

THE JERUSALEM PEACE INITIATIVE

Project on Managing Political Disputes

by Dr. Jay Rothman

with Randi Jo Land and Robin Twite



The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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List of Participants

Mr. Ghassan Abdallah, Director, Center for Applied Research in Education,
Ramallah

Dr. Ephraim Ahiram, Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem

Professor Hisham Awatani, Dept. of Economics, An Najah University,
Ramallah

Mr. Dan Bitan, Associate Director, The Harry S. Truman Institute, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem

Ms. Aliza Elion-Israeli, Playwright, Jerusalem

Professor Shlomo Hasson, Dept. of Geography, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem and the Jerusalem Institute for Applied Studies

Ms. Maya Kahanoff, The Spinoza Institute, Jerusalem

Mr. Simon Kouba, City Planner, Jerusalem

Professor Ali Qleibo, Dept. of Anthropology, Bir Zeit University,
Ramallah

Mr. Aharon Sarig, Lawyer, Jerusalem

Mr. Ziad Abu Zayyad, Co-Editor *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Jerusalem

Staff

Project Director, Dr. Jay Rothman

Project Coordinator, Mr. Robin Twite

Interns, Ms. Deborah Bing, Mr. Hanan Cohen

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Preface

This monograph deals primarily with conflict resolution and its application to one of the most deeply protracted conflicts in the world. It does not offer solutions but instead describes a process for paving the way to solutions. We are publishing this project documentation now, while the preparation of policy papers written by team members on the functional issues to which they addressed themselves is still in progress, since we feel it makes a useful contribution to the application of conflict resolution to deeply rooted conflicts such as that over Jerusalem.

Introduction

Many feel that Jerusalem is the biggest stumbling block to Israeli-Palestinian peace. In fact, some say it is a major obstacle preventing peace between Israelis and the Arab world at large and is best left alone until later. Others, however, believe that progress over the future of Jerusalem now is both possible and necessary for the broader peace process. The Jerusalem Peace Initiative described here stakes out a middle course suggesting that both positions are right - work on Jerusalem "the city of peace" can and should begin now, while resolution of it will be later, at the end of the process. Now, for unless some progress, even if primarily symbolic, is made over the issue of Jerusalem, and unless the parties can believe that the problem is somehow amenable to rational discourse, there is little chance that either confidence or necessary momentum will be forged for any comprehensive peace efforts. On the other hand, the issue clearly must be last on the agenda for it is so linked to the broader issues that it probably cannot be resolved politically except within the framework of an overall peace settlement. As former Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek (*Foreign Affairs 1988-1989*, p. 156) wrote:

Thinking about new policies for Israel's relations with the Arab states and with the Palestinians should start with Jerusalem. On one hand, there is wide agreement that Jerusalem must be the last item on the agenda of any negotiations, because whatever is decided to be the fate of the West Bank will affect arrangements in Jerusalem. On the other hand, Jerusalem's importance is such that no [final status] negotiations can even begin as long as any one of the parties is persuaded that there is no possible reconciliation of the various interests concerning Jerusalem.

And yet many Israelis and Palestinians insist that it is useless to discuss Israeli-Palestinian cooperation over the various aspects of life in Jerusalem — safety, economic development, access to holy sites, security, tourism, and so forth

— while the political issues remain so unsettled. As Israeli and Palestinian co-authors Mark Heller and Sari Nusseibeh wrote in their book, *No Trumpets, No Drums* (1991, p. 114):

Many observers believe that Jerusalem will prove to be the most difficult issue to be addressed in negotiations. Even those on both sides otherwise disposed toward reconciliation and compromise are likely to adopt a rigid, if not completely inflexible, position on Jerusalem.

The conflict over Jerusalem is different from so many other deeply protracted social conflicts around the world in intensity, not in kind. All around the world, groups within and between nation-states struggle with one another for the fulfillment of their own national identities that are threatened or frustrated. Moreover, in one communal conflict after another, existential concerns are often overshadowed by the pursuit or defense of political sovereignty which, at some point, seems to become sanctified and pursued for its own sake.

Many despair, feeling that the Jerusalem conflict is by its nature, unresolvable. Heller and Nusseibeh (1991, pp. 114-15) respond to this pessimism eloquently:

Indeed, Jerusalem is so contentious an issue that there seems to be something in the very nature of the problem that renders it irresolvable. It is possible, however, that Jerusalem is primarily a symbolic lodestone, on which all the emotions and sentiments of the conflict are focused. Whether Jerusalem's intractability is due to something inherent or symbolic is of enormous significance. If an issue is irresolvable due to its very nature, then nothing more can be said about it. If, on the other hand, its apparent intractability is a function of its symbolic role — of the fact that it embodies the fullest articulation of the emotions and prejudices people have toward the sum of issues comprising the entire conflict — then a way may be found to *defuse those issues one by one* [our emphasis]

so that the conflict as a whole begins to assume a tractable shape, and Jerusalem can then also be approached like other issues which lend themselves to a rational solution.

In the spirit of "one by one", or pieces of peace, the conflict resolution methodology used to guide the Jerusalem Peace Initiative described herein, recommends that parties in such protracted conflicts address the underlying issues head on and concretely — even, or especially, if the conflicts are significantly symbolic in nature. It proposes to steer adversaries away from exclusive positions, such as Jerusalem's status as a unified or divided city. Instead of such zero-sum frames, the methodology urges parties to look at the underlying and potentially reconcilable needs of each community vis-à-vis Jerusalem: Jews need to feel safe and assured that their identity/connection with Jerusalem will never again be severed; Palestinians need to feel in control of their lives, and free to claim Jerusalem as their beacon of selfhood. The methodology suggests that instead of parties emphasizing exclusive and unbridgeable positions regarding which ultimate political design should be institutionalized, they should start working on ways by which their respective and common human needs can best be fulfilled — thus building solid foundations for lasting peace. With such foundations, perhaps any fair-minded political arrangement can be implemented successfully.

Imagine that, instead of the mutually exclusive demands regularly heard about Jerusalem, the parties were instead to ask: How can we create a city in which different groups may live together peacefully in close proximity? How can we ensure greater safety and control for all peoples of that city? How can we further defend ourselves against extremism and promote and protect peace? How can economic development, benefiting both Jews and Arabs and requiring functional cooperation between them, be fostered? Thus parties would be able to frame their problem in common and set their agenda in terms of a question such as this: How can we forge a future in which both sides' control, dignity, identity, and safety, which indeed are interdependent, can be fulfilled simultaneously?

Such a discussion would then be based on new insights about the deeper motivations behind the conflict: the human hopes, fears, and values behind the newspaper headlines about unbridgeable positions. Having stated these needs for human dignity, safety, control over personal and collective destiny, justice and identity, participants would begin to see how much these issues motivate war and, possibly, peace between them.

Reformulating the Israeli-Palestinian and other deeply rooted intercommunal and international problems in inclusive terms may provide significant momentum for peace building. Fortunately, such reformulation is not merely prescriptive of what is necessary; it is also increasingly descriptive of a new trend that is growing all over the world. Despite the fact, however, that many people of goodwill are increasingly attempting to chart a cooperative, or "integrative" approach to problem formulation and solving, too many, particularly those with policymaking influence, lack the necessary will, skill and guidance to do such "reframing".

Albert Einstein said that the "formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new question, new possibilities, to regard old questions from a new angle, requires creative imagination". Learning to handle the many protracted conflicts of our world requires new and creative ways of defining such problems, and of analyzing them, and ultimately new ways of peacefully and cooperatively managing them.

In this monograph we have sought to describe the aims of our Jerusalem Peace Initiative and to present fairly and realistically the progress of our work and its results.

In Section One, we present a brief overview of the Jerusalem conflict and of our Jerusalem Peace Initiative.

In Section Two, brief summaries of the project outcomes — joint policy papers on issues of local politics and municipal government, economics, safety, cultural relations, education — are presented.

In Section Three, we present selections from a conference that was held in December, 1993, which provided the opportunity for public presentation of the project. The opening session, presented in edited form here, gives a broader context for our project through its discussion of "The Role of Track-Two Diplomacy in Jerusalem Peace Making".

Appendix One provides a detailed description of the project and its activities.

Appendix Two presents a rationale and proposal for institutionalizing conflict resolution in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.

Section One

Overview: Project Development and Activity

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians over the future of Jerusalem is among the most intransigent in the world. In 1967 the eastern part of the city, which had a Palestinian population, was taken by Israel following a bitter battle with the Jordanians, who had ruled that part of the city since 1948. The city, now fully under Israeli sovereign rule, has been governed with very little formal input from the Palestinian sector since that time.

Palestinians in East Jerusalem declined to take part as an organized group in the elections to the municipal council, though they were given the right to vote, since they felt this implied recognition of Israeli control over Jerusalem. The Palestinian community in East Jerusalem rejected the basic premise that Israel had the right to "unify" Jerusalem under its rule.

In this context, our Jerusalem initiative was designed to find ways to circumvent the lack of bi-communal problem solving in areas of daily and mutual concern to both Israelis and Palestinians in the city. We felt that our approach could be useful, despite the fact that many believe that Jerusalem is "too hot to handle" until peace is first achieved in the wider political arena, in forging new insight into the nature of the daily social and economic problems of all Jerusalem residents and generating practical and policy relevant proposals for managing them to the mutual satisfaction of Israelis and Palestinians alike.

At the beginning of 1993 after months of interviews with over 50 potential participants, a group of academics and professionals from both communities were invited on a professional basis to participate in the Jerusalem project. Those taking part included on the Palestinian side a leading economist, a writer and editor who is one of the major spokesmen for the Palestinian community in its dealings with Israeli institutions, an academic anthropologist, the head of an educational re-

search institute, an experienced urban planner, and several other professionals. On the Israeli side participants included the former manager of the Jerusalem municipality, a professor of urban planning at the Hebrew University, a well-known economist, an expert in education for co-existence, and other professionals. They were selected with a view to making use of their special expertise — an Israeli expert on the economics of the city and a Palestinian equally expert on this subject. At a later stage in the project they worked together in pairs.

They were to look not at the major issue of sovereignty but rather at the practical and daily concerns such as cultural affairs, economic development, education, municipal government and personal safety and security, using the techniques for dealing with intransigent conflict developed by the Project on Managing Political Disputes.

During 1993 the group participated in seven seminars, averaging about 4 hours in length. At these seminars, participants learned the three stage method developed by the Project on Managing Political Disputes (framing, inventing and structuring) and took part in a two day seminar at which they reviewed their use and discussed it with an invited audience. They also worked in pairs, one Israeli and one Palestinian (one group had 3 participants), on the five areas selected and had many, small informal meetings (sometimes with a third party present, sometimes without). They were asked to write an account of the way in which they saw the problem and to give practical suggestions as to the way in which co-operative action might be possible.

Overcoming Obstacles

Conceptual

One of the obstacles to peace is the use of language and its practical implications. In Jerusalem, this is exemplified by the use of the term “unified” versus “divided” city. Supposedly the Israelis, for the most part, desire the former

and the Palestinians the latter. However, these words merely retard progress to a future in which the two communities will find better ways to share the city because they have no realistic alternative. For Israelis, a “unified” city is a deeply contextualized word derived from historical experience. While Israel claims no interest in ruling over a population that does not recognize its right to do so, most Israelis nevertheless seek to retain and enhance sovereign control over *all* Jerusalem since this is perceived as the best, or perhaps the only, means of ensuring Israeli control over the Jewish parts of the city and the safety of its citizens. Most Palestinians, on the other hand, do not seek the physical redivision of the city, that is to return to the situation between 1948 and 1967, but rather demand a share in political control over it.

A new terminology reflecting the reality and the true aspirations of each community is essential for peace. Instead of arguing about a “unified” or “divided” city, the real problem may be framed much more constructively in terms of how to most effectively share the city so that the needs and interests of both communities are fulfilled. Whether in the future as part of an overall peace plan, Jerusalem will be shared more equitably under a single sovereign control of Israel or under a new arrangement of separate and/or coordinated sovereignty is, of course, a fundamental and highly politicized question. This project is designed to move ahead without waiting for the answer to that question in the belief that Israelis and Palestinians can and must embark *now* on the path to peace by sharing the city more fully and more equitably.

Practical

The participants in this project made heroic efforts. They were ahead of their time and working under adverse circumstances. For example, we had been generating designs and plans for a year. After months of searching, we recruited our participants; we were finally ready to begin, and scheduled our first session for April 2, 1993. Then on April 1, 1993, renewed violence led Israeli Prime Minister

Rabin to decide to close off the territories, including East Jerusalem, from Israel and thus several of our participants were unable, at the last moment, to attend our first session. Nonetheless, we overcame these practical obstacles — viewing them as part of the project itself — and persevered despite continual set-backs and readjustments of our plans.

Principles behind the Project

As the peace process moves forward and a tenuous dance is made around the whole question of Jerusalem, our project is designed to build confidence that the two populations - Israelis and Palestinians - can indeed live better together in the city of peace. Some might say that such an effort is futile until a political peace is achieved; we believe on the contrary that such an effort as ours in which Israelis and Palestinians are together defining shared problems and proposing suggestions for mutually beneficial functional solutions can help to promote both the will-to-peace and confidence-in-peace that are so necessary to bring peace about.

Having said that, however, the question about how to proceed in designing functional solutions to daily problems (such as economics or education) in the absence of a mutually acceptable political solution still had to be answered in the course of our work in such a way that participants would feel confident that their involvement would in no way compromise the political positions they hold. To this end the Israeli and Palestinian participants agreed to the following formulation of principle:

“Opinions greatly vary in this group regarding the future of Jerusalem, the political status of which is still contested. Some of us believe that a durable peace cannot be achieved unless the problem is solved on the basis of equality and justice that demands dividing or sharing sovereignty and coordinating and/or separating municipal responsibilities over the city. Others believe that Jerusalem should continue under the sovereign rule of Israel but with very extensive autonomy and

self-rule afforded to Palestinians. Thus while we all believe some changes must occur, we are at odds with each other about the shape and dimensions of those changes. We do not expect this project will change such positions; indeed, it is not designed to do so. On the contrary, we are illustrating in our work together a key purpose of conflict resolution. Despite the fact that we hold adversarial political positions among ourselves, we can nonetheless find common ground and build commitment to and confidence in peace through the conviction that as Israelis and Palestinians fated to live together in the city of Jerusalem, we must learn to do so in a better fashion than we do at present. Our project is designed in a modest way to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian co-existence in Jerusalem through concrete policy proposals for cooperative change and development in five functional areas of daily concern to both communities: security, economics, education, municipal services and governance, and cultural expression.”

Conflict Resolution Methodology

The methodology of conflict resolution employed in this project is designed to direct disputants away from adversarial position-taking towards a more cooperative dialogue. This is done by uncovering the underlying motivations - summarized as needs - for such positions. The process, if successful, then allows the disputants to interactively invent solutions which address the primary needs of both parties. The methodology suggests that in deep conflicts such as over Jerusalem, “integrative” methods of problem solving (as distinct from conquest or compromise) in which both sides meet their respective needs better, help parties reconsider the nature of winning in a way that does not necessarily leave losers in its wake.

A fundamental precondition for resolving conflicts lies in getting disputants to see the value of engaging in constructive dialogue with each other and exploring cooperative solutions. However, when conflict is deeply entrenched, conditions that would lead parties to explore these avenues are often absent, or appear to be so.

Parties are commonly hampered by the belief that the sole basis for resolving intense conflict is through conquest, or through mutual concession where parties give up a little in order to gain a little. The dispute is "settled" when one side gains the resources it seeks at another's expense, or the conflicting sides find a way to compromise and divide the resources at stake.

The compromise approach may be satisfactory when conflicts are over easily divisible resources which have little symbolic significance. However, parties who have been engaged in protracted conflict, as is the case in many ethnic or national disputes, often perceive their fundamental sense of self and collective identity to be at stake. When control over resources is linked to these concerns, the "giving up" aspects of compromise often loom larger than the "gaining" component.

With such deeply held values at stake, the very act of recognizing the legitimacy of one's opponents is often viewed as invalidating one's own concerns and claims. Thus, before parties can imagine that mutual solutions are possible it is first necessary to shift their perception of conflict management from that of zero-sum ("the more the other side gains, the more I lose") to one which is potentially positive-sum ("the more the other side gains, the more I may gain as well").

A great deal of preparatory work is necessary to facilitate recognition by the parties that they potentially have more to gain than lose by working with their adversaries to resolve their conflicts. The model of systematic preparation presented here is based on the premise that frustrated or threatened social needs are a central aspect of protracted conflict. Unlike tangible resources, these needs (i.e., identity, control, communal continuity, security, and survival) cannot be reduced or divided. Moreover, these needs are shaped by a host of underlying factors such as the values, history, and culture of parties in conflict.

Using this model, the emphasis is shifted away from exclusive focus on power and control of tangible resources to the underlying threats, fears, traumas, values, and aspirations of the parties engaged in conflict. Adversaries are helped to prepare

for subsequent problem-solving and negotiation by engaging in a process involving three sequential phases:

1. **Framing** — the process by which parties derive shared definitions about the parameters of their conflict, thus building a *will-to-cooperate*.
2. **Inventing** — the creation of cooperative options for addressing central aspects of the conflict, thus fostering a *confidence-to-cooperate*.
3. **Structuring** — based on insights from framing and inventing, parties jointly decide on the content and procedure of subsequent formal problem-solving and negotiations, thus encouraging a *momentum-to-cooperate*.

Section Two

Project Summaries

In summarizing the work of the groups in a very abbreviated form below it is evident that the atmosphere and content of the discussions cannot be conveyed in any real sense. Indeed it may be that in the very fact that participants were in most cases truly able to spell out their concerns and interact with one another on a very serious and respectful level that much of the value of the project lies — in other words the process was as important as the results.

Local Politics and Municipal Government

The team consisted of an Israeli academic specializing in problems of municipal government and a Palestinian architect and planner who has worked in the city for many years. They concluded as follows:

Framing

The main conflict between Jews and Arabs revolves around national identity and sovereignty. In its center are two conflicting, and uncompromised claims for control over the same territory. The Palestinian population rejects the legitimacy of Israel's authority over Jerusalem, and does not formally recognize Israel's municipal control over the city. The Israeli government denies the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, and while willing to cede greater autonomous control to Palestinians over certain aspects of daily affairs, rejects their claim for sovereignty over at least part of the city.

Each side approaches the city with its own specific history and sense of identity. For the Palestinians the centrality of Jerusalem derives from its geographic location, history of continuous residence, social-intellectual importance and religious identification. As Khalidi (Khalidi, 1992) writes:

Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank. It is ... the pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron to the south. Together with its Arab suburbs it is the largest Arab urban concentration in the West Bank. The highest proportion of the Palestinian professional elite under occupation resides in it. It is the site of the holiest Muslim shrines on Palestinian soil.

Indeed the Palestine National Council declared in November 1988 that it sought: "the establishment of the state of Palestine on our Palestine territory with its capital Jerusalem."

For the Israelis Jerusalem is the cradle of nationhood, the holiest city associated with the history of the Jewish people, and the source of its identity. As David Ben Gurion stated in a speech before the Knesset (5 December 1949):

Jerusalem is an integral part of Jewish history, in her faith and in the depths of her soul. Jerusalem is the heart of hearts of Israel ... A nation which over 2,500 years has always maintained the pledge vowed by the banished people on the rivers of Babylon not to forget Jerusalem — this nation will never accept foreign rule after thousands of her sons and daughters have freed, for the third time, their historic homeland and delivered Jerusalem from destruction.

Reviewing the past history of the city and comparing its present position with that of other divided cities, the team raised a number of questions including:

1. Who are the institutions and agents involved in local politics, what is their ethnic composition, and what power do they have?

2. What are the policies pursued by the different institutions and agents with regard to inter-ethnic relations?
3. What kind of political relationships exist between the different political actors active in the city?
4. How does local politics affect the social and physical structure of the city?
5. Which political approaches are, or should be, employed in order to resolve the existing ethnic divisions?

Inventing

The team felt that solutions should be aimed at:

1. Visualizing the city as a focal center in terms of historical attachment and national significance for both communities.
2. Keeping the city open so that people, commodities and capital can move freely within it.
3. Building trust between communities by providing neighborhood institutions which would diffuse authority and give a degree of autonomy to all communities.
4. A city council which represents all interests should be established which would control services such as education, road development and solid waste disposal.
5. Power over other issues such as social services, cultural activities and local planning should as far as possible be devolved to neighborhood authorities or councils.

Implementing

A paper was produced which, after developing ideas on the subject, seeks to devise a pragmatic and process oriented approach to Jerusalem's problem. Any approach to the problem of Jerusalem's local government has to simultaneously reckon with both the general (macro) and specific (micro) aspects of the political process. Thus, the approach recommended is based upon a hierarchy of solutions to be employed at the international, regional, municipal and sub-municipal levels with power delegated from the higher to the lower levels for operational work while strategic planning is undertaken at the higher level.

Economics

The participants in this team were both economists who had been involved in Israeli/Palestinian dialogue in other contexts. Their conclusions were as follows:

Framing

In framing the nature of the interaction between Palestinians in East Jerusalem and Israelis in the West of the city, the team concluded that the large gap in income and economic well-being between the two sides was a prime cause of unrest among the Palestinians. They traced the economic history of the city and the way in which this gap had developed. They noted that in recent years the policies of the Israeli authorities in respect to housing, taxation and communication between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank had aggravated the economic imbalance between the two sides of the city which already existed.

They framed the issues as follows:

1. How can the gap in well-being between the two communities be diminished and eventually, as far as possible, closed?

2. How can the gap between the infrastructure in the two parts of the city be eliminated?
3. How can cooperation be achieved on various economic issues?
4. How can borders in Jerusalem itself and the neighboring towns in the West Bank be kept open? Whatever the political situation in Jerusalem, how can borders between East and West Jerusalem be open for free movement of people and commodities not only within the city but also between Israel and Jordan?

Inventing

The team agreed that both communities could make a positive contribution to the well-being of the city as a whole and that it would be unwise for each side to think in isolation about its own interests. But they noted that while some solutions could be implemented jointly and others were specific to one side or the other, all depended on a recognition of the fact that the interests of the whole population of Jerusalem were, in economic terms, interdependent.

Among the proposals the team made were:

1. The expansion of tourism through the establishment of a Joint Tourism Commission for the city sponsored jointly by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism and the Palestinian Higher Council of Tourism. The Commission could organize joint promotional activities, jointly manage key sites, organize training for the industry and own and operate joint ventures.

2. Both communities should contribute to the development of industry in the capital. High tech industries could flourish in Jerusalem which already has many trained people and a good climate. The diamond industry, which is flourishing in Israel, might enter into joint-ventures with Palestinians and then have a future in

the city. With appropriate management experience, the people of East Jerusalem could help the entire city develop good commercial relations with the Arab world. A forum in which Israeli and Palestinian businessmen could meet and share their concerns would be a definite advantage.

3. Technical education should be improved, especially in the Eastern part of the city. East Jerusalem has few technical schools or colleges and this handicaps the Palestinians living there and prevents them from making their full contribution.

4. Promotion of the construction sector is a way of stimulating the economy of the city. While Israel vigorously promotes construction, little or none takes place in the Palestinian sectors. This is an obvious area for growth.

5. Israeli policies with regard to taxation and the freedom of movement between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank should be reviewed for the benefit of both communities.

6. Israelis and Palestinians should cooperate in attracting investment from overseas for the city as a whole; in particular for joint-ventures to which both could secure backing.

Implementing

In concluding their paper, the team wrote the following:

These then are some of the positive steps that can be taken to provide economic stimulus to the whole city and by so doing to reduce the chances of violence and improve the long-term well-being of all its inhabitants.

To make real progress will mean the encouragement of any step which creates mutual confidence, even if in economic terms it is quite small in scale. The truth is that all the inhabitants of Jerusalem are faced with the same economic problems

(though those of the Palestinians are more severe than those of the Israelis). They live in a city with a troubled political past and a somewhat cloudy political future. Jerusalem is one of the poorer cities in Israel and for geopolitical reasons its potential has never been fully exploited.

If a climate of confidence can be established and the two communities can work together in an area where freedom of movement is a norm and there are few if any custom or tariff barriers, then the position of Jerusalem, which in economic terms has been a handicap for the last fifty years, can be turned to advantage. It can become a meeting place between the Israeli and Palestinian economies and between those of Israel and the Arab world. Jerusalem has a future as a city which is not only distinguished for its religious associations, for its institutions of higher education or as the seat of government and administration, but as a prosperous economic center.

Personal and Communal Safety

Of the various issues dealt with this was the most difficult and controversial. It was especially difficult to divorce considerations of security from those relating to sovereignty and control. The team members had great experience in Jerusalem, one as a past senior official in the municipality and one as a leader in the Palestinian community, and saw the problem in all its various dimensions but they were unable to come up with more than a general diagnosis of the problems.

Framing

The problems of personal and communal safety in Jerusalem have been exacerbated by the variety of violent incidents on the one hand, and on the other, lack of balance as between Jews and Arabs in building and settlement activities in the city. Though both communities express a desire for peace and security they often do so in terms which require ridding the city of the other rather than sharing

it in peace. There is no doubt that both share a desire for personal safety and for respect before the law; however, to reach this state of affairs, in the current situation is excruciatingly difficult.

The team came up with the following basic concerns which were common to all parties:

1. To ensure religious freedom for all communities in the city.
2. To maintain a sense of personal security for each individual throughout the city.
3. To promote and preserve each side's sense of identity.

Inventing

The team put forward the following concepts:

1. Assuming that there is peace in the area, entry to the city for purposes of pilgrimage or prayer should be ensured to Christians, Jews and Moslems at all times.
2. A joint police force should be established in which Palestinians would serve along side Israelis and joint patrols be organized in certain neighborhoods. The force should operate initially in the Old City and neighboring Palestinian areas (though later policing in such areas should be left to Palestinians). Joint training for police personnel from both communities should be organized.
3. Local neighbourhood planning committees should be established and development and building licences should be available to all, regardless of their communal or religious affiliations.

4. Provision should be made for the establishment of a mediation center which would provide means of defusing local conflict by making available trained mediators to the parties in conflict. A hotline to the center should be available to the police, community leaders and general public.

Implementing

While events have in some way passed the work of this team by, (for example, with security coordination and joint patrols occurring between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho), this work is still ahead of its time when it comes to Jerusalem. Given the very delicate and sensitive state of affairs over this city at this time, the participants in this team decided they could go no further developing and concretizing their general ideas and suggestions toward a more peaceful future.

Cultural Relations

The team was made up of an Israeli playwright and director who also teaches at the Hebrew University and a Palestinian social anthropologist and author, who teaches at Bir Zeit university. It soon became clear that, unlike other topics dealt with by the teams working on the project, cultural relations did not lend itself, in the view of the team, to consideration from a historical or institutional standpoint. After much discussion they found themselves co-operating to produce a play which might demonstrate how culture could at once bring people together and illustrate in dramatic form some of the issues which have still to be resolved between the two communities in Jerusalem.

The team concluded as follows:

Framing

The team felt that although political, economic and local government issues were important, they were not more important than the fact that by living side by

side the two communities were interacting all the time. Cultural relations in the broad sense (not merely cultural events but the interaction between societies) were going on even in the stressful conditions prevailing in Jerusalem since the Intifada began in 1987. In these circumstances, a creative challenge is how to use culture and cultural manifestations to the benefit of all those living in the city and how to accustom each side to the cultural concerns and values of the other.

Inventing

The team felt that:

1. The best way to promote cultural tolerance and understanding and provide stimulus and enjoyment or both (an essential part of cultural endeavor) is to undertake work in common.
2. They would themselves attempt to demonstrate this by jointly writing a one-act play.
3. The play, once written, should be performed by a joint Israeli-Palestinian cast.

Implementing

The play is set on the grounds of the West Jerusalem YMCA, one of the few places where Arabs and Jews in the city mix on equal terms. It deals with the problems that can arise when friends from the two sides who enjoy good personal relations are caught up in the politics of the city and of the region. The play was read at the seminar in December, 1993. One of the side effects of the project was that the members of the team found it possible to develop a friendship and understanding which survived the tensions inherent in the fact that they had very different points of view about many issues.

Education

The three participants (two Israelis and one Palestinian) in this team had been involved in education in their respective sectors for many years, two as teachers and one as a former official in the Israeli Ministry of Education and Culture and currently as a researcher. Their conclusions were as follows:

Framing

The team recognized that the city is “psychologically divided” and that the divide is reinforced by the fact that the Israeli and Palestinian educational systems have often tended to delegitimize and demonize the “other” through curricula which have been used for ideological purposes. After the team made a detailed analysis of what factors had influenced the development of the two systems they concluded that there were faults in both and that whatever political solution is finally adopted the two populations will not only be autonomous but have to live and work together. If they are to do so, change in the education received by all the city’s children is a necessity.

They framed the issues as follows:

1. Currently the two existing educational systems actively or passively encourage negative stereotypes, prejudices and narrow points of view among the youth from each community. How can the educational systems of the two communities be adapted to promote tolerance, open-mindedness and mutual understanding instead?
2. What changes in the curricula are needed if education is to play a positive rather than a negative part in fashioning improved community relations?
3. What type of teacher training best encourages understanding?
4. How can writers of children’s literature and school textbooks be persuaded to avoid stereotypes and underwriting existing animosities?

Inventing

The team first noted that provisions already exist in the stated aims of the Israeli and Palestinian systems which, if implemented, would do much to improve things. For example, the stated aims of the Jordanian system (which may still underpin much of the educational system in the West Bank) include "to foster the notions of peace, respect for human values and understanding and cooperation on the basis of equality." The Israeli Ministry of Education has a special unit which has no other purpose than to promote the idea of democracy and co-existence in equality of all communities. According to the Israeli Declaration of Independence, Israel "will guarantee total social and political equality to all its citizens without consideration of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture."

Aside from activating existing guidelines within the two systems, the allocation of resources to each community in Jerusalem in accordance with its need on a fair and just basis was singled out as a key necessity.

Other proposals the team made included:

1. Joint review by educators and scholars from both communities of curricula and textbooks for schools and teacher training colleges so as to improve the quality of materials. The review body would be an advisory one and have the power to recommend, rather than enforce, change.

2. Establishment of an institutional framework within the city for the promotion of contacts between educators and students at a personal and human level. Joint seminars, workshops and exchanges on a variety of subjects, not merely those related to co-existence, should be held.

3. Encouragement of teachers to learn more about the society and needs of the community as a whole (rather than their half of it) through appropriate training activities.

4. Joint extra-curricular activities for children of all ages; field and theater trips and sports activities should be organized.

Implementing

The team proposed that as a first step to implementing the proposals put forward in the earlier phases of its work a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee should be established which should have as its terms of reference the need to promote understanding between the two communities within the educational systems of both.

Copies of the papers prepared by the teams are available on request from Robin Twite, Project on Managing Political Disputes, Davis Institute, Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, 91905.

Section Three

The Role of “Track-Two Diplomacy” in Jerusalem Peace Making

The work of the project was reviewed and it was felt to be of sufficient quality to warrant presentation at a seminar to which were invited a key group of those who are directly concerned either as academics, officials or public figures, in discussion about the future of the city. On December 21-22, 1993, we held a conference entitled “The Role of Track-Two Diplomacy in Jerusalem Peaccmaking” at the American Colony Hotel. It was attended by about sixty people including all those who had been directly involved in the project, who in pairs presented their conclusions.

The opening session set the broader context for our project with a discussion on the significance of Track-Two Diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and its relevance to Jerusalem in particular. This in edited form is provided on the following pages. The order of presentation was as follows: Dr. Jay Rothman; Dr. Ron Pundik, who is a research-fellow at the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace and was one of the two Israeli interlocutors during the “back-channel” Israeli-Palestinian talks in Oslo; Dr. Bernard Sabella, who teaches Sociology at Bethlehem University and is active in conflict resolution in the Palestinian community; Dr. Michael Romann, who teaches Sociology at Tel Aviv University and is a co-author of a recent book on Jerusalem entitled “Living Together, Separately.”

Dr. Jay Rothman: I want to speak about the process of peace making, of conflict resolution, and make some connections between what happened just three months ago in Oslo and what the Project on Managing Political Disputes at the Hebrew University has been trying to do here in Jerusalem over the last few years. What we have been doing up until now has intentionally been in relative obscurity. The idea of focusing on functional issues related to Jerusalem seemed to many to

be somewhat irrelevant, though today it seems that events have overtaken us, and focusing on such issues as economics, education and safety is increasingly viewed as a way to break log jams and to build confidence.

I want first to set the stage for our discussion about the role of Track-Two Diplomacy and conflict resolution in Jerusalem peace making. In 1991, the Madrid peace talks launched what was known as a "twin track" process involving bilateral negotiations on the one hand and multilateral discussions on the other. For about a decade previous to that time, a body of theory and practice first formulated by U.S. State Department official Joseph Montville, had been emerging under the label of Track-Two Diplomacy. In setting the stage for our discussants to address themselves to the question and role of Track-Two Diplomacy in peace making in Jerusalem, I want to begin by drawing some parallels and making some distinctions between twin track negotiations and Track-Two Diplomacy.

Montville defines Track-Two Diplomacy as follows:

Track-Two Diplomacy is unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. It must be understood that track two diplomacy is in no way a substitute for official formal track one government to government or leader to leader relationships. Rather, track two activity is designed to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraint imposed upon them by the psychologically understandable need for leaders to be, or at least to be seen to be, strong, wary, and indomitable in the face of the enemy.

Track-Two Diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve, or in the first instance to manage, conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of public view and without the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage. Track-Two Diplomacy seeks political formulas to those scenarios which might satisfy the basic security and esteem

needs of the parties to a particular dispute. On its more general level, Track-Two Diplomacy seeks to promote an environment in a political community through the education of public opinion that would make it safer for political leaders to take risks for peace.

Shimon Shamir, former Israeli ambassador to Egypt, in an interview in "Yediot Aharonot" on December 10th, 1993, spoke about Track-Two Diplomacy in the context of his own work over the last fifteen years and he defined it in terms of three dimensions. He said Track-Two Diplomacy focuses first on the humanization of relations; second on a better understanding of the other side, of their perceptions, definitions, concerns, and the ability to report those concerns back to one's side; and third to initiate new creative ideas that are put forward informally and can be denied at official levels if they are unacceptable. If new ideas arise that are not useful they can be ignored as they have no official standing and status. So the process creates the flexibility to generate creative options.

These principles were applied intentionally and in modest ways throughout our Jerusalem project. It seems to me that many of these principles can also be discerned in the negotiations carried out through the Oslo Channel, although, of course, the Oslo process was not so much driven by track two theory as by excellent and intuitively powerful innovators. Yair Hirschfeld, who along with Ron Pundik was the main interlocutor when the Oslo channel was created, does however explicitly acknowledge the practical, if not theoretical, precedents of his own efforts. I quote:

Before the Israeli-Palestinian back channel started, there was a long process of non-political, cultural dialogue of academics, writers and artists that prepared the ground.

In the Oslo initiative, as in our Jerusalem initiative, the major bilateral and final status issues were set to the side although such issues were viewed as the ultimate target at which track two efforts were aimed.

Here then is the major distinction between twin track and track two approaches. In the twin track approach, the multilaterals and the bilaterals ended up serving different and competing masters. Initially, the Israelis, under the leadership of then Prime Minister Shamir, focused primarily on the multilaterals. The Palestinians in the beginning and the Arab world were focused on the bilaterals. This could, or should, not happen in track two efforts, where functional issues like economic development, and confidence building measures, are employed by both parties as a first and shared step. Thus, it serves as a form of prenegotiation designed to pave the way for eventual bargaining and required compromises over final status issues.

Looking back to what happened in Oslo, I believe three procedural factors contributed to success there. I want to now spell them out and suggest how they can also be applied to Jerusalem.

First of all, with the support of third party facilitators to assist the process, break log jams and help foster a calm and peaceful environment, the Oslo meetings were held in absolute secrecy. This freed participants of constituency constraints and enabled creative exploration of new ideas. Peace talks were safe because had leaks occurred, the higher ups could deny their significance by relegating them to what in fact they really were—analytic, exploratory discussions among academics.

As Yair Hirschfeld said recently, the fact that he is an academic without an official government position was important. It meant that the dialogue could take place but could be repudiated officially by either side if they wished to do so. For similar reasons, our Jerusalem project has been run as a research project and in a very low key way. Up until now, we have denied requests for media interviews and have kept the discussions at an analytical and academic level. This has provided us with a freedom and flexibility to explore issues that might be construed as politically controversial by others who would then impose constraints on the cooperative nature of the endeavor. On the other hand, we have neither tried nor would have it been possible here in Jerusalem to keep our initiative wholly secret. The operative word however has been low key, an attribute for which the Jerusalem conflict is not regularly known.

Second, the interlocutors in Oslo focused upon a different type and style of discourse than is possible in formal political negotiations. They established a shared agenda that moved away from exclusive positions, the positions of statehood versus autonomy, for example, to underlying and overlapping needs and interests — safety, control over destiny, mutual problem solving, economic development, confidence building. “What you do in such a situation,” said Hirschfeld, “is to check many, many possibilities of how to bridge gaps. It is important that you discuss matters in an easy atmosphere where you can easily retreat from positions.” This approach too has been the main innovation of our project. Instead of focusing on the final status questions and exclusive positions around a Jerusalem based on a single, divided or shared sovereignty, we have assumed a diversity of opinions on this matter and sought ways to address daily and functional issues as a means of building confidence and fostering cooperation. Cooperation would serve both as a useful mechanism in itself for transforming relationships in Jerusalem and as a vehicle for helping to fulfill the underlying needs and motivations of both parties for safety, dignity, control over destiny, well being, expression of identity and so forth, without asking participants to compromise on their respective final status concerns. While disagreeing about the political outcome, participants in the project nonetheless found some tentative ways to forge cooperation over daily functional relationships.

And lastly, new ideas generated in the Oslo channel were communicated to the highest channels “back home” and given concrete expression in policy, finally symbolized by the handshake in Washington. We hope our project too, in much more modest proportions of course, will also have some resonance in practical relations and policy on the future of Jerusalem.

In conclusion, let me raise a number of general questions relative to the role of Track-Two Diplomacy in Jerusalem:

1. What are the benefits and what are the pitfalls of such an approach as we prepare for negotiating over Jerusalem several years from now?

2. Why will such an approach work or fail? Indeed, how do we evaluate success or failure of such two track initiatives? Only when they lead to a handshake in Washington? Or do we need much more nuanced measures of perceiving and evaluating the more incremental gains if they indeed occur?

3. Is it useful to set aside (but neither abandon nor attempt to directly transform) issues of final status in Jerusalem as we work on confidence building and functional cooperation? Or is there a danger that this merely serves to legitimize the status quo that only one side may favor?

4. Given the emotional attachment to Jerusalem is it possible to get significant populations, even among the elite, to support and participate in such a local level cooperation and confidence building effort?

Dr. Ron Pundik: What I will try to do here is to talk about the analytical side in order to try and combine what we were doing in Oslo together with what you are doing here in Jerusalem, and also maybe to tie it into the future. I will try also to give a personal dimension since I can talk not only as a historian which is my profession, but also as a historian who fortunately was part of history.

Dr. Rothman calls it "Track-Two Diplomacy". We called it "back channel diplomacy" which is, perhaps, the same. If you have a formal negotiation between two governments, and if the formal negotiations are working well and there are no problems, you do not need any back channels or second track. But as we all know, the situation in the Middle East never led to easy going and smooth negotiation, and this is one of the reasons why we engaged in back channel activity. This back channel, as a matter of fact, started much before the beginning of the Oslo Channel. It was Yair Hirschfeld who started a serious and intensive dialogue with the Palestinians at the beginning of the eighties. More intensive contacts with Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi started after 1988 when the PLO issued the famous December, 1988 declaration accepting 242, etc.

I will jump, however, to 1992. In April of that year I joined Hirschfeld. After the change of governments, and with the Labor government in power, we had a much more intensive relationship with the leadership since we were connected, though not officially, to Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Yossi Beilin. We were academicians and this helped in creating the Oslo Channel.

However, while for a long time we felt that there was a need for a back channel (with the bilateral rounds of talks in Washington producing little), it took time for something different to emerge. The need for change was felt by both sides and crystallized in the meeting between Hirschfeld and Pundik and Hanan Ashrawi on the 30th of November, 1992. She was the one to suggest a non-official meeting between PLO economics Minister Abu Ala and us. This was at a time when the law which outlawed meetings between Israeli citizens and PLO officials was not yet overturned (as it was several months later). We said yes despite the fact that we did not have any formal government backing.

This meeting created the back channel and led to the Oslo meetings. Of course the Oslo back channel was not the only form such contacts could have taken. Let us assume that in Washington while the negotiation was stuck, Mr. Elyakim Rubenstein had suggested to Hader Abdel Shaffi to go to Oslo and talk, in a closed room, with no orders from anybody, either by the Israel government or by the Palestinian leadership. This would have been a kind of a back channel although it would have been an official back channel rather than an unofficial one.

However the back channel you are talking about here in relation to Jerusalem is similar to what we were doing in Oslo at the beginning. Yours is a completely unofficial back channel. Now this unofficial back channel could also develop into a formal back channel, which is what happened in effect in Oslo. Our Oslo discussions started as an entirely non-official exercise; Yair Hirschfeld and I engaged in them on our own.

In policy making there are several ways to create a process. One, which is the more rational way, is what administrations and governments are trying to do i.e.

to take a decision at the higher echelons of government and pass it down to the officials, heads of sections, etc. However, in our case, the process was reversed. The idea came from the bottom and then climbed gradually, and with a lot of difficulties, up to the top, up to the decision makers and only at the very end of the process, on the last day of the process, the two decision makers, meaning Arafat and Rabin said "yes." Now this process demonstrates another aspect of the back channel; its value depends on how it develops — can those involved convey their ideas successfully to those with the power to decide?

Coming back to Oslo, we went to the first meeting in Oslo without the knowledge of the Israeli government. The only one who knew that we were going to Oslo was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Yossi Beilin. From my point of view, this gives him a lot of credit in the whole process because he took a lot of political risk; if the process had not only failed but also been leaked to the media, it could have definitely jeopardized his political career.

We went to Oslo in order to listen, in order to sound out the Palestinians. While these meetings were clearly unofficial, it was also clear to the Palestinians that we were not only academicians and not only private people; but also that we were well-connected to at least a part of the Israeli government. This leads to another point which is access, access to decision makers, because if you are undertaking back channel activity and you do not have any input at the official level, all your activity could stay on paper and either the officials will read them or not. The problem is who gives the information to the decision maker?

In our channel, there was an interesting asymmetry, which also relates to the methodology and analytical side of the process. We were non-officials but the Palestinian delegation which came to Oslo was a fully-authorized Palestinian delegation not just three intelligent people. The point man was Abu Ala, who, at that time, was in charge of the finances of the PLO and was an important politician behind the scenes. So there was asymmetry and it was a politically brave decision by the Palestinians to say yes, we are continuing this channel although we know that on the Israeli side we have people who are non-officials. The Palestinians were

open enough to judge without any preconditions that they were talking with serious people.

We were serious not only because we were well-connected but because we also came with quite good ideas. At that time, and I am talking about December, 1992, and January, 1993, after the deportation of the Hamas people, negotiation was difficult. Nevertheless, the Palestinians found in us partners who were able to think originally and in very wide terms, and who also showed that they could deliver goods. The reverse was also true. We found that the Palestinian side in Oslo were working on completely different terms than those used in the official channel. This emphasizes another advantage of the back channel.

In a back channel, you do not have a protocol so you can do and talk and say whatever you want, unlike at the talks in Washington where you have a tape recorder in the middle of the table and after every session both sides get the transcript. The Americans and probably also the international news, got the transcript. This created a situation where people were afraid to talk. In an official channel people are afraid to talk but in a back channel, you do not have any fears. The only one who knows exactly what you're saying are the two or three people who are sitting on the other side of the table.

You are also creating trust between the two sides during the talks. Trust meaning not only that you trust the people but you also are creating a kind of an ambience, an amicable situation where two sides are not talking one against the other but instead talking one with the other which is very important. I would say that if a back channel is progressing in a successful situation, one could sit and play a game of changing roles meaning that although we were sitting there, Israelis with Palestinians, we could say: "okay, we are now thinking as Palestinians and ask them to think as Israelis". By this, you get into the mind of the other side, and mainly into the problems of the constituency from which they come, which helps a lot.

Another advantage of the back channel is its secrecy. On the assumption that nothing will leak, you have a lot of manoeuvrability and there is no pressure from

the public. This is quite different in formal negotiations such as those in Taba or Cairo where the press and the public opinion is pressurizing; this pressure is usually bad for any sensitive dialogue. Those involved in back channel dialogue do not have problems of opposition from your own side, among your own friends, or of envies, jealousies, etc. which are common among politicians. If you are sitting in a closed situation and with a small group of people, usually it is much easier to get good results.

In a situation where nothing is publicized, you do not need to show off. You do not need to show that "we are stronger," nor to stick to the same old ideas of forty or fifty years ago. Everything is open. And since the discussion is secret and unofficial you can always retreat and say you were only exploring an idea which is maybe for the next generation. Maybe this is something which in the next negotiation we can fulfill if at this time we retreat or it is not accepted by the other side. Nothing that you say in a back channel is holy.

In such a back channel there is almost no influence from activities outside the room where you are talking. In Washington, the Palestinian delegation could not continue a deliberation when Hamas supporters were deported, or when the closure of the territories began. Public opinion would not allow it. In the back channel, you know that you have a target and the target is bigger than the ebb and flow of everyday life. The target is to reach coexistence, understanding, peace, a peaceful situation, between two nations. When two nations are trying to get to a solution, if somebody is shot in the middle of Ramalah or in the middle of Holon, it is important but it cannot influence our striving to get to much more important results. The fact was that there were a lot of problems from December, 1992, until August, 1993, and thereafter, but we did not allow any external development to interfere.

In our back channel, we could map the red lines, the core concerns, of the two sides. In an official channel even if you know your red lines, you will not reveal them, not in the beginning and maybe not even towards the end. There is a

traditional way of negotiation. In official negotiations, each side comes with its extreme position and you try to bridge a gap. In the "back channel" you can also come with extreme positions or bargaining positions but it is much easier and quicker to define the red lines. The advantage of Yair and myself was that we were practicing back channel activity before Oslo. Through our contacts in Jerusalem with Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi we had an approximate picture of where the Palestinians were willing to go. We also knew approximately the red lines of the Israeli government, although we were not Israeli officials and we were never informed officially what they were. Now the Palestinians, obviously knew exactly where their red lines were and as a result we had a clearer map of what both sides regarded as central than was available elsewhere.

Since we had all the advantages I mentioned earlier, and trust was developing very rapidly, there was a very good understanding between the two teams and a feeling that neither of the two teams came to humiliate or get the better of the other. We came with the understanding that we are talking to equal human beings, and with the understanding that at the end of the day we must create a situation in which to coexist. We did not come with an Israeli agenda. We came with the intention of finding common ground. We found very quickly with our Palestinian partners that they understood the idea. They were not there in order to fly banners or repeat old slogans but to understand the Israeli problem also and to suggest solutions, as well as to stand for their own interest as we stood for our own interest.

The fact was that the two sides came with a will to find a solution. In a back channel if you have problems or if there is even failure of the whole channel or of part of it, it is not as dramatic as in an official channel. In an official channel, if there is a problem, it goes everywhere and then it blows up and it gets much bigger headlines than it really deserves. Even if there is a small problem, the mass media unfortunately usually make it a much bigger problem. In a back channel, if you have a problem, you can halt negotiations for a month, nobody will know. You can do a reassessment. You can send some emissaries, as we did, within the region to ask key questions.

We had many problems in Oslo. It is not that the Palestinians came to Oslo with the same ideas as us. We came from different sides and we mapped the problems and created a situation where the two leaderships could assist one another to bridge gaps. When we had problems we used the Norwegians as a go between. It is also important in a back channel that it is bilateral, not trilateral or quadrilateral. We used the Norwegians only to send messages between us. Unlike the situation in the Camp David talks, when the Americans were not only involved but also initiators and came with suggestions, the Norwegians played an important role as facilitators. When we needed their assistance as a go between, they did it in a very, very successful and professional way.

When you have a small team working on a subject like Jerusalem, it may be of personal interest of those involved to succeed. There is a dynamic between the two sides who have a mutual interest in the success of the "baby" which is being created together. Thus each side comes back home with more personal interest in convincing the leadership about the potential in these suggestions, though of course the leadership has the last word.

Dr. Bernard Sabella: I have no exciting tale to tell you. Rather I think, in fact, when I was asked to participate in this panel, I was really thinking of starting my talk to you in Arabic and go on for five minutes in Arabic and see how you would respond, assuming that most of you are non-Arabic speakers. The idea of doing so is really to demonstrate that today in the city of Jerusalem, the gaps which separate Arab from Israeli are so huge and don't let us fool ourselves in thinking that things are really getting smoother. In fact, we have today in Jerusalem two dichotomized, polarized communities and in a sense if we do not start with this basic actuality then we are fooling ourselves.

There have been some changes and I want to try and answer the questions posed by Jay. Basically I think the ability to engage in track two diplomacy, for Palestinian and Israeli academics to come together or other Palestinians and Israelis to come together, is not the result of love suddenly discovered between the

two sides. I think we have to look at the external factors, international factors, regional factors, which are pushing both Palestinians and Israelis to talk to each other.

Track-Two Diplomacy is being practiced by more and more people. It has been legitimized not because it is so fantastic in its approach but because the realities of everyday life are forcing more and more people to come and talk to each other. In this sense, I see track two as part of a larger process and, as such it is neither conclusive nor miraculous. Rather it is a process of learning to accommodate our positions and our interests to the other side. And this is a very difficult process. It is extremely difficult because it involves first of all our identity, our identity as Moslems, as Christians and as Palestinians and our identity as Israelis and as religious Jews, orthodox Jews, secular Jews, atheist Jews, whatever.

I think track two is simply part of the process of accommodation. It is not the whole process. We live in a very complex reality and I like what Shimon Shamir said about "humanization." Humanization is the willingness to accept or accommodate our position to their position. Dehumanization is the failure to equate ourselves with the other side. If one of the two national populations in Jerusalem feels (certainly the Palestinian side feels) that it is not treated fairly and it is not given the resources to live its own life and to develop itself then we have a lack of human understanding. I am against quoting statistics but perhaps 100,000 [housing] units have been built in Jerusalem for people coming from all over Israel and the ex-Soviet Union and so on, while the Arab population of Jerusalem has doubled since 1967 without any significant increase in housing units.

It was one of the stipulations of the Israeli government in 1967 that it would treat Jerusalem as a united city in which all peoples were equal. Everybody knows this is nonsense. Everybody knows that there were accommodations, based on a patron-client relationship, such as those between former Mayor Kollek and some in the local Arab population, from which a few Arabs benefited. The majority of Arabs did not benefit because they refused to legitimize the Jerusalem municipality.

Because there is inequality, track two has a role to play in the relationships between Palestinians and Israelis in the city of Jerusalem.

However its use poses a question, which is, if I engage in a Track-Two Diplomacy or negotiation with orthodox Jews from Mea Shearim or ultra-right wing Israelis from the settlements, do I give them legitimization? That is the central question. Do I give legitimization to Israeli institutions in the city if I go and talk to the mayor of Jerusalem? I think we need to answer this question. Will contact lead to legitimization? If it does then the majority of Palestinians would not engage in track two discussion. Why should I give the Israeli Municipality legitimization? This is my city. My family has been here for generations and now they have the power and I do not.

Track-Two Diplomacy is in a sense a question of power relationship. And if I come to it with the Israeli side being very condescending towards me, I tell them "shalom" ["Goodbye"]. I have lived all my life being treated in a condescending manner, as a periphery to something else. Now I am on the stage, you either leave me alone or when you want to talk to me, talk to me as an equal. Be willing to share power with me. You don't want to share power with me, then eventually I shall conclude that you are kidding me.

As I look down the road and with the September 13 Accord as a background, I cannot see how we can go into the 21st century with the same parameters, with the same group definitions, with the same individual definitions and then say that Jerusalem is a united city. In other words, I expect track two diplomacy, or track two negotiation, to help redefine each group's definition of itself. This is very important because of all the emotions which arise when Palestinians and Israelis speak of Jerusalem. It is important if we want to maintain a city in which the two national communities live with dignity and respect and start to understand each other and respect each other that we start the process of redefining ourselves. Redefinition is a very difficult process and it cannot happen in my view as a result of people pressing on each other the need to see how decent the other side is, how

willing to compromise, how willing to understand. I think rather that the common interest which exists can facilitate the process of starting to redefine ourselves. It is a very difficult process. I'm not saying it is going to be easy for Palestinians to start redefinition. I'm not saying it is going to be easy for Israelis to start the redefinition. But we have no alternative.

One of the issues which I think important is that the Palestinians in East Jerusalem have their own municipal government. Why? Because if you are talking about 150,000 Palestinians, then you are talking about people who need housing, who need proper schools, who need a good electricity company, who need good water, who need good playgrounds and who need people who understand them directing their affairs. Today, we are not running our own affairs and so when you invite me to participate in track two meetings, I say: "Can I use this? Can track two meetings help me get to the point where we have two parallel municipalities operating side by side?" Only then can we start having common parameters which apply in the whole city of Jerusalem where each community: religious, ethnic, political feels at the same time that the city belongs to it and it belongs to the city. This is a vision.

How can track two participate in this vision? This is important because I think it is not enough to have good sentiments and good feelings. You have to translate these good sentiments and good feelings into something institutional, into something formal. I pay my taxes to the municipality. At the same time, I am ambivalent about the municipality. I cannot go talk to them. And when I talk to them what do I tell them? Okay, there are some people who would use the talk with the municipality to take an advantage here, a disadvantage there, to make deals. But why should I continue in this client-patron relationship? Why cannot I have a municipality of my own in which I can express myself and learn how to accommodate myself to the Israelis, to my neighbors?

Given the difficulties that are surrounding the September 13 Accord and its implementation and given the mood among the Palestinians, I think that track two

is more needed now than ever. But let us be clear on the assumptions or on the basic premises on which both Palestinians and Israelis come to track two. If we do not have clarity as to why Palestinians and Israelis come, then we may be misled. We also need to involve a number of people in the process. Can we reach larger segments of the population of both groups? In my opinion, this is dependent on the concrete results that track two can offer us. If track two does not offer us something concrete, people will not be interested. Why should I come? Why should I come and waste my time when the whole exercise is to be nice to Jay Rothman and he to be nice to me and both of us will agree on certain things? But what are the concrete results of this process? How do you convince the Palestinians that track two is helping you get certain concrete things?

I turn finally to the question of the final status. I think that there is a feeling today among Palestinians, I don't know if I share it, but it exists among a large segment of the population, that everything is lost in Jerusalem. There is the feeling that the Israelis really have Judaized the city, and ghettoized the Arab part of the city, and therefore everything is lost. Therefore, there is a fear that track two is going simply to legitimize the present arrangements. How then can you pass the message to Palestinians that this is not so? You cannot reassure Palestinians if you do not have concrete transformations or beginning of transformations, that indicate that Jerusalem is your city as it is our city. My hope and my vision for the future I once wrote in an article. I said as a Christian that my children at school have always had Moslem friends. They have always played with Moslem friends. And they have grown sensitized to each other's religions, to each other's concerns, to each other's individual orientations and so on. This is not so with Jewish children and Palestinian children. If you want to have an undivided city, you have to allow the opportunity for children of all communities to learn to appreciate each other. If we don't get to that point and feel that this is our city then I think we have all failed.

Dr. Michael Romann: I am not a political scientist who knows a lot about track two concepts or practices. My only contribution here comes from the fact that I am an observer of the way Jews and Arabs in this complicated city engage in

practical negotiations, or go on living practically together, and conducting what is, in effect, track two strategy in spite of political conflict. Arabs and Jews have a dialogue of actions and practical negotiation in spite of very deep political conflict and mutual non-recognition.

Part of the problem is that there is a mutual non-recognition of rights of the other side in political terms, in terms of collective identity. Other problems relate to cultural divisions—religion, language—and to the enormous social gap between the two groups.

How do they get on together and what can we learn from their relations? My first point is that in practical relations what they learn to do is to circumvent or to bypass political disagreement and political principles. In order to work together or to have commercial relations both sides find ways to circumvent the major political problems which cannot be solved. For instance, Israelis, in spite of wishing to impose full sovereignty over the Arab sector, permit certain exceptions by not fully applying Israeli law and administrative practice over East Jerusalem. Among instances of this are permitting the use of Jordanian dinars in the eastern sector or allowing East Jerusalem residents who hold Jordanian passports, issued by a country officially at war with Israel, to serve in Israeli governmental agencies (i.e. as teachers or policemen), even though the law says only Israeli citizens may serve in an Israeli administration.

A lot of the daily relationships in Jerusalem between the two communities involve a kind of creativity which I think is very much needed. I think some of such creative patterns are, in effect, track two. Jews and Arabs undertake a lot of transactions together, a lot of business together, without having officially identified that Abdullah and Sons and Cohen and Sons have a joint concern.

So long as Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians cannot agree on political terms, some functional solution is in the meantime the only possible way to move in the right direction. Academic explorations are probably quite useful in this field

because they can help discover some of the problems and dialectics involved in order to have a clearer and more objective view of the situation.

Of course there are a few assumptions about Track-Two Diplomacy. One problematic assumption is that mutual daily relations build confidence. This is not necessarily so; we have to explore it. There are, after all, cultural differences; different norms of conduct and daily behaviour. Studies show, for example, that Arabs and Jews conduct a commercial exchange differently and with different expectations. Jews tend to be functional. Arabs give some social dimensions even to daily market dealings. So it is not always true that daily practical relationships build confidence. It is not proven and we have to distinguish where and when they do, and when they don't.

Then there is the problem of majority-minority relations. It is very problematic when practical relations and negotiations are conducted in a framework where one party holds a majority position and the other a minority status. I take the simplest example. Jews employing Arabs under the existing conditions do not necessarily always build confidence.

The other assumption worth thinking about is the idea of a rational, academic solution. I know that over the years there have been at least 40 or 50 plans proposing rational solutions for Jerusalem. They did not work. They did not work because part of the problem is not rational. Part of the problem concerns identity and psychological attitude.

Academic exploration and definition of the situation, and dialects involved is important. It has helped to remind us that Jerusalem is a problem. For many Israelis over the years Jerusalem was not perceived of as part of the problem. But there is no doubt it is part of the package to be negotiated. Jerusalem is negotiable and not non-negotiable. It took the Palestinians one hundred years to concede that they must look at the problem of the Israelis in this region and see how they fit in. It has taken the Israelis many years to see that the Palestinians in Jerusalem have to be included in a settlement.

Lastly, the parties in Track-Two Diplomacy have to deal with each other on equal terms and believe me that is the most difficult thing for Israelis, especially after twenty-five years when the Jewish population with a history of 2,000 years of being a minority found itself ruling an Arab minority. I believe that track two discussions could contribute to identifying Jerusalem as part of the problem, as a negotiable element and the need for equal negotiating terms.

Appendix 1

Use of the Model in the Project

The Jerusalem initiative has employed the model as a tool for training participants in conflict resolution,¹ and it was used in practice to guide the work of the teams. The schedule of work was designed to correspond with the three stages of the model. We planned three seminars and proposed three sections to each paper based on the three stages of the model: Framing, Inventing and Structuring. After each seminar, the authors would write a draft which would commonly define the problems of their subject, invent solutions and structure their implementation. However, as will be seen, this straightforward design proved unrealistic as reality imposed itself upon this ideal and linear conceptualization.

Framing

The framing stage in the project was designed to help the participants jointly define the problems of their specific subject. The original design of the project called for a two day seminar with all of the participants which would guide them through an exercise in framing and require them to systematically move from positions to needs to interests. The two day seminar, however, proved impossible due to the time constraints of the participants. Instead, we arranged a four hour introductory meeting. Thus, training about the framing stage continued over several meetings and was never explained in as systemic and step-by-step fashion as had been done previously in dozens of training seminars with others in less "real life" settings.²

¹ Of the group of 11 participants only two reported previous study or training in the field.

² See chapter 7, "Building Pieces of Peace in the City of Peace: Jerusalem," which summarizes a series of simulations and training workshops Rothman has run, in Rothman (1992) From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic and Regional Conflicts. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

The First Framing Seminar (April 2nd, 1993): Getting Started

At the outset participants were asked to discuss their current attitudes to Jerusalem. They were not asked to abandon or even modify their political positions regarding the future of the city, but rather to explore what motivates them.

Thus, participants were asked to introduce themselves and their connection to Jerusalem. The introductions allowed participants the opportunity to express their deepest thoughts and relations to Jerusalem. Some offered personal histories of the city (e.g. "the history of my personal childhood...being kept from the Old city", "I am a true Jerusalemite...my family has lived here for fourteen centuries") while others expressed their fear to enter the "other side" of Jerusalem and their hope for peace in the city. On the whole, people expressed a wide range of professional, spiritual and emotional attachments to the city. The introductions set the tone for a deep exchange between the participants. In sharing thoughts on Jerusalem, the participants articulated their personal frames, from "the inside out."³ Some examples:

Israeli: "I was a soldier in the Israeli army in 1967 and, like many Israelis, I was hoping that this would be the last war between Palestinians and Israelis. Unfortunately, after 25 years, we can see what's happened. We had such hope that our first meeting in 1967 would bring about a change but the fact is that we are unable to talk to each other in either of our languages, Hebrew or Arabic, and we need the mediation of the English language to help us...I was born in Jerusalem, so I have always dealt with the dispute. When I was growing up, I was unable to visit the Temple Mount and the Western Wall... I am aware of the fact that I cannot deport the Arabs and I hope they understand that they cannot do the same to me. I am not optimistic about finding a political solution that will satisfy both sides, and

³ See Rothman, *op. cit.* 1992, chapter one, "Politics from the Inside Out: A Cultural History of Modern Jewish and Palestinian Nationalism."

until that day comes, I hope that we will find a way of at least living together without harming each other.”

Palestinian: “I am not a Jerusalemite, I am a refugee from the former Palestinian town which is called by the Israelis Beit Shean. Jerusalem is the core of international Arab/Islamic nationality and I have a legal and emotional sense of belonging to Jerusalem... but I have a psychological problem about Jerusalem. My wife has a Jerusalem identity card and I don’t. Our first child we were able to register under my wife’s identity card but the second we weren’t able to. During the Gulf War, I was in London and I called my family to see that everything was okay. My second son, who was five years old at the time, said to me, “You don’t love me. You gave my older brother a gas mask [to which he was ‘entitled’ as a Jerusalem resident] and I didn’t get one so I am going to die” ...When it comes to Jerusalem, we the Palestinians are qualified to determine what we want because we have suffered. We are all the graduates of the ‘college of suffering’.”

Israeli: “In order to answer the question, what does Jerusalem mean to me, I must start with a personal history. My family arrived in Palestine in 1650. We were in Gaza until 1700, when we had to move to Hebron where we stayed until 1929. We came to Jerusalem as refugees in 1929... I was born in Jerusalem in 1946 during the British mandate, so you could say that I am an Israeli - Palestinian. My concern with Jerusalem is through the history of my childhood - we didn’t go into the Old City because we couldn’t... When we conquered the city in 1967, it was a spiritual revelation for me that we could enter...I had the feeling at the time that this was a very special place, that there was this religious atmosphere of peace. This is my heritage and it is deeper than politics, it is beyond sovereignty and self determination. The politics are superficial in light of history.”

Palestinian: “I am a real Jerusalemite, not just in a theoretical or spiritual way. My family has been here for 14 centuries on my mother’s side and 8 centuries on my father’s side. We have archives and documentation to prove it. It is my city, I have property and real estate and all of our history is here. In order to be a real

Jerusalemite, you must have inheritance in Jerusalem. It is not enough just to say that you love it. I believe that Jerusalem is for the Jerusalemites, because our inheritance and kinship are here. I did not fight in the wars, I inherited the defeats.

Jews and Palestinians live together and have relationships that are frozen because of what is happening on the political level. There will always be political problems, and there will always be fanatics. We need channels for reforming consciousness, and I hope that this project will offer a better context in which to meet each other and have dialogue on a higher level.

We need to address how to make this city more dynamic. We need methods for local communities to work on problems. The West Bank has become the suburb of Jerusalem. Jerusalem cannot be isolated from the West Bank, and we must re-define who belongs to Jerusalem.”

Israeli: “Since I arrived in Israel in 1945, I have been in love with Jerusalem, and I wouldn’t give it up for anything in the world. It is a very special place, and you don’t find anywhere like it.

Jerusalem became even more a part of myself when I fought the war in 1948. It was a very significant experience for me. Since I was here from 1945, I had seen the Old City at that time.

Jerusalem today is very bound to its religious identity, I would prefer it to be less so. I think that it’s important to meet and learn about each other. After a while, I think that we will see the impact of contact. I hope the participants who couldn’t make it here today because of the closure will be here next meeting, and that soon we won’t have to worry about these problems anymore.”

Framing Team Meetings (April 2-April 27): Building Relationships

After the first seminar, the participants took on the task of meeting in their teams and producing shared problem definitions concerning their topic. The original idea was for each team to write a preliminary draft illustrating these shared problems. The first round of meetings made it clear, however, that the teams were not yet ready to do this. Many people were confused about their task, and many still did not accept the concept (as presented in the model) of jointly framing problems before designing solutions. Rothman attended the first meetings of all of the groups to help facilitate the process. Despite various levels of resistance, by the end of their first meeting, most teams had begun to define the problems of their individual communities.

The education team had spent time before their joint meeting writing about the technical problems in the educational systems of each community. Rothman pointed out that this did not address the needs and values involved in education. The team decided that the principal problem that they would address was the lack of education for the promotion of co-existence between the two sides. They outlined a draft which would articulate current educational problems in each community, barriers that must be overcome to promote greater co-existence and a summary of the common problems.

The security team had to spend time catching up since the Palestinian member of the team had not been at the first meeting due to the closure of the West Bank. This team was very reluctant to spend too much time defining problems and was anxious to move on to solutions. Rothman urged them to outline a draft that would give each participant a chance to articulate the meaning of safety for his community, jointly articulate the problems of safety in Jerusalem and summarize the convergence and divergence of each side's problem definitions.

The economics team faced the same problem of a missing team member at the first meeting. They were also very eager to talk about solutions instead of defining the problems. It was particularly a challenge for them to define problems since the

economic approach is generally geared towards solutions to empirical problems, not to articulating the often hidden social and cultural origins of such problems as prescribed in the methodology. Eventually they came up with a list of common problems that they would address: inequality of economic resources, tourism/commerce, infrastructure, opened/closed borders, relative deprivation and competition between Palestinians and between Israelis and Palestinians. In particular, in line with the methodology, they discussed the need for economic well-being — the lack of which among the Palestinians leads to threats to the well-being (e.g. security) of Israelis.

The first round of team meetings succeeded in getting the joint work started, allowing teams to work with the model and get answers to some of their questions left over from the first seminar, and lay the groundwork for framing common problems. Nonetheless, there was still a great deal of resistance to the model, and many teams were clearly eager to begin work on solutions.⁴

The Second Framing Seminar (April 27, 1993): Working through Resistance

The original agenda of the second seminar was to share the common problems that each team had produced. No team had finished that task, however, so the agenda was changed to updating everybody on each team's progress, continuing work in teams on defining joint problems and introducing the next stage. Rothman suggested that by the end of the meeting, each pair should try to have a list of common problems and the "framing stage" would be complete.

⁴ One key to the methodology is to "go slow to go fast" by keeping people from what appears to be a natural inclination to dispense quickly with a framing or definition stage and jump to the invention of solutions. A key deficiency with the "normal" approach is that superficial problem framing often leads people to address problem symptoms instead of causes.

Unfortunately, the tone of the meeting was set by the disturbing news that a Palestinian (ironically, perhaps, of the security team) was turned away at the gates of Hebrew University by campus security. Rothman expressed distress at the occurrence and suggested it was yet another example of why our project, which should indeed focus upon such daily issues and even, where appropriate describe them in the papers to illustrate the situation, was so important. A participant expressed his feeling of not being "at rest" at the meeting because of what had happened to his colleague. He requested that someone call his colleague at home to apologize. Given this occurrence everyone present agreed that the University was not an appropriate meeting place for the project and decided that all future meetings be held in a more neutral environment.

Each team then spoke about their progress. A participant voiced her concern that the model was difficult to follow. She found that in her team, which focused on education, they often found themselves working backwards. They first thought of solutions, and then went back to define the common problem. She wondered if the model provided for really creative work. Another participant then challenged the system's relevance to education.

Participant: "This system may work for issues like economics and security because there are inherent shared problems in these domains. But for education, there are no common problems. We don't want to share education."

Participant: "I think there are shared problems relating to education. The question for our team is what cooperation in education is possible in order to enhance co-existence in Jerusalem."

Participant: "This can't be about conflict resolution because education does not present a shared problem as between Palestinians and Israelis."

Participant: "It's a question of the kind of education you use ... If you have four children, and two are fighting with two, would you separate them so they don't fight anymore or have them talk to each other?"

Participant: "But what I am saying is that this is not a basic problem."

Rothman: "I disagree... Education as a process, or a vehicle for promoting understanding and coexistence, is often not used in that way, but rather the opposite. Thus education is a problem that must be addressed for promoting peace in Jerusalem."

The Third Framing Seminar (May 13, 1993): Progress by Fits and Starts

The agenda of this session was to move on to inventing. However, it was clear that there was still a high level of resistance to moving ahead as prescribed by the methodology. Very few people arrived on time for the meeting, and the frustration level was high. Thus, instead of moving on to inventing, we worked backwards and the group summed up how each team had progressed in their framing work. It was clear that while some teams were very close to finishing their work on common problem definitions, others had still to do so. The education and economics teams said that they were very close to being done with the first stage. It was also agreed that Rothman would again meet with the teams and help them finish their framing work by the next meeting.

Before the meeting concluded, the inventing stage was presented conceptually. (As summarized in Section One).

The Fourth Framing Seminar (June 2, 1993): Articulating Common Problems

By this meeting, all of the teams had shared statements of their joint problem definitions. (Brief accounts of these will be found in Section Two.)

Summary of Framing Stage

The framing stage was difficult and lengthy. In the end, all the groups “got it” and more or less employed the method as they learned it. We learned the hard way the lesson that in “field work,” reality imposes itself upon design instead of the other way around. The framing process took three months, instead of one as had been planned.

The project was subject to the lack of control that comes with the constraints of real life situations. It was, of course, all the more difficult due to the topic being addressed. Participants’ time was limited. This was especially so with those participants who are quite prominent in their communities. As already stated, three participants were not always able to reach Jerusalem as they lived outside the municipal borders and access to Jerusalem was denied to Palestinians for considerable periods of time. We had to “make due” with meetings that were short, not fully attended and separated by intervals of two or three weeks. Consequently, teams progressed at different rates, and the whole group was subject to various setbacks and frustrations of our plans and activities.

Another constraint was the level of resistance of the participants. This resistance may be explained in many ways. For example, since participants had their own ideas about the conflict which were formed by their living in its midst, they were not wholly open to the new ideas about its origins and nature as suggested by the conflict resolution methodology they were asked to employ. Some participants felt reluctant to spend time defining problems when for them the problems are already clearly defined through their every day lives. It was therefore hard to convince participants of the value of “going slow to go fast” by comprehensively, analytically and jointly defining the problems prior to devising solutions. Resistance could perhaps also be attributed to the emotional cost of failure. If the project failed to foster useful products, it could be perceived as yet another in a long list of failed attempts at peace making. Due to the constant resistance, it took a lot of convincing to get participants engaged in framing. Given that it was the first step in the project, it was especially important and difficult to overcome this resistance.

Despite the factors that made the framing stage of the project difficult, the participants were ultimately relatively successful in varying degrees at producing joint problem definitions. It was a long and difficult effort for the participants, but given the various constraints that accompanied the project, this probably should have been predictable.

Inventing

While ideally, according to the model, participants would first master and apply the framing approach and only then move into inventing (in the belief that only when problems are fully and jointly framed can appropriate and cooperative solutions be found), in reality our work did not wholly progress in this fashion. Instead, even while learning and enacting the framing component, inventing was introduced in order to build and maintain momentum, particularly for those feeling frustrated by the first stage. The inventing stage enables parties to devise integrative solutions to the problems that they defined in the framing stage. Ideally, participants cooperatively address the problems defined in their “common frame” by creating proposals and projects that address the needs of both sides. These solutions are hopefully applicable in any political arrangement for Jerusalem (e.g. the same design for economic cooperation over tourism would work regardless of whether Jerusalem remains solely under Israeli sovereignty or is politically shared or divided). Otherwise different sets of solutions should be posed for each possible political outcome (e.g. an integrated Israeli-Palestinian police force under Israeli sovereignty or a coordinated police force under shared sovereignty).

The goal of inventing in the project was to offer the teams a mechanism for creating cooperative projects which would address the problems that they jointly articulated by the end of the framing stage. This would be the second element of their joint papers. Originally, as with the framing stage we intended to have one two-day seminar devoted to presenting and exploring the Inventing process. However, again due to constraints on participants’ time, we presented this stage over several three to four hour seminars.

The First Inventing Seminar (May 13th - third meeting): Moving on Slowly

This meeting was intended to mark the end of the framing stage (with the presentation of all teams' drafts of joint problem definitions) and the beginning of inventing. Since not all teams were done framing, and not all teams were present, the agenda was changed. After an update on each team's project, we decided to go ahead with inventing training despite the fact that not all teams were at that point.

The biggest concern of the group in accepting the inventing stage was that it did not create political agreements. Several participants expressed this concern and the meeting progressed into a dialogue which attempted to address participants' doubts and explain inventing further.

Participant: "I think we have ducked the main problem and that is political framework."

Rothman: "Starting with the political outcome is the normal but often unproductive approach to managing intractable conflicts. We want to say that people with radically different political positions can still come up with areas of mutual interest and cooperation, which then may build a foundation and will for political change as well. We are addressing what underlies positions- the needs and interests. We are also building confidence. Most people say you can't address Jerusalem in the peace process yet. We are showing that Jerusalem can be addressed."

Participant: "You prefer to start with needs and interests. But in education, speaking about needs implies the dream that you have for a political situation. For instance, in Jewish education, whatever I say is based on the fact that Jewish education is self-determined. The starting point of our team meetings is that both sides will have the right to determine curriculum."

Rothman: "You need to distinguish between political structures or aspirations (e.g. mutual self-determination) and the underlying human motivation of need for such structures (e.g. control over one's own destiny and activities in a way that will not compromise the same need of the other side). To invent integrative solutions in which both sides mutually gain, you start with the needs which overlap (e.g. identity) instead of positions which contradict, and seek to find means of achieving them cooperatively through overlapping interests. In such an effort your primary objective is to fulfill your needs, not promote your positions."

Participant: "I think we are hiding our assumptions (e.g. our political positions)."

Rothman: "I'm not suggesting that you hide assumptions, but rather deconstruct them. If we start the process by looking at needs (e.g. identity, dignity, safety, honor), we are redefining conflict in a way that doesn't start with the impasse of political positions. With compromise each side must give up to gain. This is not a place to start in existential conflicts involving fundamental elements of self because we can't give up parts of ourselves. Conflict resolution suggests integrative bargaining instead. You invent solutions which address the needs of both sides. Let me summarize the integrative process with approaches (which are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive): 1) differentiation (of primary concerns or interests) 2) compensation or 3) expansion (of available resources)."⁵

By the end of the seminar, the participants seemed to grasp the concepts involved in inventing. Many were still skeptical about the viability of solutions that would be created outside the context of a prior political agreement, but the seminar teams agreed to try the method out in writing their next section of their draft papers.

⁵ For a full discussion of these integrative techniques see Rothman, Jay. "A Practical Guide. From Confrontation to Cooperation: Preparing for Problem Solving and Negotiation." The Leonard Davis Institute. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. June, 1992.

The group decided that the next meeting would be dedicated to looking at the drafts which would all include 1) joint problem definitions and 2) proposals for cooperative projects to address those problems.

The Second Inventing Seminar (June 3 and 4): Presenting Proposals

At this meeting, all of the teams had a draft of their problem definitions, and the education and economics teams had lists of cooperative proposals. (See Section Two for brief summaries of the proposals).

Structuring

Structuring phase enables parties to set the agenda for subsequent formal problem solving and negotiations. Parties prioritize and package the options developed in the Inventing phase for use in implementing proposed solutions. They use results of the Inventing stage to build a framework for designing and implementing solutions based on consensus and agreement instead of unilateral decisions. The Structuring stage attempts to take the solutions that the parties created during Inventing, and make them feasible by addressing the outside restraints, supports and resources, and ultimately devising a plan and time line for implementation.

Structuring was introduced when the education and economic development teams presented their preliminary lists of inventions.

The First Structuring Seminar (June 18th): Putting Plans into Action

Several teams had proposed cooperative projects designed to address the problems explored in the framing stage. The following format was presented for structuring each one of the proposals recommended by the teams (an example of a proposal of the education team follows):

Task: Develop a specific project proposal for each of several intercommunal (joint/parallel) peacebuilding initiatives designed to address shared problems.

Establishment of joint committees for examining text books of both sides which will make recommendations as to missing, needed material in the curriculum of both sides.

Objective: Which needs will be addressed by each initiative and in what ways?

To eliminate prejudicial and stereotypical material from text books and to promote material to enhance greater understanding of and respect for the other side, as well as enhancing each side's respective national identities without denegrating those of other nations.

Participants/Activities: Describe the human, financial, organizational resources necessary to successfully implement each initiative.

High level commission established to engage in joint examination of existing texts, and the sponsorship/development of new texts.

Resistance: What forces will constrain, slow down, or stop your efforts?

Unwillingness of some to engage in such a project in light of lack of political agreement; suspicion on either side; fundamentalists on both sides.

Leverage: What forces will support, speed up, or help promote your efforts?

International organizations, peace groups; public relations; long term value to the children; progressive teachers.

After presenting this framework participants were asked to think about their projects in ways that ensure they are “big enough to matter, but small enough to work.” They should seek to ensure that their projects would not compromise basic needs but rather could help to acknowledge and fulfill them. They should seek initiatives that lead to mutual gains. (Brief summaries of participants’ structuring efforts appear in Section Two).

Second Structuring Seminar (July 3): Epilogue

This seminar marked the mid-point of the project and the final group meeting prior to a planned public seminar in December of that year. Participants expressed both enthusiasm for progress made and apprehension regarding their ability to complete their work.

In many ways they felt that the project was only now, three months from its formal start, ready to move ahead. On the other hand, perhaps participants would now really “take ownership” and complete their work in their own fashion.

In the end, the truth probably lay somewhere between and while the teams did continue meeting, without the external re-inforcement and encouragement that had been previously and intensively offered, several of the papers never fully matured.

Nonetheless, the project did chart a path and has hopefully illustrated a “real-life” conflict resolution process with all its flaws and foibles in a way that provides both positive and negative lessons. For the organizers, one key lesson is that without an ongoing institutional framework such an ambitious project can provide little more than partial “demonstration effect.”

Appendix 2

Beyond the Project: Using Conflict Resolution in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza

It became clear during the course of the project described here that many of those with whom we were in contact in relation to our work on Jerusalem shared our view that there was a need for an institutional framework providing an on-going opportunity for conflict resolution training and intervention not only in Jerusalem but in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.

We feel this is needed given that:

1. There has been no sustained effort to train individuals from the various communities in the region so that they can (either through working in the organizations or communities from which they come, or as mediators working from a recognized central institution) help reduce the impact of, or solve, conflicts at an international, national or local level; and that

2. There is no institution or organization which can provide such training for mediators and which is recognized as being of practical value in pre-empting, or reducing the impact of, conflict. An institution is needed in which members of the different ethnic groups likely to be involved in conflict can work together and provide mediation between Israelis and Palestinians, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs and within these communities as well.

3. Projects such as our Jerusalem Peace Initiative can only fully reach fruition in the context of sustained and on-going support, possible, for example, in the context of a developed institutionalized framework.

Experience from outside Israel, for instance in the USA, South Africa and Northern Ireland, shows that while believers in the value of conflict resolution

have some difficulty pointing to conflicts which they have fully resolved, they can still claim with reason to have ameliorated the impact of conflictual situations on many thousands of occasions through their practical and sustained engagement over years — on the ground.¹ The approaches they have put into practice have proved helpful. They variously emphasize the need for parties to reconcile rather than to simply express their needs, the necessity of recognizing the validity of an opponent's right to state his case, the value of thinking together about ways in which the conflict can be solved by innovative and interactive action, and of mechanisms for preventing its reoccurrence. In many cases they have provided third-party intervention which makes possible a meeting of groups between whom there has developed a state of chronic hostility and have offered warring parties a way out.

The idea that an institution should be established in Jerusalem to provide a focus for work in conflict resolution has been floated. It is our hope that this idea will be carried forward and that it will provide more impetus for efforts to look at social conflicts of all kinds in this region and especially perhaps at those functional issues such as those we have addressed in our Jerusalem Peace Initiative - security issues, education and its role in society, cultural contact and contrasts, economic cooperation between communities, and a fair and sensible approach to municipal government. An institution such as that envisaged should:

a. Provide training in conflict resolution for Israelis (both Arab and Jewish) and Palestinians. This training would have as its prime objective to equip those involved with the tools with which they could practice mediation in actual conflict situations.

b. Provide from among the successful students of the training courses a body of skilled mediators drawn from *both* major ethnic groups in the area.

¹ See Rothman (ed.) (1993). "Practicing Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies." The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

c. Gain acceptance from Israeli and Palestinian authorities (and later in the Middle East generally) who would see in it a way of tackling conflicts which, though initially small, may escalate and pose a potential threat to peace. The institution would not be able to tackle conflicts which are already out of control, where people have been killed and emotions are volatile, but will hopefully be able to work on disputes which have not yet reached such a chronic situation.

d. Operate a "hotline" service which, on request, will be able, for example, to send a trained Israeli and a trained Palestinian, or in the case of conflict between religious and secular Jews, one religious and one secular Jew, to deal with the crisis and try to resolve or ameliorate the conflict. The hotline would be available to the police, to local authorities, to community leaders and to individuals.

e. Undertake mediation for parties involved in commercial or other disputes and receive payment for such mediation.

f. Initiate *and* sustain projects such as the one described in this monograph.

A possible structure for such an institution includes the nomination of a high level Board (including public figures from as wide a political spectrum as possible), joint directors (one Palestinian and one Israeli), a permanent physical center, and a small support staff. Conflict resolution training should be done by individuals from abroad who have special knowledge of the region and its conflicts and by those from the local communities who have the appropriate experience.

Discussions with government officials and politicians, with law enforcement officers, with academics and with individuals involved in community relations, will be needed in order to ascertain that the idea has general acceptance within the community before anything is done.

While such an institution should be highly analytic and self-reflective, it cannot be primarily academic. Instead it ought to be practically-oriented with a

view to influencing: *conceptions* (about conflict and its management through empirical work and study), *practices* (through training and intervention) and *policy* (through engagement of high level politicians and policy-makers in the workings and results of the envisioned institution).

With this publication we come to the end of a seven-year conflict resolution program (of which the Jerusalem Peace Initiative was part). We hope that this ending, however, will lead to fruitful new beginnings.

Conflict resolution has a significant role to play in furthering Middle East peace. An institution is needed which will actively develop the ability of those with the will to develop and apply the skill to deal effectively with ongoing conflicts on a sustained and long term basis.

Such an institution is a natural next step of our effort to introduce conflict resolution theory and practice to the region.² In fact, it is likely that something of this kind will materialize in the not-too-distant future. The need for it is obvious. It is not likely that conflicts will be hard to find in our region in the near future and increasingly people of good will are seeking creative means of dealing with them.

² For further information on previous work of the project please write: Mr. Robin Twite, Davis Institute, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel, or Dr. Jay Rothman, Haverford College, Haverford, Pa. 19041 USA.
