


המכון ליחסים בינלאומיים
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# Between Peacefulization and Securitization: The Social Construction of Peace

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September 2010

Language Editing: Colette Stoeber

The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Leonard Davis Institute.

Graphit Press Ltd., Jerusalem

Printed in Israel

# Abstract

In recent years, much attention has been given — mostly through the use of the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization — to the question of how issues are framed as threats to security. In a securitization process, enunciators construct an issue as an existential threat that justifies taking extraordinary measures and policies. However, IR literature is quite silent about a related process I term "peacefulization" — this is when issues or policies are framed and constructed as related to peace. I suggest that recognizing and elaborating on the peacefulization process helps to explain how distinct issues are framed and constructed as related to peace, and how this framing helps or hinders the chances of achieving a stable peace. My aim in this paper is to sketch out a framework to unravel the mechanisms of peacefulization. To this end, I will rely on the extensive literature on securitization and on the solutions that have been suggested to deal with some of its limitations.

# Introduction

Why and how are specific issues in certain communities framed as conditions for achieving peace or as part of a peace process? This is an intriguing question, since, as the scholarly literature emphasizes, in many cases policies are justified through a framework of threats and insecurity. In other words, why and how are policies in some situations constructed as a way of dealing with threats and placating insecurities, while in other similar situations these policies are constructed as related to peace or as part of a peace process?

By elaborating on these questions, I develop in this paper a concept I term "peacefulization." I define peacefulization as the *construction or framing of an issue or a process as if it were related to "peace."* I argue that peacefulization occurs when in a specific context actors use discursive means to socially construct an issue or a process as a condition for achieving peace, as part of an attempt to build peace, or as a way to promote or enhance existing peace(ful) relations.

While some scholars have touched upon related matters in studies of the social construction of peace, the disparity between the number of these studies and the number of discussions on the social construction of threats and (in)security is remarkable. Research on the latter is widespread and well developed: scholars have acknowledged that threat and security are dependent on language, discourse, interpretation, and that they are part of a (social) process rather than given (Campbell 1998; Chilton 1996; Hopf 1998, 186–187; Lipschutz 1995, 224; Tannenwald 2007, 372; Weldes 1999, 2, 7).[1] These ideas have been further elaborated through the concept of *securitization* suggested by the Copenhagen School more than a decade ago.

1 For an evaluation of studies that consider the social constriction of security, see also (Adler, 1997: 342–7; Wendt, 1999: 253–4; Farrell, 2002: 58, 65; Hopf, 1998: 186–8; Kowert and Legro, 1996: ftn. 81 pp. 485–6).

According to Buzan et al. (1998), securitization is a process through which issues are framed as existential threats and are thus used to justify taking extraordinary measures. This theory and the fruitful discussion that followed this conceptualization have resulted in a rich and broad understanding of the concept of security.

In contrast, the literature on the social construction of peace is much less developed. Indeed, as I later show, some scholars, including those who are part of the Copenhagen School, touch upon closely related issues. However, I contend that social constructions of peace cannot be fully understood through approaches that focus on social constructions of security, which mainly describe how actors become secure (or insecure). Therefore, although existing studies can contribute to my exploration of "peacefulization," this process has distinctive characteristics that cannot be fully comprehended through them. I suggest that peacefulization is more than the removal of threats and the placation of insecurity; rather, it is a process that concerns peace and its meaning.

In this respect, it should be noted that peace has different meanings. The basic distinction is between what Galtung (1964) has referred to as positive and negative peace.[2] In this respect, peacefulization captures both

2 Some approaches define peace in a negative way, as the absence of violence, and thus tend to elaborate on the conditions and mechanisms through which violence can be prevented. While this scholarship focuses on the prevention of violence, it addresses this issue from different levels of analysis and from distinct apporaches. For example, some scholars focus on hegemons, deterrence, and the balance of power, while others focus on more cooperative explanations, such as institutions, organizations, and the states' regime (e.g., democracy) (see, Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov 2000, 11, 14). Focusing on negative peace is also evident in other approaches, including idealist ones, which explore supranational structures that would decrease the likelihood of international wars (e.g., Terriff et al. 1999, 67). On the other hand, some approaches use positive definitions of peace, suggesting that peace is not merely the lack of violence but is dependent on additional characteristics and values, such as harmony, social justice, and adherence to environmental considerations (e.g., see in Richmond 2008, 77). For further discussion on the continuum between war and peace, see (Gregor 1996, xiv; Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov 2000, 18–23; Miller 2007, 64). It should be noted, however, that this difference in understandings of the word peace is not only a theortical issue, it has political implications as well, since political actors use this word and mean different things by it.

the positive and negative conceptions of peace. Acknowledging the distinct nature of peacefulization allows us to take into account the rhetorical power of the word peace — a power that further demonstrates why peacefulization cannot be reduced to such similar processes as de-securitization.

I argue that in the same way that "security" in a securitization process is a speech act — wherein the narration constitutes the action — "peace" works to similar effect.[3] Therefore, just as framing an issue as an existential threat can justify taking extraordinary measures, framing an issue or process as related to or part of "peace" may also help to mobilize support to advance policy. Enunciators are able to do this because of the symbolic power of the idea of "peace," and also because — in spite of the variance in the specific meaning of peace and its different interpretations throughout history — this idea is endorsed in so many cultures, religions, and communities.

To study the process of peacefulization, I develop a theoretical framework partly based on the extensive literature on securitization. Applying the concept of peacefulization within this theoretical framework has several advantages.

First, it provides a useful prism through which to study peace processes, especially as it contributes to our understanding of how these are affected by discourse. I argue that through the concept of peacefulization, we can distinguish among different cooperative practices according to the social constructions related to peace that shape them. Furthermore, the approach of peacefulization addresses the concern Richmond raises about assumptions that are made in the study of peace. According to Richmond, scholars "often make the mistake of assuming that the project of peace is so apparent as to not require detailed explanation." For example, he asks, "what is peace, why, who creates and promotes it, for what interests, and who is peace for" (Richmond 2008, 16). The study of peacefulization helps to address some of these questions and it also points to the need to acknowledge and think about how actors' perceptions of peace and peace processes have shifted throughout history.

Second, this theoretical framework, acknowledging the political process

3 On speech acts and securitization, see (Vuori 2008, 74).

through which enunciators attempt to influence a target audience, addresses another concern of Richmond's about the study of peace in IR. He contends that scholars do not give enough attention to the role and agency of individuals and societies, but rather tend to focus on "grand scale political, economic, military, social and constitutional peace projects" (Richmond 2008, 13).

Lastly, the study of peacefulization has important policy implications. It indicates the need for practitioners to be more attentive to the specific ways they or their opponents frame issues. Furthermore, while peacefulization may on the one hand help to promote peace and cooperation between actors and former rivals, it can also become a burden to peace by constructing preconditions for achieving it.

This paper has three main parts. In the first, I review the scholarship that relates to the study of the social construction of peace. To this end, I first discuss the literature that focuses on the construction of the meaning of peace, then I elaborate on the studies of social constructions that affect peace processes, and finally I distinguish between, on the one hand, the theories of de-securitization and security communities and some critical approaches to peace studies and, on the other hand, my suggested approach of peacefulization. In the second part, I develop the concept of peacefulization by drawing on insights from the Copenhagen School and from studies on communities of practice, and I discuss the mechanisms through which peacefulization occurs. In the third part, I distinguish between the three main categories of peacefulization through which enunciators frame and construct issues or processes as related to "peace" — *general preconditions for achieving peace, preconditions for a specific peace process*, and a *concrete stable peace between two former rivals* — and I provide some brief demonstrations of each of these.

# 2. The Social Construction of Peace

While reviewing the entire body of literature on peace studies is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, and as there are thorough reviews of this scholarship (e.g., Richmond 2008; Terriff et al. 1999),[4] I will consider only those studies that overlap with the process I coin peacefulization. I focus on studies emphasizing discourse and social constructions that can be viewed as connected to the meaning of peace, as well as on studies that deal with the social construction of peace processes. I argue that despite the substantial contribution of current scholarship, its ability to encompass the distinctive characteristics of the process I term peacefulization is somewhat limited.

## The Social Construction of the Meaning of Peace

Wæver (2004) and Richmond (2008, 7–8) review the different conceptualizations of peace throughout history (and see also Adler 1998).[5] For example, Wæver argues that in the eighteenth century, when peace was achieved domestically, the "core meaning of peace accordingly moved towards external security." This view was further developed in the mid-nineteenth century, when the Enlightenment movement saw peace as a feasible attainment (2004, 58). In this respect, "[t]o some extent 'security' (although not in our mid-twentieth century meaning) came to define peace" (2004, 59).

4 Peace literature is varied and includes many subfields and approaches that differ in their epistemologies, normative assumptions, methodologies, and the nature of the referent of peace (i.e., whether states, communities, individuals). For a discussion of the differences between theoretical approaches to the question of what is peace, see (Richmond 2008, 9–15; Terriff et al. 1999). For discussion on the key actors explored by the different approaches to peace, see (Richmond 2008, 9; Terriff et al. 1999, 67).

5 On the development of the field of conflict resolution since the 1950s, see (Miall et al. 1999, 39–64).

Wæver goes on to argue that the use of the concept of peace (and security) constantly shifted during the Cold War, and has continued to do so since it ended (2004, 62).[6] This point is illustrated through a consideration of the activities of Nobel Peace Prize winners in recent years: those awarded this prize have often not been concerned with traditional peace-related issues, such as promoting peace between states, but with realms more closely linked to an extended concept of peace (environment, social rights, etc.) (e.g., Buzan and Wæver 2009, 272).

Another attribute of the social construction of peace concerns its positive content in many cultures and communities.[7] Peace has become a favorable and desired aim to which many aspire, although this has not always been the case.[8] However, because the meaning of peace is not fully clear, the aspiration for peace can have different meanings. Richmond suggests that states socially construct the meaning of peace according to their interests, values, and identities. He contends, "Socially constructed states therefore socially construct a broader peace in their image, according to their own identity, and within the broader international structure, which of course acts as a constraining factor on their own agency" (Richmond 2008, 82).

While literature that addresses the meaning of peace is important in identifying basic constructions affecting peace, it is nevertheless limited when it comes to explaining a distinct peace process in which specific actors are involved. In other words, although this literature describes the contexts within which peace processes can take place and enunciators can effectively use the speech act of peace to promote policies, it in fact cannot explain specific cases.

6 As Wæver argues on the shifts in the meaning of peace throughout history, after the end of the Cold War "peace reappeared as a Western concept, to advance values as democracy and 'new world order'" (2004, 62).

7 Richmond, for example, contends that the liberal view of peace has become hegemonic in IR (2008, 17, 92–93, 110–111).

8 For example, war and violence are important values for some societies, as for example Fascist regimes or during some Romantic periods in history in which the usage of force was cherished.

## The Social Constructions of Peace Processes

A second category of research that explores social constructions relating to peace concerns the social constructions that affect peace processes. Unlike the studies that focus on the construction of the meaning of peace presented above, these are more closely related to the concept of peacefulization, and can be understood — at least to some extent — as alternative or complementary concepts. Nevertheless, as shown below, they cannot fully account for the distinctive characteristics of peacefulization.

**Security communities**: One approach that can be used to explore social constructions affecting peace processes is that of security communities. Adler and Barnett's suggestion that actors can create (and construct) shared identities and norms that are concerned with stable peace (Adler 1998, 169; Adler and Barnett 1998, 10) stands at the heart of their articulation of the concept of security communities. They define a (pluralistic) security community as "a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett 1998, 30). Such communities are constructed in such a way that social cognitive and normative bonds allow people in a region to identify with people from other states within this region, sharing values and understandings that reduce the chance of violence between them (Adler and Barnett 1998, 59).

Furthermore, not only is the approach of security communities similar to the approach of peacefulization in its concern with social constructions that affect peace (see Adler 1997, 258),[9] but, as I later show, social learning is also crucial for both. Social learning — an active process of redefining or reinterpreting — changes people's perceptions and may change their values and become internalized. In addition, these processes shape international institutions, promoting the diffusion of meanings among states. This may

9 In this respect, since security communities are socially constructed, regions that do not yet have characteristics of a security community can transform into them through social processes wherein peaceful norms are learnt and institutionalized (Adler 1997, 258–259).

result in the development of collective learning, identity, and trust and in this way help to create the security community (Adler and Barnett 1998, 43–45).

Discourse is also important in security communities. For example, Adler and Barnett suggest that officials in states from regions that lack security communities may try to promote the establishment of such a community in their regions. They suggest that these actors — following processes of learning — are "using the language of transnational values, community and cognitive interdependence to conceptualize the foundations of a peace system" (1998: 58).

It follows then that the approach of security communities is based on understanding social constructions that influence peace processes, unraveling a mechanism that has both internal and international dimensions. However, this approach still significantly differs from what can be explored though the concept peacefulization.

First, despite the fact that the theory of security communities refers to some characteristics of positive peace — the values shared by the members of a security community and their collective identity — the key constitutive element of security communities is that violence among the members of the community becomes unimaginable.[10] Thus, security communities are not primarily peaceful alliances or communities of liberal values, but "mainly communities of cooperative security practices that help diffuse peaceful change via self-restraint subjectivities." In other words, rather than explaining the promotion of peace, security communities literature mainly aims to explain how threats are placated among the community's members through cooperative security practices (Adler 2007, 16–17, 34). In this respect, security communities are defined in terms of negative

10 It should be emphasized that Adler and Barnett (1998, 10) frame their approach as one of the alternative explanations to lack of violence (rather than, for example, as an explanation to peace). Furthermore, according to Adler and Barnett (1998, 45), one of the important components of the process through which security communities are established is the promotion of a shared definition of security. Nonetheless, it should be noted that according to Adler (1998, 167) the idea of security community includes not only characteristics of negative peace, but "has a positive meaning, is ontologically real and epistemologically significant, and can be empirically described."

peace and avoidance of violence. In contrast, the concept of peacefulization encompasses more strongly both positive and negative views of peace.

Second, the theory of security communities cannot (and does not aim to) fully address the implications of constructing issues and policies as relating to peace. As I will show later in my examination of the disparity between peacefulization and de-securitization, and as discussed above regarding the difference between positive and negative peace, peace is not necessarily simply the avoidance of violence. In fact, peace can be understood as a speech act, a fact that demonstrates the need to be more attentive to the special impact of using this wording or framework.

A final difference between the concept of peacefulization and the approach of security communities is the level of cooperation needed among the international actors at the beginning of the process. As some scholars suggest, the emergence of a security community requires the preconditions of existing dynamics of cooperation (see Aradau 2004, 400; Richmond 2008, 83).[11] In contrast, peacefulization does not require previous cooperation between actors. The process of peacefulization may theoretically explain the enlargement or enhancement of existing security communities in cases where narrators use the discourse of peace to advance this aim. But peacefulization may also be applicable to actors that have had less cooperative relations.

**De-securitization**. Another alternative way to explore how social constructions affect peace processes is through the Copenhagen School's concept of de-securitization. According to Buzan et al. (1998, 4), de-securitization is a process through which issues are taken "out of emergency mode into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere." As further clarified by Buzan and Wæver (2003, 489), de-securitization is "a process by which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat. The process can be directly discursive, addressing the definition of the situation;

11 In this respect, in many conflicts, even the precipitating conditions for the development of security communities suggested by Adler and Barnett (1998, 37–38) are not evident.

more often it is indirect, where a shift in orientation towards other issues reduces the relative attention to the previously securitised issue."

In other words, de-securitization has two main characteristics related to peacefulization. First, it may promote more cooperative behavior between opponents and thus help to reach peace later on. Second, in many cases de-securitization is a process that depends on social constructions, even if indirectly. In such cases, de-securitization may result from the social construction of another issue as a (more severe) threat, or from shifting the structure of the relations between the involved actors, replacing the framing of insecurity that previously characterized their interactions. In this respect, de-securitization can be viewed, at least partly, as related to social constructions of peace processes. As Wæver (1998, 69, 91–92) for example suggests, the peace in Western Europe and the emergence of the security community in this region is not a result of common security structures or institutions as most theories of security communities expect, but rather an outcome of a process of de-securitization in which mutual security concerns were marginalized in favor of other issues.

Despite the important insights of these studies, the concept of de-securitization has its limits. First, the mechanism of de-securitization needs to be further clarified. While this weakness also exists in the broader theory of the Copenhagen School, on which I later elaborate, it is more apparent in the study of de-securitization, especially with regard to how social constructions are used to take issues out of their existential threat status.

Second, if we acknowledge, as noted above, that peace is more than the absence of violence, then there is a difference between being secured and having peace. Wæver (1998, 71) suggests that "security and insecurity are not exhaustive options [...] Usually those who do not feel insecure, do not self-consciously feel (or work on being) secure; they are engaged in other matters." In other words, we need to differentiate between situations of being secured and situations of peace. The process of de-securitization cannot be fully captured by the process of peacefulization, since peace has distinctive characteristics and influences. The removal of threats and

being secured can thus be understood as only one of the dimensions of peace.[12]

Furthermore, the concept of de-securitization is limited in its ability to recognize the whole meaning of the process that is captured through the concept of peacefulization due to the fact that "peace" is a speech act. Although de-securitization emphasizes social constructions that relate to security and to the effects of using the word "security," peacefulization emphasizes a different framing and therefore a different process. In other words, while de-securitization concerns mainly how social constructions and discourse result in decreasing the level of insecurity, peacefulization concerns the effects of peace itself and is empowered by the attributes and connotations of the word "peace."

Lastly, de-securitization by definition can take place only after an issue has been securitized. In contrast, a process of peacefulization, although closely related to previous constructions and values of the relevant community, does not require any specific construction beforehand.

**Narratives of peace**: Besides the Copenhagen School and research on security communities, many other critical and emancipatory approaches exist that also demonstrate the importance of peaceful narratives and discourses. For example, Elise Boulding suggests the method of "imaging the future" and of participating in the construction of a peaceful global culture and a global civil society (Boulding 1990, 95–117). Jabri suggests the notion of a "discourse of peace" as a way to overcome the counter dominant discourse of violence that shapes international relations and justifies the use of force (1996: 145–171).

These approaches share peacefulization's key assumptions of the importance of discourse and the resulting social structures that affect the likelihood of peace. However, peacefulization significantly differs from

12 Furthermore, this continuum and limiting of the meaning of peace (understanding it only as the absence of violence) is also challenged by Mitzen's assertion (2006) that peace processes by themselves can be a source of (ontological) insecurity and thus peace cannot guarantee security. Acknowledging the process of peacefulization helps to emphasize that peace processes and how they are constructed have their own dynamics which cannot be reduced only to questions concerning the level of violence.

these approaches in a number of ways. First, although the advantage of these visional approaches stems from their clear moral position on what peace is and how it should be achieved, they tend to focus on the structural level. As a result, they cannot address specific top-down attempts of narrators to mobilize support by framing issues as related to peace, nor can they explain concrete events. Furthermore, peacefulization can be used to explore processes initiated by enunciators regardless of their level of sincerity or the specific content that is ascribed to peace. Therefore, peacefulization, unlike these approaches, may describe not only processes that promote peace but those that burden the chances of achieving it.

# 3. Developing the Theoretical Framework of Peacefulization

By drawing on the literature of securitization (and de-securitization) and on the literature of practice in IR, I aim to unravel the mechanisms through which different types of peacefulization take place. More specifically, by elaborating on securitization research I present the main elements of the process of peacefulization: the enunciator, the audience, the referent object, and the relevant speech act. In addition, I emphasize the importance of power and the social context — two issues that are somewhat lacking in the literature of securitization and that are highly relevant to the study of peacefulization.

## Securitization and Its Critics

Some of the main elements in securitization literature are the referent object, the enunciator, and the audience. Buzan et al. argue that the nature of referent object (the issue to be securitized) is important as there are objects that "are generally held to be threatening" (e.g., tanks). In addition, they stress that successful securitization (where the result is that an issue is constructed as an existential threat) is dependent on the authority of the enunciator (the securitizing actor) vis-à-vis the target audience. This process is achieved when security becomes a speech act — wherein the utterance (of security) itself is the act.[13] Thus, "by labeling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means." Hence, enunciators follow

13 This is demonstrated in Wæver's (1995, 55) claim that "[b]y definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it do be so."

the grammar of security to create the discursive effect (Buzan et al. 1998, 26, 32–33, emphasis in the original) and overcome alternative framings.

In recent years, two main challenges have been raised regarding the theory of securitization.[14] Addressing this criticism of the Copenhagen School's method of exploring securitization may help to further clarify the mechanism of peacefulization.

First, scholars question various aspects of the Copenhagen School's characterization of securitization as a speech act. For example, they argue that the Copenhagen School's explorations overemphasize speech acts and the semantics of security (Bigo, 2002; Pouliot 2008, 265; Stritzel 2007, 358); that they are not attentive enough to different kinds of speech acts (Balzacq 2005, 175–176; Vuori 2008, 79–81);[15] that they usually cannot account for one of the basic conditions for successful speech act — that is, sincerity (Balzacq 2005, 176); and that they ignore visual and symbolic manifestations (Stritzel 2007, 370–371; Williams 2003).

Second, scholars criticize the approach's limited incorporation of power considerations and social context, which results in the limited ability of the approach to fully encompass the political dimension (Balzacq 2005, 174, 176; Stritzel 2007, 365). As Balzacq explains, "the configuration of securitization evolves within a symbolic context"; therefore, a successful process of securitization is dependent on the ability of enunciators to "convince an audience [...] to recognize the nature of a symbolic referent subject" (as a threat) (Balzacq 2005, 184). Similarly, McDonald (2008, 571,

14 It should be noted that traditional security studies take the criticism against studying the discourse of security even further by suggesting that the Copenhagen School overemphasizes discourse and overstretches the boundaries of the concept of security (Baldwin 1997; Moravscik 1999; Miller 2001). The tension between traditional security studies scholars and scholars from the Copenhagen School resulted in their tendency to ignore each other's research, and thus prevented mutual contribution (Knudsen 2001, 355: Wilkinson 2007, 6).

15 Vuori, for example, argues that a big part of the literature on securitization focuses on a specific kind of securitization — that regarding legitimizing future action (2008: 79). However, he points out additional aims of securitization that enunciators employ through different kinds of speech acts: for agenda setting, for deterrence, for legitimizing past actions or reproducing the security status of an issue, and for control (2008, 76–91).

573) argues that the effects of social, political, and historical contexts and contextual factors such as actors' identities are downplayed in the study of securitization. He suggests exploring why some political communities are apt to perceive a specific issue as a threat and how historical narratives and culture can affect this process.

Furthermore, some critics have argued that these two main problems — the importance of the context and the limited effect of speech acts — pull the theory in different directions, and thus potential solutions to either of them magnifies the other (Balzacq 2005, 177–178; Stritzel 2007, 366–367).[16]

One promising answer these challenges[17] was to view securitization as a practice (e.g., Bigo 2002; Vuori 2008; Williams 2007). Bigo was one of the first to acknowledge this; in the context of the securitization of migration, he suggested that this process is feasible through day-to-day practices and routines of bureaucracies and institutions that shape the effects of discourses and use their power to manage unease (Bigo 2002, 73). In this respect, it is not only the speech act that matters, but the speech act within a broader social context. This context is acknowledged by Williams' insightful approach, which draws heavily on Bourdieu. He suggests (with Iver Neumann) that in order to encompass the politics of security, it is important to understand not only the "conceptual structures" that affect them but their social context as well (Williams 2007, 66).[18] Security, he explains, "lies neither solely in the discourse or speech act, nor solely in the knowledge discourse, nor directly in

16 For example, Stritzel (2007, 367) argues that, "an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant."

17 In order to deal with these challenges, some scholars suggest alternative directions for developing frameworks in order to understand the process of securitization (see in Stritzel 2007, 376), as well as how speech acts, power, and the social context affect it (e.g., Bigo 2002; McDonald 2008; Williams 2007).

18 Williams shows how the relationship between security and culture can be understood by Bourdieuinian conceptualizations of field, habitus, institutions, and capital (power) (Williams 2007, 90). Similarly, Vuori sees securitization as a practice. In his view, "[i]llocutionary speech acts, like securitization, are an example of practices that derive from these universal rules" (2008, 73). For further discussion on practice and Bourdieu in this regard, see (Balzacq 2005, 189). For further discussion of Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field, see (Pouliot 2008, 274–275).

the organization. It functions in the context of all three." Furthermore, power and a "corresponding constellation of social forces" are important elements of this process (67).[19]

While the framework of practice is useful in emphasizing the importance of context and power in the process of securitization (and, as I later demonstrate, in the process of peacefulization), scholars who advance such views point to the importance of nonreflexive knowledge.[20] Conversely, I assert that *reflexive* knowledge remains important in studying narration processes such as peacefulization and securitization. Thus, as scholars persuasively claim, securitization for example is an intentional process in which enunciators strategically manipulate discourse to promote their policies and convince a target audience (Balzacq 2005, 172–173, 179; McDonald 2008, 569). In this respect, the way situations are constructed, the choice of wording, the framing of issues, the use of symbolic power elements, and speech acts all aim to appeal to a large audience — and hence are intentional.

## A Framework for Studying Peacefulization

Following this discussion, I suggest that peacefulization can be efficiently studied through a theoretical framework that acknowledges both the intentional and the unintentional influences shaping this process. Such a framework needs, on the one hand, to consider how a state's behavior is affected by practices and by social context and, on the other hand, to be attentive to an actor's identities and power and to intentional actions taken by agents. More specifically, we must explore the main elements that constitute

19 On security as a practice, see also (Hansen 2006).

20 For example Williams, following Bourdieu, argues that the habitus captures the kind of behavior that is semiconscious and dependent on occupying specific social positions, and that it is constituted through a process of inculcation, which becomes a second nature through experience (Williams 2007, 25–26). This is further developed by Pouliot, although the process of securitization is not the focus of his work. He argues that practices are created through experienced knowledge that is not reflexive but tacit, inarticulate, and automatic, and therefore is "not thought but simply enacted" (Pouliot 2007, 617; 2008, 271).

the process: the social context (and thus the possible alternative framings) as well as past practices and narratives, the enunciator, the audience, the referent object, and the speech acts that characterize the framing.

**The context**: While studying the social context is very important to an understanding of securitization, it is even more crucial in the study of peacefulization. This is because international norms — not just the social context of each involved actor — play an active role in peacefulization. For example, international norms affect and shape how different actors' perceive what peace means or requires (e.g., Adler 1998, 165; 2004, 58–59).[21] In addition, taking into account the "context" allows us to better explore the alternative voices and the competition among different discourses for audience attention.[22] This not only points to how history, past practices, narratives, and identities affect the construction of framings, it also emphasizes the need to acknowledge the competition among possible framings. For example, a situation can be constructed both as a threat and as part of a peace process, a point that is clearly demonstrated in Wæver's (2004, 61) discussion of the discourse on common security in the West in the 1980s. He argues that reformists at that time used "security" but redefined it (in order to appeal to a mainstream audience) through concepts such as "common security" or "security partnership." He suggests they refrained from using the word "peace" in order to avoid association with, for example, the radicalism of the disarmament movement. This clearly exemplifies the powerful connotations of both the words "peace" and "security," and also shows how enunciators can choose among various possible framings.[23] An approach that acknowledges the social context allows us to consider and study these elements, and sheds light on how a specific framing was chosen over others. Furthermore, we can study the longer term influences of framings: not simply how past practices,

21 This may also demonstrate the connections among the different categories of peacefulization.

22 On alternative voices, see also (Balzacq 2005, 179). On the need to explore different and alternative discourses, see (Hansen 2006, 80; Milliken 1999; see also Lupovici 2009a, 203).

23 McDonald (2008, 569) also emphasizes the importance of the intentional use of speech acts.

narratives, and discourses affect the chosen framings, but how they are shaped by them.

It is within this context — based on past practices, narratives, and discourses — that the interactions between enunciators and the target audience regarding a referent object can be understood. Balzacq (2005) and Stritzel (2007), in their works on securitization, demonstrate the importance of social contexts. According to Stritzel (2007), the meaning of a threat is not a given but is generated through a social process and is embedded in an existing discourse.[24] Similarly, Balzacq (2005, 178–179) refers to two levels of the securitization process — the agent and the act — that are embedded within a social context. We need to think of a process of peacefulization in a similar way.

I suggest that in order for enunciators to efficiently affect their audience, they may use their ideas, knowledge, and understandings to show how their interpretations of peace (and the steps or conditions they view necessary for achieving it) fit or are embedded in the context — for example, they may show that their notions of peace do not threaten the identity or other meaningful norms shared by the audience. Furthermore, in fact, they need to show how the audience's cherished norms can be achieved or advanced through the framing they offer.

**The enunciators**: The social context provides enunciators with knowledge, opportunities, and tools to mobilize support, but it also constrains the spectrum of legitimate ideas and, more importantly, the possible framings that the audience will be willing to accept. Most importantly, the social context affects how enunciators are able to mobilize power — both actual and symbolic (Adler 1991, 9; 2007, 10, 12) — to persuade and socialize their audiences through collective learning processes (Adler and Haas 1992, 385–386; Checkel 2001, 562–563; Johnston 2001) to accept the suggested framing of peacefulization. Learning processes may aid in the integration of new ideas and help enunciators both to think of and to create framings that appeal to the audience and correspond with its identities, norms, and

24 It should be noted, however, that the main difference between the suggested approach and Stritzel's is that I put more emphasis on speech acts.

practices.[25] Furthermore, such a learning process leads not only to the adoption of new practices, but to the transformation and constitution of identities as well (Adler 1997, 339; 2005, 10, 15–16). In other words, the acquired knowledge is important since "learning" is a continuous process of participating in the creation of new meanings, identities, and language (Adler 2005, 15). It is through the creation of appealing framings that peacefulization may occur.

**The audience**: As with the process of securitization, the audience takes a crucial role within the process of peacefulization. Some important notions can thus be drawn from the extensive discussion of this matter in securitization literature. In recent years, scholars have suggested that securitization should not be limited to domestic audiences of collective political actors, but that targets may vary from the individual level to the global (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 258). Hagmann (2008), for example, demonstrates how securitization can be an international process that may promote cooperation. Similarly, Higashino (2004) suggests that the enlargement of the EU was constructed as a solution to threats to its members. Conversely, the target audience of a securitization process is not necessarily the general public; rather it can be, for example, elite groups within society (Vuori 2008, 72).

Acknowledging the social context teaches us that the characteristics of the audience influence whether a specific issue can be constructed as part of a peacefulization process. Buzan and Wæver (2009, 255), for example, suggest that securitization is more likely to succeed when the actors share a national identity. As Buzan et al. elsewhere further explain, securitization may be more challenging when the audience is international: "The way the securitization processes of one actor fit with perceptions of others about what constitutes a 'real' threat matters in shaping the interplay of securities within the international system. Both within and between actors, the extent of shared intersubjective understandings of security is one key to understanding

25 It should be emphasized that by learning I do not mean to imply that the new ideas — which help to construct the new framing — are necessarily more accurate, "logical," or valid, but rather that they are perceived as suitable and gain power when they are politically selected. Adler terms such a process as cognitive evolution (1991, 15).

behavior" (Buzan et al. 1998, 30–31). In other words, the referent object — especially in cases of peacefulization — is not a given, but is subjected to continuous interactions between enunciators and audience, and between the new ideas and past framings and structures.

How new ideas emerge, and the tension between new and previous framings, is demonstrated, for example, in how academic argumentations are used, taught, and distributed by narrators. Thus, while enunciators can try to advance the desired framing by appealing to the authoritative power of experts, the success of such argumentations depends on the audience's past practices, norms, and identities.[26] It is thus not surprising that discourse plays an important role in this process.[27]

**The referent object and the speech act**: I suggest that the intentional choice and use of wording in advancing policy is especially significant in a discourse of peace. This is mainly because such a discourse may be perceived as a challenge to actors' previous dispositions, perceptions and, most importantly, practices and identities (Mitzen 2006; Northrup 1989).

In this respect, just as "security" is a symbol (see Balzacq 2005, 183–184), "peace" is also a symbol. There are some threats that are so intimidating that they "do not depend on language mediation to be what they are" (Balzacq 2005, 181); likewise, there are attributes of peace that do not need much elaboration. Also, in the same way that enunciators are able to construct various issues as security problems, they can construct different issues as related to peace. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the speech act of peace is distinct from the speech act of security. To suggest that something (a policy, an issue) is related to peace has implications of its own and this very framing may create a special dynamic.

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26 The usage of academic arguments to frame issues has clearly occurred in the theory of democratic peace (see hereinafter pp. 27–28), which is perceived to lie in accordance with American democratic identity and practices. Conversely, the challenges in marketing ideas on solutions to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians — such as transforming the sovereignty of the "sacred basin" in Jerusalem into God's hands (Horowitz 2000) — stem from the challenges these solutions pose to the practices and identities both sides hold.

27 Regarding the connections between identity and discourse, see (Hansen 2006, 44; Hopf 2002, 1, 13).

To conclude this section, in order to study peacefulization we need to trace the process through which enunciators construct and frame a referent object (a policy or an issue) to a specific audience as related to peace; to consider the practices, narratives, identities, and discourses in which the framing of peace is embedded; and to acknowledge that the framing of peace is not self-evident — that, in fact, enunciators could have advanced an alternative framing.[28] A successful process of peacefulization may not only shift perceptions regarding peace processes — perceptions in different stages of interactions with an opponent, as I elaborate on in the next section — but may create strong mechanisms that change the adopted practices (and thus allocation of resources). Over time, acting in accordance with the new practices may lead to internalization of these perceptions — whether as the result of habit or as a change in the actor's identity (see Adler 1998, 174–175).

28 This overlaps with Lupovici's (2009a) modern constructivism methodology, which is based upon combining the methods of process tracing, discourse analysis, and exploration of counterfactuals.

# 4. The Different Types and Stages of Peacefulization

While peacefulization refers to the process through which issues or policies are constructed as being related to peace, it may be categorized according to its distinct modes — or the manner in which it proceeds. I suggest that the key criterion in distinguishing the types of peacefulization is the *stage* of the process — more specifically, how concrete the peace process is. In the first category, peacefulization involves constructing issues or policies as *general preconditions for achieving peace*. Here, enunciators work to frame the terms under which peace can be attained. Enunciators in general refer to what other actors should do (or be) in order that peace with them will be feasible. In contrast to the other categories of peacefulization, at this stage who those actors are is not entirely specified. The second category of peacefulization deals with *preconditions for a specific peace process*. At this stage, the framing of an issue or a policy as related to peace is not general but concerns a particular actor. However, there is still no peace process — rather, peacefulization here involves framing what must be done (or happen) prior to moving into a specific peace process. The third category of peacefulization deals with the framing of the characteristics of the peace itself, and thus concerns *concrete stable* peace with a specific actor. In contrast to the two previous categories, peacefulization here does not involve constructing issues or policies as preconditions enabling a future peace process; rather, it focuses on constructing issues and policies that will be part of stable peace between two former rivals. In other words, enunciators construct the characteristics of a concrete peace with a particular actor, framing how the peace itself with that actor can be practiced and enhanced.

While the distinction among these three types or phases of peacefulization is not clear-cut, and although they are all related to the meaning of peace

for an audience and concern constructing issues or policies as if they were related to peace, they differ in the concreteness of the peace.[29] In addition, it should be noted that an issue can be peacefulized in different ways and stages. Lastly, although the distinct categories portray a continuum of different stages through which an issue or a policy can be peacefulized, each stage does not require the peacefulization of the previous stage. For example, enunciators may use the term "democratic peace" to frame how actors in the world may live in peace — in other words, a world of democratic states will be peaceful (*general preconditions for achieving peace*); or the term may frame what a particular actor is required to do or be prior to a peace process — that is, become a democracy (*preconditions for a specific peace process*); or the term can be used to promote peace and cooperation with other actors — for example, enhancing democratic institutions as a way to make peace more solid (*concrete peace*). While each stage may influence the next one, a peacefulization process does not necessarily require that the frame at a previous stage be established prior to the construction of a later one.

## Peacefulization as the general preconditions for achieving peace

In this phase of peacefulization, the precondition(s) for achieving peace are constructed, determining what may precede a peace process. Here, peacefulization can be used to justify policies that are framed as contributing to future peace without referring to a concrete process with a particular actor. This type of peacefulization is a process through which issues or policies are presented as related to peace in the form of preconditions to the ability to attain it. Although closely related to what I described earlier as narratives of peace, this phase has significant differences. While both approaches consider general attributes of peace and acknowledge social constructions that affect peace, peacefulization lacks the moral standing that characterizes

29 To some extent this difference among the types of peacefulization overlaps with the distinction between conflict resolution and reconciliation, see (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004).

is merely the ascription of issues or policies to peace, regardless of whether the construction advances liberal, social, or environmental values.

Democratic peace is an interesting example of such a process, wherein American enunciators utilize the general idea that spreading democracy will enhance international peace (Ish-Shalom 2006).[30] In this case, an issue (the regime of an actor) or a policy (promoting democracy) is constructed as related to peace. This, of course, does not mean that the audience needs to perceive the idea as the *only* way to attain peace but as related to and connotative of the concept of peace — and further as something that advances global peace.

The idea of democratic peace also helps to illustrate the main elements of the process of peacefulization, discussed above. First, although the framing of democratic peace derived from the academic use of the concept, it demonstrates the social context in which scholars, practitioners, and the public are embedded, allowing them to think of peace in such a way. For example, the concept could have been referred to as the theory *of democratic stability* or the theory of *democratic security*, which logically may more accurately capture its essence. In this respect, it clearly illustrates the more fundamental construction of peace as avoidance of violence (negative peace) in American society and political thinking. It is the mutual reinforcement of the two symbolic and powerful words — democracy and peace — that enhances the attractiveness of this connection, even if the practical implications derived from relevant theories are misrepresented by the construction of "democratic peace" to the larger audience. The point is that in an American social context, enunciators are able to use the symbolic power of the nexus between "peace" and "democracy" to appeal to a large audience. Further, it is the American social context — its discourses, narratives, and practices — that makes this framework attractive, not only to the public but to policy makers in the first place.

30 Similarly, some Israeli officials used such arguments to explain why peace in the Middle East is hard to attain (Ish-Shalom 2006, 582–584).

## Peacefulization as the Preconditions for a Specific Peace Process

The second category of peacefulization is the process of peace with a specific actor: that is, determining what should be done to promote the chances of peace or to enable peace or a peace process. In contrast to the third category of peacefulization — which also refers to peace with a particular actor — this construction is not related to a concrete peace, but rather sets the (pre)conditions for a future peace or advancement of a peace process. One possible use of such a construction is to justify a specific policy or policies toward that particular actor (e.g., as long as A will not do X, we cannot [or should not] have peace with A).

For example, international apologies for past wrongdoings can be constructed and framed as related to peace (e.g., Bole 2004) — and more specifically as a precondition for achieving it — when the victim demands an apology from the offender. Nonetheless, apologies can be also constructed in a more cooperative light: for example, when both sides are able to accept the other not only as the victimizer but as the victim. This was clearly articulated, for example, in an op-ed by Judea Pearl (2008), the father of murdered journalist Daniel Pearl, who suggested that "*[f]or the sake of peace*, Israel and Palestinians should apologize to each other" (my emphasis).

The ability to construct apologies in a more cooperative way — in cases, of course, where it is relevant — demonstrates the importance of framing, intentions, and narratives, and also reveals that peacefulization depends on reality and the perceptions of the involved actors. Such a shift toward cooperation may be the result of, among other things, what Löwenheim (2009) portrays as the emergence of an international norm of apologies. The existence of such a norm may affect the social contexts of international actors and thus be the reason why some actors in recent years have come to refer to this issue as relevant for peace.

## Peacefulization as a Concrete Stable Peace

The third category of peacefulization concerns the narrations that aim to build or enhance a concrete state of peace between actors. Through this process, enunciators construct the characteristics of peace by suggesting that certain issues or policies are necessary to the maintenance or enhancement of peace between the involved actors. In other words, enunciators create the framework of practices that, if followed, will make peace a continuous state between two or more former rivals.

The separation of two communities can be an example of this kind of peacefulization. This is an interesting point, however, since separation can be constructed not only as a part of a peace process (as for example with the successful Czechoslovakian case) but as part of a process of securitization through the framework of threats and insecurity as well. Thus, despite the attempts to securitize the partition of Czechoslovakia (Fawn 2000, 34)[31] made by opponents of this move, who tried to construct it as a threat and as a source of insecurity, the main and successful process was peacefulization, where the separation of Czechoslovakia into two nations was constructed as a way to achieve (and preserve) stable peace. In this respect, the separation of Czechoslovakia was not a process of de-securitization. This is because, first, there was no previous process of securitization that could then be de-securitized, and second, and more importantly, the separation of the people was itself constructed as a peaceful process.

As Tir indicates, not only was the separation between the Czechs and the Slovaks peaceful and nonviolent (Tir 2005, 548–549), but its success was the result of it being constructed as peaceful. Likewise, Leff claims that

31 For example, Václav Havel, the president of the Czech and the Slovak Federative Republic, "warned Czechoslovak citizens of the dangers of self-interested politicians who put power above the interest of the federation" (Fawn 2000, 34). Furthermore, and more generally, while the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks were relatively good even after the end of the Cold War, they still carried some mistrust (Leff 1998, 141–142). This mistrust could have easily led to framing the separation process as one of securitization.

ironically the partition was made feasible "*by the very factors that also made it peaceful*. Whereas in the past either side might have been impelled toward concession [...] by a threatening or coercive international environment, the emerging post-cold war Europe was primarily an environment of opportunity rather than of threats" (Leff 1998, 140, my emphasis). This process was enabled (and had positive results) because it was constructed as peace(ful) and not as a solution to threats posed by two parties against each other. Furthermore, because a majority of the Czechs and the Slovaks preferred preserving the federation over separation, the political elites in both new states continued to emphasize the peaceful aspects of the separation process in their efforts to legitimize it for the population at large (Fawn 2000, 31, 33; Holy 1994, 816).

Acknowledging that this process was achieved through peacefulization provides a more accurate explanation of the framing and construction of the Czechoslovakian partition. The political culture in Czechoslovakia made the peaceful partition possible, demonstrating how values and narratives embedded in the social context affect behavior. In addition, the social context demonstrates that peacefulization was not self-evident, since as shown above the separation could have been constructed within a different framing. It further demonstrates that this peacefulization process also depended on enunciators who deliberately aimed to influence the public. Although during the period 1990–1992 neither the Czech nor the Slovaks wanted the creation of two independent states (Fawn 2000, 31, 33; Holy 1994, 816),[32] once separation became an accepted fact, the Czechs adjusted to it quickly (Fawn 2000, 35).

Another example, Israel's unilateral steps toward the Palestinians from 2002 to 2006, demonstrates how an alternative framework can be constructed, thus emphasizing the social dimensions of the Czechoslovakian case. The Israeli's policy toward the Palestinians — establishing the separation wall (the "separation barrier" in Israeli discourse) and disengaging from the Gaza strip and parts of the West Bank — were constructed in the

32 For example, in June 1990 only 5% of the Czechs and 8% of the Slovaks sought entirely independent states (Fawn 2000, 31).

context and frame of threats. Israeli officials explained that Israel must take these steps not only to secure itself from terror attacks, but to placate potential threats to its ability to continue to be a Jewish and democratic state (Lupovici 2009b). However, a peacefulization framework could also have been used in the Israeli case. Bar-Siman-Tov (2009, 206) argues that the disengagement move was a missed opportunity, as it could have been constructed as part of a peace process rather than as a unilateral act. While the situation in Czechoslovakia in the 1990s significantly differs from the Israeli case, the comparison is still relevant in emphasizing the social constructions that shaped them. In this respect, in both cases political actors used different kinds of framing to justify and promote a separation process. Although the context and the political atmosphere differ in these two cases, the concept of peacefulization helps in our analysis of them — whether as a tool for explanation (the Czechoslovakian case) or as a way to contemplate an alternative possible framing (to that of securitization, as with the Israeli case).

# Conclusions

In this paper, I demonstrated the importance of acknowledging the process of peacefulization. While it is closely related to studies that explore social constructions of peace and to theories of securitization/de-securitization, it displays significant differences. Mainly, this approach allows us to bring to center stage the important implications of enunciators' framing issues as related to peace and their use of the word "peace" to advance policies. In my study of peacefulization, I elaborate on the literature on securitization, which despite its differences helps us to sketch out a framework to study this phenomenon.

The theoretical framework presented here has some general theoretical implications for the field of IR. While the literature on securitization is extensive,[33] it is quite puzzling that scholars who acknowledge the effects of social constructions on international politics have not considered further modes of framing such issues as peacefulization. In other words, the emphasis of the literature on securitization demonstrates a bias in IR and security studies toward the research of one kind of construction/framing when in fact enunciators use different, and even contradictory, framings to advance policies. Furthermore, once a framing has been established — whether, for example, of security or of peace — how it was constructed has additional ramifications for international security and the chances of achieving peace. Therefore, scholars must not only be more attentive to the question of whether an issue is constructed as part of a peace process or as a response to threats, they need to clarify the conditions under which one framing is more likely to be applied than the other.

33 For example, Wæver (2003, 16–17 qtd. in Stritzel 2007, 359) acknowledges the large number of studies that have used the theory of securitization. On the fertility of the concept of securitization, see also (McDonald 2008, 565–566).

The concept of peacefulization allows us to theoretically consider another related social process, that of *de-peacefulization*, a process through which an issue or policy is taken out of its framework of peace. It is beyond the scope of this paper to sketch out the details of such a process, but one of the main challenges of removing an issue from a status of peace is that this framing creates internalized practices that are difficult to change.

This is closely related to another important issue — the way current framings and practices may burden a peace process (even if unintentionally). I argue that over the long term, peacefulization may create strong frameworks and mechanisms that curb the ability to think of alternatives, thus limiting the flexibility that is often necessary in peace processes and in marketing the peace to the public. Indeed, sometimes the way peace processes are framed reflects the seeming irresolvable challenges of the conflict and it concerns crucial ethical and moral questions. However, sometimes such framings burden policy makers in their efforts to come up with more creative and innovative ideas, and, more importantly, they complicate the public's ability to accept these novel ideas.

The process of peacefulization has important policy implications. This paper demonstrates that just as policies can be marketed to the public through the framing of security, policies can be marketed through peace — by using the symbolic power of the word "peace" — regardless of whether they in fact advance peace or not. Furthermore, this process may become crucially important, as it may help to prepare the public to support a move from a mode of enmity to cooperation. However, just as not every object can be securitized and not every narrator is capable of initiating securitization, the ability to peacefulize is also rather limited. Policy makers are constrained by social context, knowledge, identities, social constructions, and powerful discourses and narratives. Therefore, learning processes may be crucial in creating contexts in which peacefulization that advances a true peace process can take place.

Policy makers thus should be attentive to the framing they use for a number of reasons. First, as suggested above, they may want to maintain some degree of flexibility to allow them to be able to market future ideas

on achieving or promoting peace. Second, and even more importantly, the process of peacefulization and the construction of an issue or a policy as related to peace — especially as a precondition for achieving it — has an impact not only on domestic politics but on the other actor(s) as well, affecting their sense of (in)security. However, if actors are able to mutually construct an issue as being one of peace, this may placate potential tensions and therefore contribute to the achievement of peace.

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# Acknowledgment

For all their help and comments, I am grateful to Emanuel Adler, Arie Kacowicz, and Gallia Lindenstrauss. I am also grateful to Colette Stoeber for excellent copy editing. I would also like to thank the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for their generous support, and Prof. Alfred Tovias, Anat Illouz and Hani Mazar for making this publication possible.

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