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Identity Formation
Processes
in the Transition
from War to Peace

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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the discipline of international relations has dealt with the phenomenon of international wars—their causes, characteristics, impacts, and termination. In contrast, our research deals with the *transition* from war to peace after the termination of international wars, and how these transitions have affected the construction, reconstruction, and change of domestic and international identities that states adopt. Thus, we are concerned with two major questions: (1) Why and how does the transition from war to peace affect the identities states choose both domestically and in international terms? (2) How do those changed identities lead to political changes both domestically and in international relations?

We argue that there is a causal though unclear link between the transition from war to peace and the shaping and reshaping of state identities, both vis-à-vis the international arena and in the domestic context. In other words, the way wars are ended and the subsequent transition to peace affect the salience of civic, national, and ethnic identities within the state and the struggle among them. Moreover, this transition changes the state's (international) identity in terms of the national roles and role conceptions that it adopts in the international arena and these are perceived by other actors. In turn, those changed identities can lead to domestic political changes—taking the form of political transitions, democratization and liberalization, and regime changes, while also influencing the state's international relations—involving the adoption of new roles and orientations, or behavioral expressions of change in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

The roots of state identity can usually be traced in formative historical events and processes such as nation-building and state-building, change in political status (i.e., decolonization, independence, and sovereignty), and international wars. Such wars reflect and emphasize issues of identity, in terms of what is regarded as "national identity." The symbolic expression of that national identity is found in primordial links to the "motherland" and in "family (blood) ties," around which many historians have (re)created the historical narrative of states and nations, centering on the role of the collective self in fulfilling collective goals and normative conceptions. These historical narratives have helped states (and nations) to shape and reshape their own identities, building and rebuilding the self-conceptions of the individuals and collectivities within them. Hence, we assume that the identity of a state encompasses complex relationships among collective identities within it, which struggle among themselves for salience in a constant and dynamic conflictive flux (Deax 1993; Hall 1998). One should not, therefore, consider a priori any collective identity or another as particularly paramount or inferior, but rather as dynamic entities vying for predominance within an active process of change and adaptation.

The termination of wars and the subsequent transitions to peace change the historical narratives of the states and nations involved, and by extension, the identities of the states themselves. Any transition from war to peace entails a reevaluation of the "other," as well as of the collective self. In this sense, the re-creation of state identities takes place simultaneously in two interrelated dimensions. *Internationally,* the state's identity is being reshaped and clarified in terms of the

national roles and conceptions it adopts in its foreign policies and international relations, in contrast to past periods. *Domestically,* there is a new selection among the collective identities within the state as a source of social identification for different collectivities or social groups, which in turn affects the (international) state identity as well.

The transition from war to peace is a momentous process in which the identities of the state, stemming from the past, must confront present events that will impel their redefinition in the near and distant futures. During the transition period, the relinquishment of previous identities affects the creation of new identities. In this regard, different forms of transition, mediated by different social agents and entrepreneurs, unevenly affect the shaping of collective identities. These social agents include the ruling political elites and the political opposition, the leaders of prominent social groups, and intellectual elites and/or individuals that shape the domestic public opinion.

The transition period from war to peace accelerates and enlarges the internal competition among different collectivities (social groups) for the predominance of collective identities within the state. It provides fertile ground for competing interpretations of the new and far-reaching events by different groups within the society. This exacerbation of the competition among domestic identities reflects three main factors:

First, the transition period requires new assessments and definitions by different groups regarding such issues as: Who is the other (friend or foe)? Is there a new type of threat to the state and to the nation, to their development or autonomy? What is the role of the collectives toward the "other" with whom they make peace? To what extent do the new conditions of formal

peace and external reconciliation threaten the existing contours of the different identity groups or collectives (i.e., national, ethnic, and/or civil) as such?

Second, the transition from war to peace requires that the different collectives within the state adopt new positions and attitudes, based on the different conceptions and paradigms that they first experience in their peaceful encounter with the "other" in regard to ideological, political, and/or social issues.

Third, the transition to peace compels the individuals within their collectivities to adapt themselves in cognitive and affective terms to new and unfamiliar realities. This adaptation follows the individual perceptions of the change (to peace) as affecting the previous stability of their "critical identity" (self), which in the past provided them with a sense of security and predictability (Breakwell 1986). In this regard, the choice among competing and coexisting collective identities (such as national, ethnic, or civil) depends both on existing circumstances and on expected features of the preferred identity, such as:

- The extent to which individuals in the society have been exposed to propaganda and education regarding a given identity, and their degree of sensitivity and vulnerability to these
- Protecting the society and the state as a whole against external threats
- Providing significant benefits to the members of the collective, such as governmental positions or widespread cultural influence

In the following pages, we first define and classify different kinds of transition from war to peace, as well as the different identities that they shape. Second, we develop a succinct model and formulate a series of hypotheses about possible links among transitions from war to peace, identities, and political changes. Third, we provide an initial empirical assessment based on a sample of cases of transitions from war to peace since 1945.

DEFINING TRANSITIONS FROM WAR TO PEACE AND COLLECTIVE (SOCIAL) IDENTITIES

In the literature of international security and peace studies, not much attention has been paid to the transition from war to peace as an identity-shaping period.[1] This theoretical lacuna can be explained, at least partially, by the lack of precise definitions of the issues of war termination and transition from war to peace. Moreover, during the Cold War period there was a serious lack of attention to the role of nonmaterial factors such as norms, culture, and identities in shaping international behavior.[2] We agree with the Constructivists that the formation of state identities matters, since they affect interstate normative structures such as regimes or security communities. In other

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1 There is, of course, a vast literature on the general issues of transition from war to peace and the new state of peace. See, inter alia, Chanteur (1992); Kegley and Raymond (1999); Rosenthal (1991); Nardin and Maple (1992); Kegley (1995); Doyle (1997); Baldwin (1993).
2 On the definitions of war termination, see Handel (1982). On the lack of attention to nonmaterial factors, see the Constructivist critiques in Adler (1997) and Katzenstein (1996).

words, identities shape and generate national interests, since "actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what they are representing— 'who they are'—which in turn depends on their social relationships" (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996:52, 60). How are these identities created, constructed, and shaped in the first place, so that they can affect international politics by bringing about political changes? In seeking an answer to that question, we turn to the analysis of the transition from war to peace.

Transitions from War to Peace: Definition and Classification

Transitions from war to peace have been examined within the general framework of peace studies.[3] In general, transitions refer to an ill-defined continuum extending from the decision to end the war (war termination) all the way to the formal conflict resolution and peace agreements at the end of the process of bargaining and negotiation. Although there is a plethora of literature on strategies to achieve peace, the focus has so far been on the economic aspects of the peacemaking process and on the aftermath of civil wars (Colleta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, 1996).

For the purposes of this study, we define the transition period from war to peace as a temporal process of

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3 For a sample of the literature on peace studies, see Bloomfield and Moulton (1997); Hampson (1996); Bennett and Stam (1996); Massoud (1996); Brown (1994); Brecher (1989); Sigal (1988); Dunnington and Martel (1987); Blainey (1976); Coser (1961); Bailey (1982).

peacemaking, extending from war termination to the formal resolution of the conflict through peace agreements. Kegley and Raymond (1999: 258) define peacemaking as "the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that seeks to end a war and resolve the issues that led to the original conflict." The overall goal or end-term of the transition from war to peace is to reach a stage of normalization or rapprochement, characterized by "normal" diplomatic relations.

Regarding the *typology* of transitions, we identify four major types, as a function of the power relations between (or among) the parties involved and the results of their last war, as follows:

(a) After a clear military victory by one of the parties, resulting from a hegemonic war or a highly asymmetrical distribution of power between (or among) the parties

(b) After a clear military victory by one of the parties, despite the symmetrical or moderately asymmetrical distribution of power between (or among) the parties

(c) After a military stalemate between (or among) the parties

(d) After a military victory and a political stalemate that did not lead to a political resolution between (or among) the parties

(a) and (b) *Transitions from war to peace after a clear military victory by one of the parties:* This type of transition might result from a hegemonic war, or a highly asymmetrical power distribution between (or among) the parties.

Alternatively, it might follow a victory (or defeat) under symmetrical or moderately asymmetrical power relations between the parties. In both cases, the transition can be either imposed or negotiated between the parties. If it is a coercive transition, the winning party usually imposes its own terms on the vanquished. The coercive transition tends to be swift and radical, as a result of regime change and imposition, as well as of profound ideological changes imposed on the vanquished state(s), so that the time lag between war termination and formal peace is relatively short. If, on the other hand, it is a *negotiated transition,* there is a need for consensual agreement between the parties, with or without the assistance of a third party (such as an international organization or a sole mediator). In this case the transition tends to take longer.

(c) *Transitions from war to peace after a military stalemate:* In this case there have been no clear military results from the last war, usually reflecting a perceived symmetry between the parties, despite a possible asymmetry between them. The transition period hence creates a sense of either immediacy or prolonged attrition. Over time it might create the conditions for ripeness, reaching a point of "hurting stalemate" over the long term, inducing political negotiations between the parties to resolve their conflict by peaceful means (Zartman 1983; Campbell 1976; Keckmeti 1958). This type of transition tends to be long and painful.

(d) *Transition from war to peace after a war that was decided on the battlefield but has not led to a political settlement between the parties:* In this case the transition will be slow, piecemeal, multistage, and evolutionary. This gradual

process allows the former foes to learn and adapt themselves to their changing circumstances. The negotiations between the parties can lead to the building of cooperative relations over time, and even to a situation of a "positive-sum" game. Alternatively, the parties may interrupt their negotiations with political and even violent crises, leading to the emergence of a "cold war" or long periods of stagnation, since they still perceive their relationships in terms of a "mixed-motive" if not "zero-sum" game.

State and Collective Identities: Definition and Classification

The concept of "identity" initially comes from social psychology, where it refers to images of the individual and his/her distinctiveness projected through social relations with significant "others." Although states and nations are reifications of human communities (of individuals), we can extrapolate identity in social terms, and hence can assign to states and nations as *significant actors* collective identities, both in the international and domestic arenas (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 58-59). In international terms, we shall refer to the international identity of the state, or *state identity*, as a concept closely linked to the basic idea of national roles and role conceptions adopted by a state in its foreign policy (Holsti 1970). In domestic terms, we shall examine three collective identities within the state, contested among different social groups (collectives or collectivities): national identity, ethnic identity, and civic identity.

The International Identity of the State
(State Identity in International Relations)

By state identity in international relations we refer to the roles and conceptions a state adopts as an international social subject or actor in the international arena. State identity can be recognized in several ways, as follows:

(a) As the expression of national roles and role conceptions that are the components of its foreign policy[4]

(b) As the expression of its national ideology (Eatwell 1993)

(c) As the expression of its collective uniqueness, or "national character"

In operational terms, we can characterize state identities in terms of five dimensions that provide us with a glimpse of the roles and interpretations the state assigns itself in the international system, including:

(1) *Multilateralism:* Does the state participate in regional or international organizations in order to fulfill its declared goals, or does it prefer to act unilaterally?

(2) *Degree of identification with the core:* Does the state regard itself as part of the core or of the periphery?

(3) *Relations with the dominant power:* Does the state support it, receive support from it, or oppose it?

(4) *Degree of activism:* Is the state active or passive in terms

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4 See, e.g., Holsti (1970); Wendt (1996); Katzenstein (1996); Finnemore (1996).

of its international impact on the international society?

(5) *Linkage between domestic and foreign policy:* Does domestic decisionmaking reflect the state's international identity, or vice versa?

Collective Identities within the State (Domestic Identities)

By collective identities we mean a sense of "we-feeling" of individuals who identify themselves within a common social framework, on the basis of a social comparison and contrast with significant "others," as a form of in-group/out-group comparison (Festinger 1954). In this context, we refer mainly to cognitive processes of identity construction, while examining issues such as social identification, social categories, exchange of identities, and salience of identities. The relevant collective identities for our discussion are (a) national identity; (b) ethnic identity; and (c) civic identity.

(a) *National identity.* We define *national identity* as a subjective sense of uniqueness shared by all the individuals within the framework of their national collectives, notwithstanding the different (and differing) characteristics of that uniqueness. This definition, like the concept of *nationalism,* echoes Renan's characterization of national identity as a "spiritual, nonmaterial principle" directly related to the psychological dimension, by which each individual defines national identity according to his/her own "self" and needs.

(b) *Ethnic identity. Ethnic identity* may be defined as the self-identification of a given collective stemming from its

common past, memories, rituals, interpretations, and reintepretations. Although definitions of ethnic groups tend to overlap with their socioeconomic parameters, their functional needs, and the competition among interest groups, we emphasize six *objective* characteristics that might constitute an ethnic identity: (1) a collective name; (2) a common mythological origin; (3) a common history; (4) a shared culture; (5) a link to a certain territory; and (6) collective solidarity (Smith 1987).

(c) *Civic identity.* We define *civic identity* as individuals' shared knowledge and recognition that they are participants and partners within a national framework, by which the state provides them with defense, security, and welfare in exchange for their acceptance of a (legal) system of rights and duties.

The civic identity is the result of the actions of the modern state, defined as a sovereign political entity over a given territory, with a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Civic identity equates state identity with the borders of the state, leading to patriotism (identification with the state) rather than nationalism (identification with the national group). In formal(istic) terms, a civic identity can be traced back to the enactment and reform of constitutions that underline the protection of civil rights and the legal parameters of the polity, stressing the concept of citizenship.

Political Changes: Definition and Classification

As noted above, as a result of changed identities there is room for a myriad of possible political changes, both in domestic and international (foreign policy) terms.

Domestic political changes refer to a change, transformation, or reformation of the existing political structures and institutions, or of the value system and beliefs that underlie them and the official government policy. In this sense, there is the possibility of a change of the *government*, where the leaders are replaced, but the basic norms and rules remain the same; or, alternatively, of a change of the *regime* itself, where the norms and rules are changed, as in democratic transitions away from authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

According to Hagan (1989), there are five types or categories of domestic political change, ranging from moderate to dramatic. They include: (a) the replacement of the leaders, without changing the ruling coalition; (b) a change in the components of the ruling coalition; (c) change of government (the ruling elite) by an alternative group from the same political spectrum; (d) change of the ruling elite by a political group from the opposite political spectrum; and (e) a change of regime, either peaceful or violent, that leads to a change in the norms and legal rules.

Political changes in the foreign policy realm encompass new role conceptions that the state adopts, a change in the nature of interactions with other actors, a change in the general orientation of foreign policy, or a change in actual behavior in international relations.

These political changes can be identified by examining new interpretations of the concept of national interest, as well as changes in membership in international organizations, including formal alliances.

LINKING TRANSITIONS FROM WAR TO PEACE, IDENTITIES, AND POLITICAL CHANGES: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

We can now suggest a theoretical framework (or model) that examines the possible links among:

(1) Different types of transition from war to peace.

(2) The state identity, i.e., the international identity a state adopts in the international system in terms of foreign policy orientations, national roles and conceptions.

(3) The collective identities that coexist within the state (i.e., national, ethnic, and civic). These domestic identities compete for predominance, affecting the selection of the state (international) identity in the international realm.

(4) Domestic and international political changes, brought about as a result of changed identities.

In the model, we argue that under given conditions (to be specified below), war termination and the process of transition from war to peace will lead to an identity change, and in turn to political changes. The model identifies two major stages in the process of identity change:

(a) An *immediate* identity change will be explained by assessing process variables related to the type of war termination and the extent of the subsequent transition from war to peace.

(b) A *gradual* identity change will be explained by

analyzing process variables and background conditions such as the distribution of power between (or among) the parties at the end of the war; the degree of legitimacy granted to the government (and/or regime) of the vanquished state; and the degree of diplomatic intervention by third parties.

The rationale for the model is rather simple. Within any given state there are different collective identities: national, ethnic, and civic. Each of these identities grants individuals within a given collective a sense of security and stability of his/her own self (critical identity), so that he/she chooses it as a source of further social identification. In this sense, the transition from war to peace may represent a disruptive force in terms of those domestic identities, by amplifying and exacerbating the conflict and competition among them, ultimately leading to the predominance of one among the others. In psychological terms, the transition from war to peace affects inner dimensions such as self-image, self-esteem, and self-assurance, to the extent that the "other" is now depicted in a different light during the transition and afterward. The selection of a new or a different collective identity then leads to the adoption of a certain state (international) identity, which fits the characteristics of the collective identity selected domestically. Thus, for instance, if during the transition period the identity selected is the "national identity," then the state will choose a state identity that will emphasize its unique (national) characteristics. In turn, those new or enhanced identities might lead to domestic and international political changes in a state's behavior and its perceptions and role conceptions.

The Variables of the Model

There are five variables that, combined, shape the possible changes in identity, which in turn may lead to political changes:

1. *Type of war termination:* As pointed out above, war termination might result in a clear military victory by one of the parties, a corresponding defeat by the other party, or lack of military and/or political resolution (stalemate).

2. *Power distribution between (or among) the parties concerned:* At the time of war termination, the distribution of power between the parties might be considered as symmetrical or asymmetrical. This variable is intimately related to the type of war termination, since the end of the war reflects and (re)defines for the parties their power distribution.

3. *Length of the transition process from war to peace:* The transition process from war to peace refers to the period extending from the formal end of hostilities (such as cease-fire) up to the ratification of peace treaties. This process can be immediate (following the end of the war), short-term, or long-term. Depending on the length of the process, it may foster a sense of attrition (Keckmeti 1958), urgency (Campbell 1976), or even ripeness (Zartman 1983).

4. *Diplomatic intervention of third parties in the transition from war to peace:* The transition process can take place with a direct, bilateral agreement

between the parties; or, alternatively, with the diplomatic assistance of third parties, including international organizations, regional organizations, ad hoc committees, third-party states or individuals.

5. *Legitimacy for the regime (and/or government) of the vanquished state:* Legitimacy involves the acceptance by the citizens of the authority, law, and symbols of the government (Lipset 1960). At the end of the war, the ruling elite may enjoy a high or low degree of legitimacy.

Hypotheses

Based on these five variables, we propose the following hypotheses:

H1. *To the extent that the transition from war to peace follows a clear military victory, which reflects an asymmetrical distribution of power in favor of the winning party, the transition will be swift and continuous. As a result of it, a sense of national identity will be strengthened within the vanquished state, which will eventually choose a state identity that underlines its uniqueness in international relations.*

Groups, like individuals, have to "mourn" their lost leader, territory, and/or self-esteem, in order to reincorporate themselves into the normal stream of life within the international society. A decisive military victory by a hegemon or a dominant power usually leads to a swift and continuous transition from war to peace, so that there is not a profound or persistent negative impact on the self-image of the collectives within the vanquished state. The rationale for the collectives

within the defeated state is that, given the degree of asymmetry in the power relations of the former enemies, there was "no alternative" to the military defeat and the subsequent imposed and swift transition to peace. Therefore, in spite of the feelings of anger and disillusionment linked to the defeat and the lost self-value, there is no turn (back) to an ethnic identity that stresses revisionist or irredentist postures regarding the lost war. Instead, there is a deliberate selection of a national identity that will preserve the collective's uniqueness and self-esteem by other, peaceful means.

H2. *To the extent that the transition from war to peace follows a clear military victory despite a perceived power symmetry between (or among) the parties, a sense of ethnic identity will be strengthened within the vanquished state.*

When the military defeat was inflicted by another party that is perceived as having more or less the same power as the vanquished party, then the sense of self-assurance, self-image, and security of the collectives of the defeated state is profoundly injured. Hence, the collectives will choose an ethnic identity centered on the sense of "we" against the "other," and reflected in an ethnocentric and revisionist identity in international relations.

H3. *To the extent that the transition from war to peace follows a situation of military stalemate (there having been no clear resolution on the battlefield), reflecting a basic power symmetry between the parties, then the transition will be lengthy and may lead to a condition of hurting stalemate. As a result, the parties agree to manage their conflict by negotiations so as to resolve it by peaceful means. This transition will lead to a stronger civic identity within one or both parties, which in*

turn will affect their selection of a state identity that reflects the current norms of the international society.

A condition of hurting stalemate implies that the whole society, including its different collective identities, experiences a long period of domestic discourse and a soul-searching exposure to the intricacies of finding a negotiated solution to its international conflict. This long transition period includes changes of government and even of regimes, leadership changes, and the emergence of a new, younger generation of voters who did not actively participate in the military conflict. The length of the period also facilitates adaptation processes and learning, leading the society to greater readiness for compromise so as to maintain its social cohesiveness. Thus, the domestic discourse and bargaining lead to the realization that the civic identity should be preferred, since it is the most resilient under the new conditions of peace. In international terms, this civic identity will promote and affect a state identity that regards itself as allied with the domestic and international elements interested in peace, while domestically committed to the development and strengthening of its civic identity.

H4. *To the extent that the transition from war to peace is short and swift, and there is no diplomatic intervention by third parties, then the national identity within the vanquished state will be strengthened.* The rationale is similar to that of H1.

H5. *To the extent that the transition from war to peace is long and gradual, and there is intensive diplomatic intervention by third parties, then the civic identity within the vanquished state will be strengthened.* The rationale is the same as for H3.

H6. *To the extent that the legitimacy granted to the*

government (and/or regime) of the vanquished state is high, then its ethnic and/or national identities will be strengthened.

If there is a strong sense of social cohesiveness and legitimacy of the current political regime, this will allow the regime to manipulate historical reinterpretations, on the basis of collective memories, so as to reignite a collective sense of pride and self-esteem that enables coping with the transition from military defeat to peace. Hence, for similar reasons as for H2, if the social cohesiveness and legitimacy of the regime are strong, then the collectives of the defeated state will choose an ethnic or national identity, reflected in a revisionist state identity toward the international arena.

H7. *To the extent that the legitimacy granted to the government (and/or regime) of the vanquished state is low, then its national and civic identities will be strengthened.*

The rationale for this hypothesis has been presented under H3. The collectivities feel frustrated, and that frustration leads to social transformations and cleavages within their societies in opposite directions. Thus, some collectivities strengthen their national identity as a response to the need to protect themselves against external dangers and threats. Conversely, other social groups bolster their civic identity as a response to socialization, education, and propaganda from within and without the state, including other international actors. Hence, the result is a combination of national and civic identities, within a continuing learning process of cognitive evolution. The state identity in international relations thus reflects this dissonance, allowing for a myriad of possible and contradictory orientations.

AN INITIAL EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF TRANSITIONS FROM WAR TO PEACE SINCE 1945

The seven hypotheses presented above should be tested empirically against the record of transitions from international wars to peace since 1945. Based on the definition of international wars according to the Correlates of War project, we have first compiled a sample of twenty transitions from war to peace that have resulted in changes in the state identities of the former enemies. It should be emphasized that regarding the empirical validity of H1 and H2, we examine the identities of the state defeated in the last war. Conversely, for H3, it is harder to identify the "winners" and "losers" from the last war. For the purposes of the sample, we succinctly define the length of the war and the transition afterward, the type of transition, the preexisting identity (before the transition to peace), and the current identity during and after the transition itself.

The twenty cases of transition from war to peace include: six in Asia; five in Africa; three in the Middle East; three in Latin America; and three in Europe. The Asian cases include: Japan-United States (1945-1952); Japan-China (1945-1994); Indonesia-Malaysia (1963-1972); Vietnam-Cambodia (1979-1992); United States-Vietnam (1975-1998); India-China (1962-1994). The African cases are: Ethiopia-Somalia (1977-1999); Angola-South Africa (1975-1999); Tanzania-Uganda (1978-1990); Chad-Libya (1988-1994); Morocco-Algeria (1962-1989). The Middle Eastern cases are: Israel-Egypt (1973-1979); Israel-Jordan (1967-1994); Iran-Iraq (1988-1991). The Latin American cases include: Argentina-United Kingdom (1982-1999); Honduras-El Salvador (1969-1998); Peru-Ecuador (1981-1998).

Finally, the European cases are: Germany-United States (1945-1949); Germany-Soviet Union (1945-1990); Germany-Poland (1945-1992). The sample of cases is summarized in Table 1.

In methodological terms, it is difficult to discern from this initial sample the distinction between correlation and causality. Thus, the fact that states have changed their collective and international identities over time does not indicate in itself that this has been a necessary result or impact of their transition from war to peace. After all, we have not argued here that transitions from war to peace are the only causes of the construction of new identities and subsequent political changes. Identities might result, for instance, from structural changes in the international environment or, alternatively, from changes in leadership, ideas, and norms (Stein 1999). Therefore, to study the possible causal linkages between the transitions to peace and the adoption of new identities we turn to a list of four selected cases, in order to illustrate and test the validity of our hypotheses, as follows:

(1) The (West) German identity and national role and conceptions, following its defeat by the United States at the end of World War II and the transition to peace between 1945 and 1950. As in the Japanese case, this imposed transition fostered a radical change in the German identity, manifested in a clear pacifist (or at least peaceful) stance in international relations.

(2) The Argentine identity, following its defeat by the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas War of April-June 1982. The transition to peace and

Table 1: Sample of Cases Following International Wars Since 1945

War; focus	Results of war and type of transition	Domestic identity before war	International identity before war	Domestic identity during transition and afterward	International identity during transition and afterward
Pacific War; *Japan*-United States, 1941-1945 (focus on *Japan*)	Military victory of the U.S.; imposed; asymmetrical distribution of power; 1945-1952	Ethnic and national	Imperialistic; revisionist; regional hegemon; militaristic	National and civic	Pacifist; "trading state"; developer; faithful ally (of the U.S.)
Japan-China, 1938-1945 (focus on *Japan*)	Japanese defeat (symmetrical distribution of power); negotiated transition, 1945-1978	Ethnic and national	Imperialistic; revisionist; regional hegemon; militaristic	National and civic	Pacifist; "trading state"; developer; faithful ally (of the U.S.)
Indonesia-Malaysia "confrontation," 1963-1965 (focus on *Indonesia*)	Stalemate (symmetrical distribution of power); negotiated transition, 1965-1972	Ethnic and national	Liberator; independent	National (following regime change), based on Pancasila	Developer; regional leader; regional subsystem collaborator; internal development
Vietnam-Cambodia, 1979 (focus on *Vietnam*)	Vietnamese military victory, without immediate political solution; negotiated/ imposed by a third party; transition, 1979-1992	Ethnic and national	Anti-imperialist; antirevisionist; independent	National and civic	Regional subsystem collaborator; independent
United States-Vietnam, 1964-1973 (focus on *United States*)	U.S. military defeat, despite asymmetrical power of the U.S.; negotiated and gradual transition, 1975-1999	National and civic	Liberator; hegemon; developer; anticommunist agent; world policeman; example	National and civic	Defender of the faith and (democratic) values; developer; anti-communist agent

Table 1 (cont' d.)

War; focus	Results of war and type of transition	Domestic identity before war	International identity before war	Domestic identity during transition and afterward	International identity during transition and afterward
India-China, 1962 (focus on *India*)	Military victory of China (despite perceived power symmetry between the parties); negotiated and lengthy transition, 1962-1994	National	Liberation supporter; defender of the faith and values; leader of the Third World; independent; pacifist state	Identity	Developer; bridge; independent; aspirations for regional hegemony
Ethiopia-Somalia, 1977 (focus on *Ethiopia*)	Clear military victory of Ethiopia (power asymmetry in Ethiopia's favor); still, negotiated transition, 1977-1988	National (based on "scientific socialism")	Nonalignment; independent, active independent; anti-imperialist agent	National and civic (following regime change)	Pro-Western; faithful ally (of the West); internal development
Angola-South Africa (and Namibia), 1975-1988 (focus on *Angola*)	Military stalemate, without clear results from the war (despite South African power asymmetry); negotiated and lengthy transition, 1988-1998	National (based on Marxist ideology)	Bastion of revolution; liberator; liberation supporter; anti-imperialist agent	National and civic (following pragmatic adaptation of the regime, amid civil war)	Regional subsystem collaborator; internal development
Uganda-Tanzania, 1978 (focus on *Uganda*)	Clear Tanzanian military victory (despite power symmetry); partly imposed transition, 1978-1990	Ethnic and national	Bastion of the revolution; liberator; liberation supporter; anti-imperialist	National and civic (following regime change)	Independent (nonaligned); regional subsystem collaborator

Table 1 (cont' d.)

War; focus	Results of war and type of transition	Domestic identity before war	International identity before war	Domestic identity during transition and afterward	International identity during transition and afterward
Chad-Libya, 1978-1987 (focus on *Chad*)	Military victory of Chad (despite power symmetry); negotiated transition, 1987-1994	National	Antirevisionist (anti-Western); independent; anti-imperialist	National and civic	Pro-Western good neighbor; internal development; bridge
Algeria-Morocco, 1962 (focus on *Algeria*)	Military victory of Morocco (despite power symmetry); negotiated transition, 1962-1989	Ethnic and national (based on an Islamic and socialist republic)	Anti-imperialist, antirevisionist (anti-Western); liberator; liberation supporter	National and civic (following regime changes)	Independent; regional subsystem collaborator; bridge; internal development; mediator
Israel-Egypt, 1973 (Yom Kippur War) (focus on *Israel*)	Clear Israeli military victory, but political stalemate and impossibility of imposing a political solution; negotiated and gradual transition, 1973-1979	National and ethnic	Faithful ally; example; defender of the faith; developer; Jewish state	National, ethnic, and civic; continuing struggle among identities	Faithful ally; example; defender of the faith; developer; Jewish state; regional subsystem collaborator
Israel-Jordan, 1967 (Six Day War) (focus on *Israel*)	Clear Israeli military victory, but political stalemate and impossibility of imposing a political solution; informal and formal, negotiated and gradual transition, 1967-1994	National and ethnic	Faithful ally; example; defender of the faith; developer; Jewish state	National, ethnic, and civic; continuing struggle among identities	Faithful ally; example; defender of the faith; developer; Jewish state; regional subsystem collaborator

Table 1 (cont' d.)

War; focus	Results of war and type of transition	Domestic identity before war	International identity before war	Domestic identity during transition and afterward	International identity during transition and afterward
Iran-Iraq, 1980-1988 (first Persian Gulf War) (focus on *Iran*)	Military stalemate (power symmetry between the parties); negotiated transition, 1988-1991	Ethnic and national (based on Islam)	Anti-imperialist (anti-Western); bastion of the revolution and liberator; anti-Zionist; defender of the faith	National	Independent; anti-Zionist; defender of the faith; example
Argentina-United Kingdom, 1982 (Falklands/Malvinas War) (focus on *Argentina*)	Clear British military victory (power asymmetry in favor of the U.K.); imposed war termination, but gradual negotiation of transition to peace, 1982-1999	National and ethnic	Anticommunist; independent; defender of the faith; regional leader; militaristic and revisionist	National and civic (following regime change)	Regional protector; example; faithful ally (of the United States); regional subsystem collaborator; pacifist
El Salvador-Honduras, 1969 ("Football War") (focus on *El Salvador*)	Victory of El Salvador (symmetrical power); but impossibility of imposing a political solution; hence, negotiated and gradual transition, 1969-1998	National	Anticommunist; defender of the faith	National and civic (following regime change and end of civil war)	Regional subsystem collaborator; internal development

Table 1 (cont' d.)

War; focus	Results of war and type of transition	Domestic identity before war	International identity before war	Domestic identity during transition and afterward	International identity during transition and afterward
Ecuador-Peru (Oriente Conflict, since 1941) (focus on *Ecuador*)	Initial military victory of Peru in 1941; followed by a coerced transition in 1942; but later negotiated and punctuated by military crises in 1981 and 1995; finally resolved by negotiations in 1998	Ethnic and national	Internal development; revisionist (in territorial terms); independent	National and civic (following regime change)	Internal development; regional subsystem collaborator
Germany-United States, 1941-1945 (Second World War, 1939-1945) (focus on *Germany*)	Military victory of the United States and the United Nations (hegemonic war; asymmetrical power distribution); imposed/coerced transition, 1945-1949	Ethnic and national	Hegemon (aspirations); anticommunist and fascist (Nazi ideology); example	National and civic (following imposed regime change)	Example; pacifist; "trading state"; developer; regional subsystem collaborator
Germany-Soviet Union/Russia, 1941-1945 (Second World War, 1941-1945) (focus on *Germany*)	Military victory of the Soviet Union (hegemonic war; asymmetrical power distribution); but negotiated and gradual transition, 1945-1990	Ethnic and national	Hegemon (aspirations); anticommunist and fascist (Nazi ideology); example	National and civic (following imposed regime change)	Example; pacifist; "trading state"; developer; regional subsystem collaborator
Germany-Poland, 1939-1945 (Second World War) (focus on *Germany*)	Military defeat of Germany (within the hegemonic war); but negotiated and gradual transition, 1945-1992, especially 1989-1992	Ethnic and national	Hegemon (aspirations); anticommunist and fascist (Nazi ideology); example	National and civic (following imposed regime change)	Example; pacifist; "trading state"; developer; regional subsystem collaborator

normalization of relations between the two countries occurred between 1982 and 1999. Argentina returned to democracy in 1983, and the new democratic regime strengthened its civic identity, which positively affected the international identity adopted by the state, especially since 1989.

(3) The identity of the United States, following its military defeat at the end of the Vietnam War in 1973 and the forced unification of Vietnam in 1975. The transition from war to peace between the two countries took place over a long period, from 1973 to 1998. The aftermath of the Vietnam War led to the strengthening of the civic identity within the United States.

(4) The identity of Israel, in the aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the transitions from war to peace with Jordan during 1967-1994 and with Egypt during 1973-1979. In both cases Israel was unable to translate its military victories into unilateral political solutions. The transitions to peace have led to a chaotic combination of national and civic identities in Israel, the "Land of Israel" (*Eretz Yisrael*) being the focus of its ethnic and national identities and the "state of Israel" (*medinat Yisrael*) forming the basis of its civic identity.

CONCLUSIONS AND EXTRAPOLATIONS

We have argued that there is a possible (though not unique) causal link between the type of transition from war to peace and

the shaping and reshaping of state identities, both vis-à-vis the international realm and in the domestic arena. Hence, the way international wars end and the subsequent transition to peace affect the selection among competing domestic collective identities—civic, national, or ethnic—within the state. Moreover, this transition also affects the (international) state identity, in terms of national roles and role conceptions that the state adopts in the international arena, which are perceived as such by other actors. As a result, important political changes may take place, both in the domestic realm (e.g., democratization and other types of political transition) as well as in international relations (e.g., a different type of foreign policy, at both the declarative and behavioral levels).

The transition from war to peace is a momentous process where the identities of the state, stemming from the past, must confront present events that will shape their redefinition in the near and distant futures. The relinquishment of previous identities during the transition period influences the creation of new identities. In this sense, different forms of transition unevenly affect the shaping of collective identities and subsequent political changes and transformations.

We have identified four major types of transition, as a function of the power relations and the results of the last war: (a) after a clear military victory by one of the parties, following a hegemonic or highly asymmetrical distribution of power; (b) after a clear military victory by one of the parties, despite the symmetrical or moderately asymmetrical power relations between the parties; (c) after a military stalemate; and (d) after a military victory and a political stalemate that did not lead to a

swift political resolution between the parties. Transitions can be coercive or imposed, or they can be negotiated out of a consensual agreement and compromise between the parties. Moreover, they can be swift and revolutionary or gradual, evolutionary, and moderate, sometimes punctuated by long periods of stagnation and even sporadic bouts of crisis, including some recurrence of violence.

As far as the collective identities of and within the state are concerned, our classification distinguishes between the international identity of the state and domestic identities that compete within it—national, ethnic, and civic. There is a direct relationship between domestic and international identities, since the selection of a new or different collective (domestic) identity leads to the adoption of a certain state (international) identity, which fits the characteristics of the collective identity selected domestically.

By linking the three components of our theoretical model—different transitions from war to peace; the international identity of the state; and the three collective identities that coexist and compete within it—we have arrived at several hypotheses, as a function of different types of transition. These hypotheses can be examined against a sample of twenty cases of international war since 1945 that led to subsequent transitions from war to peace. Moreover, they can be further tested, and corroborated or refuted, by a more detailed analysis of four case studies, in which we can analyze in-depth the internal and external dynamics of identity construction and subsequent political changes.

From the initial reading of the sample of cases, we can suggest the following conclusions and extrapolations:

- Although there seems to be a logical and causal relationship between the type of transition and the identities states choose, we should be careful to qualify our findings to the extent that identities and political changes might result from other intervening variables, or external causes. For instance, as we point out in some of our examples, regime change (in itself a possible result of a military defeat), rather than the transition from war to peace itself, can be a direct cause of a change in identities both within the state and in the international arena. Similarly, civil wars and their aftermath—transitions from civil war to peace and reconciliation—can also explain the shaping of identities within the state and in relation to other international actors.

- In empirical terms, it is difficult at times to draw the distinction between the psychological and sociological consequences of the last war on the one hand, and the impact of the subsequent transition to peace itself on the other. For instance, in the cases of the failed involvement of great powers in small wars (e.g., the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan), it was not necessarily the transition to peace in itself that solely caused the change in the domestic and international identities of the great powers. Rather, the aftermath and impact of the results of those wars themselves directly affected and traumatized the identities of the United States and the former Soviet Union.

- Although the empirical evidence shows that long transitions to peace tend over time to have a lasting impact on the shaping of identities, the very length of the process seems to indicate that one could reverse the direction of causality as well, in a Constructivist direction. That is, in the long term, the new

identities that collectives within the state and the state in the international arena adopt can, in turn, also significantly affect the foreign policy of states, and thus, by extension, the quality of the transition to peace itself. Hence, it is difficult to refer to transitions to peace and to identities as independent and dependent variables, respectively. Instead, we are trying to explain a very complex synergistic process, where transitions to peace and identities mutually explain and affect each other. Although the transitions from war to peace are first of all a direct extension of war termination and an initial reflection of the power relations between the parties, they also are a result of a socially constructed reality. If that is the case, then identities, norms, and culture have a crucial role to play in explaining those transitions as well.

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