



המכון ליחסים בינלאומיים ע"ש לאונרד דייוויס

The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations

The Concept of a Eurasian Union: Roots, Essence, and Prospects

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◆ Policy Paper ◆
The Leonard Davis Institute

Policy Paper, No. 51, May 1996
The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations
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Introduction

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991, just after the dissolution of the former USSR. From the quantitative point of view, the activity of this new interstate association has been astonishing. Over the first four years of its existence, its members signed about six hundred documents on multilateral cooperation in various fields. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate efficiency.

By early 1993 it was already clear that Russia, the backbone of the CIS, was not much interested in developing close multilateral ties with its former USSR partners, seeming to prefer bilateral relations instead. Since the spring of 1992 it has, indeed, signed bilateral agreements on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with several CIS states.

Multilateral cooperation, meanwhile, is progressing at a much slower pace. Most of the ratified agreements remain nothing more than formal confirmation of CIS members' intentions to attempt to solve problems together. Of course, the indisputable inefficiency of the CIS is itself a topic warranting analysis, though not central to the concerns of this paper.

That inefficiency has, however, stimulated a search for alternative ways of integrating the post-Soviet states that would enable them to surmount their current deep crisis. It was disappointment with the CIS, in particular, that led Kazakhstan's President N. Nazarbaev to promulgate his own idea for reintegration of the post-Soviet territories, namely, the concept of a Eurasian Union (EAU).

Nazarbaev's concept of a Eurasian Union is interesting both in its own right and in terms of how it differs from the present CIS. There were, to begin with, pressing economic considerations that induced the Kazakhstani president to formulate this idea, and undoubtedly affected its nature. Discussion of these considerations will shed light on the practical implications of the concept.

Nazarbaev's concept deserves to be considered a genuinely new one, since it appeared in a new, concrete political situation. To place it in historical context, however, this paper will also discuss the philosophical background of the idea, including Russian thinkers' ideas about Eurasia in the early part of this century.

The concept of a Eurasian Union is of special importance in international politics, and the paper will conclude by assessing its near-term prospects of realization.

The Origins of Nazarbaev's Proposal

It is not surprising that it is Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbaev who has advocated a plan for reintegration of the former Soviet republics. The breakup of the USSR had extremely damaging socioeconomic consequences for Kazakhstan as well as the whole Central Asian region. The general industrial decline that has occurred in almost all the countries of that huge region was caused by the severing of economic ties with other regions of the former USSR that had developed over decades. Another result of the breakup was the cessation of immense state investments, most of which were allocated from the USSR budget. This was bound to affect national economies, including that of Kazakhstan.

In the past, Kazakhstan, which is rich in natural resources, had a relatively developed industry, and its agriculture was sufficient to supply its own foodstuffs with even some exportation of grain. Today, however, the country's economy is in a disastrous state. Thus, in 1993 gross domestic product was 12.9% lower than in the previous year, and more than one-third lower than in 1989 when Kazakhstan was still part of the USSR.¹

Output in major industries is also decreasing. By 1993, electrical energy output had decreased by 11.1% compared to 1990, the year the crisis began. Gas output since 1990 was down by 17.3%, oil output by

more than 11%. Production of metal-processing lathes, torging-pressing machines, prefabricated ferro-concrete constructions, and saw-timber had decreased considerably.

A decrease in foodstuffs and consumer goods production had an especially negative impact on the standard of living. In 1993, grain output was down to 21.6 million metric tons from 29.5 million in 1992. Foodstuffs production came to only about 85% of the 1992 level, and was even more impressively low compared to the pre-1990 period.

Like other former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan is very closely connected to other regions of the ex-USSR, especially Russia. In 1991, 89.5% of Kazakhstan's export and 92.8% of its import were directed to or supplied by the post-Soviet republics. The partial rupture of these ties caused not only production decline but high inflation: in 1992, consumer goods prices rose more than 1500%.

After Moscow had posed clearly discriminatory conditions for the republic's acceptance into the ruble zone (i.e., the common use of the ruble as the unit of currency by CIS states), Kazakhstan introduced its own national currency, the tenge. However, inflation continued to grow and exceeded 2200% in 1993. The initial tenge exchange rate dropped from 4.68 tenge/dollar in November 1993 to 50 tenge/dollar in October 1994. (It should be noted that in the second half of 1994 and in 1995, inflation was declining significantly.)

The country's standard of living reflects these changes: more than one-third of the population are now below the subsistence level.² This situation has affected the country's internal political stability and, naturally, has lowered the population's approval of the reforms. President Nazarbaev's personal popularity, which in the early stages of the reforms was very high, is also decreasing.

Hopes for development on the Turkish model, which were widespread during the first stage of independence, have proved futile. The geographic, ethnic, linguistic, and religious proximity of the Central Asian republics to Turkey, as well as the relative similarity between their economies and that of prereform Turkey (up to the 1980s), gave

rise to notions of utilizing the so-called Turkish model both to emerge from the crisis and to obtain considerable Turkish aid. However, these expectations were soon disappointed.

Nazarbaev understood earlier than others that neither Turkey nor any other country in the region could become an adequate substitute for Russia. Russia's many-sided role in the life of the Central Asian countries—first and foremost, as financial donor—goes back centuries and cannot possibly be played by other countries. Nazarbaev realizes that today integration with Russia, primarily economic, is imperative for the restoration of the half-destroyed economies of the new Central Asian states. Indeed, practically since the formation of the CIS Nazarbaev has advocated closer economic integration of CIS members.

Another reason for Nazarbaev's favoring of closer ties with Russia is the need for a viable model of interethnic relations that would guarantee the country's internal security. A peculiarity of the country's ethnic composition is that Kazakhs—the native ethnic group of the territory—constitute less than half the population (according to the latest census data of January 1989, only 39.7% of the Kazakhstan population were Kazakhs, and Russians were a very close second at 36.4%; the rest were Ukrainians, Germans, Uzbeks, Tatars, Uighurs, Koreans, and others).³ Despite the Kazakhs' higher natural increase than that of Russians, the emigration of Russian-speakers, and the mass emigration of Germans, by mid-1994 the Kazakhs still did not exceed 44% of the population.⁴

Recently, tensions between Kazakhs and Russians have been fostered by such factors as the making of the Kazakh language, which the Russian population hardly knows, into the state language, the assertion of territorial claims to Kazakhstan by nationalists in Russia, and the militant nationalism demonstrated by a group of Kazakh officials immediately after independence was proclaimed. Furthermore, the other nationalities support the Russians. As V. Tishkov, director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has noted:

Kazakh nationalism has already demonstrated its impatience and intolerance by provocative toponymic changes; by language policies; by removing non-Kazakhs from power, prestigious occupations, and higher education; and by migration policies. To some extent, this blatant nationalism may be explained as a kind of therapy for traumas the Kazakh nation has suffered, the subverting of its collective dignity by previous regimes. It can also be regarded as a way of eliminating its dependence on the former center.⁵

Up to the fall of 1993 there were attacks by Kazakh nationalists on the Russian and Russian-speaking population, which forms the overwhelming majority in the northern and eastern regions of the country. The attacks, which sometimes sparked retaliations, included an anti-Russian campaign in the press, demonstrations, and even assaults. The Slavic movement *Lad*, as well as different Cossack (the Cossacks constituting a Russian ethnic group) associations, have demanded that autonomous Russian enclaves be established in Kazakhstan. As early as 1990, when nationalism among official Kazakh bodies began to manifest itself, Slavic activists requested from the then-chairman of the Supreme Soviet, A. Lukianov, the establishment of an autonomous region in eastern Kazakhstan.⁶ Similar claims were later made concerning other Russian-speaking regions, especially in the north.

President Nazarbaev realizes that aggravation of interethnic tensions may dangerously threaten his country's stability. He is also alarmed by the Russian population's demand that it be granted dual—i.e., both Kazakhstani and Russian—citizenship, which, he believes, could lead to a yet deeper rift in the population. The Kazakhstani press has even warned that in such a situation the Russians might turn into a kind of fifth column.

The pragmatic Nazarbaev also realizes that the national problem in Kazakhstan has a pronounced economic dimension. The Russian-speaking population's role in the economy is disproportionate, whereas,

for various reasons, Kazakh involvement in all branches of the economy is only 35%, and in industry alone just 22%, even though, as noted, Kazakhs are 44% of the entire population. Russians tend to hold key positions in modernized industries, in science, and in some nonproductive activities.

The emigration of the Russian-speaking population may have grave economic and social effects. In 1993, emigration from Kazakhstan exceeded immigration by 222,100, which amounts to 1.3% of the total population.⁷ The emigrants represent the most sophisticated part of the population, or, as Nazarbaev has remarked, the "most precious manpower capital. Loss of it constitutes considerable damage to the country."⁸

Thus, it is crucial that a civilized and universally acceptable solution to the "Russian question" in Kazakhstan be found. President Nazarbaev has already made attempts to solve the problem, and has admitted that "mistakes" and "distortions" were perpetrated regarding the Russian population. Measures have been taken to alleviate the problem of Russian-language functioning (it is now permissible to use Russian as an official language in many cases) and to simplify the procedure for acquiring either Russian or Kazakhstani citizenship. At the same time, Nazarbaev realizes that an overall solution to the "Russian question" in his country is attainable only within the framework of federation or confederation with Russia. In such a situation, the problem of the "northern and eastern territories" of Kazakhstan would lose its menacing character.

Presumably, analysis of Russia's national interests in Central Asia led Nazarbaev to the conclusion that there are only two possible courses for Russian-Kazakhstani relations to take: either union in some form, or confrontation, which would be dangerous for Kazakhstan. Indeed, even the present Russian authorities, who proclaim themselves democratic, sometimes show relapses into imperial thinking. Should the right-wing politicians come to power in Moscow, Kazakhstan will have to deal with aggressive claims by its northern neighbor,

claims that will meet with "understanding" among almost half the Kazakhstan population. In that case, Kazakhstan will find it extremely difficult to defend its present, rather artificially drawn borders.

A relationship of alliance with Russia would guarantee to Kazakhstan the security not only of its northern and eastern borders but also of its southern one, where it faces another potentially dangerous neighbor, China. Just two decades ago Beijing declared its territorial claims on the Soviet Union, and they included Kazakhstan lands (in the Semipalatinsk region). Kazakhstan, in general, will hardly be able to maintain its territorial integrity without external assistance—all the more so given the fact that Kazakhstan was pressured by the United States, Russia, and other countries into relinquishing the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the former USSR. Alliance with Russia, however, strongly guarantees the security of all of Kazakhstan's borders.

According to U. Kasenov, director of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research,

realization of the need for some form of interstate unification of the former Soviet republics is growing. Many politicians clearly understand [this apparently refers, in the first place, to the leadership of Kazakhstan] that only by being united will the countries manage to overcome economic and social crises, interethnic and interstate disputes and conflicts, and to attain both external and internal security and stability.⁹

Such a union will undoubtedly require of the leaders of the post-Soviet republics that they sacrifice part of their sovereignty. Nazarbaev, unlike leaders of some Central Asian countries, is prepared for such a step.

Nazarbaev has important moral advantages that make it easier for him to propound daring plans of post-Soviet territorial reintegration.

For one thing, he did not participate in the 1991 Belovezhskaia Pushcha meeting, where the three Slavic "sisters," Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, decided on the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of a Slavic commonwealth. Moreover, it was thanks to Nazarbaev that the decision taken in Belovezhskaia Pushcha did not result in a real tragedy for the entire ex-USSR. Several days after that meeting, leaders of the five Central Asian Soviet republics held a meeting in Ashgabat. As a response to the formation of the Slavic commonwealth, the understandably angered leaders of the Muslim republics could have proclaimed their own Muslim commonwealth. If so, the whole Soviet Union would have been threatened by a profound schism along civilizational lines. The Soviet Union might then have shared the destiny of Yugoslavia, and Kazakhstan that of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In due time historians will appreciate Nazarbaev's tremendous contribution in steering the Ashgabat meeting (December 1991) in the constructive direction, as a result of which, several days later at the Almaty meeting, the majority of the former Soviet republics joined the CIS. The "divorce process" of the former USSR partners was quieter than in Yugoslavia, which was much closer to the West.

Nazarbaev also understands that both Russia and the post-Soviet Muslim states are threatened by Islamic fundamentalism. The proximity of that fundamentalism's major center, Iran, to the Central Asian states makes the threat the more real and urgent for them. Integration with so powerful a state as Russia, however, would considerably strengthen the position of Kazakhstan and the other states of the region in resisting fundamentalism.

Thus, Nazarbaev's idea of a new form of integration into a Eurasian Union (EAU), in place of the fruitless CIS (or, if its members insist, parallel to the CIS), reflects, on the one hand, his disappointment with the results of the first stage of Kazakhstan's independent development, and on the other, his desire to secure external aid and support, primarily from Russia, in coping with his country's complicated political, economic, and ethnic problems.

Some politicians and observers regard Nazarbaev's idea of an EAU as reflecting only a desire to earn political points. Thus, Uzbekistani President I. Karimov believes that if the EAU idea "is being advocated so persistently, then it is not just a theoretical premise. . . . they want to use [it] in order to raise their rating in Kazakhstan."¹⁰ Yet Karimov admits that Nazarbaev's plan could prove effective in solving urgent problems of both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as other republics. However, Karimov continues his condemnations: "What's new in the Eurasian idea? I repeat: to create political superstructures and occupy an appropriate place in these structures. This sounds rude and harsh, but it is the truth."¹¹

It seems clear, however, that Nazarbaev's considerations in advancing the EAU idea include all the above-mentioned factors, even if a political motivation also comes into play.

The Concept of a Eurasian Union

President Nazarbaev defines the proposed Eurasian Union as

a union of independent states, enjoying equal rights, aimed at realization of the national and state interests of each country of the Union and of their joint integration potential. The EAU is a form of integration of sovereign states whose aim is to enhance their stability and security, and to bring about socioeconomic modernization throughout the post-Soviet territories.¹²

It is important to note the first word in this definition, "union." This is the main feature that differentiates the EAU from the CIS. The Commonwealth is not a union, nor any other kind of interstate formation. It was, indeed, emphasized in the Almaty Declaration of the CIS's creation (December 21, 1991) that "the Commonwealth is neither a state nor supranational formation."¹³

The EAU concept is based on three major principles that differ from those that underpin the CIS: establishment of supranational bodies to coordinate activities of its members in the fields of economics, defense, and foreign policy; organization of a common economic space; and creation of an integral defense complex. Although some similar principles were mentioned by the CIS in its resolutions, they have never been acted on.

Indeed, according to Nazarbaev one of the major causes of the CIS's failure is a discordance in its members' activities.¹⁴ The adopted decisions are not implemented, nor is there any coordinated mechanism for doing so. There is a lack of common laws regarding customs, export prices (especially for raw materials), and so on.

According to Nazarbaev's proposal, special supranational bodies would be created in the framework of the interstate union.¹⁵ The EAU's supreme political body would be a council of the heads of state and government of the member-countries. Individual countries would preside in the council for terms of six months (in Russian alphabetical order).

Nazarbaev's plan also includes creation, within the framework of the EAU's supranational bodies, of a parliament that would be formed either by delegating to it parliamentarians of the member-countries or by direct elections. Each country would be equally represented in this parliament. It would form the supreme consultative body, but its decisions would require ratification by national parliaments. The EAU parliament's functions would include coordination of national laws, which should encourage formation and proper functioning of a common economic space, as well as the unification of national laws regarding the EAU citizens' social rights and interests.

The EAU members' foreign policy would be coordinated by a council of foreign ministers. This body, like the council of states' and governments' leaders and the parliament, would hold periodic meetings.

At the same time, Nazarbaev's plan calls for formation of a standing executive body that would be called the International Executive

Committee. Its main function would be the implementation of the decisions adopted by the council of states' and governments' leaders. The International Executive Committee, too, would be headed by representatives of all the countries in rotation. In addition, the plan envisages various councils for coordination of activities in the fields of education, science, culture, health, ecology, crime fighting, and so on.

The EAU proposal affirms the right of migration and travel for citizens of all the countries throughout the Union's territory. The official language of the EAU would be Russian, with national languages continuing to function within states. Nazarbaev suggests that the EAU's capital be one of the cities situated at the Europe-Asia junction (e.g., Kazan' or Samara).

Creation of a common economic space is the second major factor that distinguishes the EAU from the CIS. According to Nazarbaev, a number of supranational coordinating structures within the EAU framework would establish and manage this space. A special Commission on Economics of the council of states' and governments' leaders would formulate guidelines and carry out coordination functions. Furthermore, a number of specialized commissions on various economic domains—finances, taxation, resources, and so on—would be created. An EAU international investment bank and a common payment monetary unit, a convertible ruble, would also be established.

In his proposal Nazarbaev does not specify whether this Union is to have a common currency, a single central bank, a customs union, or a unified monetary and fiscal policy. Only a common payment monetary unit and an investment bank, which are less significant, are mentioned. Hence, it may be that Nazarbaev does not envisage that the EAU would include a common currency or a central bank. From Nazarbaev's various statements, however, it may be inferred that the EAU would include a customs union. He often notes that one of the main reasons for the CIS's failure is its customs barriers; presumably, these would have to be eliminated in the EAU to make way for a customs union of all members.

The EAU's common defense space, the third differentiating factor, would involve "joint actions aimed at strengthening national armed forces and protection of the EAU external borders," as well as formation of EAU joint peacekeeping forces for maintaining stability and resolving conflicts within the Union. According to the proposal, only Russia of all EAU members would retain its nuclear status. An EAU interstate authority would be established for resolving problems of nuclear disarmament, with representatives of international organizations allowed to participate.¹⁶

According to Nazarbaev's concept, the EAU seems to take the form of a federation or confederation; it is difficult to define this Union more precisely. Only after the signing of a multilateral treaty, which would specify what functions the Union members agree to delegate to the supranational bodies, would the nature of the EAU emerge more clearly.

Some analysts regard Nazarbaev's EAU concept as an attempt to restore the Soviet Union. But the proposed EAU, with its democratic structure, market economy, and shared authority, scarcely resembles the USSR, which only purported to be a federative state but was actually a country with a rigid, unitary form of government and strict subordination of all republican bodies to Moscow. Membership in the EAU would be strictly voluntary, as opposed to the USSR, into which the republics were in fact subsumed through the hereditary acquisition of power over the entire territory of the former Russian empire by the Bolsheviks. It was Moscow that, impelled first and foremost by its own political considerations, determined the arbitrary interrepublican borders, which have now been inherited by the CIS countries.

Each member-state of the EAU would, of course, retain real sovereignty as a member of the Eurasian Union. On the other hand, unlike the CIS whose structure is amorphous, the EAU with its special supranational bodies would be capable of guaranteeing its members real coordination in the economic, military, and other fields.

In formulating his proposal, President Nazarbaev undoubtedly took into account international experience with interstate integration,

especially that of the European Union. The European Union, indeed, clearly shows the advantages of the close, large-scale interstate cooperation enjoyed by its members, at the same time that each country maintains complete sovereignty. Indeed, Nazarbaev has often stressed that the European Union offers a good model for the post-Soviet independent states.

The common economic space created by the Eurasian Union would ensure every member-country the opportunity to enjoy all possible advantages, including the natural broadening of the market and the free migration of people, capital, goods, and services. This should foster the countries' economic growth, and might be specially beneficial to weak countries, allowing the gradual bridging of gaps in development levels.

Unions of this kind, as a rule, group around the largest or most economically developed countries. In the EAU, Russia would naturally become such a center. Among the five Central Asian countries, only Kazakhstan with its dimensions, natural resources, and development level might become a subregional center. Thus, an important Russia-Kazakhstan axis might emerge.

In military-political terms the EAU would not constitute a rigid union. Nazarbaev realizes this would be unacceptable to many of the current CIS members, which would fear a diminution of sovereignty. At the same time, the EAU members would coordinate their defense efforts, based on appropriate agreements; and, as noted, a collective peacekeeping force would safeguard stability throughout the Union. Each country would, nevertheless, preserve its own national armed forces and full control over them, another factor buttressing the sovereignty of each member. Nazarbaev's project does not envisage creation of joint armed forces other than the peacekeeping forces mentioned earlier, nor of supranational bodies for control of armed forces, which again testifies to the fact that the EAU is not meant to become a military-political union.

Eurasia: The Cultural Dimension

On the more theoretical plane, the notion of a Eurasian Union has a counterpart in the concept of Eurasia. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the search for new modes of development have led to a revival of that geopolitical concept, which over the past decades had nearly been forgotten. In the 1920s, the idea of Eurasia was widespread among Russian intellectuals who emigrated to the West. Among its founders were the linguist N. Trubetskoi, the philosophers L. Karsavin and B. Vysheslavtsev, the scientist G. Vernadsky, and the theologians G. Florovsky and V. Zenkovsky.

This concept emerged with the search for the ethnic and sociocultural identity of the Russian state, which stretched over vast expanses of the two continents, Europe and Asia, and encompassed Slavic, Turkic, Finno-Ugric, and other ethnic groups. As the Russian linguist T. Ochirova observes:

The idea of Russia-Eurasia constituting a self-sufficient and self-reproducing ethnic group, and a specific cultural type, shut within in its own shell on the one hand but permanently expanding on the other—such was the starting point of the Eurasian program. . . . From the territorial point of view, the geographical and political borders of Eurasia were concordant with the historical borders of the Russian empire. According to the “Eurasians,” the historically established territorial unity of the Russian empire was characterized by natural and stable borders, for the state that emerged in the very center of the continent’s watery basin became a natural unifier of the Eurasian territories.¹⁷

It is interesting to note that Russian-emigrant “Eurasians” who were opponents of the communist regime acknowledged as quite natural that the “communist empire” occupied almost the entire ter-

ritory of the former empire. Indeed, they regarded that fact as a corroboration of the Eurasian idea.

Adherents of the Eurasian idea maintain that a peculiar type of civilization, which belongs neither to purely European (Slavic) nor to purely Asian (Turanian) culture but combines elements of both, exists on the vast territories of the former Russian empire. This civilizational community of different ethnic groups formed the basis for a common state system throughout the Russian empire until October 1917.

The Eurasian model is believed to have been geographically determined. According to this view, Russia's position in the center of the Eurasian land mass fostered a type of civilization that is different from the Atlantic one. The Atlantic civilization is littoral, and its economy is oriented toward making the most of this proximity to the sea. The Eurasian civilization, however, is a "steppe" or continental one, and its economy is oriented toward intercontinental commerce. It is thought that this remoteness from the sea fosters a special "closed" character of the Eurasian culture as well as economy, and that a "steppe"—that is, spatial rather than urban—element predominates; as one of the theorists of the Eurasian concept, G. Florovsky, put it, "the 'steppe' spirit soars above [this culture]."¹⁸

Eurasia's cultural basis comprises Varangian (Scandinavian), Slavic, Byzantine, and Tatar streams, but it is believed that a Turanian, rather than Slavic, element predominates and that this is why, despite all Slavophile expectations, the Slavs never formed a common state. Moreover, the agreed boundary-line separating Russian Eurasia from Europe crosses the Slavic territory. That border has separated, in a more general sense, East from West, so that territorially the Russians are united with non-Slavic ethnic groups.

Both geographical and historical factors played an important role in the emergence of the peculiar character of the Eurasian state model. The empire established by Genghis Khan, which embraced vast Eurasian expanses including Russian principalities, was surprisingly stable over almost three hundred years. It was apparently a precursor of the

powerful Russian state and later the Russian empire, whose final boundaries hardly differed from those of Genghis Khan's empire. Thus, the process of the merging of the Russian-Slavic and Asian-pagan cultures occurred within this vast territory over many centuries.

That process, however, was far from painless. In Florovsky's ideologically colored view, "in the Russian historical reality even of the recent past, it was Tatar-Muslim and Mongolian-Lamaist elements that violently defied Holy Russia's spirit, resisting not russification but the spirit of Orthodoxy and church. [Therefore], there are islets and oases of both Europe and Asia in the national-state body of Russia."¹⁹ And yet, in his view, these islets and oases are organic components of an integral whole.

The polyglot character of Russian civilization seems to have fostered a state organization different from the European one. According to the well-known Russian thinker B. Kapustin, European civilization is based on a universal and autonomous normative order that is independent of the state, whereas in Russia the reverse is true: state organization forms the basis of the Russian civilization. What this means is that Russian state organization, because of its Eurasian character, is founded not on some definite ideology (although there have been many attempts to establish such an ideology) but on "a necessity to preserve order as such, as an antidote to localism and chaos; . . . this order took the form of the merging of various traditions and cultures."²⁰

The state itself, then, acts as a means of reconciling inimical forces and suppressing recalcitrant ones. Indeed, Kapustin asserts that Moscow often "turned out to be a suppressing rather than conciliatory factor, which constructed in Eurasia an unjust hierarchy of languages, traditions, and cultures."²¹

Moscow had performed such organizational and gendarme functions throughout Eurasia over many centuries up to the communist revolution of 1917, and it continued to during the seventy years of Soviet rule. The demise of the USSR once again highlighted the ques-

tion of the further development of Russia's civilization. What kind of civilization should it be? Should it seek an isolated path of development, abandoning all the ties with other civilizational branches with which it once formed a common Eurasian civilization? Or should it seek to retain the Eurasian territory by establishing a new system of relations with its former republics?

This is a contentious issue in contemporary Russian thought. Some authors believe the Eurasian alternative is the only feasible one, given Russia's geographic position and historical roots. According to one extreme expression of this outlook, "concepts of 'Russia' and 'empire' remain synonymous. Even diminished and ethnically more homogeneous, Russia will keep its imperial traditions."²²

However, Russia's imperial traditions do not necessarily threaten its Eurasian neighbors. According to some thinkers, the rebirth of a common state comprising Russia and its neighbors would be a welcome development for the non-Russian nations. The scholar A. Panarin maintains that "besides purely national interests, all Eurasian nations have common civilizational interests. . . . As for external opposition, be it the Western temptation or Islamic fundamentalism, it should be met with a rebuff, which should be expressed in some ingenious solution involving new civilizational priorities."²³

According to many analysts, the fact that at present the former USSR is economically half-ruined, in a state of social distress, and politically rife with conflict necessitates a new form of integration that would enable the surmounting of the general crisis. Panarin believes that this "is an objective imperative of the Eurasian expanse, considering first of all its geopolitical instability, and also peculiarities of climate, traditions, the heritage of tribal discord, and so on. A common state could transform these masses into elegant and effective structures."²⁴ Proponents of the Eurasian concept include both left-wing politicians (including, first and foremost, democrats) and extreme nationalists grouped around the notorious daily *Zavtra* (formerly *Den'*). Indeed, in that newspaper Eurasian advocates have allotted a regular

column—"Slavic-Islamic Academy"—to the topic, in which they champion the unity of the Russians and the Turkic nations.

Opponents of the Eurasian idea in today's Russia are no less heterogeneous. According to V. Mironov, director of the Institute of Politics, "Russia's ruling class is the most consistent opponent of the Eurasian idea. Its reasoning is transparent: only by divesting itself of its outlying regions can Russia gain an entrance ticket to Western civilization."²⁵ Opponents are found among the extreme nationalists as well. Thus, N. Lysenko, leader of the National-Republican Party of Russia, believes there are no realistic prospects for implementing the Eurasian idea:

The Russian and Turkish intellectual elites just cannot draw together because of the lack of a spiritual basis. Judaism, from which both Christianity and Islam derived, certainly cannot be considered such a common basis. Over the past thousand years Orthodoxy and Islam have diverged so far that only a person unable to tell Adam from Nebuchadnezzar could believe in any sort of rapprochement on a 'common spiritual basis.' . . . The Eurasian idea captivates only that part of the Russian intelligentsia which, because of intellectual overdevelopment, remains completely underdeveloped as far as the national idea is concerned.²⁶

The debate about the Eurasian concept is just one of the elements of the political struggle in post-Soviet Russia. It reflects both the sincere desire of scholars to determine the most secure and expedient path for Russia's further development as a multinational state, and all sorts of political motivations disguised as theoretical speculations.

The notions of scholars, however, do not often determine politicians' decisions even in countries with longstanding democratic traditions, and this was even less the case in the communist world. Almost all the current leaders of Russia and the other CIS countries were

formerly part of the communist elite, and one can hardly expect them to have radically changed their political orientations. Therefore, one should not expect the Eurasian concept to influence considerably the search for new modes of integration of the post-Soviet area. Yet the concept's adherents as well as opponents will undoubtedly refer to it repeatedly in the course of the political struggle.

The Imminent Prospects

The prospects for implementation of a Eurasian Union are dependent first of all on the attitudes of the leaders of the CIS countries. Most of them have, in fact, reacted unfavorably to Nazarbaev's proposal. President Yeltsin—or, to be exact, his "shadow cabinet"—has looked askance at the EAU idea, and the Kremlin has submerged it in protracted and fruitless discussions. In a letter to Nazarbaev, Yeltsin wrote that "Your proposals deserve most serious study";²⁷ but elsewhere in the same letter he downplays their significance. Several months later, at the CIS summit in Moscow in October 1994, Yeltsin referred to the EAU idea as "premature."²⁸

The fact that Russia, which would have had to become the center of the new interstate integration, is not interested in reviving a structure resembling the lapsed Soviet Union means Nazarbaev's idea has no chance of implementation at least so long as the current leaders hold power in Moscow. Russian leaders pursue their own interests rather than schemes of integration. As the prominent independent newspaper *Nezavisimaiia gazeta* observed, "so long as power is held by the forces that made Yeltsin president of Russia, progress in the direction of the Eurasian Union is more than doubtful."²⁹

Nazarbaev's proposal received wholehearted support from the leader of just one CIS country, namely, President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan. Some CIS heads of state have openly rejected the proposal, such as Uzbekistan's President Karimov, but most of them avoid expressing

any definite support. The October 1994 conference of the CIS leaders in Moscow demonstrated a clear unwillingness to revive supranational structures. The conference established only one such body, the International Economic Commission (IEC), which has very limited power and cannot control the development of national economies. Nazarbaev's expressed desire to appeal directly to the parliaments and peoples of the CIS countries regarding his EAU proposal reflects his disappointment over his colleagues' position rather than any serious prospect of realizing the idea "from below."

At present, then, it appears impossible to revive a federative or confederative state with a common supranational center on the former USSR territory. The process of the USSR's dissolution has gone too far. Irreversible changes have occurred in the political structures and economies of the former Soviet republics. New political elites have emerged that are unlikely to give up their power. Although just three heads of state (of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) took the decision on dismantling the Soviet empire at the meeting in Belovezhskaiia Pushcha, what was destroyed will not be restored with such ease. The notion, however banal, that it is easier to destroy than create finds confirmation here.

Yet Nazarbaev's concept of a Eurasian Union retains importance as a model for the potential future development of the CIS. Both in Russia and the other new states, political analysts realize that the twenty-first century will be characterized by deeply integrated economic and political associations rather than by separate national economies. To keep pace with the changes, sooner or later the CIS states will have to seek modes of effective integration.

Some Russian politicians believe that the post-Soviet states' reintegration will take the form of a gradual rapprochement based on expanding cooperation and the appreciation of common interests. As Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin put it, "we will have to proceed along a slow and painful, but the only productive road—that of the gradual rapprochement of the CIS countries, dependent on the

readiness and willingness of separate states and on conditions in particular fields."³⁰ In Adamishin's view, the decisions taken at the October 1994 conference of the CIS leaders in Moscow, on establishing an International Economic Commission (IEC) as well as a payment union, which are meant to encourage the creation of free trade zones between the countries, constitute the first step in this gradual process.

Nevertheless, the main obstacle to integration of the CIS seems to have been not a lack of appropriate decisions but a lack of interest in their implementation. For this reason, the decisions on an IEC and a payment union may turn out to be inoperative. Similarly, on September 25, 1993, nine of the twelve CIS members signed an agreement on the creation of an Economic Union in the CIS, but most of these countries, including Russia, were in no hurry to implement it.

Still, most analysts expect an intensification of integration tendencies among most of the CIS states, including Russia. Although isolationist trends are strong in today's Russia and some believe that it has gained economically by dropping the ballast of the former USSR republics, many analysts maintain that Russia's economic interests will impel it toward its new CIS partners before too long.

For example, according to V. Kirichenko, vice-chairman of the Russian Federation Committee on Economic Cooperation With the CIS Countries, the new Russian establishment believed that in trying to achieve reforms, Russia should separate itself from its former republics and take a separate path. However, in his view the "radical reform" failed, and Russia's leaders should not have "underestimated the extent of dependence of some essential economic spheres of Russia, including its infrastructure and its supply of raw materials for its industry and foodstuffs for its population, on cooperation with economic complexes of the former Union republics." He regards the "near abroad" as a capacious and accessible market for Russia: "Even temporary loss of positions on that market instigates our partners to redirect their ties in foreign trade, science, and technology toward the

'far abroad,' since, because of the pressure of competition on the part of other countries, such loss may become irreversible."³¹

A similar opinion was expressed by V. Mironov, director of the Institute of Politics:

The interests of the state-bureaucratic establishment will sooner or later come into conflict with the interests of the rising class of entrepreneurs. . . . Having failed in the developed markets, [the Russian neobourgeoisie] will return to the traditional Russian expanses. Then it will force the government to remove all the newly constructed obstacles to free migration of goods, capital, and people. It will create a common Eurasian market "from the bottom" in unison with the national neobourgeoisie who, in their turn, will use such a union as a defense against their local political establishment.³²

Many analysts believe other weighty factors, apart from economic ones, will impel Russia and other CIS states toward integration. First of all, there are military-strategic problems. Indeed, many strategic forces that in the past constituted indivisible military complexes became separated by the new state borders. To secure a collective defense potential, there must be cooperation aimed at maintaining these forces' fighting efficiency. This is especially so for the Central Asian republics, which are finding it very difficult to achieve a defense capability (there is, for instance, the well-known, acute problem of protecting the Tajikistani-Afghani border). Means of defense are still lacking for the borders between the former USSR republics, and it is clear that border protection of each CIS country is vitally important for all the other countries.

In his appeal to the CIS leaders in March 1993, President Yeltsin called for the creation of a joint security system within the Commonwealth framework, basing his proposal both on military and economic

expediency. He asserted that "We should pursue the goal of creating an efficient security system . . . that would become a significant factor of maintenance of peace in the entire Eurasian region. Joining of efforts in this area would also allow the reduction of the defense expenditures of each state, while preserving the necessary security level."³³

There are no grounds to assume that Russia has given up that idea; indeed, from time to time prominent Russian military and political figures make declarations suggesting Moscow still desires to create a collective CIS security system. General V. Samsonov, head of command for the CIS countries' military cooperation, wrote in November 1994: "Creation of a collective security system seems to be necessary and urgent. [The] potential threat to the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the states . . . has not been eliminated."³⁴

A readiness for military-political integration can also be observed outside of Russia, especially in those new states where ethnic, territorial, tribal, and other conflicts make the security issue most acute. On the other hand, there is an apprehension in these countries that military integration with Russia would threaten their sovereignty. Thus, at the February 1993 annual meeting in Moscow of the CIS defense ministers, such countries as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan called for organization of the collective security system according to the NATO model, since in NATO each country's real sovereignty is guaranteed.³⁵

Although Russia has less economic motivation for reintegration than other CIS countries, it has greater military-strategic motivation. For one thing, it fears that should it withdraw from the territories of the new states, the resulting vacuum will be filled by others. Second, Moscow is fully aware that the only way for Russia to remain a member of the great powers club is to retain control of all former Soviet military-strategic forces. Consequently, integration in the military field is in Russia's national interest, and this will impel it to maintain close ties with its neighbors and to seek acceptable forms of integration with them.

It is clear then, overall, that the national interests both of Russia and its neighbors will incline them toward reintegration, though it is not clear what forms integration will take. It has already become evident that Russia cannot settle for mere strengthening of bilateral relations with the new states.

Questions of the possible modes and the geographic boundaries of a reintegration have become salient in Russian political discourse. Indeed, all conceivable and even inconceivable options and combinations of interstate unions, federations, and confederations have been discussed, including even restoration of the USSR. However, despite the powerful nostalgia for the "common Soviet motherland" that persists among parts of the population, there is practically no chance of a revival of the USSR in its old form; only communists, headed by G. Ziuganov, do not rule out such a possibility. According to Ziuganov, "the geopolitical borders of Russia and the USSR were formed over centuries and were acknowledged by international organizations. . . . We renounce all forms of confrontation and aggression and seek progress toward the republics' voluntary integration and creation of a renewed Union, this time based on democratic principles."³⁶

Among the various schemes of integration, even the restoration of the Russian empire has been mentioned, though this is hardly realistic. The USSR did not, of course, comprise all the prerevolutionary (1917) territories of the empire. Such countries as Poland and Finland, which were once part of the empire, have now for decades existed separately, and cannot conceivably be reintegrated with Russia.

Another scheme, known as the "collecting of Russian lands," envisages annexation of regions with Russian and Russian-speaking populations, from the Crimea to northern Kazakhstan.³⁷ This seems a little more realistic but still fairly unpracticable. Neither Ukraine nor Kazakhstan, despite current critical situations, would agree to relinquish territories it feels entitled to. Were Russia to make assertive claims to these territories, it would risk a large-scale war against these

countries as well as censure and possible sanctions by the world community.

Among integration projects that seem more feasible are plans for unions on an ethnic or ethnoregional basis. Slavic, Turkic, and Finno-Ugric federations or confederations have been proposed. At first sight it may seem that the Slavic states, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, have the most potential for such a union; they have common origins and similar cultures, and their economies are on comparable development levels, which is considered particularly important in terms of possible reintegration.³⁸ In practice, however, integration of these countries would be just as difficult as of any other CIS countries.

Thus, in spring 1993 the three Slavic states declared a trilateral economic union, but no practical implementation ensued. The Kremlin decided that the costs of Slavic unity would be too great for Russia's economy; in other words, Russia's "economic egoism" prevailed over its strategic national interest of restoring and enhancing its influence over the former USSR territory. The 1994 attempt to unite the monetary systems of Russia and Belarus met the same fate. Although in 1995 Yeltsin and Belarus's President Lukashenko signed a treaty on large-scale cooperation (according to which the borders between the two countries would be fully open again and Russian military forces would remain in Belarus), the proposals to establish some sort of federation or confederation between the two countries were not supported by the Kremlin.

Russian reintegration with Ukraine would face even greater difficulties. Ukraine's new President Kuchma is known to be loyal to Moscow, and the eastern and southern regions of the country mostly support reintegration; but western Ukraine strongly opposes it, and this would present a formidable obstacle.

Although only four years have passed since the Central Asian countries attained independence, several attempts to integrate them have already been made. In January 1993, at a summit of the five countries in Tashkent that received detailed press coverage, plans of

integrating the entire region were discussed. However, it soon became clear that the countries' respective interests conflicted. For instance, Turkmenistan, tremendously rich in natural resources, did not want to be economically bound to the countries of this region (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan). Tajikistan, the scene of an ongoing civil war, is virtually unable to survive without large-scale Russian economic and military aid, so that its relations with Russia remain crucial.

No Central Asian Union, then, has been created; yet the strong need for integration remains. As an analyst of Russian policy toward this region, T. Shaumian, has noted: "Russian diplomatic activity in Central Asia is still inefficient, whereas Russia's own economic problems considerably restrict development of its relations with Central Asian states, to say nothing of rendering them economic assistance."³⁹ According to the analysts A. Arapov and Yu. Umansky, the Central Asian countries also need to react in concert to challenges that Russia poses for them.⁴⁰ Movement in that direction seemed to occur in the summer of 1993 when, after Russia had stipulated unacceptable conditions for the Central Asian republics' joining the ruble zone, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement according to which they rejected Moscow's conditions and synchronously introduced national currencies, namely, the Kazakhstani tenge and Uzbekistani sum.

In the summer of 1994, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement that many regarded as a step toward trilateral confederation. It was the first such agreement since the dissolution of the USSR that established mechanisms for coordination, control, and implementation of the decisions adopted. *Nezavisimaia gazeta* noted that it established "executive bodies for bringing the Central Asian alliance closer to the integration model that was repeatedly mentioned by the Kazakhstani leader at the CIS summits."⁴¹ Joint interparliamentary working groups for harmonization of national laws and norms, and development of new coordinated laws, were also created. Decisions on the establishment of an Interstate Council, and

of a Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development, were also adopted. The three countries also signed agreements on trilateral cooperation in military-technological, economic, and social fields.

From the formal point of view, this trilateral alliance resembles a miniature Eurasian Union, and one of the three countries, Kazakhstan, indeed straddles Europe and Asia. Some Russian analysts, however, are not very optimistic about the future of this alliance. A. Voskresensky, a researcher at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, suggested that "most probably, this mini-union will break up, and Nazarbaev understands that. For even Kazakhstan, the most stable of the newly formed states, has experienced considerable difficulties following the declaration of independence and introduction of its national currency."⁴² Nevertheless, among all the recent integration projects the Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani-Kyrgyzstani alliance appears to be the most advanced in terms of implementation; the rest are only at the stage of discussion.

Worthy of mention here is the Caucasian Peoples' Confederation (CPC), which was established as early as 1991. It emerged not as an interstate but as a sociopolitical association of the Muslim nations of the northern Caucasus: Circassians, Kabardians, Karachiens, Adigians, Balkarians, Chechenians, Ingushes, and numerous Daghestan minorities, as well as Abkhazians, most of whom live in Transcaucasia (Georgia's northwest). The CPC has no juridical status in the world community, nor is it recognized by the Russian government. However, it wields considerable influence over Muslims of the northern Caucasus and Abkhazians. In the summer of 1992, during the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, the CPC mustered voluntary fighting units and sent them to support the Abkhazian army, contributing to some extent to tiny Abkhazia's victory over Georgia. In the Chechen war, however, the CPC's role was hardly visible.

Other plans for regional union, such as the Black Sea-Baltic Confederation, have remained at the theoretical stage. That is mainly because these unions' putative members are aware of the difficulties

involved in implementing such plans, including mutual regard for partners' interests and resolving tensions over territory. They are also aware that they are unable to provide each other aid for development.

By now, then, it is clear that only integrated bodies in which Russia participates seem really auspicious. Only Russia, despite its own problems, is capable of acting as the leader of the entire region and of providing the aid that is so crucial to the other countries' development. It is also clear that the Kremlin remains uninterested in implementing the Eurasian Union, so that for now there is no possibility of its establishment. In the foreseeable future, Russia would be much more likely to create merely a bilateral Russian-Kazakhstani or Russian-Belarus confederation. Decisive majorities of the populations of both Kazakhstan and Belarus support union with Russia; President Nazarbaev, for his part, has always supported the idea. Economically, Kazakhstan alone would constitute a much lighter burden for Russia than any combination of the former Soviet republics (excluding Ukraine). Taking into account Kazakhstan's tremendous natural resources, a Russian-Kazakhstani integration seems at present to have the best chance among possible integration schemes.

A large package of Russian-Kazakhstani agreements that were signed in Moscow early in 1995 gives hopes of further rapprochement, and eventually even a confederal relationship, between these countries. The documents include an agreement on a payment union, which marked the beginning of the creation of a common customs space, and an agreement on simplifying the procedure of granting host-country citizenship to Russians who live permanently in Kazakhstan and vice versa.

Very similar agreements between Russia and Belarus were later signed in Minsk. It seems, then, quite plausible that all three countries will establish a trilateral economic union in the not too distant future.

It is clear, in any case, that any future integration will have to be voluntary, and hence that the strong resistance among national politi-

cal elites would have to be overcome. Another problem is the question of how Russia would subsidize the other members of an integration—whether on a nonindemnity basis, as during the decades of the USSR, or on the basis of market principles. The overcoming of these major obstacles would allow the solving of more practical problems, such as: economic policy coordination, unification of tax and bank laws, currency and customs regimes, creation of common infrastructure (electroenergetics, transportation, communications, information), and so on. Even despite all these difficulties, many analysts continue to believe there is no alternative to integration. As the economist N. Shmelev put it, “reintegration of the entire former Soviet economic space, or of its main part, is just a question of time, and most probably of the near future.”⁴³

The conviction that integration tendencies will inevitably intensify is also shared by some foreign observers. For instance, S. D. Shenfield of Brown University maintains:

Those embracing a neo-Soviet self-identification naturally strive to restore a new union that will bear as close a resemblance as possible, in territorial extent as well as internal structure, to the USSR. In practice, this usually means a much strengthened Commonwealth of Independent States . . . within which the constituent republics retain considerable autonomy.⁴⁴

Of course, the questions of what form reintegration will take and when it will occur remain open. Many different factors will come into play—and first of all, the development of the political situation in Russia itself. For multinational federative Russia, the reintegration issue is of particular political importance because of the strong separatist tendencies in some of its regions. Not only national republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechenia, and others) have tried to gain real independence from Russia, but even several nonnational regions

and territories (Vologda, Ural, Far East, Yenisei). As the analyst V. Skorokhodov has noted:

Russia's breakup into separate states is quite possible, unless economic collapse and the center's complete loss of control over the political situation are prevented. [If not], federation subjects will be condemned to survive solely by their own strength. Such a situation would promptly be exploited by regional political elites that aspire to complete political independence, separation from the center, and, finally, satisfaction of their own political ambitions.⁴⁵

Ironically, the very danger of regional separatism may stimulate greater interest in reintegration with the new independent states. In that regard, the supporters of reintegration in the other CIS countries become natural allies of the majority of Russian political forces who support Russia's integrity. In this way, the overall chances of reintegration increase.

At the same time, the war in Chechenia inevitably affects perspectives on a CIS integration. Opponents of integration among the former Soviet republics, particularly nationalistic elements, feel strongly vindicated by the Chechenia situation. Even many of those who tended to favor integration for economic reasons are now chary of becoming victims of Moscow's imperial policy and repeating Chechenia's fate. And despite the fact that Moscow will remain the economic center of the CIS, political interests of the separate states will counteract integrational tendencies. On the whole, trends of economic cooperation within the CIS should continue to strengthen, whereas inclinations toward political integration have been weakened by the Chechenian war.

Conclusion

The concept of a Eurasian Union is an attempt at defining the future of the vast geopolitical area of the former Soviet Union. The basic question is: will this area be reintegrated in the near term, or will the new post-Soviet countries develop as independent states?

As we have seen, some historical and sociocultural conditions act in favor of reunification of the former Soviet republics. For dozens, indeed hundreds, of years the various peoples were strongly influenced by each other. As a result, their cultures are now hardly homogeneous and cannot be identified as only Slavic or Turkic or Finno-Ugric. The interpenetration of the cultures encourages the preservation of close ties. An additional ethnic factor—the significant Russian minorities that now live in all post-Soviet states—acts in this direction.

The common economic and political development of these republics over many years, in the framework of one centralized state, the USSR, fostered a hard economic interdependence that cannot be eliminated in a short time without dire consequences. Since the collapse of the USSR this has become readily apparent, further encouraging integrational tendencies.

At the same time there are factors that discourage reintegration, not only in the former political form but in any other form of political dependency on Moscow. In most of the post-Soviet states, a new national elite has emerged that does not want to relinquish its power and privilege, and opposes any new political dependence on Moscow. Even more important, some political forces within Russia itself regard the former Soviet republics as an onerous economic burden for their country, and oppose closer ties.

Taking all this into account, Nazarbaev's idea of a Eurasian Union involving some sort of economic union of the former Soviet republics on a voluntary basis while preserving their full political independence appears realistic. It affords possibilities of economic advantages for all

the members of such a union. The realization of the concept, however, will depend on the outcome of political struggles in the post-Soviet states, primarily Russia.

Notes

1. Calculated on the basis of *Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)*, Country Report, 1st quarter 1994, pp. 87, 88.
2. All the data on Kazakhstan's economic development are taken from: *Economist Intelligence Unit*, Country Profile 1993-1994; *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, no. 5, 1994, pp. 134-145.
3. *Vestnik Statistiki*, no. 12, 1990, p. 70.
4. *Aziia* (Almaty), no. 24, June 1994, p. 3.
5. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 8, 1994, p. 5.
6. *Ibid.*
7. N. Nazarbaev, "To Renovated Kazakhstan Through Deepening of Reforms and National Consensus," *Aziia* (Almaty), no. 23, June 1994, p. 3.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Aziia* (Almaty), no. 25, June 1994, p. 5.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Aziia* (Almaty), no. 23, June 1994, p. 2.
13. *Izvestiia*, December 23, 1991, p. 1.
14. *Mysl'* (Almaty), no. 1, 1995, pp. 3-8. See also *Aziia* (Almaty), no. 23, June 1994, p. 2.
15. *Aziia* (Almaty), no. 23, June 1994, p. 2.
16. *Ibid.*
17. T. Ochirova, "Geopolitical Conception of Eurasianism," *Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost'*, no. 1, 1994, p. 48.
18. *Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost'*, no. 1, 1994, p. 51.
19. G. Florovsky, "Eurasian Temptation," *Novyi Mir*, no. 1, 1991, pp. 206-207.
20. B. Kapustin, "European and Russian Civilizations: Will They Meet?" *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, no. 4, 1992, p. 46.
21. *Ibid.*

22. A. Malashenko, "Evident for Everyone," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 9, 1994, p. 2.
23. A. Panarin, "Between Atlantism and Eurasianism," *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, no. 11, 1993, p. 12.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
25. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, October 26, 1994, p. 2.
26. *Nash Sovremennik*, no. 7, 1993, pp. 153-154.
27. *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, September 23, 1994, p. 1.
28. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, October 25, 1994, p. 1.
29. *Ibid.*, October 26, 1994, p. 2.
30. *Ibid.*, November 12, 1994, p. 3.
31. V. Kirichenko, "On Tendencies to Economic Reintegration in the CIS," *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, no. 9, 1994, p. 7.
32. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, October 26, 1994, p. 2.
33. *Krasnaia Zvezda*, March 18, 1993, p. 1.
34. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, November 26, 1994, p. 3.
35. *Krasnaia Zvezda*, March 2, 1993, p. 1.
36. *Shlach Peremogy* (L'viv), June 25, 1994, p. 4.
37. Yu. Petrov, "Reintegration of the Post-Soviet Space: A Myth or a Realistic Prospect?" *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, July 12, 1994, p. 3.
38. *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'*, no. 9, 1994, p. 25.
39. T. Shaumian, "Russia's Foreign Policy in Southern Asia and New Geopolitical Realities," *Vostok*, no. 6, 1993, p. 100.
40. A. Arapov and Yu. Umansky, "Central Asia and Russia: Challenges and Responses," *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, no. 5, 1994, pp. 70-71.
41. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, July 12, 1994, p. 3.
42. *Ibid.*, July 2, 1994, p. 3.
43. N. Shmelev, "A Myth or an Approaching Reality?" *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, no. 10, 1994, p. 53.
44. Stephen D. Shenfield, "Post-Soviet Russia in Search of Identity," in



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