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The Milošević Regime and the Crisis in Serbia

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When you translate from the language of communism into the language of democracy, you need to change both the vocabulary and the grammar. It is a very difficult and complicated task. However, if you want to translate from the language of communism into the language of nationalism, all you need to change is the vocabulary. The grammar remains the same. The type of mental structures that the new system builds up [is] based on the foundations that already existed under communism. It is us versus them, it is inclusion versus exclusion, and violence as a legitimate way of achieving previously ideological, and now national, goals.

Konstanty Gebert (Polish journalist)\(^1\)

INTRODUCTION

To understand the nature of the Milošević regime and the roots of the Serbian crisis, one must return to the origins of the regime in 1987. Slobodan Milošević did not come to power through either popular election or normal party procedures: he seized power through an internal party coup, embracing the waxing anti-Albanian and anti-Muslim phobias that were then spreading among rural Serbs in particular as the core of his ideology. The Milošević regime built its ideological foundations on hatred, rapidly expanding that hatred to include also Croats, Hungarians (in the Vojvodina), Germans, Austrians, the Vatican, and, of course, the United States—and expanded its power through a series of unconstitutional and illegal measures. These included the mobilization of protesters to destabilize and topple the elected governments in Novi Sad, Titograd (Podgorica), and Priština (the capitals, respectively, of Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo), the arrest of Kosovar Albanians who had signed a petition supporting the 1974 SFRY (Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia) constitution, the installation by Belgrade of Momir Bulatović and Rahman Morina (in 1989)

as the party chiefs in Montenegro and Kosovo, respectively, the amendments to the Serbian constitution adopted in 1989 (which bypassed the federal constitution), the suppression of the provincial autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina in March 1989, the subsequent suppression of the provincial assembly in Kosovo, the use of official channels to declare a boycott of Slovenian goods (in December 1989), the Serbian bank swindle of December 1990, the holding of local Serbian referenda in Croatia in summer 1990 without the approval of Croatian authorities, the unilateral establishment of Serb autonomous regions in Croatia and Bosnia from August 1990 to April 1991, and the establishment and arming of Serb militias in Croatia beginning in summer 1990. And this is only a partial list of unconstitutional and illegal measures taken by Serb authorities from 1988 to 1991.² That said, it is clear that the Milošević regime was illegitimate both objectively (in terms of its political system, economic system, and general disregard for human rights) and contextually (in terms of its failure to comply with the laws of the land). It was no coincidence that among his few close allies Milošević could count Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, who at one point promised to send troops to Serbia to shore up Milošević’s regime in the event of any future conflict with NATO.³

A January 2000 poll found that 56 percent of Serbs were fed up with Milošević.⁴ By mid-April, the proportion of discontents had risen to 71 percent.⁵ In fact, Milošević might have been toppled a good deal earlier but

² For a more complete list, see Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo, 3rd ed. (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 69–70.
³ Agence France Presse, 6 March 2000, on Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe (hereafter, LNAU); Beta news agency (Belgrade), 5 March 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 March 2000, on LNAU. See also Star Tribune (Minneapolis), 12 May 2000, at www.startribune.com.
⁵ Agence France Presse, 13 April 2000, on LNAU.
for the series of fronts he opened over the years—first in Croatia and Bosnia, and later in Kosovo. Indeed, Milošević may well have calculated, in 1990–1991, that he stood to gain from taking the country to war, regardless of the outcome on the battlefield (though there is ample evidence that he expected to have achieved all of his territorial goals by late 1993 at the latest).

How would war serve his interests? First, in conditions of war, there is a natural tendency for people to rally around the government; rival politicians are forced to compete on the issue of patriotism where, by virtue of being out of power, they are at a disadvantage. This is part of the explanation of the fact that the most vocal opposition leaders during the 1990s (Vuk Drašković, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement; Zoran Djindjić, president of the Democratic Party; and Vojislav Šešelj, president of the Serbian Radical Party) all had credentials as bona fide nationalists.6

Second, in conditions of war, opponents can be marginalized or attacked as “traitors,”7 and the independent press can be more easily muzzled. The leadership is, thus, in a better position to monopolize political discourse.

And third, the war enabled Milošević to gain disproportionate control of the nation’s resources, dividing the nation’s wealth with family and cronies. A 1997 report in *U.S. News & World Report* noted, for example, that then-Prime Minister Mirko Marjanović was worth about $50 million and that many other high-ranking officials in Belgrade had grown rich through illegal

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means and were, by then, heading private firms fueled with misappropriated state funds. By 1993, the Milošević regime had seized all foreign-currency accounts in Serbian banks—involving about $3.8 billion in foreign currency. This control of the country’s wealth made the regime even stronger. In this regard, the UN economic embargo was a complete miscalculation because it made it far simpler for Milošević and his regime to monopolize economic power, to control imports, and to pocket war profits. By the end of 1999, some 65 percent of Serbs were officially reported to be living below the poverty line—with unofficial estimates ranging as high as 80 percent.

In the West, the myth was widespread until very recently that Milošević enjoyed enormous popularity among Serbs. In fact, in elections held on 9 December 1990, Milošević’s Socialist Party garnered only 46.1 percent of the vote—the largest proportion won by any party, to be sure, but less than half nonetheless. Given the electoral rules that had been adopted in Serbia, however, this gave the Socialist Party control of 77.6 percent of the seats in the parliament. In the presidential elections of December 1992, Milošević secured his electoral victory over challenger Milan Panič only by invalidating the registration of many voters, by orchestrating the slander of his rival in the regime press (while denying Panič the possibility of any reply), and even by holding up approval of Panič’s candidacy until close to election day, thus ensuring that his rival had no air time until late in the race. In the December 1993 parliamentary elections, the Socialist Party’s

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9 I Net web site (Belgrade), 10 January 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 January 2000, on LNAU.
support shrank to just 36.7 percent of the vote, yielding 49.2 percent of the parliamentary seats.\(^{12}\) And subsequently, in November 1996, the Socialist Party actually went down to defeat in local elections in Belgrade, Niš, and several other cities, but attempted, unsuccessfully in the event, to annul the opposition's victories.

Milošević held onto power, however, in spite of his sagging popularity at home, by keeping the opposition divided, by cultivating an on-again, off-again, on-again working alliance with the neofascist Vojislav Šešelj, who eventually served as Milošević's deputy prime minister,\(^ {13}\) by constraining cultural production to fit his nationalist, folk-heroic ethos,\(^ {14}\) by maintaining a sense of never-ending crisis, by waging war against the country's independent media, and, perhaps above all, by promulgating a culture of hatred. Milošević also transformed once-liberal Serbia into a police state. By 1993 there were some 25,000 police stationed in Belgrade alone, making the Serbian capital, in Robert Thomas's words, "the most heavily policed capital in Europe."\(^ {15}\) Significantly, some 60 percent of Belgrade's police force came from outside Serbia itself—that is, largely from rural parts of Bosnia and Croatia. That such recruits to the police force would have little rapport with the urban intelligentsia and university students of Belgrade goes without saying.

**MILOŠEVić'S WAR AGAINST SERBIAN SOCIETY**

There was a time when apologists for Milošević's regime could point to *Vreme, Naša borba*, and other independent periodicals, and to a string of

12 Gordy, *Culture of Power*, p. 49.
14 Details in Gordy, *Culture of Power*, pp. 104–205.
independent radio and television stations, as “proof” that there was a diversity of news sources in the country. But that time has passed; such independent media as still existed during 1999–2000 were, as we shall see, under siege. Moreover, even at the height of “press freedom” in Serbia, 69 percent of Serbs relied on television as their primary source of information, and, in most cases, this meant state-controlled Radio-Television Serbia.\textsuperscript{16} What this has meant in practice was shown in a July 1992 survey conducted by the independent Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade among 1,380 respondents. Asked who had been bombarding Sarajevo from the surrounding hills during May and June, 38.4 percent answered “Muslim-Croat forces,” 22.5 percent simply did not know, and only 20.5 percent thought that Serb forces were responsible.\textsuperscript{17}

During the years 1987–1994, Milošević seemed to be content to control Radio-Television Serbia, the daily newspaper \textit{Politika}, and the tabloid daily newspaper \textit{Politika ekspres}, though for a time the weekly magazine \textit{NIN} and the daily newspaper \textit{Večernje novosti} were also in his court. But beginning in late 1994, the regime’s tolerance for dissenting views had dwindled. Already at that time, the government assumed control of the influential daily newspaper \textit{Borba}, impelling defiant journalists on its staff to launch a new paper of their own called \textit{Naša borba}. The independent-minded newspaper \textit{Svetlost} (published in Kragujevac) was taken over by the authorities in 1995, while \textit{Vranjske novine} and \textit{Novi Pančevac} (from Pančevo) were brought down by governmental pressure the following year. The editor of \textit{Borske novine}, Miroslav Radulović, was jailed for six months in October 1995 for having published a photo montage showing the faces of Serbian and Montenegrin leaders atop bare male torsos. In Belgrade itself, the independent newspapers \textit{Dnevni telegraf}, \textit{Naša borba}, and \textit{Danas} were temporarily banned in spring 1998, with heavy fines imposed on \textit{Dnevni telegraf} and \textit{Glas javnosti} for the publication of stories critical of the

\textsuperscript{16} According to a 1994 poll, reported in ibid., p. 65.
\textsuperscript{17} Thompson, \textit{Forging War}, p. 108.
government or its ministers. *Dnevni telegraf* and *Naša borba* were subsequently suppressed altogether. Among the broadcast media, the regime’s ministers maintained a nearly total monopoly. Independent radio stations simply did not last: Radio Pingvin, the first private, independent radio station in Belgrade, was acquired by Milošević’s henchman, Željko Raznjatović, in March 1996; the independent station Radio Smederevo was taken over by Mirjana Marković’s party, JUL (Yugoslav United Left), in June 1996; and B-92, the crown jewel of the independent stations, was taken off the air by the authorities on two occasions—briefly at the end of 1996 and again in April 1999, in the midst of the NATO aerial campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).18 In March 1997, a new, more restrictive broadcasting law was adopted in Serbia, which stipulated that “no private radio or television station would be allowed to broadcast to an audience of more than 25 percent of the 10.5 million population.”19 A governmental decree making it illegal to spread “anxiety, panic, and defeatism” among the public was also put to use during 1998 so as to curb independent-minded media.20 Then, on 22 October 1998, a new law on the media21 laid down certain elastic criteria under which critical voices could be silenced, and specifically banned the broadcast of Serbian-language programs by foreign stations including the Voice of America, the BBC, and Radio Free Europe. In response, the Association of Independent Electronic Media in Serbia (ANEM) issued a statement declaring that the new law “destroys what little freedom there was and leads the country into dictatorship and darkness.”22 The law applied only in Serbia, however, leaving Montenegro’s media significantly freer.

About this time, the Milošević regime passed a law transferring

18 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
university administration to government hands. The law authorized the government to appoint both university presidents and the deans of colleges—a move for which the only precedent was the wartime quisling government of General Milan Nedić (1941–1945), which had functioned in conditions of Nazi occupation. Under the law, Vice Premier Šešelj was named chair of the governing council of the Belgrade University law school, where he vowed to carry out a “purge,” and professors in all faculties were required to sign loyalty oaths. Among those dismissed or barred from the classroom were four law school professors, twenty-five professors of philology, and two professors of mathematics. Other professors resigned in protest. In May 1998, when the draft law was still being discussed in parliament, Belgrade University students gathered 35,000 signatures on a petition to have the legislation withdrawn, and demonstrated—two thousand strong—outside the parliament building, but to no avail. The bill was passed into law on 26 May 1998.

There were also purges in 1998 in the upper echelons of the army, the secret service, and the governing party itself. Momčilo Perišić was dismissed as chief of staff because he had expressed reservations about Milošević’s plans to use force to suppress Albanian restiveness in Kosovo. And on 27 October 1998, Radio Belgrade announced that Jovica Stanišić had been dismissed as chief of the State Security Service. He had served in this post

23 Beta news agency (Belgrade), 28 May 1998, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 May 1998, on LNAU. Regarding the Nedić government, see Milan Borkovic, Milan Nedić (Zagreb: Centar za Informacije i Publicitet, 1985); Žarko S. Jovanovic, Nova vlast u Srbiji 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1997). The latter publication was specifically approved by Slobodan Milošević, who is listed in the book as one of its prepublication reviewers!


since 1991 and had figured, for many years, as the second most powerful man in Serbia, after Milošević.27

But even as Milošević was tightening his reins on the universities and on the press, two prominent journalists, Aleksandar Tijanić and Slavko Čuruvija, in an act of great courage and integrity, published an open letter to Milošević in the independent Belgrade weekly magazine Evropijanin. Accusing Milošević of having suspended the constitution and stifled freedom of the press, Tijanić and Čuruvija continued:

• Everything that the Serbs created in this century has been thoughtlessly squandered: state and national boundaries; the status of an ally in two world wars; national dignity; membership in all international institutions; the European identity of Serbs has eroded; Serbs withdrew from their ethnic territories in Croatia and parts of Bosnia; the nation has developed a complex of being an aggressor, genocidal, vanquished and a keeper of the last frontiers of European Communism.

• [The] merits and [the] worth of all Serbian institutions have been destroyed in a planned manner: you have brought the university and a local farmers’ collective to the same level, equated the Academy of Arts and Sciences with a nursing home, you degraded the church, [the] legislature, [the] media, parliament, and the government.

• Under the cover of transition, which is nothing but a different name for robbery, you impoverished the middle class, nurturing at the same time the emergence of a new economic and political elite; national per capita GNP has dropped to $1,400....

• You have left a small circle of about 100 families which enjoy your support and protection in charge of the state resources; officials of the state you lead demonstrate feudal extravagance and arrogance in the

midst of huge misery and poverty; large companies are run by your proxies. ...

- Your country is in decline. Serbs are dying from diseases that are curable or do not exist elsewhere in the world; there are no medications, the situation of the health care system is drastic, and the population uses sedatives the way vitamins are used in the developed countries. ...

- A psychosis of permanent state of emergency has been imposed on the society, in addition to the fear of the omnipotent police and your henchmen, who boast that they can order executions of the people they dislike; absolute obedience is demanded from the population; hysterical choreographed outpourings of support are devised after every victory that contributes to our decline. 28

Tijanić and Ćuruvijja closed by listing thirteen demands, among them that Milošević stop the persecution of the media, annul the new university law, initiate authentic processes of privatization, commit himself to a struggle against organized crime, establish the independence of the judiciary, recommend the calling of new elections, work to promote interethnic amity, and apply for membership in the European Union and the NATO Partnership for Peace.

As a result of the publication of this article, Evropijanin was fined $240,000 and its property confiscated. Five months later, Ćuruvijja was gunned down on the streets of Belgrade in broad daylight. Only now, in the wake of Milošević's fall, has the murder been traced to the State Security Service itself.

CHAOS AND GANGLAND KILLINGS IN BELGRADE

Contrary to popular wisdom, the seventy-eight-day NATO aerial campaign against the FRY in the spring of 1999 did not strengthen Milošević. On the contrary, it weakened him enormously, in the first place by bringing opposition to him into the open, in the second place by stimulating a serious mending of fences among opposition forces, and in the third place by demonstrating, beyond any shadow of doubt, the relative isolation into which Serbia had fallen in the Milošević years. The escalation of internal repression that followed the aerial campaign was the surest sign that Milošević himself was aware of this reality. Given the way in which earlier conflicts had only served to reinforce his position, however, most likely Milošević did not expect this result.

Already in the days immediately following Milošević’s negotiated capitulation (which he, not surprisingly, trumpeted to his domestic audience as a resounding victory), anti-Milošević demonstrations broke out in the town of Čačak, 150 km. south of Belgrade, where, on 29 June, some ten thousand protesters demanded Milošević’s resignation. Antiregime rallies quickly spread to Novi Sad, Leskovac, and Užice, with some twenty thousand demonstrating against the regime on the streets of Leskovac on 5 July. Street protests continued well into November. The army was reported (in late June 1999) to be on the verge of mutiny, while Democratic Party President Zoran Djindjić confidently predicted that

31 Agence France Presse, 22 November 1999, on LNAU, regarding an antiregime protest in Belgrade attended by an estimated three thousand people.
Milošević would fall from power within six months at the most.\textsuperscript{33} As discontent spread, opposition leaders became emboldened, with Nebojša Čović, president of the Democratic Alternative, criticizing FRY President Milošević and Serbian President Milutinović in the sharpest possible terms in an interview published in the independent weekly *Vreme.*\textsuperscript{34}

Yet, as had happened so often in the past, Vuk Drašković, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement, and Zoran Djindjić, president of the Democratic Party, found it impossible to agree either on a common slate of demands or even on joint action. Thus they again failed to present a united front.\textsuperscript{35} Meanwhile, about twelve thousand residents of Belgrade signed a petition demanding that Milošević resign, while the Alliance for Change collected 150,000 signatures on a second petition, which charged, among other things, that “since [Milošević] came to power he has become ten times richer while he has made Serbia ten times poorer.”\textsuperscript{36}

Already on 20 July 1999, Crown Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević and the Crown Council issued a statement, from London, accusing Milošević of having pursued “a catastrophic national and state policy,” calling on him to resign, and suggesting that the “easiest and fairest way out of the chaos created by the illegitimate authorities would be to restore the monarchy embodied in the historic Karadjordjević dynasty as the guarantor of constitutionality and democracy.”\textsuperscript{37} Significantly, the independent Belgrade newspaper *Blic* carried an interview with the crown prince on 30 July in

\textsuperscript{33} Milan Jelovac, “Miloševicu dajem najviše šest mjeseci” [An interview with Zoran Djindjic], *Hrvatski obzor* (Zagreb), no. 222 (10 July 1999), at www.tel.hr/hrvatski-obzor/broj222/djindjic.html.


which the would-be heir was given the opportunity to repeat these points.\footnote{38} Across Serbia, opposition mayors and local officials talked of wanting to topple Milošević. As early as 22 July, Momčilo Perišić, the former chief of staff, publicly called for the removal of the existing leadership “by political means” and the redirection of the society “along the path of civic and democratic programs, and not those of hatred and violence.”\footnote{39} Then, on 11 August, in a dramatic gesture of defiance and opposition, the bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church called for Milošević’s resignation and the establishment of a transition government to organize free and fair elections.\footnote{40} This call was echoed in mid-October by Archbishop of Belgrade Franc Perko of the Roman Catholic Church.\footnote{41}

But Milošević had no intention of yielding to such pressures. Instead, he reshuffled the cabinet in mid-August, bringing five members of Šešelj’s ultranationalist Radical Party into the cabinet.\footnote{42} Falling back on his standard ploy of drawing strength from people’s hatreds, Milošević orchestrated a deafening tirade in the regime-controlled press against Kosovo’s Albanians and NATO alike,\footnote{43} and set in motion a fresh campaign in the press against Serbia’s gays and lesbians.\footnote{44}


\footnote{40} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12 August 1999, at archiv.nzz.ch/books/nzzmonat/0/1476179T.html.

\footnote{41} Agence France Presse, 15 October 1999, on LNAU.

\footnote{42} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13 August 1999, at archiv.nzz.ch/books/nzzmonat/0/27161T.html.


\footnote{44} As noted in Svetlana Slapšak, “O biciklistima i onim drugima,” Nezavisni (Novi Sad),
At this point, such tactics were probably beside the point. At year’s end, national income stood at half of what it had been in 1990, while industrial production in 1999 was 25–40 percent lower than in 1998. Unemployment in the FRY stood at 27.3 percent in 1999, up from 25.2 percent in 1998; by republic, the unemployment rate was recorded at 26.5 percent for Serbia in that year and 36.8 percent in Montenegro. Among pensioners the situation had become especially desperate: 75 percent of Serbian pensioners were said to live below the poverty line, 50 percent could not afford enough bread, and one in three had stopped buying meat altogether. Against this legion of impoverished Serbs, there were, as of early 2000, about 200,000 FRY citizens enjoying fabulous wealth. The damage inflicted on the economic infrastructure by NATO in spring 1999 only deepened the sense of desperation. A front-page headline in Vreme warned that it would take forty years just to return to the economic levels of 1989 (and that prognosis did not even take into account the huge inequalities of wealth which had developed in the years since Milošević took office). Indeed, an opinion poll conducted among 1,588 Serbian adult citizens about this time found that 54 percent thought that the system was going steadily downhill and would soon collapse altogether, while only 4 percent thought that the system was


45 It was 25% lower according to official figures; 40% lower according to unofficial figures—Die Presse (Vienna), 24 December 1999, at www.diepresse.at.

46 Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 5 March 2000, on LNAU.

47 Danas (Belgrade), 19 February 2000, as summarized in Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 February 2000, on LNAU.


functioning well.⁵⁰ While rumors circulated that Milošević would seek to save himself by starting a war against Montenegro,⁵¹ the leading opposition parties worked hard at mending their fences and, by 10 January, were able to report that fourteen of the fifteen opposition parties (all except Perišić’s small party) had come to an agreement on a united front. Speaking at a press conference at year’s end, Zoran Djindjić, by now a leading figure in the Alliance for Change coalition, pledged to remove Milošević by “democratic” means before the end of 2000.⁵²

Meanwhile, the FRY continued to sink rapidly into chaos—both at the center and at the periphery. Vuk Drašković, leader of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement, was himself nearly killed in a traffic collision in October 1999 which many (including Drašković himself)⁵³ suspected had been arranged from above. After that event, Belgrade witnessed a series of gangland-style attacks, often in broad daylight. Among those shot were Serbian warlord Željko “Arkan” Raznjatović, age 47 (on 15 January),⁵⁴ Šešelj’s bodyguard Petar Panić, age 33 (on 28 January),⁵⁵ Defense Minister Pavle Bulatović, age 52 (on 7 February),⁵⁶ underworld figure Branislav Lainović, age 45 (on 21 March),⁵⁷ JAT airline director Živorad Petrović, age 61 (on 25 April),⁵⁸ businessman Zoran “Škole” Uskoković, a friend of the aforementioned Lainović having his own links with the underworld and

⁵⁰ A further 28% said that the system had problems but was still functional, while 14% did not have clear views—Vesna Bjekic, “What the Citizens of Serbia Fear,” AIM-Press, 12 October 1999, at www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data, p. 2.
⁵¹ Die Presse, 13 October 1999, at www.diepresse.at.
⁵² Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 December 1999, on LNAU; Agence France Presse, 10 January 2000, on LNAU.
⁵³ Agence France Presse, 26 April 2000, on LNAU.
⁵⁸ Agence France Presse, 26 April 2000, on LNAU; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 April 2000, at www.sueddeutsche.de.
possibly implicated in the murder of "Arkan" (on 27 April),\(^{59}\) and Boško Perošević, chief of the Vojvodina branch of the Socialist Party of Serbia (on 14 May).\(^{60}\) In addition, a car belonging to Milenko Dragojlović, a Belgrade lawyer, was riddled with bullets on 24 April, while unknown assailants attacked Vukašin Obradović, owner of the south Serbian newspaper *Vranjske novine*, on 25 May.\(^{61}\) All of the foregoing died of their wounds. Furthermore, four people were injured in the course of a shootout in downtown Novi Sad in early February.\(^{62}\) Rumors quickly circulated that Raznjatović had become estranged from Milošević, had established close relations with opposition leader Djindjić, had asked Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović about the possibility of safe haven in Montenegro, and may even have been prepared to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal in gathering evidence against Milošević.\(^{63}\) There were also rumors that Milošević had been preparing to fire Bulatović, "a modest man untainted by corruption or black market activities,"\(^{64}\) who was not among the five Scrb leaders charged earlier by the Hague Tribunal with war crimes in Kosovo. Interestingly enough, Bulatović's successor as defense minister, Dragoljub Ojdanić, was one of those five indicted in 1999. Belgrade authorities variously charged Western intelligence agencies or local Otpor (Resistance—an opposition student movement) activists with having perpetrated these slayings.

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59 Radio Montenegro, 27 April 2000, in *BBC Monitoring Europe—Political*, 27 April 2000, on LNAU; Agence France Presse, 27 April 2000, on LNAU.


61 Beta news agency (25 April 2000), trans. in *BBC Monitoring Europe—Political*, 25 April 2000, on LNAU; Radio B2-92 web site (Belgrade), 25 May 2000, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 27 May 2000, on LNAU.

62 SRNA news agency (Bijelina), 5 February 2000, in *BBC Monitoring Europe—Political*, 5 February 2000, on LNAU.


CHAOS AND VIOLENCE IN THE PERIPHERIES

But the escalating violence was not confined to shootings in Belgrade and Novi Sad. As the situation in Kosovo continued to spiral out of control, with local Albanians exacting revenge on their erstwhile Serbian and Roma neighbors, the violence also spread to Serbian municipalities just north of Kosovo, where an estimated 85,000 Albanians formed 70 percent of the local population, according to recent estimates. As Serbs fled from Kosovo, abandoning their homes to Albanians, described by the Belgrade government as “Albanian terrorists,” Albanians living in the communities of Preševo (Albanian: Preshevë), Bujanovac (Albanian: Bujanovc), and Medvedja (Albanian: Medvegjë) came under pressure. Indeed, as many as 20,000 Albanians are thought to have fled these communities from March to November 1999, taking refuge in Kosovo or in Macedonia. Others resolved to stay and fight the Serbs. Amid reports of house searches and physical harassment of local Albanians by police, a group of armed Albanians attacked a police patrol in the area of the villages of Lucane and Dobrosin. But not all the violence was interethnic. One of the first


67 There were more than 100,000 Albanians living in these communities just outside Kosovo as of March 1999, and only 85,000 as of late November. See Los Angeles Times, 30 November 1999, at www.latimes.com/news/reports/yugo/news.

68 Die Presse, 22 March 2000, at www.diepresse.at.

69 Bot Sot (Priština), 14 April 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 April 2000,
Albanians in this region to lose his life after the NATO campaign had ended was Mustafa Džamilj, district vice-president of the Socialist Party of Serbia in Bujanovac and director of the elementary school in the village of Djurdjevac. Džamilj was a prominent Albanian loyal to the Republic of Serbia, and was most likely gunned down by Albanian nationalists.

Discontent also rose dramatically in Vojvodina, in spite of Milošević’s efforts to buy time by driving out local Croats and Hungarians, offering their homes to Serbian refugees from Bosnia and the Krajina. Since 1991, 50,000 to 100,000 Hungarians have been driven from this northernmost province of Serbia, alongside some 45,000 Croats. Already during the war in Bosnia, young Hungarian men from Vojvodina were reportedly drafted into the Yugoslav Army far beyond their proportion of the population, with those remaining behind being subjected to daily insults and harassment, according to a story published in the Christian Science Monitor. In a dramatic example of Serb nationalist pressure, Vojislav Šešelj visited the Vojvodinan town of Hrtkovci in July 1992 and read out a list of seventeen local (Croatian) “traitors” who were warned to leave the village immediately. As a result of sundry forms of pressure, the ethnic composition on LNAU; Beta news agency (Belgrade), 17 April 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 April 2000, on LNAU.


72 There were 50,000 Hungarians according to MTI (Budapest), 29 July 1999, in BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, 29 July 1999, on LNAU; 100,000 Hungarians according to MTI (13 September 1999), in BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, 14 September 1999, on LNAU; and 45,000 Croats according to Larisa Inic, “Lutanje po državi pravnih iluzij,” Nezavisni, 11 February 2000, at www.nezavisni.co.yu/327/htm/327subotica.htm, p. 2.

of Hrtkovci changed virtually overnight, even though Vojvodina was allegedly outside the war zone. According to Index, an independent newspaper published in Vojvodina, the ethnic composition of Hrtkovci in May 1992 was 70 percent Croat, 20 percent Hungarian, and 10 percent Serb; by the end of July of that year, the population was only 2 percent Croat and 12 percent Hungarian, but 83 percent Serb, and 3 percent “other.”

According to Hungarian Radio, many local Hungarians were dismissed from their jobs in a “soft” version of ethnic cleansing, while the Belgrade government drew up plans for a “third colonization” of Vojvodina by Serbs.

Resistance to Milošević’s policies in Vojvodina grew, among both Serbs and non-Serbs, with 80 percent of citizens favoring a restoration of provincial autonomy (abolished in 1989, at the same time that Kosovo’s autonomy was abolished).

The leading opposition politicians in Vojvodina—Nenad Čanak, president of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina; Jožef Kasa, president of the League of Vojvodinan Hungarians; Miodrag Isakov, president of the Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina; and Stanimir Lazić, president of the Political Council of the Vojvodinan Movement—all came out in favor of a restoration of autonomy, with Čanak promoting a plan for the reorganization of Serbia into six federal units: Vojvodina, Šumadija, southeast Serbia, Sandžak, Belgrade, and Kosovo. But the longer Milošević remained in power, the greater the support for an independent Vojvodina—a solution which was unimaginable before the breakup of the SFRY in 1991.

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74 Regarding Šešelj, see The Independent (London), 24 August 1992, p. 8; regarding the ethnic composition of Hrtkovci, see Christian Science Monitor, 10 September 1992, p. 1, on LNAU.
75 The first colonization was after 1918; the second came after 1945.
Interethnic relations also deteriorated sharply in the Sandžak region (in southwestern Serbia). As in Vojvodina, Serb nationalists created an atmosphere of fear and terror for non-Serbs—in this case, for Muslims. A 1994 report in the Christian Science Monitor stated: "Hundreds of Muslims, most of them impoverished and illiterate peasants, have been terrorized and beaten in recent months during police raids on their homes.... Authorities... have also jailed and tortured more than 50 key activists of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA).... Thousands of Muslims have fled the region...."79 In fact, from 1991 to 1997 nearly 70,000 people, mainly Muslims, are said to have abandoned their homes and fled from the Sandžak.80 During the years 1992–1994, Serbian paramilitary formations were active in the Sandžak. From April 1992 to April 1994, more than fifty Sandžak Muslims were murdered or disappeared and were presumed dead; others were kidnapped. In the first thirteen months of the Bosnian war, nearly one hundred Muslim-owned homes and shops in the Sandžak were destroyed.81

Tensions remained high in the Sandžak, where human rights continued to be violated by the authorities (according to the Bosniak National Council of Sandžak).82 Locals complained that in Novi Pazar, the capital of Sandžak, 95 percent of city police were Serbs, even though 80 percent of the city's inhabitants are Muslims. According to Jiří Dienstbier, UN special commissioner for human rights in the former Yugoslavia, there was a danger that open conflict could break out in the Sandžak region at any time.83

79 Christian Science Monitor, 11 April 1994, p. 2, on LNAU.
82 Agence France Presse, 12 November 1999, on LNAU.
83 CTK National News Wire, 5 October 1999, on LNAU.
Among the Muslims themselves, there are two broad groupings: the Bosniak National Council led by Sulejman Ugjanin, which favors regional autonomy as a solution; and the Sandžak Coalition led by Rasim Ljajić, which has ruled out either autonomy or secession, seeing the solution to local problems in the establishment of a liberal order in the FRY as a whole.⁸⁴

Montenegro, Serbia’s partner in the FRY, also became a flash point, with growing secessionist sentiment based not on misconceived notions of national self-determination as such,⁸⁵ but on the desire of Montenegrins to put as much distance between themselves and Milošević as possible. Before the NATO aerial campaign in 1999, Montenegrin separatist sentiments were politically marginal, but this changed during the campaign when Montenegro declared itself “neutral” and its president Milo Đukanović called on NATO to depose Milošević. Significantly, the first protest of any kind in Montenegro during the campaign came only on 21 May when 1,000-3,000 inhabitants of the town of Cetinje demonstrated against the deployment of Yugoslav Army reinforcements in the area.⁸⁶ The Montenegrin government promised to arrest any indicted war criminals who might enter Montenegrin territory, including Milošević,⁸⁷ and issued an amnesty for Montenegrins who had dodged the draft during the war with NATO.

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⁸⁶ One thousand according to BBC News, 22 May 1999, at news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe; three thousand according to Die Welt, 22 May 1999, at www.welt.de/daten.

Soon after the war ended, the Montenegrin government drew up a plan to redefine the FRY as a confederation of two equal states, with separate monetary systems, separate foreign ministries, and even separate defense systems. The Belgrade press rushed to denounce the proposal, but by the end of the summer, Montenegrin secessionism was clearly gaining momentum. In February 1999 only 21 percent of Montenegrins had favored independence, but seven months later 43.9 percent of them favored it (vs. 38.9 percent opposed, 9 percent having no opinion, and 8.2 percent declaring that they would not vote in any eventual referendum on the question). By late May 2000, 65 percent of Montenegrins were said to favor independence.

Federal officials sent characteristically mixed signals. Vice Premier Šešelj called the Montenegrin proposal "nonsense" and promised that Serbia would use force to suppress any move toward independence. Ratko Krasmanović, secretary-general of the left-wing JUL party and a close confidant of Mirjana Marković, denounced the Montenegrin proposal as "criminal and contrary to the constitution." But subsequently, in a statement which was given various interpretations, Milošević declared that the Montenegrins should decide their own future for themselves.

89 "Narod ne prihvata odvajanje Crne Gore od Srbije," in Politika ekspress (Belgrade), 29 August 1999, p. 4.
90 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, as reprinted in Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung für Rumänien (Bucharest), 4 September 1999, p. 3.
In fact, the Montenegrin government was doing just that. On 2 November it introduced the German DM as its official currency in a first step toward establishing a separate Montenegrin currency,\textsuperscript{95} and in early December it made a bid to take control of the republic's main airport at Podgorica.\textsuperscript{96} Meanwhile, as interrepublic dialogue reached a dead end,\textsuperscript{97} a battalion of military police loyal to federal Prime Minister Momir Bulatović (a Milošević loyalist) was formed, and Milošević's defense authorities set up and armed paramilitary units in Montenegro, in a pattern reminiscent of preparations in Croatia and Bosnia a decade earlier.\textsuperscript{98} The United States urged Podgorica to be cautious, but extended $7 million in grant aid, on top of an earlier $8 million, in support of judicial and local government reforms and movement toward a free-market economy.\textsuperscript{99}

By early March, Serb-Montenegrin tensions seemed to be skidding dangerously out of control as Serb authorities first imposed high "export" fees on Montenegrin firms purchasing goods in Serbia,\textsuperscript{100} then imposed a blockade on supplies of medicine to Montenegro,\textsuperscript{101} and finally, imposed a total blockade "on the import of raw materials and semi-finished goods for

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Die Welt}, 3 November 1999, at www.welt.de/daten; Montena-fax news agency (Podgorica), 27 March 2000, in \textit{BBC Monitoring Europe—Political}, 27 March 2000, on LNAU.


\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Die Presse} (Vienna), 20 October 1999, at www.diepresse.at.

\textsuperscript{98} According to charges registered by Andrija Perišić, a member of Montenegro's ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, as reported in the \textit{Star Tribune}, 1 February 2000, at www.startribune.com. On 20 March, Montenegrin police confiscated a cache of explosives and guns from Aleksandar Vujovic, chairman of the Andrijevica municipal committee of JUL (Mirjana Markovic's party). On this, see \textit{Vijesti} (Podgorica), 21 March 2000, in \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasts}, 23 March 2000, on LNAU.

\textsuperscript{99} Regarding caution, see \textit{Agence France Presse}, 5 February 2000, on LNAU; regarding $7 million, see \textit{Deutsche Presse-Agentur}, 31 January 2000, on LNAU.

\textsuperscript{100} Info-Prod Research Ltd., 1 February 2000, on LNAU.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Agence France Presse}, 8 March 2000, on LNAU; see also \textit{OÖNachrichten}, 7 March 2000, p. 4, at www1.oon.at/public/dcarchiv.ht.
Montenegrin industry and the export of industrial products from Montenegro." Montenegrin President Djukanović was frank about his fear that Belgrade might try to use its supporters within Montenegro to provoke civil war in the republic, and admitted, in an interview with the Vienna daily Der Standard, that Podgorica was already preparing for the worst. Montenegrin Vice-President Dragiša Burzan was even more explicit, telling the Croatian daily Slobodna Dalmacija that Montenegrin independence was now "unavoidable." With the Yugoslav Army noting that it was maintaining a "level of combat readiness" to defend FRY integrity, Belgrade accused Podgorica of "escalating political conflicts."

As tensions mounted in late March, Djukanović speculated that Milošević had only two possible recourses to stay in power: to extend his control over wayward Montenegro, or to cut the republic loose and content himself to rule in rump Serbia. In early April, amid reports of an increasing number of defections by Yugoslav Army officers and soldiers to join the Montenegrin police, Belgrade announced that it was setting up a

102 Montena-fax news agency, 8 March 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 March 2000, on LNAU.
104 Der Standard (Vienna), 20 March 2000, in BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, 20 March 2000, on LNAU.
105 Montenegrin Information Ministry web site (Podgorica), 16 March 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 March 2000, on LNAU.
106 Montena-fax news agency, 16 March 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 March 2000, on LNAU.
107 Quoted in SRNA news agency (Bijeljina), 21 March 2000, in BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, 21 March 2000, on LNAU.
108 Radio Montenegro (Podgorica), 28 March 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 March 2000, on LNAU; Agence France Presse, 5 April 2000, on LNAU.
109 BH Press news agency (Sarajevo), 5 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 April 2000, on LNAU.
new military-police battalion within Montenegro. Meanwhile, Montene-
grin authorities tightened security in the republic, appointing three dismissed
Yugoslav Army generals to serve as counselors for security and defense.

And then there was Kosovo, still a dangerous flash point despite the
37,000-strong KFOR peacekeeping force. In March, tensions in Kosovska
Mitrovica seized the headlines, but the problems extend far beyond the city
limits of that divided municipality. Before the month was out, KFOR was
confiscating arms and ammunition belonging to local Albanians. As the
New York Times put it in mid-month, "tens of thousands of alliance troops
and a United Nations administration have failed to prevent de facto
partitioning of Kosovo or continued ethnic bloodshed." Whether beefing
up KFOR, as some NATO members were reported to favor, would
suffice to solve the underlying problem was open to question. After all, the
fundamental problem which has produced a decade of violence between
Serbs and non-Serbs was the hate-mongering, chauvinistic regime headed by
Milošević. Until a legitimate government could replace it and undertake
processes of healing and reconciliation, there would always be new
problems, new emergencies, fresh crises. Meanwhile, it was probably too
late for Serb-Albanian reconciliation, at least in the short run; for their part,
Kosovar Albanian leaders Rugova and Thaçi have continued to insist that
they will not be content with anything less than full independence for
Kosovo.

110 Agence France Presse, 8 April 2000, on LNAU.
111 UPI (1 April 2000), on LNAU. See also Die Presse, 31 March 2000, at www.diepresse-
se.at.
112 SRNA news agency (Bijeljina), 21 March 2000, on LNAU.
115 Regarding Rugova, UPI (17 April 2000), on LNAU; regarding Thaçi, see Die Presse, 23
May 2000, at www.diepresse.at.
THE SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

During the 1960s and 1970s, nationalism flared up in several republics; and in the decade following Tito's death in 1980, the flames of nationalism burned again in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. What all too few observers understood at the time was that these nationalist currents drew their strength, in the first place, from the illegitimacy of the communist one-party system, even if its federal structure gradually resulted in the system functioning more like a confederal union of six one-party systems. As an illegitimate political formation, the Yugoslav communist system ultimately relied on force to maintain itself.

If postsocialist Yugoslavia was to have any hope of a smooth transition, it was critical that it develop legitimate institutions, whether jointly or separately in the respective republics. The FRY's distinction in the post-SFRY transition is fourfold. First, only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communist establishment succeed in holding onto power, even if by radically changing the programmatic ideology of state. Elsewhere, noncommunist parties or coalitions took power (though in Macedonia, the former communists joined in a coalition to form the first postcommunist government). Second, only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communists themselves embrace a program of nationalism. Although the other republics were not without their own nationalists, the local communist parties in Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia preserved their antinationalist orientation and redesigned themselves as Western-style social democratic parties (while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the communists became irrelevant overnight).

Third, in contrast with Croatian President Tudjman and Bosnian President Izetbegović, whose electoral victories were achieved with the help of local Catholic and Islamic clergy, respectively, Milošević was not beholden to ecclesiastical authorities for his power, even in part. This contributed to Milošević's indifference to the repeated calls by Serbian Orthodox hierarchy that he resign. Indeed, in mid-April 2000, a senior official of Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) accused the Serbian
Orthodox church of siding "with those who bombarded us, infidels, non-Christians who [are] destroying our people," while the public relations office of the (opposition) Serb National Council (SNV) of Kosmet issued a statement complaining that the regime was waging a verbal campaign against the church and the SNV itself.117

And finally, only Milošević's regime relied on the inculcation and nurturing of hatred in the first place to develop support. Without denying Tudjman's territorial revanchism or the intolerance which developed among both Croats and Bosnian Muslims in the course of the war, it is a fact that neither Tudjman nor Izetbegović depended on hatred for political survival.

If one adds to this calculus Milošević's arguably paranoid-psychopathic personality traits, one has the profile of a dangerous regime: illegitimate (both objectively and in its own legal context), relying on the promulgation of nationalist hatred for its continuance, at odds with local clergy, and led by an individual with a problematic personality.

Stevan Dedijer, an eighty-eight-year-old Serbian dissident, suggested a remedy for Serbia's ongoing political illness, claiming that what Serbia needed was a "Serbian Adenauer." Nothing could then have pleased the West more than to see Milošević removed and "de-Nazification" set in motion. Indeed, the West offered cash incentives—promising to lift sanctions and provide at least $3 billion in assistance to a post-Milošević regime, and dangling $5 million for information leading to the arrest of Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, and Bosnian Serb military commander

116 Extract of speech in Radio B2-92 (14 April 2000), trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 April 2000, on LNAU.
117 SRNA News agency (Bijeljina), 16 April 2000, trans. in BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, 16 April 2000, on LNAU. See also Radio B2-92, 14 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 April 2000, on LNAU.
118 I have developed an argument along these lines in my Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo, 3rd ed. (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 299–301.
119 "Srbija mora naci svoga Adenauera" [An interview with Stevan Dedijer], Hrvatski obzor, no. 210 (17 April 1999).
Ratko Mladić. At the same time, the now-united Serbian opposition opened discussions aimed at finding a formula under which Milošević might step down voluntarily. But General Stevan Mirković, chief of staff of the Yugoslav People’s Army in the 1980s, was more skeptical and insisted that “a military coup is the only way out of the current crisis,” urging military commanders to take the appropriate steps.

Until the first week of October 2000, Milošević did not show any signs of any inclination to resign. On the contrary, at his behest the police held a firm line against the student activists of the Otpor movement, detaining and beating some 190 Otpor members from 1 September 1999 to 1 March 2000. Meanwhile the regime played havoc with the electoral rolls, peremptorily granting citizenship to large numbers of Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (in a move criticized by the Serbian opposition) as well as to some forty thousand recent immigrants from China (a move which would also enable the “Sino-Serbs” to own property in Serbia).

Meanwhile, Milošević adopted a series of measures which appeared to constitute preparations for a fifth war, this time against Montenegro. In a key move, Milošević excluded Montenegrin officers from a list of seventeen senior officers being appointed to new posts in mid-March. The regime


121 Radio Panccevo, 17 February 2000, trans. in *BBC Monitoring Europe—Political*, 17 February 2000, on LNAU; Radio B2-92 (Belgrade), 18 February 2000, trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 19 February 2000, on LNAU; Agence France Presse, 18 February 2000, on LNAU; *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 21 February 2000, on LNAU.

122 Quoted in UPI, 7 February 2000, on LNAU.


124 Regarding refugees, see Beta news agency, 3 February 2000, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 5 February 2000, on LNAU; regarding Chinese, see *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 10 March 2000, on LNAU.

125 TV Crna Gora (Podgorica), 13 March 2000, in *BBC Monitoring Europe—Political*, 13 March 2000, on LNAU.
also called for "loyal forces" to volunteer for military service, organized paramilitary units within Montenegro (as mentioned), set up an "illegal" television station within Montenegro, using military equipment to broadcast programs prepared in Belgrade, and initiated verbal attacks on the Montenegrin government, charging that it "had 'massively' armed the local police with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, had armed trusted civilians, and had employed foreign experts to provide training in 'terrorism and sabotage'." Meanwhile the chairman of the opposition Democratic Alternative, Nebojša Čović, accused Belgrade authorities of using scare tactics to persuade the citizens of Serbia to vote for the ruling party in the coming elections, while threatening that an opposition victory would mean the start of a civil war in Serbia itself. These steps replicated the pattern of events that had preceded the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia and Bosnia a decade earlier.

Nevertheless, this time there was a difference. In the period leading up to those earlier conflicts, Milošević had been content to control the leading news media. This time around, he moved decisively to quash or suffocate a broad range of independent media. Already in December, police raided the premises of the independent ABC Grafika printing company, which published the independent daily newspaper Glas javnosti, confiscating about $400,000 worth of equipment; then, the following month, a Belgrade court ordered the closure of ABC Grafika as part of a bankruptcy procedure, even though the company's general manager said that the company had reached agreements with its creditors. The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)

127 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 March 2000, on LNAU.
128 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16 March 2000, on LNAU.
129 Radio Montenegro (Podgorica), 15 February 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 February 2000, on LNAU.
130 The opposition has taken the threat seriously. See "Režim spreman za dramičnu sukobu," Blic, 6 March 2000, at blic.gates96.com/daily-pages/politika.htm.
condemned the receivership proceedings against ABC Grafika. Although the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS) demanded the retraction of the 1998 Law on Public Information and the cessation of all repression against independent media and journalists, Serbian police confiscated the complete consignment (24,000 copies) of the Banja Luka-based independent weekly, Reporter, two weeks in a row. Goran Matić, Yugoslavia’s minister of information, justified pressures on the independent media by chastising journalists critical of the government as “terrorists.”

As for the opposition, whose leading figures had spoken out in defense of the independent media, Milošević characterized it, in a speech before a mid-February congress of the Socialist Party, as “a group of bribed weaklings and blackmailed profiteers and thieves.”

In late February, the authorities escalated their campaign against independent media, imposing stiff fines on Danas (for having quoted local pharmacists who had complained about the allegedly low quality of imported pharmaceuticals), Vuk Drašković’s newspaper Srpska reč (for having implicated a police officer in the October traffic collision in which Drašković had barely escaped death), and Belgrade’s television station Studio B (repeatedly), taking control of the popular daily Večernje novosti.

132 Beta news agency, 30 January 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 February 2000, on LNAU.
133 Beta news agency, 31 January 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 February 2000, on LNAU.
134 BH Press agency (Sarajevo), 1 February 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 February 2000, on LNAU.
135 Quoted in Agence France Presse, 11 February 2000, on LNAU.
136 Quoted in Independent Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), 23 February 2000, p. 5, on LNAU.
137 Ibid.
138 Agence France Presse, 11 March 2000, on LNAU.
139 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 March 2000, on LNAU; Radio B2-92, 7 March 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 March 2000, on LNAU; Beta news agency, 7 March 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 March 2000, on LNAU; Radio B2-92, 8 March 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 March
which had become more critical of the government, and dispatching police to the broadcasting facility jointly operated by Studio B and Radio B2-92, to cut their cables, resulting in an interruption of service. Authorities also shut down a series of independent television and radio stations in the first two weeks of March, including Radio Boom 93 (in Požarevac), Radio-Television Požega, Radio Golf, Nemanja TV, Tir Radio (in Čuprija), and Pirot Television (in southwestern Serbia), while Šešelj's Radical Party illegally interfered with the frequency allocated to Lav TV (in Vršac). In justification of these forced closures, Matić accused the independent media of "advancing American interests in Serbia."

In April, the government served several independent media outlets with fines. The newspaper Narodne novine (Niš) was fined 400,000 dinars ($40,000 at the official exchange rate) on 10 April in a suit filed by the Yugoslav Army. The prestigious weekly magazine Vreme was fined 350,000 dinars on 11 April, on the ground that it had mistakenly held the minister of information, Željko Simić, personally, rather than the government as such, responsible for the firing of a Belgrade theater

2000, on LNAU; Studio B television (Belgrade), 9 March 2000, trans. in BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, 9 March 2000, on LNAU.

140 Star Tribune, 2 March 2000, at www.startribune.com; Beta news agency, 8 March 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 March 2000, on LNAU.

141 This occurred on 6 March 2000. See UPI, 6 March 2000, on LNAU; Radio B2-92, 7 March 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 March 2000, on LNAU.


143 Quoted in Die Presse, 3 March 2000, at www.diepresse.at. See also Pregled vesti, 14 February 2000, at www.beocity.com/vesti.

director.145 Studio B and the independent news agency Beta were likewise fined—450,000 dinars and 310,000 dinars, respectively.146 At month’s end, members of the UN Human Rights Commission voted 44 to 1 to condemn the Belgrade regime for its treatment of the independent media, among other things.147

The Belgrade authorities, however, saw little reason to concern themselves with international scolding, and instead only escalated the pressures against the remaining independent media. On 17 May, in a decisive blow, government authorities seized control of the broadcasting facilities shared by Studio B television and Radio B2-92, simultaneously assuming control of Radio Index, located in the same building. Police also confiscated Radio Pančevo’s transmitter and began broadcasting Serbian folksongs, in place of the station’s habitual critical commentary.148 Opposition politicians responded by declaring that these measures were tantamount to the “beginning” of dictatorship149—suggesting that they had been engaging in naïve wishful thinking until then.

The repression of the media continued over the succeeding months, with the detention in June 2000 of Radio Yugoslavia journalists who had gone to Montenegro to report about local elections in Podgorica and Herceg

145 Star Tribune, 11 April 2000, at www.startribune.com; International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine), 12 April 2000, p. 4, on LNAU.
146 Beta news agency, 10 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 April 2000, on LNAU; Beta news agency, 18 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 April 2000, on LNAU; Agence France Presse, 18 April 2000, on LNAU.
147 Russia cast the sole dissenting vote. See IPR Strategic Business Information Database, 23 April 2000, on LNAU.
Novi, the fining of the independent daily _Danas_ in early August, and the filing of misdemeanor charges against the director and editor in chief of _Kikindske novine_ because they had attended a gathering organized by Otpor—a crime in which, in the words of the indictment, the two journalists figured as "unregistered civil conspirators."

About the same time, Slobodan Cekić, the director of Radio Index, an independent Belgrade station, died in a mysterious water-sports accident at the Adriatic resort town of Herceg Novi. Montenegrin police considered the circumstances suspicious and immediately launched an investigation. Meanwhile, Radio B2-92, banned by Belgrade authorities in May 2000, made arrangements to broadcast from Kosovo (via Radio Kontakt in Priština) and from Hungary (via Radio Tilos), among other things. Reviewing this dismal record, Veran Matić, the editor in chief of Radio 2B-92, noted in June 2000 that over the preceding two years, twenty-six employees of broadcast or print media had been killed, at least sixty journalists had been taken into custody, and six had been given prison terms.

Taken in sum, the various measures—against the opposition, against non-Serbs, against gays and lesbians, against the independent media—documented Serbia's slide toward ever more repressive rule. Among the

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150 Tanjug, 12 June 2000, trans. in _BBC Summary of World Broadcasts_, 14 June 2000, on LNAU.
151 SRNA news agency, 9 August 2000, trans. in _BBC Summary of World Broadcasts_, 11 August 2000, on LNAU.
152 Quoted in Radio B2-92, 7 August 2000, in _BBC Summary of World Broadcasts_, 9 August 2000, on LNAU.
153 _Deutsche Presse Agentur_, 6 August 2000, on LNAU.
154 Regarding Kosovo, see _FoNet news agency_, 26 July 2000, trans. in _BBC Summary of World Broadcasts_, 28 July 2000, on LNAU; regarding Hungary, see Hungarian TV2 satellite service (Budapest), 29 July 2000, trans. in _BBC Summary of World Broadcasts_, 1 August 2000, on LNAU.
constants in political life, we may cite these two: first, that regimes built on a foundation of hatred have an inherent tendency to become steadily more repressive and dangerous; and second, that between legitimate governments and illegitimate regimes there can be no lasting peace since, as Hannah Arendt and Guglielmo Ferrero both understood, illegitimate regimes always fear the politics of legitimate states and of liberal oppositionists alike, preferring the company of fellow despots. \(^{156}\) The conclusion was unavoidable: so long as Milošević would remain in power, the cancer of nationalism would continue to gnaw at the body politic of the region and the crisis would continue.

**NEW DANGERS**

Until 1999, Serb-Montenegrin friendship and solidarity had been taken for granted and even the thought of any war developing between these two “fraternal” fellow-Orthodox nations was complete anathema to virtually all citizens on both sides. But in the early months of 2000, anti-Montenegrin jokes began to circulate in Serbia, both on the Internet and in public spaces, suggesting that the regime might be beginning the psychological preparations for eventual war. The earlier wars in Croatia and Bosnia had likewise been presaged by such “jokes,” behind which most observers saw the workings of the Serbian police.

But even as these jokes began to do their dirty work, Milošević, aware that, under the constitution, his term of office would expire in 2001, without any entitlement to run again for the presidential office of either Serbia or Yugoslavia, concentrated on once more changing the constitution. Accordingly, in late March 2000, he arranged for the government to propose a new

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law to the federal government. Under the provisions of this law, the composition of the deputations sent by the Serbian and Montenegrin legislatures to the Chamber of the Republics, the upper house of parliament, would be changed in such a way that Djukanović would be constrained to include also delegates from Momir Bulatović’s Socialist People’s Party. This, in turn, could give Milošević the two-thirds majority he would need in that house in order to change the constitution. In spite of opposition from Djukanović’s party, the law was passed by the Serbian parliament on 11 April. 157 The law also provided that only a political party with at least twelve deputies in the republic’s legislature could send deputies to the Chamber of the Republics. Dragan Veselinov, chair of the Vojvodina Coalition, an opposition grouping, asserted that the new law threatened to wipe out in one blow the representation of opposition parties from Vojvodina and the Sandžak in the upper house of parliament; Veselinov characterized the passage of this law as “an internal coup in the Serbian Assembly.” 158

Three days after the passage of the law, some 100,000 to 200,000 people turned out for a protest rally in downtown Belgrade. 159 Although the sheer size of the gathering raised opposition spirits, 160 the regime responded in

157 Beta news agency, 30 March 2000, trans. in BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, 30 March 2000, on LNAU; Agence France Presse, 11 April 2000, on LNAU.
158 Radio B2-92, 11 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 April 2000, on LNAU.
159 State radio claimed that only thirty thousand people took part. Regarding “at least 100,000,” see Radio B2-92, 14 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 April 2000, on LNAU; regarding “nearly 200,000,” see Beta news agency, 14 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 April 2000, on LNAU; regarding “around 30,000,” see Radio Belgrade, 14 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 April 2000, on LNAU. AFP reported that “more than 70,000 people” took part in the protest; see Agence France Presse, 14 April 2000, on LNAU. DPA accepted the opposition figure and reported attendance at “more than 100,000 people”; see Deutsche Presse Agentur, 14 April 2000, on LNAU. The New York Times reported “at least 100,000 people” in attendance; see New York Times, 15 April 2000, p. A3.
force; throughout April and May, police repeatedly beat protesters with batons, inflicting wounds on them, and used tear gas to break up peaceful assemblies. Even so, more than 50,000 people demonstrated against the regime in several Serbian cities on 19 May, with some 15,000 turning out for an anti-regime rally in Belgrade eight days later. The regime responded to these latter protests by arresting opposition activists in Čačak, Novi Sad, Užice, and other cities, and by accusing opposition leaders of trying to break up what remained of the country. On 23 May masked men attacked a sit-in protest at the university, beating up several dozen students; three days later Jevrem Janjić, the Serbian minister of education, ordered the immediate closure of all universities and colleges, a week ahead of schedule, and declared that all university premises would remain off-limits to professors and students until further notice. As students marched in


protest, Serbian Patriarch Pavle lent his support to them,\textsuperscript{165} even as the authorities showed their contempt for world public opinion by characterizing the International Tribunal for War Crimes (in The Hague) as a criminal organization.\textsuperscript{166} Finally, at month’s end, with the opposition parties still unable to formulate an effective strategy, the Otpor student movement announced its transformation into a broader citizens’ association, to be called the Popular Resistance Movement (Narodni Pokret Otpor, or NPO).\textsuperscript{167}

Predictably, the restructured Chamber of Republics played the role assigned to it by Milošević, and on 6 July, the bicameral legislature adopted amendments to the constitution, prescribing the direct popular vote of both the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the deputies to the Chamber of Republics. This move allowed citizens of Serbia to outvote citizens of Montenegro, thereby nullifying Montenegro’s constitutionally guaranteed equality with Serbia. Montenegro’s government repudiated the amendments, which, it said, had been adopted by “an illegal and illegitimate federal parliament.”\textsuperscript{168}

With the constitution “fixed,” Milošević now called for elections on 24 September. Djukanović predictably declared that his republic would boycott the elections. Meanwhile, most of the Serbian opposition united around Vojislav Koštunica, the president of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), while Drašković offered his own candidate for the presidency: Mayor of Belgrade Vojislav Mihailović, grandson of the Chetnik commander Draža Mihailović.

\textsuperscript{165} Radio B2-92, 25 May 2000, trans. in \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasts}, 27 May 2000, on LNAU.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Tanjug} (Belgrade), 24 May 2000, trans. in \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasts}, 26 May 2000, on LNAU.

\textsuperscript{167} Beta news agency, 25 May 2000, trans. in \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasts}, 27 May 2000, on LNAU.

\textsuperscript{168} Governmental draft submitted to the Montenegrin parliament on 7 July, as quoted in \textit{Agence France Presse}, 7 July 2000, on LNAU. See also \textit{Stuttgarter Zeitung}, 11 July 2000, at www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de.
As the election campaign got under way, Ivan Stambolić, whom Milošević had removed from office in 1987, gave several interviews to Montenegrin television. In these he described the Serbian leader as a “master of consuming and reproducing chaos,” a “Frankenstein’s monster,” and declared that “In the end, he must be destroyed, most people are against him and they will get him. He will never go in peace.”

On 25 August 2000, the sixty-four-year-old Stambolić, who had maintained contact with opposition circles, was kidnapped in broad daylight in the Banovo Brdo area of Belgrade. Although the police announced the launching of an intensive investigation, opposition figures speculated that Stambolić had been kidnapped on Milošević’s orders.

Milošević and his family related to the world through a thick screen of sheer fantasy. In their fantasy world, it was Western intelligence agencies who masterminded and carried out the massacre of Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995, not the ever-innocent Serbs. In their eyes, as Mirjana Marković put it in April 2000, the task for Serbs was to extend “support to an initiative for the association of progressive and educated people into an international front against world evil”—an international front to be led, presumably, by Serbia’s first family. And, quite consistently, in the midst of the gathering crisis, Milošević’s son Marko constructed a six-acre fantasy world of his own—the Bambi theme park, which opened in July 1999. Two decades after Tito’s death, with their country in a shambles—not just economically

169 Quoted in Sunday Times (London), 27 August 2000, on LNAU.
170 “Nastavlja se istraža povodom nestanka Ivana Stambolica,” in Politika (Belgrade), 1 September 2000, at www.politika.co.yu/2000/0901/01_35.htm; Christian Science Monitor, 29 August 2000, p. 7, on LNAU; UPI, 30 August 2000, on LNAU.
172 Quoted in Tanjug, 15 April 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 April 2000, on LNAU.
and politically but also culturally—many Serbs started to look back with wistful nostalgia to the days of self-management, brotherhood and unity, and nonalignment. A cult radio station calling itself Radio Nostalgia starting playing songs of the Tito era, and became one of Serbia’s most popular stations.174

Zvonimir Trajković, a former adviser to President Milošević, characterized the Serbian dictator as “a very imposing man, excellent with details and excellent over short distances... [an] excellent individualist, but a catastrophically bad organizer.”175 Jovo Babić, a political sociologist, offered another interpretation of Milošević, telling the independent weekly Nezavisni in February 2000 that Milošević might best be compared with the French revolutionary leader Robespierre,176 adding that the Serbian political system of the 1990s was a blend of democracy and totalitarianism—in essence a totalitarian democracy. For Die Presse, the FRY could best be understood as a feudal state, making Milošević a kind of feudal baron.177 And for Tom Gallagher, a professor at Bradford University, no understanding of Milošević’s Serbia was complete unless one took into account the way “criminals [had] patronized nationalist associations and causes in order to find a respectable cover for their activities,” and the methodology of corrupt privatization in which the family and cronies of Slobodan Milošević had been the primary beneficiaries.178 Finally, in an article published in the independent Serbian monthly Republika in May 2000, Radonja Dubljević highlighted an essential juridical aspect of the Milošević regime, noting that where most dictatorships either use the

174 New York Times, 30 April 2000, Section 4, p. 3, on LNAU.
175 Extract in Radio B2-92, 25 April 2000, trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 April 2000, on LNAU.
177 Die Presse, 17 May 2000, at www.diepresse.at.
constitution to suppress the rights of the society and its citizens or violate the constitution, treating it as if it did not exist, Milošević did both; Dubljević’s analysis thus points to the core of Serbia’s political paradox, explaining how the same regime was able to appear both legitimate and illegitimate in the eyes of its own citizens and of much of the world.179

END OF AN ERA

As late as August, it appeared that Milošević would simply have himself declared the winner in the 24 September elections; but as election day approached and as the substantial strength of the opposition became manifest, foreign observers began to speculate that Milošević would “concede” the need for a runoff election and then set his sights on stealing the runoff. This was, apparently, Milošević’s strategy when the Federal Electoral Commission released its official results. Under FRY election rules, a runoff was required if no candidate garnered more than 50 percent of the votes; and Milošević held that fifty-six-year-old law professor Vojislav Koštunica, candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, had won only 48.22 percent of the vote vs. 40.23 percent for Milošević himself, with the remainder spread among three other candidates. The opposition, by contrast, claimed that Koštunica had won 54.6 percent of the vote, against 35.01 percent for Milošević.180 The Federal Election Commission now set the runoff elections for 8 October, even as the United States and West European countries announced their recognition of Koštunica’s first-round victory.


180 Official results in Borba (Belgrade), 27 September 2000, at www.borba.co.yu/elections.html; opposition figures as reported in Monitor (Podgorica), no. 519, 29 September 2000, at www.monitor.cg.yu/str_01.html.
Rather than agreeing to a second round, however, Koštunica insisted that he was already the president-elect, and his supporters took their protests to the streets of Belgrade. Faced with Milošević’s intransigence, the opposition moved to organize a nationwide strike.\footnote{Glas javnosti (Belgrade), 27 September 2000, at www.glas-javnosti.co.yu; La Repubblica (Rome), 27 September 2000, at www.repubblica.it.} By the end of the month, there were signs that the army would not stand by Milošević.\footnote{Star Tribune, 27 September 2000, at www.startribune.com.} Meanwhile, in a signal that could not have escaped Milošević’s attention, his erstwhile hangers-on began to abandon him, seeking to mend fences with the opposition before it was too late.\footnote{Washington Post, 29 September 2000, p. A22.}

Schools, factories, theaters, restaurants, coal mines, and even buses in Belgrade, Niš, and elsewhere shut down in support of the opposition’s claim to victory. Altogether, more than forty cities across Serbia participated in the general strike.\footnote{Glas javnosti, 3 October 2000, at www.glas-javnosti.co.yu.} Some twenty thousand people took to the streets of Belgrade on 3 October, as did some thirty thousand in Niš; in Belgrade the crowd marched on Milošević’s official residence, chanting “The police are with us.”\footnote{Star Tribune, 3 October 2000, at www.startribune.com.} Milošević first derided his opponents as Western “puppets,” then ordered the arrest of strike leaders. Among those arrested was Dragoljub Stojić, leader of the public transport trade union.\footnote{New York Times, 4 October 2000, p. A1.}

On 5 October, as hundreds of thousands of angry Serbs descended on Belgrade, demonstrators stormed the federal Assembly building, taking control of it and setting it on fire. At first police responded with stun grenades and tear gas, and several dozen people had to be rushed to emergency wards. But eventually, as demonstrators seized control of at least two police stations, the police gave up their defense of a man whom only
minority of Serbs still viewed as their president. By the end of the day, the Tanjug news agency had declared Koštunica "the elected president of Yugoslavia"—an announcement promptly confirmed by the Federal Electoral Commission, which admitted it had made a "mistake."

The following day (6 October), Milošević addressed the Yugoslav public in a brief television broadcast, admitting his defeat and congratulating Koštunica on his victory. Koštunica quickly secured the resignations of Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir Bulatović and Serbian Interior Minidyrt Vlajko Stojiljković; on the other hand, Serbian President Milan Milutinović and the Yugoslav defense minister, General Dragoljub Ojdanić—both indicted for war crimes by the International Tribunal in The Hague—refused to submit their resignations as requested by Koštunica.

The incoming government faces severe challenges. Even bringing the corrupt to justice may be complicated, insofar as the guilty parties began shredding documents almost as soon as Koštunica’s victory became official. Then there is the question as to whether Koštunica can afford to remand Milošević to the custody of The Hague (or, perhaps, whether he can afford not to do so). Then there are all the other political, economic, and ethnic troubles that were sown during Milošević’s thirteen years in power.

At least some Serbs are admitting that their society has been afflicted with a kind of sickness. But overcoming that sickness will require more than just getting rid of Milošević and his coterie, more than just insisting that the results of the elections be honored, more than just restoring freedom of the press. It will require that Serbs confront their recent past—as the French have begun to do in connection with the Vichy Republic, as the Americans

have done in connection with the 19th-century massacres of the Amerindians, as the Germans did after World War II—and that, in turn, will require that those individuals who are guilty of having committed crimes, whether crimes of corruption and abuse of power or crimes of genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide, be brought to justice.