architectural features along international borders. We combine these new data with updated data on border walls to construct and validate a Bayesian latent variable model for generating estimates of each state’s border orientation at the national, dyadic, and border-crossing level.

Arzu Kibris, University of Warwick, “*The Geo-Temporal Evolution of Violence in Civil Conflicts*”

Existing research on the diffusion of civil conflict violence at the local level implicitly assumes that all conflict events are equally likely to spillover, and that all geographical units within a country are equally relevant for the conflict. Both assumptions are flawed. I first argue that violent events can have damaging effects on the operational capability of the warring sides and that the extent of that damage is an important determinant of the likelihood of future violence. I then hypothesize that it is those events with losses on the state side that are likely to be associated with geo-temporal spillovers, whereas events with insurgency losses are less likely to be associated with future mayhem in their vicinity. Second, I argue that geographical units within a country may vary according to their relevancy for the conflict and that the distribution of the level of relevancy over space is correlated with the geo-temporal evolution of conflict events. I find support for my arguments in a spatio-temporal analysis of the civil conflict in Turkey. I first introduce a new and detailed dataset that allows me to track the spread of events in this long running conflict at high resolutions with detailed information on the losses suffered by the sides. I then statistically analyze the geo-temporal evolution of the 7286 fatal conflict events recorded in this dataset, by employing a split-population model that simultaneously and separately estimates the unobservable distribution of underlying risk of conflict over territorial units and the risk that a geographic location will actually experience a conflict event at a certain point in time given the underlying distribution of conflict risk over space. The results offer strong support for my hypotheses.

Alexei Abrahams, Princeton University; Eli Berman, University of California San Diego; Prabin Khadka, New York University; **Esteban F. Klor**, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and John Powell, Harvard University, “*Patterns of Violence in Protracted Conflicts: An Episodic Analysis of the Israel-Gaza Conflict*”

Does violent retaliation to attacks by state and non-state actors lead to deterrence or, on the contrary, to counter-retaliation and protracted violence? We study this question in the context of Israel's conflict with Gaza between 2007 and 2014, using original security reports from the United Nations. Exploiting natural language parsing (NLP) techniques, we build a dataset including over 16,000 Palestinian projectile launches and over 8,800 Israeli airstrikes, recorded with precise timing. Our findings weigh heavily against the argument that retaliation perpetuates this conflict. The conflict is characterized by short-lived episodes of violence separated by quiet interludes. Episodes tend to last less than one day and are followed by 3.5 days of calm, on average. Most episodes have no retaliation: 61% are one-sided, consisting only of provocations that go unanswered. Among episodes that do, the median number of successive counter-retaliations is only 3. Moreover, counter-retaliation does not induce subsequent episodes: 91% of episodes are initiated by Gazan militant attacks and 85% of episodes end with a Gazan militant attacks. Most importantly, we find no evidence that retaliation induces or deters subsequent violence. The median number of days of calm following episodes with retaliation (3.1) is almost the same as the median duration of calm following all episodes (3.4). Furthermore, the type of projectile launched by Gazan militants does not seem to be affected by Israeli retaliation or the lack thereof. Rather than provoking an immediate increase in violence, retaliation seems to have no short-term effect, as would be predicted by a model of long-term deterrence.

Neta Kliger-Vilenchik, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Maya de Vries, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Barbara Pfetsch, Freie University of Berlin; and Annie Waldherr, University of Münster, “*Co-Constructing Space in Urban Public Spheres: Twitter Use in Jerusalem*”

In digitized networked public spheres, individual and collective actors connect with others, crossing the borders of cities, nations, and languages. New translocal networks of communication emerge, which are locally anchored, but simultaneously transcend national boundaries.

In this paper, we present a multi-national, collaborative empirical project (currently in its early stages) that seeks to examine the *spatial configuration of urban public spheres through the social web*, in two cities – Berlin and Jerusalem. In this presentation, we will focus on our plans for the Jerusalem study, examining the use of Twitter in the contested space of Jerusalem, both East and West. Our research questions investigate: How is a sense of space constructed through the social media communication of Jerusalem's Twitter users? How do the Jerusalem Twitter users synthesize global and local, virtual and physical, public and private contexts? And how do they experience Jerusalem as a contested space?

Sabine Kurtenbach, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, “*Conflict and Peace in Latin America*”

Latin America declared itself a zone of peace in 2014. This is an undisputed statement with regard to the absence of interstate wars. Since the signing of the peace accord between the Colombian government and the region's oldest guerrilla movement, FARC, expectations have been high that

a cycle of internal wars and armed conflicts will also come to an end. However, Latin America remains the world's most violent region if other manifestations of violence are included in the analysis. This presentation analyses the continuity and change in these patterns of violence and violence reduction from a conflict-transformation perspective. Theoretically, conflicts should be transformed and embedded in institutions in order for them to be managed without the use of violence. Latin America experiences provide empirical evidence of a lack of conflict transformation, which has resulted in the shifting of violence from the political system into society.

Lior Lehrs, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *“Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table: Analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks on Jerusalem”*

The question of Jerusalem is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its resolution is crucial for the overall success of efforts to resolve the conflict. This paper explores the negotiating processes that took place between Israel and the Palestinians regarding the question of Jerusalem since the Oslo Accords (1993), with attention to the Camp David process (2000-1) and the Annapolis process (2007-8). Assessment of these processes reveals on the one hand that the question of Jerusalem posed one of the major obstacles to agreement in past negotiations, but on the other hand, it shows a gradual process in which the parties have drawn closer and understandings have begun to emerge. The paper analyzes the main issues discussed by the parties, the gaps and the apparent areas of agreement, and discusses the lessons that can be drawn from this case study for different theoretical questions from peace studies literature.

Oded Adomi Leshem, *“Mapping Hope for Peace in Conflict Zones: New Data from Israel-Palestine”*

The Hope Map Project is a global attitudes study aimed at measuring the aspirations and expectations of people mired in protracted violent conflicts. The first phase of the research was conducted simultaneously among 1,000 Jews and Palestinians in Israel proper, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip resulting in the most extensive dataset about citizens' hopes for peace administered in a conflict zone. Utilizing a set of definitions of peace, the study reveals the demographic and political predictors of hope and hopelessness among Israelis and Palestinians and offers a comparison of the hopes for peace between the two societies. The study also identifies the political attitudes directly impacted by hope. Most importantly, results demonstrate that hope for peace predicts the presence of pro-resolution attitudes more than any other socio-political factor measured. Taken together, the Hope Map Project produces the first detailed account of hope for peace among those embroiled in a protracted ethnonational conflict.

Carmela Lutmar, University of Haifa, *“Transitional Justice and Civil Wars Recurrence, 1946-2006”*

Transitional justice processes entail judicial and non-judicial means to redress human rights abuses committed during wars and other violent political events. Some claim that these processes, aimed at establishing accountability, serving justice, and fostering reconciliation, are imperative for post-

conflict peace to hold. However, while a great deal of the empirical literature on transitional justice focuses on case-studies, little systematic attention has been given to the impact of transitional justice mechanisms, specifically to their impact on the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

In this paper, I argue that the type of transitional justice mechanism used – punishment-oriented or reconciliation-oriented – has an impact on the probability of civil war recurrence, and that this relationship is mediated by factors such as the overall intensity of the conflict and the goals of the rebel group. I also hypothesize that the severity of the conflict and the rebels’ goals will have an effect on the timing of transitional justice processes and subsequently on the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

To test these hypotheses, I systematically explore the impact of the timing and type of transitional justice mechanisms on the recurrence of civil war violence in the period from 1946 to 2006. To this end, I use the Justice Data Project categorization of transitional justice, collapsing the mechanisms into justice (punishment)-oriented mechanisms (trials, reparations, exiles, and purges) and reconciliation-oriented mechanisms (truth commissions and amnesties).

Devorah Manekin, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Reed Wood, Arizona State University, *“The Influence of Female Fighters on Audience Attitudes toward Rebel Movements”*

In an effort to attract support from international audiences, rebel leaders often attempt to cultivate and disseminate a positive, sympathetic narrative regarding the movement and its political goals. We consider one factor that potentially influences the success of this endeavor. We argue that the visible presence of female fighters—and rebel efforts to highlight their participation—positively influences audience attitudes toward the group by strengthening observers’ beliefs about the legitimacy of its goals and its decision to use armed tactics. We further contend that these effects can translate into tangible strategic advantages by assisting group efforts to foster positive relationships with external constituencies and actors. We empirically assess our hypotheses by combining a novel survey experiment in two culturally and geographically distinct countries with analyses of new cross-national data on female combatants and information about transnational support for rebels. Results from both sets of analyses support our arguments.

Manus I. Midlarsky, Rutgers University, *“Religion and Genocide in Time of War”*

To understand the relationship between religion and genocide in time of war, one needs to distinguish between sacred and secular political religions. Among the genocidal events inspired by political religions based on sacred texts are the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, the Sack of Magdeburg, the British Civil War in Ireland, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Bosnia. Civil religions and secular political religions discussed are the French Revolution, Italian Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinist Communism. Lacking the restraints found in traditional religions, the secular political religion is most dangerous. Large-scale genocides are best explained by diachronic processes entailing subordination followed by gain and then loss by the perpetrators. The presence of loss in various forms is found in virtually all cases. Emotions like anger and fear are engaged that typically

do not influence routine politics. All of the cases, even those of minimal loss are influenced by international events.

Benjamin Miller, University of Haifa, "*The International Order and the Arab Spring*"

With the end of the Cold War, analysts advanced competing expectations about the likely character of the post-Cold War Order. Many expected a far-reaching transformation in the fundamental character of world politics. Some of these predictions were quite optimistic (especially by Liberals and Constructivists in International Relations theory), believing the changes will lead to more peace and cooperation. Some, however, were Pessimists, predicting the emergence of new types of conflicts (for example, Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations"; and Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy"), while others (the Realists) remained skeptic regarding the possible transformation in the fundamental character of international politics, even if taking into account specific changes in the global distribution of capabilities as leading to some changes in the dynamics of the international system—whether in the direction of a benign hegemon or balance of power politics. The paper investigates the effects of the "Arab Spring" on Middle East and international security according to these competing theoretical perspectives. The paper then evaluates the explanatory and predictive power of the perspectives. I argue that the combined effect of two factors—state strength and national congruence-- is the most useful for explaining the variations in the application of the competing approaches.

Dan Miodownik, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Chagai M. Weiss, University of Wisconsin, "*How Individual Actors can Derail Group Conflicts*"

Do individual actors have the power to derail conflict dynamics, and influence patterns of violence? Many studies of ethnic conflicts and repression consider violence as an intergroup dynamic, entailing ongoing interactions between diverse actors including incumbent states, rebel groups, protesters, and oppressed minorities. Shifts in patterns of violence are often considered to be driven by strategic, practical, or ideological motivations. However, at times independent actors commit uncoordinated and unexpected attacks that fundamentally influence dynamics of conflict. Analyzing geo-located police data from Jerusalem, and exploiting what was an unexpected, and perhaps exogenous shock to intergroup relations in the city, we demonstrate how individual actors can radically shift conflict dynamics. Doing so we show how the kidnapping and vicious murder in July 2014 of Mohamad Abu Hdeir, a young Palestinian resident of Jerusalem, influenced the prevalence, location, and types of violence implemented by residents of one of the most contested cities in the world. Our evidence calls for a new understanding of conflict dynamics, which pays close attention not only to organized groups implementing different forms of violence, repression, and resistance, but also to individual entrepreneurs who can change conflict trajectories independently.

Karina Mross, University of St. Gallen and German Development Institute, "*Disaggregating Democracy Support to Explain Peaceful Democratization after Civil Wars*"

Democratization is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy support explain the effect of democratization after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this paper shows that external support for democracy can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy support and analyze its effect on peace using a configurational approach. It focuses on support for competition (e.g. promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (e.g. strengthening the rule of law) and cooperation (e.g. facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy support can help to prevent recurrence during post-conflict democratization. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratization. First, support for ‘cooperative democratization’, characterized by substantial support for cooperation in lower risk contexts. Second, the combination of substantial support for institutional constraints and competition to foster ‘controlled competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilizing potential of democratization processes after civil wars and inform policy makers designing post-conflict support strategies.

Patrick Regan and Matthew Sisk, University of Notre Dame, and Hyun Kim, Korea University, “*Water Scarcity, Climate Adaptation, and Armed Conflict*”

The dynamic relationships between climate change and armed conflict have been discussed at length, but there have been few studies that integrate dimensions of climate adaptation into the processes linking climate change to armed conflict. By using geospatial grids for climate change and armed conflict, and country level climate vulnerability measures of sensitivity and adaptive capacity, we empirically examine the effects of climatic and non-climatic conditions on the probability of armed conflict in Africa. Results suggest that there are close links between climate drivers and armed conflict. Importantly, greater levels of adaptive capacity lead to a lower likelihood of armed conflict. From a policy perspective, our results suggest that enhancing adaptive capacity under conditions of climate pressure will reduce the probability of people taking up arms in response to water scarcity.

Nimrod Rosler, Ephraim Yaar & Yasmin Alkalay, Tel-Aviv University, “*Support for the Oslo Accords among Jewish-Israeli Women and Men: What Affects the Gender Gap in Support for Peace?*”

The question of whether women are more oriented towards peace has been debated in the research literature for several decades. Examined quantitatively especially among American participants, there has been very little similar work in the context of societies deeply involved in intractable conflicts. Since the pioneer studies of Tessler and his colleagues from the late 1990s in the Middle East, no study has systematically examined whether there is a difference between the attitudes of men and women regarding peace agreements in conflict driven areas.

Hence, the aim of our current study is to investigate more rigorously whether there is a gender gap in support for peace among members of society involved over a long period of time in a violent conflict, and whether such gaps change over time. Moreover, we seek to examine if major events

during the conflict, which move it from the stage of peacemaking negotiation back to escalation, has differential effects over women and men.

Using the data of the 'Peace Index' survey conducted monthly since the mid-1990s among a representative sample of the Jewish-Israeli population, we suggest a comprehensive analysis of public opinion in this context. Through employing robust methods examining both control over other influential variables such as political ideology and religiosity, and their interaction with gender, we will provide an empirical answer to this issue based on more than 140 polls. Furthermore, our study explores a possible explanation relating to socio-psychological coping mechanisms with terror events to our findings indicating the widening gap between the attitudes of women and men following the Second Intifada.

Belgin San-Akca and Mehmet Yavuz Yagis, Koc University, "*Marketing Jihad: Monopolizing an Ideology*"

We approach the armed Islamist movements as members of a global movement for jihad. In our view, the structure of this global movement evolved in four main phases: (1) warlords and loose formation, (2) semi-organized and more hierarchical formation, (3) army-like formation with uniforms, and (4) special forces formation. In this paper, we show that special forces supporting armed Islamist groups instruct to use a mix strategy for appealing to potential fighters. While, on the one hand, they acknowledge violent instruments, on the other hand, they start promoting norms about the proper methods for fighting jihad. We examine the parallels between historical forms of fighting an insurgency, such as Mao's revolution in China, Bolshevik revolution in Imperial Russia, and Che Guevara's initiatives in Latin America to answer two questions: (1) Is jihad emerging as a new form of insurgency?, and (2) If so, can jihadist movements sustain themselves over time and transform into state structures as we see in socialist and communist states around the world?

Khader Sawaed, University of Haifa, "*Citizenship Agreement and Democratization: Explaining the different trajectories of Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring*"

Stateness is a crucial precondition for the success of any democratization process and democracy consolidation. One component of stateness is *citizenship agreement*, i.e. the existence of an agreement about the national identity and the membership boundary of a political community. Unlike many Arab countries, Tunisia and Egypt enjoyed during most of their history high levels of stateness. With the break of the Arab Spring, it was not a surprise that these countries were the first to shake off their long-lived dictators and seemed best positioned to transition successfully to democracy. However, the two countries found themselves in dramatically different places. Tunisia had succeeded in crossing the threshold of democratic transition, while Egypt regressed to authoritarianism. My key argument is that the level of stateness in Egypt has been decreased, mainly because of lack of citizenship agreement inside the Egyptian society and political system, which led to the coup and the end of democracy in the country. While in Tunisia, the political leadership played a main role to keep high level of citizenship agreement that kept a relatively high level of stateness that made an important contribution for the democracy consolidation in Tunisia.

Shmuel Sandler, Bar-Ilan University, *“The Compound Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Study in the Temporal-Spatial Borders of a Protracted Rivalry”*

The Arab Israeli Conflicts structure can be described as a compound one in which both interstate and intercommunal domains interact. Starting as an ethno-national dispute in Mandatory Palestine it expanded into an interstate one in 1948 and turned into a compound interstate and intercommunal structure since 1967. Henceforth it stretched out into ethno-religious (Hamas) realms and the Shite-Sunni sphere stretching out to the Middle East Periphery that is to say Iran and Erdogan’s Turkey. Conflict expansion brought in its wake realignment in its core. The question to be answered is whether the winding down of the conflict on the interstate level (Ben-Yehuda Sandler 2002) will constitute the beginning of the end of a balanced protracted “social” conflict (Azar, 1978).

Christian Schultheiss, University of Cambridge, *“Incremental Dispute Settlement and How to Distribute Future Power”*

I report one surprising pattern in the politics of the East and South China Sea disputes: States believe that incremental dispute settlement agreements implicitly recognize their rivals’ claims although any legal prejudice of such agreements is explicitly excluded. States bargain about incremental agreements as if they prejudiced their position. Negotiations succeed where prejudice is acceptable, they fail where it is not. Under international law, any prejudice of incremental agreements is explicitly excluded and agreements do not recognize a rival’s claim in any way. What looks at first glance like states’ vague sensitivities about international law rather than geopolitics dominated negotiations. What prevents states from reaching incremental agreements on oil, gas or fisheries – agreements that allow states to realize some of the interests that are said to motivate their claims in the first place? The core hypothesis of this paper is that the political sensitivity in negotiating incremental agreements stems from the fact that such agreements distribute future bargaining power on the disputes. The problem of implicit recognition is one instance of this class of problems.

Benjamin Schvarcz, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *“Religious Peacebuilding in Israel: The Froman Peace Campaign”*

Religious faith and religious devotion are widely conceived as conducive to hatred, division and war. Nevertheless, an emerging scholarly field, self-defined as “religious peacebuilding,” is dedicated to the notion that religions also have a great reconciliatory power. Rabbi Menachem Froman (1945-2013) was one prominent, highly commended and very committed religious peacebuilder in the Israeli-Palestinian context. This paper examines theoretical components underlying the peace campaign prompted by Froman and his numerous active disciples in the area south of Bethlehem (also known as “Gush Etzion”). Thinking about the Froman peace campaign from that point of view will contribute to better understanding both the local phenomenon and the general religious peacebuilding theory.

Timea Spitka, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *“International Protection Norms, National Security, and the Protection of Civilians”*

Traditional notions of security have focused on the protection of the state or ethno-religious groups. To what extent does national or group security provide protection for vulnerable civilians? International protection norms namely Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have given precedence to human security and civilian protection over state sovereignty. Although human security is part of today’s discourse and has evolved into an international norm, it has not been translated into protection of civilians. This research examines dichotomies of national and international protection related to power dynamics, dependency, loyalty and exploitation. It examines protection in a single conflict-ridden case; Israel/Palestine, to illuminate on some of the gaps in the current studies of protection. Examining security and protection within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, this research analyses Israeli, Palestinian and international security strategies as they apply to the protection of all civilians. Examining protection versus security strategies, this study reveals some of the realities and myths about national and international protection. The research moves beyond the current lack of protection strategies to discuss alternative and more effective human protection.

Hiroyuki Suzuki, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and Hebrew University of Jerusalem *“Acceptance, Not Recognition: Japanese Foreign Policy toward the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)”*

This study focuses on the historical development of Japanese foreign policy toward Palestine, in particular, its political body: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In February 1977, the Japanese government allowed the PLO to open its representative office in Tokyo, but the government was hesitant in recognizing the official status of the PLO. Why did the Japanese government adopt this position toward the PLO?

This study compares Japanese foreign policy toward the PLO with that of other countries and demonstrates that Japan imitated Indian diplomacy toward the PLO. After the oil embargo of the Arab oil-producing countries in October 1973, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt the need to communicate with the PLO. This study analyzes the official documents of the Japanese government, memoirs of related persons, and interviews of Japanese members of the PLO office and then sheds light on the untold story of the Japanese government’s foreign policy toward the PLO.

Alexander Tabachnik, University of Haifa, *“Spiraling and Contracting Conflicts: Russian Far East and the National Republics of the Siberian Federal District”*

Russia, in the late 1980s and during the 1990s, was characterized by the ethno-national revival of ethnic minority groups, especially in the national republics, as well as by the formation of strong separatist movements, such as in Chechnya. At the same time, despite deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the weakened Federal Center, the republics of Yakutia, Buryatia and Tuva remained relatively stable. Their titular ethnic groups did not develop considerable separatist movements, although Yakutia was characterized by a more decisive stance. However, the

strengthened Federal Center, especially under Putin's rule, negated the republics' previous efforts towards gaining political distance from Moscow.

Will Moscow preserve the existing status-quo in the mentioned republics and generally in the Russian Far East in the medium and long term? The deep demographic crisis and shrinking population, especially ethnic Russians, accompanied by economic weakness may eventually undermine Russian state strength and weaken the control of the Federal Center over the peripheral regions.

Konstantinos Travlos, Ozyegin University, "*'That Hateful Invention': Aversion to War and Managerial Coordination within the Issue Paradigm*"

What conditions lead states to engage in interstate managerial coordination, sacrificing their freedom to pursue all available foreign policy options in order to foster peace? I focus on major powers, arguing that decision makers are more likely to engage in the regulation of the use of force in international relations via managerial coordination when they have been afflicted by aversion to war combined with innovative thinking about international relations. I then evaluate the relationship between the likelihood of been afflicted by aversion to war and the likelihood of engagement in managerial coordination via a large-n study of major power behavior in the 1715-2001 period.

Elis Vllasi, Purdue University, "*The Ethno-National Homelands and Strategies of Democratic Spoiling*"

Why do democratization efforts succeed in some cases, but not others? The extant literature generally lays blame for failure at the domestic structures (e.g. socio-economic), the role of agents (e.g. institutional design), or international influences (e.g. state openness). I argue, however, that the actions undertaken by an ethno-national motherland in a target country where it shares kin are a frequently overlooked, but significant predictor of democratization failure. Democratization is seen as a barrier to promoting the convergence between ethnic and political boundaries. Building on the theory of peace spoilers, I contend that an ethno-national homeland can opt for a variety of strategies to challenge the democratization of a target state. Strategies can range from helpful to harmful to democratization of a target state. Their level of effectiveness at spoiling democratization efforts is a function of motivation and opportunity. Relying on new datasets from Varieties of Democracy, Ethnic Power Relations and events data, and different statistical models this paper will show that democratization is spoiled when an ethno-national homeland displays high levels of motivation and opportunity to challenge the borders. Moreover, democratization emerges as an ethno-national homeland exhibits low levels of motivation and opportunity to contest the borders.

Allard Wagemaker, Netherlands Defence Academy, "*The Chinese are coming! BRI, Afghanistan and geopolitical shifts in South and Central Asia*"

The Chinese are Coming! is about the Belt Road Initiative. In particular, it is about the security of the Silk Road Economic Belt for which the control of Central and South Asia is fundamental – a region that is known for the Great Game. China will most likely face (strong) resistance here from other great and regional powers.

This paper argues that the crux of the success of BRI in this part of world is the stability and accessibility of Afghanistan, which is currently not participating in BRI. The paper starts with a closer look at security as a concept for which the Copenhagen School and the Security Dilemma approach are used to understand China's security challenges. Next is a discussion of the Chinese challenges and how they will affect the geopolitical dynamics in South and Central Asia. The final part focuses on how and why the Chinese strategic and security interests are inevitably connected to Afghanistan.

Daniel F. Wajner, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, "*Battling for Legitimacy: Analyzing Performative Contents in the 'Gaza Flotilla' Paradigmatic Case*"

How can we explain the dynamics of non-conventional struggles such as the "Gaza Flotilla" case of May 2010? Most International Relations scholars analyze international disputes using a "chess-logic", according to which the actors seek to outmaneuver their opponents on the battleground. However, an increasing number of clashes are guided by a "performance logic": although the players interact with one another, their real targets are the audiences. The present study aims to bridge this gap, proposing a phenomenological framework for analyzing this particular kind of *performative* contest over legitimation and delegitimation in contemporary conflicts. It expands upon the idea that current *anarchical* global politics increasingly lead contending actors to engage in "pure" legitimation struggles — "*battles for legitimacy*"— in order to persuade international audiences that they deserve political support. In addition to providing guidelines for the identification of these phenomena, this paper presents a model for the methodical examination of their interactive dynamics based on three legitimation functions (Appropriateness/Consensus/Empathy). This model is applied to the Flotilla case by mapping the framing contests across "*legitimation (battle-)fields*". The findings of this study, which emphasize the strong interplay between normative, political, and emotional mechanisms for empowering (de-)legitimation strategies, may contribute to expanding the research program concerning international legitimacy

Carly Wayne and Yuri Zhukov, University of Michigan, "*Never Again: The Holocaust and Political Legacies of Genocide*"

What political lessons do victims of mass violence and genocide learn and pass on to their children? We explore two pathways through which personal experiences of genocide may shape the political attitudes of survivors and their descendants. First, these experiences could engender empathy toward other victims of violence, making survivors of repression (and their descendants) more supportive of oppressed out-groups. Second, exposure to this type of mass violence could heighten levels of fear, making these individuals less supportive of other victimized groups, if they believe they pose a potential threat. We examine these two divergent effects in the context of the Jewish experience of the Holocaust, and the attendant abstract principle of "never again." We

conduct a survey experiment of out-group political attitudes among American Jews, including survivors, descendants, and those with no family connection to the Holocaust. We find that survivors and descendants are far more likely to support accepting Syrian refugees than individuals without a direct family connection to the Holocaust. Yet, compared to other respondents, survivors and descendants are also less likely to change their attitudes on refugees after being primed to feel empathy or threat toward them. These findings suggest that exposure to mass violence and genocide increases empathy toward other victimized groups, and this effect likely endures across generations.

Chagai M. Weiss, University of Wisconsin – Madison, “*Linking the Battlefield and the Ballot Box: The Causal Effects of Combatant Deaths on Support for Incumbents*”

What are the electoral costs of war and conflict? Recent studies of the American electorate offer that voters punish incumbents for combat casualties. Nonetheless, these advances suffer from limitations relating to the specification of mechanisms and identification of causal effects. In this paper, I examine the effects of combatant deaths on voting behavior in Israel, and test the plausibility of mechanisms relating to changes in political preferences. Employing a difference-in-difference strategy, I identify the negative effect of combatant deaths on support for incumbents. I further show that this effect is likely associated with the electorate’s shift towards hawkish parties. My findings are in line with the expectations of existing theories, but cast doubt on the common assumption that decreased support for incumbents is driven by dovish sentiments. Instead, the Israeli electorate is shown to vote against incumbents in order to elect more hawkish political alternatives.

Yair Yassan, Ben-Gurion University, “*Political Violence of Citizens towards the State and its Agents*”

States are generally perceived legitimate when they act fairly, for the benefit of citizens, and as such that allows them to influence. When this perception is undermined, citizens may deviate from the rules of democracy and act in protest, and sometimes even violently. The use of violence against state agents can be interpreted as a loss of state legitimacy in its most basic sense, ie, a challenge to the monopoly of violence that should be in the hands of the security forces. Based on 60 semi-structured interviews with protest actors from three different struggle arenas in Israel – Jewish settlers, Negev Bedouins, and Ethiopian descendants – my research shows that while social groups can be defined in different socio-political statuses, citizens from different groups will explain political violence based on undermining the authority of the state according to different components: identification, trust, procedural justice, distributive justice, legality and effectivity.

Limor Yehuda, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “*Collective Equality: Normative Yardstick for the Transformation of Self-Determination Conflicts*”

Over the last few decades, power-sharing arrangements have become a central component of peace agreements in self-determination conflicts. While power-sharing has been successfully mainstreamed into the international practice of conflict resolution, tensions between ethnic components of the power-sharing arrangements and core principles of liberalism and human rights law hinder its incorporation into accepted normative frameworks, both political and legal.

This paper argues that we should view ethnic power-sharing as manifestations of a broader principle of “collective equality” which refers to equality between the rival collectives. The offered principle of “Collective Equality” draws from the practice of peace processes (NI, Bosnia, Cyprus and Israel/Palestine), theories of political justice and international law. While this principle is not yet found in the established interpretation of international law, it can be developed by new reading of the *equal right to self-determination of peoples*. Its adoption will enable to better accommodate the peaceful resolution of self-determination conflicts and to serve as a useful normative yardstick.