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Peace Policy as Domestic and as Foreign Policy: The Israeli Case

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INTRODUCTION

Domestic and foreign policies are sometimes linked. However, we do not know much theoretically and empirically about how and when they are linked or under what conditions they influence each other. Much of the literature neglects the interactions between the two domains, instead focusing on the impact of one on the other. We do have some knowledge about the interactions between domestic and international conflicts,[1] and between external factors (adversary relations or regional and global developments) and conflict reduction and resolution.[2] We know very little, however, about the relationship between domestic politics and peacemaking.[3] Nor do we know much about why, how, and when the interactions between international and domestic politics influence peacemaking.

International and domestic politics may be treated as conditions or manipulable elements in a strategy to bring about conflict reduction or resolution. International politics in this regard refers mainly to adversary relations or regional and global interactions. A hurting stalemate following a war or crisis, or regional and global pressures, may be regarded as external constraints that may influence the sides to a conflict to consider its reduction or resolution.[4] By domestic politics we refer, as Kriesberg and Husbands suggest, to the basic political structures and processes that involve such political actors as leaders, political elites, interest groups, and even the public, as well as the political interactions between and among them.[5]

Although external factors are sometimes necessary conditions for initiating a peace policy, domestic factors may encourage or even pressure decisionmakers to initiate conflict reduction or resolution; they may also inhibit leaders from doing so. In democratic states, external factors cannot suffice to produce an agreement unless there is domestic acceptance. Peace initiatives may create or exacerbate domestic opposition that can endanger or even foil the peace

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efforts. Understanding the interactions between domestic politics and peacemaking is necessary not only for determining the ripeness or the timing for conflict reduction or resolution, but also for assessing the chances that peace efforts will culminate in an agreement.

Here, as Putnam suggests, a two-level game may develop: bargaining between two rivals or enemies that aims at reaching a peace agreement (Level 1) is connected with domestic political bargaining about whether to accept and ratify an agreement (Level 2). Each decisionmaker, as Putnam maintains, plays "at both game boards" and cannot ignore either one of them. At the international level, as his duty to the national interest, the decisionmaker has to play so as to maximize his chances to reach the best agreement; this also involves pacifying domestic opposition and minimizing negative domestic reactions. At the national level, he has to build a coalition for the agreement among the relevant political and interest groups. Failure to do so may mean forfeiting the opportunity for an agreement.[6]

Efforts to resolve an international conflict may lead to a domestic conflict when the concessions that are made are not acceptable to parts of the political elites, interest groups, or even of the general public. In this two-level game, decisionmakers on both sides who aim for a peace agreement should take into account their own side's, as well as the other side's, ability to acquire domestic legitimacy for it. It is particularly in democracies that domestic legitimacy may be necessary for conflict reduction or resolution.[7]

ISRAEL AS A CASE STUDY

This study aims to examine Israel's complex peacemaking with Arab actors in terms of interactions between external and domestic factors.

Until the Six Day War, peace was regarded by the Israeli political system as a lofty ideal, unattainable because of the Arab refusal to recognize Israel and conclude a peace agreement with it.[8] These perceptions underwent their first partial modification in response to the outcomes of the war, particularly

Israel's gaining control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Different conceptions began to develop in the political system about the possibility of obtaining peace in exchange for all, most, or even some of the occupied territories. The trade-off of "territories for peace" became the focus of an internal political debate between "hawks" and "doves" that crossed the political spectrum of coalition and opposition parties.[9]

Furthermore, differences of attitude arose as to whether the benefits of peace were worth its security, ideological, and historical costs. Not only were most of the territories regarded as vital in security terms, but some were perceived as important for religious, ideological, and historical reasons. Although the Sinai and the Golan were mainly regarded as strategically valuable, the West Bank or Judea and Samaria, in addition to strategic importance, had special religious and historical associations. The building of settlements in the territories was aimed at consolidating Israel's control of them, and only enhanced their importance by adding to the picture the central Zionist value of land settlement. Thus, the dismantling of settlements came to be perceived as a threat if not a betrayal of Zionist ideals,[10] and the settlement of the territories increased the difficulty of trading territories for peace.

The value of peace not only contradicted other values such as territory, security, ideology, and religion but was incommensurable with them. Territory is a real, tangible asset; peace is a largely abstract, elusive, and uncontrollable entity that is dependent on the future development of relations between the two sides. The question was how to create a reasonable and acceptable trade-off between the value of territory (overall) and the value of peace.

In the aftermath of the Six Day War, Israeli decisionmakers realized that any peacemaking that would involve territorial concessions would be regarded not only as a foreign policy issue but also as a domestic one, and this could pose real problems both in peacemaking and in domestic politics. However, because the Arabs were perceived as uninterested in resolving the conflict with Israel, the question remained hypothetical and an issue in the domestic debate rather than a real foreign policy issue. However, when conflict reduction or resolution became a viable option to be considered, the relationship between

international and domestic politics in peacemaking turned into a concrete problem that the political system had to cope with.

This paper argues that (1) external rather than domestic factors were responsible for initiating conflict reduction or resolution; however, the role of domestic factors increased during the negotiations; (2) every Israeli peacemaking effort that involves territorial concessions immediately and automatically becomes a two-level game because it creates a value conflict; (3) a lack of consensus arose in the political system about making territorial concessions for the sake of peace, not only between coalition vs. opposition parties but sometimes even within the coalition itself; (4) decisionmakers need to acknowledge that peacemaking that requires territorial concessions is not only a foreign policy issue but also a domestic one, and therefore requires wide domestic legitimacy; (5) a tacit domestic understanding developed that every territorial concession needed to be legitimized by different forums: the party, the cabinet, the government, the Knesset, and even by a referendum or elections; (6) a formal ratification or approval of a peace agreement does not constitute an end to a domestic debate when the agreement remains unacceptable to some of the political elites and groups.

The first serious case of a two-level game that entangled external and domestic factors in peacemaking occurred in the attempts to end the War of Attrition in 1970; the most recent one took place in January 1997 with the concluding of the Hebron agreement with the Palestinians.

The considerable historical record of conflict reduction and peacemaking efforts made by Israeli leaders that we have today enables a comparative inquiry into the following cases: (1) the U.S. initiative to terminate the War of Attrition (June 1970); (2) the first disengagement agreement with Egypt (January 1974); (3) the disengagement agreement with Syria (May 1974); (4) the second disengagement agreement with Egypt (September 1975); (5) the peace agreement with Egypt (1977-1979); (6-7) the Oslo agreements with the Palestinians (September 1993; October 1995); (8) the peace agreement with Jordan (October 1994); (9) the Hebron agreement with the Palestinians (January 1997).

DISCUSSING THE CASES

1. *Ending the War of Attrition (June 1970)*

The first real crisis that involved external and domestic factors in conflict reduction attempts occurred at the end of the War of Attrition. The external factors dominated these efforts. Although the initial U.S. proposal of a cease-fire was rejected by Israel, the bargaining that developed with the United States led Israel to comply. New U.S. assurances were most important in changing Israel's position. The Egyptian acceptance of the U.S. initiative and the increased danger of Israeli-Soviet military confrontation also constituted important external pressures on the Israeli government.[11] The U.S. initiative called on Israel, in addition to the cease-fire, to declare its readiness to withdraw on all fronts including Judea and Samaria, within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242 and with the aim of reaching a contractual peace agreement between Israel and Arab states. Although that demand was only declaratory and not operational, since it was not yet clear whether the Arabs would agree to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel, it triggered an immediate domestic crisis. Menachem Begin, the leader of the Gahal Party that was part of the National Unity Government (which had been formed on the eve of the Six Day War), refused to have any part in a governmental policy to redivide the land of Israel. Although not everyone in Gahal fully shared Begin's outlook, they supported him in his stance against accepting the U.S. initiative. Attempts by Prime Minister Golda Meir to dissuade Gahal from leaving the National Unity Government failed to change Begin's position.[12]

On 31 July 1970, the government decided to accept the U.S. initiative despite the opposition of Gahal ministers; the vote was 17-6. At Gahal's insistence two votes were taken; on the second, concerning the cease-fire, the government was unanimous. Gahal wanted to distinguish between the cease-fire on the one hand and the U.S. demand for territorial concessions in the West Bank on the other.[13] The government's decision was approved by the Knesset

on 4 August by a vote of 66-28 with 9 abstentions.[14] The acceptance of the U.S. initiative enabled the termination of the war but caused the collapse of the National Unity Government.

Thus, the government fell because of a foreign policy issue, and this made the question of territorial concessions in the West Bank a central controversial issue. The majority of the government preferred the costs of domestic crisis to the costs of continuation of war, including an escalation of the military confrontation with the Soviet Union, and a political confrontation with the U.S. The domestic political conflict remained relatively moderate because of the three years of cooperation in the National Unity Government, which softened personal and policy antagonism.[15]

The two-level game, which combined interstate bargaining (with the U.S.) and intracoalition bargaining, was influenced by the fact that the government could survive without Gahal. This created, as Brecher maintains, "greater self-confidence among those in power and a potential for more flexibility in foreign policy initiatives." At the same time, the development of a domestic conflict in the form of Gahal's opposition to the government's decision created a concern among the top leadership that "flexibility might be interpreted in Israel as a concession to external pressure; and that, in turn, would reduce the Government's credibility in the eyes of the mass public. In addition to that restraining factor, many members of the Coalition had been persuaded that a hard line was just and sound."[16]

In sum, the Israeli decision to accept the U.S. initiative was mainly influenced by the external factors rather than the domestic ones. The leading elite in the coalition, the Labor Party, accepted not only the costs of the collapse of the National Unity Government but also the requirements of: withdrawal from occupied territories; implementing all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242; and mediation of the conflict instead of direct negotiations. However, since not much was really achieved by the mediation attempts until the Yom Kippur War, no real problems developed of reciprocal relations between domestic and external factors. Nevertheless, while the government failed to exploit the domestic constraints in order to

reach a better agreement, it succeeded to bargain with the U.S. to secure guarantees as well as military and economic support.

2. *The First Disengagement Agreement With Egypt (January 1974)*

The attempts by the United States following the Yom Kippur War to reduce the Israeli-Egyptian conflict again involved a mix of domestic and external factors. This occurred because the idea of conflict reduction was based on the principle of territorial disengagement between the Israeli and Egyptian armies, which necessitated a limited Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai. That, in turn, negated the Israeli principle that no territorial withdrawal would be made for the sake of conflict reduction but only for its resolution.

Again the external factors dominated the decisionmaking process, although domestic factors were very significant. Important external constraints included the U.S. political pressures, the Soviet military threats, and the military instability along the cease-fire lines, which carried the danger of a new war. In addition, the high rate of casualties in the war, the need to release productive manpower from military tasks, and the crisis of national morale led to severe domestic pressure on the government to stabilize the cease-fire.

Nevertheless, the government perceived that the proposed agreement on disengagement of forces amounted to no more than a unilateral Israeli withdrawal. Israel alone was asked to pull back, both from the west bank of the Canal and from positions that it occupied on the east bank. Moreover, it was feared that not only would this weaken Israeli militarily, but if Israel once yielded to pressure it would invite an unending process of pressure. In addition, there was a bitter sense that Israel was being asked to award a prize to those who had attacked it.[17] Although the government was essentially interested in an agreement with Egypt, the domestic political constraints meant it was in no position to make territorial concessions, especially with elections imminent. The Alignment expected that such concessions would be politically exploited by the opposition or even by coalition partners.[18] The Alignment's victory in the elections in late 1973 did not necessarily eliminate its domestic political

constraints. Not only had the party lost some of its power (five Knesset seats), but it now faced a unified right-wing opposition party, the Likud, which had increased its power in the elections (seven Knesset seats) and blamed the Alignment for the debacle of the war. The victory in the elections, however, signaled more than anything else that the people still wanted the Alignment to find a way to stabilize the military situation. Nevertheless, to the militant opposition in the Knesset and outside of it the government had to prove not only that it emphasized Israel's security concerns but that it could bargain effectively without making concessions that would endanger Israel's security. It had to make, as Kissinger maintains, "a show of bravado for domestic consumption."[19] The government, indeed, preferred to be perceived as coerced by the United States "to release its prey rather than relinquishing it voluntarily."[20] It was easier to justify the concessions as an acquiescence to the United States than to the Arabs.

Thus, the government struggled between the need to conclude an agreement and the need to avoid domestic criticism. The withdrawal would be Israel's first on any front since 1957, and the need to legitimize it was paramount. Indeed, throughout the disengagement negotiations the Likud and extraparliamentary groups organized demonstrations warning the government about Kissinger's evil intentions and about making concessions that would endanger Israel and betray its interests. Later, the opposition denounced the agreement as an apocalyptic disaster for Israel. Begin and Ariel Sharon blamed the government for relinquishing territorial assets for which Israel had paid in blood, while gaining little in return. Moreover, Israel had conceded territories while remaining in a state of war.[21]

On 17 January 1974, the government unanimously approved the disengagement agreement. The next day it was signed with Egypt. Although Egyptian President Sadat wanted the agreement to read that Israel was "retreating" to an agreed-upon line, the Israeli government refused to accept that term because of its sensitivity in Israel and instead accepted only the term deploy.[22]

Although the Israeli Basic Laws did not require the government to submit the agreement to the Knesset for approval, the government was most interested in legitimizing it—because of the precedent of its including a territorial concession, because of the domestic constraints, and probably because of the government's need to enhance its own confidence in the agreement. The government informed Kissinger, and asked him to inform Egypt, that the agreement would need to be ratified by the Knesset. On 22 January, following a stormy debate in the Knesset, the agreement was supported by 76 MKs with 35 voting against. Because of the power differential between the coalition and the opposition, there was no problem in legitimizing the agreement with a wide majority. The government's decision to submit the agreement to the Knesset's approval became a precedent for future agreements with Arab actors that involved territorial concessions.

This case demonstrated for the first time not only that conflict reduction or resolution entailed the intertwining of external and domestic factors, but also that the dominance of external factors over domestic ones in the government's calculations did not eliminate or diminish the problem of legitimizing agreements that involved territorial concessions. Indeed, the government's concerns about domestic constraints weakened its self-confidence and influenced its style of negotiation. On the other hand, the government was able to exploit its domestic weaknesses to attain a better agreement, or at least to secure U.S. guarantees and military and economic support.

3. *The Disengagement Agreement With Syria (May 1974)*

The disengagement negotiations with Syria in May 1974 again combined external and domestic factors. Again Israel was asked to make concessions that included part of the territory it had captured in the Six Day War, in addition to the territory it had captured in the Yom Kippur War, in return for a disengagement agreement with Syria. However, the convergence of external and domestic factors was this time totally different not only from the case of

the negotiations with Egypt, but also from future cases, because an interim government handled the negotiations.

Golda Meir, who established her new government on 10 March 1974 (following the elections of 31 December), resigned on 11 April, mainly because of her realization that her government lacked domestic legitimacy because of its responsibility for the devastation of the Yom Kippur War. The victory in the elections had been illusory; the protests against the government and especially against Defense Minister Moshe Dayan only intensified following the publication of the Agranat Inquiry Commission's report, which blamed the military leadership for the debacle and actually whitewashed the political leadership.[23]

Although Yitzhak Rabin was elected by the Alignment as the designated prime minister, the establishment of a new government was delayed until the conclusion of an agreement with Syria. It was accepted that the interim government, because of its experience as well as its responsibility for the war, should serve until the end of the negotiations with Syria.[24] This rare situation minimized the role of domestic political constraints, since there was no way this government could be toppled. Moreover, surprisingly the Likud, which strongly opposed the negotiations and the agreement, accepted as legitimate the fact that an interim government was responsible for negotiating such a crucial agreement.

The fact that this was its last mission made the government, and especially Meir, feel even more accountable to conclude an agreement that would in some way compensate for the debacle of the war. Meir, indeed, told Kissinger that "this agreement was her way of drawing a line under the last war. She could then say that she finished her task."[25]

The government's decisionmaking calculations were dominated by: an intensified war of attrition with Syria that created strategic instability; the need to moderate Syrian enmity so as to avoid endangering the process of conflict reduction with Egypt; and U.S. pressures. There were, however, domestic nonpolitical considerations. Kissinger felt that the need to secure the release of Israeli prisoners of war was the most important factor affecting Meir's

behavior: "I thought I detected a sense of relief that she would be the Prime Minister who brought back the last Israeli prisoners from a war for which she would never cease blaming herself."[26]

Nevertheless, the long history of conflict with Syria, the mistrust, and the objective situation on the ground (involving a small stretch of territory that was close to Israeli population centers and that contained settlements) made the negotiation of a disengagement agreement with Syria even more difficult than that with Egypt. Kissinger, in fact, concentrated most of his efforts in Israel, holding twenty-three meetings with the Israeli negotiating team and only fourteen with Syrian President Asad.[27] The negotiating team was made more effective by its representing an interim government. The resolution of the domestic political crisis by the resignation of the government enabled it to concentrate all its energies on the negotiations. "The negotiations were their last hurrah and they were determined to go out with the right agreement."[28] The Israeli team was tougher and more ready than during the negotiations with Egypt.[29]

On 29 May 1974, the government unanimously accepted the disengagement agreement with Syria. A day later the agreement was presented for the Knesset's approval, according to the new tradition that began with the agreement with Egypt. Although the government portrayed the agreement as the best that it could obtain, the Likud again objected and argued that not only had the government violated its own principle of not making any territorial concessions without concluding a peace agreement, it had conceded strategic assets in return for a mere cease-fire. Nevertheless, the government had wide support: 76 MKs voted in favor of the agreement, 36 opposed it, and 3 abstained.[30]

4. *The Second Disengagement Agreement With Egypt (September 1975)*

The second disengagement agreement with Egypt of September 1975 again involved a mix of external and internal factors, mainly because it included new territorial concessions in the Sinai that were regarded as strategically and

economically important. However, the interaction between the two domains was different this time, for the following reasons: (1) the coming to power of a new Israeli government headed by Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister, Shimon Peres as defense minister, and Yigal Allon as foreign minister; (2) the choice of another disengagement agreement with Egypt as a preferred policy not only as a preemption of external constraints but also as a response to domestic constraints; (3) the crisis in the negotiations in March 1995, which preceded the agreement of September 1995.

Even without U.S or Egyptian pressures, Rabin wanted to ensure the continuation of political negotiations with Arab actors so as to stabilize the conflict reduction process: "I did not want us merely to respond to outside initiatives—be they American or Arab."[31] He was concerned that without renewed momentum in this direction, a military deterioration would occur. He preferred another disengagement agreement with Egypt because it was the most important Arab actor and an agreement with it had greater potential to stabilize the Arab-Israeli conflict than would a first disengagement agreement with Jordan or a second one with Syria. Such an agreement might also break the Egyptian-Syrian alliance, and minimize the prospects of a new Arab war against Israel.[32] No less important was the assessment that territorial concessions in this agreement would be less costly than those with Jordan or Syria, and therefore more acceptable by domestic factors. Another aim of concluding a new agreement with Egypt was to minimize Kissinger's pressures to conclude a disengagement agreement with Jordan. Rabin realized that an agreement with Jordan that would include territorial withdrawal in the West Bank would cause the collapse of his government, mainly because his coalition partners (the National Religious Party) and even prominent members of his own party, especially Peres, would not accept such terms. The personal tensions and rivalry between Rabin and Peres constituted another obstacle to greater flexibility on the Jordanian front. Rabin even adopted Meir's commitment to submit any agreement on the future of the West Bank to the approval of the public via elections to the Knesset.[33] Rabin's lack of experience in domestic politics, and probably his sense of political insecurity, also contributed to excluding Jordan

from the negotiations and enabled a second disengagement agreement with Egypt.

With respect to the negotiations with Egypt, coalition pressures, especially those coming from the young leaders of the National Religious Party whose views were identical to those of the Likud, also became a domestic constraint. The competitive relationships among the "triumvirate" (Rabin, Peres, and Allon) also influenced the negotiations with Egypt.

In contrast to the previous agreements, which were more reactive to external constraints, the new agreement with Egypt was an Israeli initiative aimed at coping better with both external and domestic constraints. The initial Israeli proposal made by Rabin himself was that in return for Egypt's acceptance of an end to the state of belligerency, Israel would withdraw its forces another thirty to fifty kilometers, which would mean relinquishing the Gidi and Mitla passes (except for their eastern parts) and the Abu Rodeis oil fields.[34] Alternatively, if Egypt could agree only to stabilization of the cease-fire and some political improvements, Israel's withdrawal would not include the passes.[35] Rabin, however, was most interested in an agreement with Egypt and was prepared for a withdrawal in the Sinai even "without getting a substantive political concession from Egypt"[36]—this despite the sharp criticisms already being voiced in Israel.

Kissinger's shuttles in March 1975 failed, however, to forge an agreement on the depth of Israel's withdrawal, the extent of the Egyptian advance, and the duration of the agreement.[37] Israel refused to concede on the issue of the depth of its withdrawal, especially since this was to include the passes. Although the government's considerations were mainly strategic, it seemed it also could not domestically justify such a concession except in return for the termination of the state of war.

The United States blamed Israel for the failure of the negotiations and adopted a policy of reassessment that had a punitive element against Israel.[38] The increased external constraints triggered a reaction of domestic solidarity in Israel. The opposition parties, headed by Begin, promised unconditional support for the government's position.[39] Indeed, in a Knesset session on 24

March 1975, 92 MKs supported the government's position, while only 4 opposed it and 6 abstained.[40] Nevertheless, the U.S. reassessment policy led Israel to reconsider its stance. Again external constraints dominated Israeli calculations. Israel was now ready to withdraw from the eastern entrances to the passes if in return the U.S. would take over all the early-warning installations in the area of the passes and operate them on behalf of both Israel and Egypt.[41] This enabled Kissinger to renew the negotiations and indeed to reach an agreement. The new agreement was not really much different from that of March; still, the U.S. constraints and inducements were what convinced Israel to change its position.[42]

On 1 September 1975, the government unanimously accepted the agreement. However, this provoked unprecedented opposition. For the first time three prominent members of the Alignment, among them Dayan, joined the opposition in voting against the agreement in the Knesset.[43] Among the other coalition parties, two MKs from the National Religious Party voted against, and one from the Independent Liberals abstained.[44] In the Knesset debate held on 3 September, the opposition speakers accused the government of making concessions that endangered Israel's security. They maintained that there was no reason to change the stance it had taken in March that was supported by the opposition, especially when Israel had not gained anything real that could justify the change. The acceptance of the agreement, they claimed, constituted surrender to the U.S., and would only increase Israel's dependence on the Americans. They also criticized the government for poor handling of the negotiations that had damaged Israel's bargaining power. Because of the importance of the issue, the government was asked to call for new elections. At the end of the discussion, only 70 Knesset members voted for the agreement, 43 opposed it, and 7 abstained.[45]

In addition to the opposition in the party, in the coalition, and in the Knesset, Gush Emunim, which became the main right-wing interest group, organized demonstrations and riots against Kissinger and the government that indicated greater power for extraparliamentary groups than ever in the past.[46]

5. *The Peace Agreement With Egypt (1977-1979)*

An unprecedented convergence between external and domestic politics occurred in the peacemaking with Egypt, mainly for the following reasons: (1) this was the first conflict-resolution event between Israel and an Arab actor; (2) making peace with Egypt required total withdrawal from the Sinai, dismantling of settlements, and establishment of autonomy for the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; (3) the conflict-resolution process was handled for the first time by a right-wing leader who had opposed the conflict-reduction agreements with Egypt and Syria; (4) the interaction between domestic and external factors varied at different stages of the peacemaking; (5) the domestic opposition to the peacemaking came mainly from the ruling party and the coalition, whereas the support came mainly from the opposition parties; (6) extraparliamentary groups mounted the strongest opposition to the peacemaking, particularly in its implementation phase.

Begin, like Rabin before him, oriented Israel's peacemaking toward Egypt. Like Rabin he realized that the Egyptian-Israeli conflict was territorial and strategic, rather than ideological and emotional, and that if Egypt could be persuaded to remove itself from the Arab-Israeli conflict, wars would cease and other Arab states might be encouraged to negotiate with Israel. However, Begin believed that only a comprehensive approach to negotiations could lead to a contractual peace treaty—"comprehensive" meaning a full-fledged peace with one country, even if only a separate peace. Begin also believed in going into peace negotiations directly from a state of war without any military or political interim agreements, since he did not think Israel would get enough in return for partial withdrawals and the like. He sought to achieve two seemingly contradictory goals: keeping Judea and Samaria under Israel's control, and creating the conditions for an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Although the ambition to incorporate Greater Israel reflected a strong passion to gain ideological legitimacy, the search for peace served as a means of gaining domestic and international legitimacy. It was important to him to

prove to his opponents that he could be a statesman, a leader who could bring Israel to a new and better situation.[47]

Personal and domestic factors rather than external constraints, such as U.S. political pressures and actual or potential Egyptian threats to resume the war, motivated Begin to signal to Egypt his desire to reach a peace agreement. Begin preferred direct negotiations with Egypt so as to avoid an active U.S. role; he feared that any external mediation would aim to impose unfavorable conditions on Israel. A direct approach toward Egypt also preempted U.S. constraints aimed at reaching a comprehensive peace via an international conference under U.S.-Soviet auspices.[48] Sadat's decision to carry out his initiative was made only after he had become convinced, through direct and indirect exchanges with Israel, that it would receive a positive response.[49]

Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was welcomed not only by the entire government but also by an overwhelming Knesset majority of 83-3 and more than 90% of the public. Domestic factors encouraged the advancing of the negotiations with Egypt. However, the prolonged deadlock in the negotiations following Sadat's visit and Begin's visit to Ismailia increased both the external and the domestic constraints on the government. The U.S. and Egypt agreed about a strategy for pressuring Israel: the U.S. intensified its political pressures on Israel, while Egypt threatened to withdraw from the peace process.[50]

On the domestic level, two contradictory constraints emerged. On one side, MKs from the Likud and the National Religious Party within the coalition as well some from the Alignment, together with the extraparliamentary groups Gush Emunim, Movement for a Greater Israel, and the Sinai settlers, tried to coordinate their struggle against the government's peace plan. On the other side, the opposition parties and a new interest group, Peace Now, accused the government of squandering a rare opportunity for a peace treaty with Egypt because of inflexible positions.[51]

The government's peace policy now encountered opposition not only in the Knesset and among the public but within the government itself. The key dissenting figure was Defense Minister Ezer Weizman. Essentially, Weizman believed that Sadat was sincere in his desire to conclude a peace treaty quickly,

and that Begin and Dayan were responsible for the breakdown of the negotiations.[52]

Begin's agreement to attend the Camp David summit greatly decreased the domestic constraints. Not only did Begin's decision easily gain the support of his own party, the cabinet, the opposition parties, and the Peace Now movement, but perhaps surprisingly, no opposition emerged at this point from among those who objected to the Israeli peace plan and even to the peace process itself. The general support may be explained by the fact that whereas the Alignment and Peace Now perceived the conference as an important chance to revitalize the peace process, Begin's promise to his party and to the Sinai settlers that under no circumstances would the Israeli delegation accept the removal of any settlement in the Sinai satisfied these groups.[53]

At the Camp David summit, however, the interaction between external and domestic constraints reached a climax and confronted Begin with a severe value conflict. Begin was offered a peace agreement with Egypt, but in return for relinquishing all of the Sinai, dismantling the settlements, evacuating the airfields in the Sinai, and altering his autonomy plan. Begin stood alone against a common U.S.-Egyptian position that made the potential costs of resisting extremely grave: not only endangerment of the prospects of reaching an agreement with Egypt, but also aggravation of Israel's relationship with the U.S. On the other side, Begin faced pressures from his own delegation, especially Dayan and Weizman, to comply. Begin had, moreover, his own personal constraints, especially after having promised not to concede on the Sinai settlements. However, the rare symmetry of external (U.S. and Egyptian) and domestic (his own delegation) constraints proved effective in inducing Begin to prefer the peace agreement over the settlements.[54]

Begin's signing of the Camp David accords forced him to face new domestic constraints: from the party, the cabinet, the Knesset, and the public. Nevertheless, he continued to enjoy the support of the opposition parties and of Peace Now. In the cabinet Begin won the support of eleven members, two voted against, one abstained, and the three National Religious Party ministers, as well as one other minister, decided not to participate in the vote. In the

Knesset, 84 voted in favor of the Camp David accords, 19 opposed, and 17 abstained. Ten (7 from the Likud) of those who opposed the accords and 13 who abstained (9 from the Likud) came from the coalition. Without the opposition's support, Begin could not have won the Knesset's approval of the accords.[55]

The extraparliamentary opposition to the agreements—mainly Gush Emunim, the Movement for a Greater Israel, and the Sinai settlers—became active immediately after they were signed. However, they failed to exert any important impact on the Knesset or the public. Indeed, 75% of the public expressed satisfaction with the Camp David agreements, affirming that the advantages exceeded the costs; 78% justified the concessions made by the government; 70% supported the possible removal of the Rafiah settlements.[56]

The balance between external and domestic constraints changed again following the Knesset's approval of the agreements. Serious differences between Israel and Egypt about the interpretation of the Camp David agreements prevented a speedy conclusion of the negotiations on a peace treaty and developed into a crisis that intensified external constraints on Israeli decisionmaking. Egypt, with the support of the United States, introduced new demands that Israel could not accept. Israel refused to make any further concessions beyond those in the accords, leading to a new deadlock.[57]

The cabinet's determination to "bargain harder" was aimed not only at preventing any alterations in the accords, but also at easing the domestic constraints from those who opposed the agreements. Although the government's position in the new negotiations was backed by the opposition parties, the domestic opposition to the agreements did not diminish.[58] New U.S. constraints on Israel were what brought about the resumption of the negotiations, and President Jimmy Carter's visit to Israel and Egypt in March 1979 led to a breakthrough and to conclusion of the peace treaty. With this, the role of external constraints ended.[59]

On 19 March 1978, the government approved the treaty, with two ministers voting against. In the Knesset vote, 95 voted in favor, 18 against, and 2 abstained (with 5 not participating). The increased support over the Camp

David agreements (95 to 84, respectively) reflected the Alignment's decision to impose party discipline on its members, and decisions by five MKs from the Likud and three from the National Religious Party who had opposed or abstained on Camp David to vote in favor of the peace treaty. The government's main legitimacy problem remained with its own party: seven from the Likud opposed the treaty, two abstained, and two did not participate.[60]

The Knesset's massive support for the peace treaty marked the end of the formal process of legitimizing the government's peace policy, which had begun after Sadat's visit. However, it did not end the domestic constraints. Moreover, the stage of implementation proved much more difficult because it entailed carrying out tangible concessions: the return of territory, evacuation of residents, and dismantlement of settlements.

The domestic opposition to the peace implementation began immediately after the Knesset's approval of the treaty. The opposition was led by extraparliamentary groups: Gush Emunim, its offshoot the Movement to Stop the Withdrawal (MSW) in the Sinai, as well as some of the Sinai settlers. However, although the opposition to the withdrawal culminated in a violent confrontation between the army and the MSW, it never actually endangered the implementation of the peace treaty.[61]

In addition to these constraints, new domestic constraints emerged because of the government's settlement policy in Judea and Samaria as well as its negotiating style in the autonomy talks. Not only was the cabinet sharply divided on those issues, which indeed led to Dayan's and Weizman's resignation from the government, but the opposition parties and Peace Now intensified their pressures on the government. Dayan, Weizman, and the opposition groups feared that the government's policy was aimed at foiling the implementation of the peace treaty. These domestic constraints, however, had only minimal impact on the government, mainly because its settlement policy as well as its negotiating style in the autonomy talks were aimed not only at ensuring that the autonomy would not develop into a Palestinian state but also at coping with the constraints that came from the right wing.[62]

In sum, the peacemaking with Egypt constituted a particular and a dynamic case of interaction between external and domestic constraints, with fluctuations in the interactions at each stage of the negotiations. The external constraints were again more influential than the domestic ones. The two different kinds of domestic constraints (from the left and the right) to some extent neutralized each other's influence on the peacemaking. Nevertheless, the massive support of the opposition parties and groups for the peace policy enabled the approval of the peace agreements in the Knesset. In contrast, with the disengagement agreements the opposition parties triggered domestic constraints against the agreements.

6-7. *The Oslo Agreements With the Palestinians (September 1993; October 1995)*

The interaction of external and internal constraints in Israel's peacemaking with the Palestinians has unique characteristics that differed from the peacemaking with Egypt: (1) the peacemaking was made by a homogeneous center-left government that had only a minimal majority in the Knesset; (2) external and domestic constraints were responsible for initiating the peace process; (3) the peacemaking was with the PLO, which was considered the most dangerous political and ideological enemy of the state of Israel; (4) the territorial concessions in this case were perceived as the most critical, not only in territorial, strategic, and security terms but mainly in political, historical, and ideological terms; (5) the domestic constraints became the most severe in any Israeli peacemaking and even led to the assassination of Rabin; (6) the interaction between external constraints (terrorist actions) and domestic constraints led to the government's defeat in the 1996 elections.

External constraints played an important role in initiating the peace process with the Palestinians. These constraints were Palestinian and regional rather than American. Indeed, this marked the first time in Israeli peacemaking that U.S. constraints played so minimal a role. Rabin was impelled by the recognition that there was no military solution to the intifada, and hence a political solution

was needed. Just before the 1992 elections, personal security had been undermined by a wave of fatal stabbings by Palestinians, and Rabin believed that the only remedy to such violence was a separation between Israel and the Palestinians, which could be achieved only by granting personal autonomy to the latter. He therefore promised to implement autonomy for the Palestinians within nine months after the establishment of his government.

The deadlock in the Washington talks with a Palestinian delegation that Labor had inherited from the Likud government formed another external constraint that influenced the government. The concern that the PLO was on the verge of collapse, and the only alternative would be the radical Hamas, constituted another constraint. The escalation of the wave of stabbings, and the costly continuation of the IDF's presence in Gaza, strengthened the inclination to leave Gaza, but this could only be effectuated through an agreement with an authorized Palestinian body that could take responsibility for the area after its evacuation.

Another external constraint that contributed to Rabin's decision to negotiate with the PLO was the lack of a viable Syrian option. Rabin, who preferred the Syrian track, realized that it would be very costly because it entailed an immediate readiness for withdrawal from the Golan Heights, including the removal of the settlements there. Therefore, the Palestinian option became more attractive.[63]

The domestic constraints on Rabin came from his coalition partner, Meretz, and from his own party, both of which pushed for negotiations with the PLO. Rabin's promises throughout the election campaign to do his best to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also created a potential domestic constraint; Rabin felt obligated to carry out his commitment. There was also a personal factor: Rabin and Peres were both in their early seventies, and realized that this could well be their last opportunity to advance the peace policy they believed in. They felt they owed such peacemaking to their constituency and to history.[64]

The homogeneous nature of the government, which included only Labor and Meretz (following the withdrawal of Shas from the coalition), eased the

government's legitimizing of the Oslo agreements; only two ministers abstained. However, the opposition parties and groups were totally opposed. Rabin and Peres realized that any negotiation with the PLO might trigger immediate domestic constraints, because such a policy would be perceived by many, and especially the right-wing parties and groups, as a betrayal of Israel's national interest and national consensus. Both leaders realized that the opposition parties, as well as the right-wing interest groups including the settlers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, would strongly oppose the peace initiative. It seems, however, that they did not foresee the extent and intensity of the opposition.[65]

Rabin and Peres had, indeed, great difficulty legitimizing the peace policy in the Knesset. Only 61 MKs supported the Oslo 1 agreement, 50 opposed it, 8 abstained, and 1 did not participate in the vote.[66] The Cairo agreement was supported by only 52 MKs; the opposition boycotted the vote to show that there was no majority among the public in favor of the agreement. Only 61 MKs voted in favor of the Oslo 2 agreement, and 59 voted against, including two Labor MKs. Thus, all three agreements were supported by only minimal majorities in the Knesset. Moreover, without the support of the Arab party and the mostly Arab ex-communist party, which were not part of the coalition, the government could not have ratified the agreements in the Knesset.[67]

This marked the first time since 1974 that the support for Arab-Israeli agreements was so minimal. Neither the opposition parties nor the interest groups led by the West Bank and Gaza settlers recognized the Knesset's approval as legitimizing the peace policy. They argued that because of the agreements' crucial political and territorial significance—including recognition of the PLO and negotiation with it, as well as territorial concessions in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza—the government could not genuinely legitimize them by a minimal majority, especially when it had to rely on non-Jewish and non-Zionist support from the Arab parties. On issues so vital to the Jewish people, the opposition insisted, there was a need at least for a special majority that would neutralize the Arab vote in the Knesset, and for a referendum that would truly reflect the will of the Jewish people. Indeed, they preferred new elections as the best way to legitimize the agreements. There were also arguments from

religious quarters that the government was not permitted to transfer any parts of Eretz Israel to foreigners, even if this was approved by the Knesset. From this standpoint, neither a national referendum nor even elections could legitimize the exchange of territories for peace.[68]

The opposition parties were unable to foil the approval of the agreements by the Knesset, and the domestic constraints shifted from the Knesset to the "political backyard." The opposition parties were willing to cooperate with extraparliamentary groups such as the Yesha Council (which represents the settlers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) in order to delegitimize the government and its peace policy. Other extraparliamentary groups that strongly opposed the peace policy with the Palestinians included the Yesha Rabbis Council, the Committee for Abolition of the Autonomy Plan, Zo Artzenu (This Is Our Land), and small ultraright groups such as Kach and Eyal. The main activity of the Yesha Council was to organize antigovernment demonstrations in cooperation with the opposition parties. Some of these demonstrations escalated into violence. In cooperation with the opposition parties, the Yesha Council acted to delegitimize the government by portraying it as having abandoned Israeli interests and values. Indeed, some groups and individuals not only referred to the government's peace policy as "an act of national treachery," but called Rabin and Peres "traitors" and "murderers." Some circles adopted illegitimate means to foil the policy, including traffic disruptions as well as threats of unrest, assassination, and even civil war. Indeed, the actual assassination of Rabin was a direct outcome of the delegitimization campaign.[69]

Although the government failed to legitimize the peace policy among the opposition parties and interest groups, it gained majority support among the public, but not by a wide margin. In a poll taken in late August 1993, 53% supported the Oslo 1 agreement, 45% opposed it, and 2% had no opinion. Oslo 2 was supported by only 51%, with 47% opposing and 2% taking no position.[70]

The domestic constraints escalated from September 1993 and culminated in Rabin's assassination, and the external constraints did not deescalate. The continuation of Palestinian terrorist actions (though not by the PLO), Arafat's negative declarations including calls for jihad, and the failure to expunge the

offensive parts of the Palestinian National Covenant as stipulated in the Oslo agreement were all factors that constrained the government, because they indicated that the government had not properly assessed the conflict environment or the other side's peaceful intentions.[71]

The escalation of terrorist activity, mainly the suicide bombings, was exploited by the opposition parties as buttressing their claim that the peace policy was mistaken. Thus, the external constraints interacted with the domestic constraints, the former intensifying the latter. The Oslo process has not, indeed, strengthened tactical or personal security; more than two hundred Israelis, including both soldiers and civilians, have been killed in terrorist attacks since the process began. This has been the most important factor in influencing the public, and apparently caused the defeat of Peres and the Labor Party in the May 1996 elections.[72]

8. *The Peace Agreement With Jordan (October 1994)*

The peace agreement with Jordan was totally different from the previous agreements with other Arab actors, mainly because it did not involve territorial concessions but only exchange of territories. Nevertheless, the Jordanians' claims for territories occupied by Israel created external constraints on the government. Although the Israeli government recognized the Jordanian claims as legitimate, it found them difficult to accept mainly because they might endanger the existence of Israeli settlements in these territories and trigger domestic constraints. Only an agreement on exchange of territories, which could avoid the removal of Israeli settlements, could prevent domestic constraints against a peace agreement with Jordan from emerging. Indeed, such a solution was found and prevented not only the emergence of domestic constraints, but also the convergence of external and domestic constraints.[73]

The government unanimously approved the peace agreement with Jordan, and an overwhelming majority of MKs also supported it: 105 in favor, 3 against, and 6 abstentions.[74] As for the public, 91.5% supported the agreement. Overall, this amounted to the most massive support for any agreement with

an Arab actor till then. This support was a direct outcome of the lack of territorial concessions and, also, of the widespread sympathy for King Hussein in Israel.[75]

9. *The Hebron Agreement With the Palestinians (January 1997)*

The agreement with the Palestinians on Hebron that the Netanyahu government signed again reflected a mixture of external and domestic constraints. The interaction of the constraints, in turn, reflected certain factors: (1) the Hebron agreement was part of the Oslo 2 agreement, which had not been implemented by the Labor government because of the election campaign and its loss of the elections; (2) the agreement was signed by Netanyahu, who opposed the Oslo process and upon whom it was, in effect, imposed; (3) external constraints dominated the implementation of the agreement; (4) domestic constraints acted in contradictory directions, both for and against the agreement.

The fact that the Hebron agreement was part of the Oslo 2 agreement dominated Israeli decisionmaking. The Oslo and Hebron agreements in themselves constituted constraints. Netanyahu's government could not evade the Hebron agreement, mainly because he realized that its implementation was required and only a severe violation of the agreement could justify delaying or refraining from its implementation. But because he perceived both the Oslo agreements in general and the Hebron agreement in particular as negative developments, he tried to renegotiate the agreement as a condition of its implementation.

Netanyahu's government faced various external constraints favoring immediate implementation of the agreement—from the United States, the Palestinians, Egypt, and Jordan. Whereas the U.S., Egypt, and Jordan threatened in one way or another that avoiding implementation would harm or endanger relations with Israel, the Palestinians threatened to resume violent actions.

The domestic constraints were of two kinds. The opposition parties pushed for immediate implementation of the agreement as it had been concluded by the previous government; some in the Likud, the government, the coalition

parties, and the right-wing extraparliamentary groups opposed the agreement and had hoped that the new right-wing government would refuse to implement it. For them, Netanyahu's claim that the agreement had been imposed on him by the previous government and he had no choice but to implement it was not convincing.

Although the domestic constraints from his own party and camp were significant, the external constraints determined the decisionmaking on the Hebron agreement. The deterioration of Israel's relations with Egypt and Jordan, and possibly with the United States, and Israel's isolation in the world were perceived as worse contingencies than anything the domestic constraints could cause. Still, Netanyahu could not ignore the constraints from his own party and government, so that renegotiation of the Hebron agreement became the only way to cope with the contradictory constraints. He sought to prove to domestic opponents of the agreement that he was trying his best to improve its terms in a very complicated situation. His knowledge that the opposition parties would support the agreement made it easier for him to cope with his own camp's constraints.

In fact, Netanyahu failed to convince considerable parts of his party and government. On 15 January 1997, only eleven ministers voted in favor of the agreement, and seven—three of them from his own party—opposed it.[76] This constituted the largest opposition within a government to an agreement with Arab actors since 1974. However, a day later, as expected, Netanyahu won massive support in the Knesset because of the opposition's backing: 87 MKs voted in favor of the agreement, 17 opposed it, 1 abstained, and 15 did not participate. Fifteen of the opponents came from the coalition (7 from the Likud). Some of those who declined to participate did so as an act of political protest (among them three ministers).[77] The public, too, decisively supported the agreement: in a poll taken on 29 January 1997, 66.7% favored it, 26.8% opposed it, and the rest took no position or did not know.[78]

CONCLUSIONS

Among the cases considered in this study, one was an agreement on ending a war, three were agreements on a conflict reduction, two were peace agreements involving conflict resolution, and three were interim agreements. Besides the agreement on ending the War of Attrition, which involved only willingness to make territorial concessions, all the others actually involved territorial concessions—in the case of the agreement with Jordan, an exchange of territories. One case (ending the War of Attrition) was handled by a National Unity Government, two by a Likud government, and six by a Labor (Alignment) government.

The following findings emerge from these cases:

1. In most of the cases, external rather than domestic constraints were responsible for initiating conflict reduction or resolution. However, in two cases—the second disengagement agreement with Egypt, and the peace agreement with Egypt—initiatives by leaders rather than external or domestic constraints were what started the process. Nevertheless, in these two cases the role of external constraints increased throughout the process, and was crucial for successful conclusion. Although U.S. constraints were more influential than regional ones, concerns about a new war initiated by the Arabs, or about the instability of the strategic relationships, were also significant.

2. Although domestic political constraints played a minimal role in instigating or preventing peace initiatives, they became very important once the process got under way. They acted mainly as obstacles, but never succeeded in preventing the formulation or implementation of peacemaking.

3. Potential or actual territorial concessions triggered domestic constraints because they created value conflict. In all the cases discussed, domestic constraints against territorial concessions came mainly from the right wing. These constraints were more considerable when the agreements were handled by Labor governments than by Likud governments, mainly because the right-wing opposition parties managed and directed the opposition to the peacemaking initiatives. Moreover, the left-wing constraints were aimed not against the

peacemaking initiatives themselves but against attempts to retard or stop them.

4. Decisionmakers acknowledged that peacemaking that required territorial concessions should be legitimized by certain forums, especially the Knesset. Knesset legitimization was regarded as the best way to cope with domestic constraints. However, it did not suffice to prevent or reduce them, and even encouraged the emergence of extraparliamentary constraints, since the Knesset ceased to be an effective venue for opposing a peace process once an agreement had been approved by it. Specifically, in three cases—the peace agreement with Egypt and the two Oslo agreements (1 and 2)—Knesset approval of the agreements actually increased the constraints.

5. Except for the peace process with Jordan, all of the cases took the form of a two-level game characterized by interaction between external and domestic constraints. The dynamic of the interaction was not necessarily linear; that is, the increase or decrease of external constraints was not necessarily followed by the increase or decrease of domestic constraints. But increased external constraints seemed to decrease domestic constraints when the government was led by the Labor Party (as in the case of the second disengagement agreement with Egypt) and to increase them when the Likud was in power (as in the peace agreement with Egypt and the negotiations on the Hebron agreement). Whereas the right-wing opposition tends to decrease its constraints to support a government facing external constraints, the left-wing opposition tends to increase its constraints when the government is perceived as foiling the peace process.

6. Aware of this two-level game, decisionmakers sometimes tended to manipulate it in order to cope with one kind of constraint or another. In negotiations, they tended to emphasize their domestic constraints so as to cope with external constraints; in coping with the domestic opposition, they sometimes utilized external constraints, sometimes even preferring that the United States pressure Israel in order to justify the concessions made. It is not clear to what extent this interplay between the contradictory constraints improved the different governments' bargaining power in coping with external and domestic constraints.

NOTES

1. See, e.g., Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973); Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics* (New York: David Mackay, 1973).

2. I. William Zartman, "Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution," in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, eds., *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 299-319; Richard Haass, *Conflicts Unending* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Tony Armstrong, *Breaking the Ice* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).

3. Jo L. Husbands, "Domestic Factors and De-Escalation Initiatives," in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, eds., *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), pp. 97-116; Janice G. Stein, "Domestic Politics and International Conflict Management," *International Security* 12 (1988): 203-211.

4. See n. 2.

5. Husbands, "Domestic Factors"; Louis Kriesberg, "Introduction: Timing, Conditions, Strategies, and Errors," in Kriesberg and Thorson, *Timing the De-Escalation*, pp. 7-9.

6. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (1988): 427-460; see also Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32 (1978): 881-912.

7. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process 1977-1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

8. Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 135; Abba Eban, *An Autobiography* (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 435-436; Moshe Dayan, *The Story of My Life* (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1976), pp. 490-492 (Hebrew); Gideon Rafael, *Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy—A Personal Memoir* (New York: Stein & Day, 1981),

pp. 170-171, 177-178.

9. Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 70-149; Baruch Kimmerling, "Exchanging Territories for Peace: A Macrosociological Approach," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 23 (1987): 13-33.

10. On value complexity in peacemaking, see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "Value Complexity in Shifting From War to Peace: The Israeli Peace-Making Experience With Egypt," *Political Psychology* 16 (1995): 545-595.

11. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition 1969-1970: A Case Study of Limited Local War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 175-185; Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 454-517; Dan Margalit, *Message From the White House* (Tel Aviv: Ot-Paz, 1971), pp. 156-183 (Hebrew).

12. Brecher, *Decisions,* pp. 489-500, 510-515.

13. Ibid., p. 496.

14. Ibid., p. 498.

15. Ibid., pp. 498-499; Margalit, *Message*, pp. 156-183.

16. Brecher, *Decisions*, p. 511.

17. Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), p. 567; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 608, 622, 624, 790.

18. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 652, 789.

19. Ibid., p. 817.

20. Ibid., p. 608.

21. *Knesset Records*, 22 January 1974, pp. 10-61.

22. Matti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 161.

23. Ibid., pp. 185-187.

24. Ibid., pp. 187-188.

25. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 1003.

26. Ibid., p. 1106.

27. Golan, *Secret Conversations.*

28. Ibid., p. 188.

29. Ibid., p. 211.

30. *Knesset Records*, 30 May 1974, pp. 1459-1511.

31. Rabin, *Memoirs*, p. 243.

32. Yitzhak Rabin, *Record of Service* (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1979), p. 442 (Hebrew).

33. Golan, *Secret Conversations*, pp. 217-218.

34. Rabin, *Memoirs,* pp. 247-249.

35. Ibid., p. 251.

36. Ibid., p. 257.

37. Ibid., p. 255.

38. Rabin, *Record of Service*, pp. 465-472.

39. Ibid., pp. 460-461.

40. *Knesset Records*, 24 March 1975, pp. 2307-2324.

41. Rabin, *Memoirs*, p. 268.

42. Rabin, *Record of Service*, pp. 491-501.

43. The two others were Mordechai Ben-Porat and Amos Hadar.

44. Zevulun Hammer and Yehuda Ben Meir voted against; Hillel Zeidel abstained.

45. *Knesset Records*, 3 September 1975, pp. 4080-4136.

46. Rabin, *Memoirs*, p. 271; Rabin, *Record of Service*, pp. 485-486; Ehud Sprinzak, *Political Violence in Israel* (Jerusalem: Institute for Israel Studies, 1995), p. 61 (Hebrew).

47. Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace* (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), pp. 76, 190; Amos Perlmutter, *The Life and Times of Menachem Begin* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), pp. 327, 336; Aryeh Naor, *Begin in Power: A Personal Testimony* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1993), pp. 18-19, 109-111 (Hebrew).

48. Weizman, *Battle for Peace*, pp. 76-77; Naor, *Begin*, pp. 18-19, 109-111.

50. William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peace Making and Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986).

51. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel*, pp. 92-95.

52. Ibid., pp. 95-97, 100-102.

53. Ibid., pp. 109-112.

54. Ibid., pp. 125-132; Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 394-399; Weizman, *Battle for Peace*, p. 372; Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981), pp. 177-179.

55. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel*, pp. 147-150.

56. Ibid., pp. 150-152.

57. Ibid., pp. 155-161.

58. Ibid., pp. 161-167.

59. Ibid., pp. 172-178.

60. Ibid., pp. 183-185.

61. Ibid., pp. 224-233.

62. Ibid., pp. 195-211.

63. David Makovsky, *Making Peace With the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 31, 34, 82-83, 114-120; Shimon Peres, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), pp. 9-10; Shimon Peres, *Battling for Peace* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), pp. 320-323; Rabin, *Knesset Records*, 13 July 1993, pp. 8-12; *Ha'aretz*, 31 August 1993.

64. Makovsky, *Making Peace*, pp. 111-113.

65. Ibid., p. 62.

66. Three MKs from the Likud abstained.

67. Netanyahu, *Knesset Records*, 21 September 1993, pp. 7685-7700; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): Daily Report*, 15 September 1993, p. 26, 24 September 1993, p. 22, 6 May 1994, p. 44; *Knesset Records*, 5 October 1995, pp. 30-101.

68. *Jerusalem Post*, 30 August 1993; *FBIS*, 30 September 1993, p. 51; *Ha'aretz*, 27 July 1995.

69. Sprinzak, *Political Violence*, pp. 108-130; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *The Transition From War to Peace: The Complexity of Decisionmaking—The Israeli Case* (Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 1996), pp. 87-90.

70. *Yediot Aharonot*, 30 August 1993, 28 September 1995.

71. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Transition,* pp. 91-92.

72. Ibid.

73. Moshe Zak, *King Hussein Makes Peace* (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1996), pp. 292-299 (Hebrew).

74. Besides the 3 MKs from Moledet who voted against, 5 MKs from the Likud and 1 from the National Religious Party abstained.

75. Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Tamar S. Hermann, and Arieh Nadler, *Peace Index Project: Findings and Analysis, June 1994-May 1996* (Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 1996) (Hebrew).

76. *Ha'aretz*, 16 January 1997.

77. Ibid., 17 January 1997.

78. Yuchtman-Yaar, Hermann, and Nadler, *Peace Index.*